Event Notification Report for August 29, 2001

DISCOVERY OF ABNORMALLY LOW ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER FLOW TO DIESEL GENERATORS

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"This is Scott Richardson calling from the DC Cook Nuclear Plant with an [8]-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) for 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition . . . . . . ' "

"While performing an Essential Service Water (ESW) surveillance test on Unit 2, it was noted that the ESW flow to each Diesel Generator was abnormally low. This condition could have prevented the Diesel Generators from fulfilling their safety function. This condition was caused by sand and sediment in the ESW system and impacted both units."

"Subsequent system flushes and valve cycling [have] eliminated the low flow condition in both Unit 1 and 2 Diesel Generators."

"We will continue to monitor ESW system performance. Further investigation of this event is in progress to determine the root cause of the low flow anomaly."

"Unit 2 will be [shutting] down [and] going to [Cold Shutdown] beginning in the next 3 hours." (Refer to event #38253 for additional information.)

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.

PLANNED MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM TO REPAIR A REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMP FLOW CONTROL VALVE

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"Grand Gulf Nuclear Station manually scrammed from 27% [core thermal power] in preparation to repair reactor recirculation pump 'A' flow control valve B33F060A. All control rods fully inserted, and all other safety systems responded as designed. Condensate booster pump 'A' tripped for no apparent reason. Investigation into why the 'A' condensate booster pump tripped is underway."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

* * * RETRACTED AT 1305 EDT ON 8/29/01 BY DAVID HANKS TO FANGIE JONES * * *

The licensee is retracting this event notification. After further review, the licensee determined that the manual reactor scram was part of a pre-planned sequence of events and as such was not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R4DO (Gail Good) has been notified.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING A 30-GALLON DIESEL OIL SPILL FROM A FREIGHT TRAIN WHICH DERAILED AND BREACHED THE PROTECTED AREA BOUNDARY

A freight train derailed and breached the protected area boundary. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this event. However, 30 gallons of diesel oil spilled from the train. The oil was contained by trap rocks and did not reach receiving waters.

Security personnel have been posted as a result of the protected area boundary breach, and fire protection personnel are currently on scene cleaning up the diesel oil spill. The licensee is in the process of notifying the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection of the oil spill. The licensee also requested that local police investigate the cause of the train derailment.

In addition to the initial 4-hour event report for the offsite notification, the licensee plans to call back with an update to include the reporting criterion for the breach in the protected area boundary.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify applicable state and local officials.

***** UPDATE FROM MIKE GOBELI TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1115 ON 08/29/01 *****

The licensee provided this update to include an additional 1-hour security reporting criterion to the initial 4-hour event report for the offsite notification. The licensee determined that this event was also reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1), Appendix G, I(1)(c), for a degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, controlled access area, or vital area.

The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (David Lew), NRR EO (John Tappert), IRO (Nader Mamish), NRR IAT (Richard Rosano), NMSS IAT (Aaron Danis), Region 1 IAT (Greg Smith), Region 1 (Curtis Cowgill), Headquarters OPA (Beth Hayden), and Region 1 OPA (Neil Sheehan).

* * * PARTIAL RETRACTION 1350 9/10/2001 FROM SMITH TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

The licensee has determined that this incident is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71 (b)(1) as a one hour report. The NRC resident inspector has been informed. Notified R1DO (Barr).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT: MISSING NDC DENSITY GAUGE


Today Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation faxed a copy of a letter to the State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control stating that a device was missing; NDC, Mass Monitor, Model # 104. The former Florida Coast Paper facility had several fixed radioactive sources when it went bankrupt in 1998. It was purchased by Smurfit-Stone and the radioactive sources have all been removed with the exception of this source. It was a portable device that had been kept in a locked steel toolbox within a locked laboratory. It was last seen in late June. Numerous contractors have been on site engaged in the removal of equipment prior to mill demolition. Mill personnel have searched the mill repeatedly and now suspect that the device was removed by one of the contractors. All facilities that have received equipment from the mill have been asked to search for the device. Florida is investigating this incident. Florida incident number for this event is FL01-095. The NDC Mass Monitor contained 30 millicuries of americium-241.

MISSING 21 MICROCURIE COBALT-60 TESTING SOURCE.


On 08/29/01 it was discovered at the University of Pennsylvania Physics Department that a 21 microcurie cobalt-60 source was missing. An extensive survey and search of the Physics Department building was performed and the source was not found. All persons who had access to the source were questioned. The Radiation Safety Officer for the University of Pennsylvania notified NRC Region 1 office of this event.