Event Notification Report for July 26, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/25/2001 - 07/26/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38168 38169 38170 38171 38172 38173
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38168 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/25/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:28[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 07/24/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 12:30[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/25/2001|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |PATRICK HILAND R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |C.W. (BILL) REAMER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SISLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 - HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN - LOSS OF ONE CONTROL OF THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY |
| PRINCIPLE |
| |
| On 7-24-01 at 1230 hours, a process operator in the X-330 Building |
| discovered a NCSA-0330_004.A05 noncompliance with cell 29-4-6. Cell 29-4-6 |
| is a shutdown cell at a UF6 negative and was buffered above 14 psia. Over |
| time the pressure decrease to 13.96 psia. This violated NCSA-0330_004.A05 |
| requirement #8 resulting in a loss of one control (moderation) of the double |
| contingency principle. Mass (second control) was maintained throughout the |
| event. |
| |
| NCSA-0330_004.A05 requirement #8 states in part, "Within 8 hours after |
| cascade equipment shutdown (motor turned off) and with the system at a UF6 |
| negative, the system shall be pressurized with plant air or N2 buffer at > |
| 14 psia, unless the equipment is undergoing maintenance, pre and post |
| maintenance troubleshooting, being evacuated or treated." |
| |
| Buffer pressure was increased to greater than 14 psia at 1300 hours. |
| Moderation control was re-established for cell 29-4-6. |
| |
| The safety significance of this event is low. There is no deposit in this |
| cell. The worst case would be contamination on process surfaces exposed to |
| process gas prior to shutdown and buffering. |
| |
| This event is reportable per NRC BL 91-01 as a loss of one control of the |
| double contingency principle. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| The safety significance of this event is low. There is no deposit in the |
| cell (thus is less than a safe mass for an H/U=4 and the cell is isolated |
| from the cascade. The mass in the cell is controlled by virtue of the fact |
| that the shutdown cell is isolated from the cascade which is also shutdown. |
| If the unbuffered condition were permitted to continue for a long period of |
| time, the H/U could eventually reach a maximum of 4. However, since any |
| material in the cell is less than the safe mass H/U ratio, a criticality |
| would not occur even if the H/U reached the maximum through the loss of a |
| buffer. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| The cell would need to be unisolated and UF6 introduced to create a deposit. |
| That deposit would then have to become sufficiently moderated in order for a |
| criticality to occur. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| The parameters controlled are mass and moderation. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| There is no deposit in this cell. Worst case would be contamination on |
| process surfaces exposed to process gas prior to shutdown and buffering. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| The NCS control is a dry air buffer >14 psia. Over time the pressure |
| decreased to 13.96 psia. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| Buffer pressure was increased to greater than 14 psia at 1300 hours. |
| Control was re-established. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with the DOE Representative. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38169 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PALISADES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/25/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:51[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 07/25/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:31[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT VINCENT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/25/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |PATRICK HILAND R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) DEGRADED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ADDITIONAL INDICATIONS DISCOVERED ON CRDM HOUSINGS |
| |
| "Nondestructive examination of welds on control rod drive mechanism pressure |
| housings has resulted in the discovery of additional indications to those |
| reported earlier (reference event notification numbers 38083, 38103 and |
| 38111). The weld examinations are being conducted as part of an |
| extent-of-condition evaluation resulting from a discovery on June 21, 2001 |
| of a through-wall indication on CRDM 21. Extent-of-condition and cause |
| evaluation is ongoing. Regular updates with NRC Region III and NRR will |
| continue." |
| |
| The licensee stated that no further notifications will be made to the NRC |
| Operations Center regarding this issue. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the |
| licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38170 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GRAND GULF REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/25/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:12[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 07/25/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:16[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEPHEN HUMPHRIES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/25/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |GARY SANBORN R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |VICTOR DRICKS OPA |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |JOE HOLONICH IRO |
| |JOHN TAPPERT NRR |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING ACTUATION OF THE CIVIL DEFENSE SIRENS WHEN NO |
| ACTUAL EMERGENCY EXISTED |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "During an emergency preparedness drill, a local agency (Claiborne County |
| Civil Defense) activated the civil defense sirens. The sirens should not |
| have been sounded for the drill. This report is being made as an event that |
| for which notification to other agencies has been or will be made |
| (50.72(b)(2)(xi)). Plant operation was not affected, and no release of |
| radioactivity occurred." |
| |
| The licensee stated that the sirens sounded briefly (for probably less than |
| 1 minute). At the time of this event notification, the site had not |
| received any calls from the public. |
| |
| It was reported that Claiborne County Civil Defense notified local radio |
| stations and requested them to make an announcement stating that the |
| actuation of the sirens was unintentional and that there was no emergency. |
| Claiborne County Civil Defense also plans to issue a press release. |
| Applicable State, local, and other government agencies were involved in the |
| exercise and are aware of the event. The licensee notified the acting NRC |
| resident inspector (Peter Alter). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38171 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BROWNS FERRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/25/2001|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:31[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/25/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:46[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TIM GOLDEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/25/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |MALCOLM WIDMANN R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR SCRAM DURING TESTING |
| |
| "During performance of CIV [combined intercept valve] testing per 2-OI-47 |
| section 6.7, the unit 2 reactor scrammed due to Turbine Generator Load |
| reject. Emergency control procedure EOI-1 was entered due to low reactor |
| water level and high reactor pressure. PCIS [primary containment isolation |
| system] groups 2,3, 6 and 8 were received, A, B and C SBGT [standby gas |
| treatment] trains started and A CREV [control room emergency ventilation] |
| started as expected. Initial indications show that some Safety Relief Valves |
| (SRVs) momentarily opened during the pressure spike following closure of the |
| main turbine control and stop valves. The unit remains in hot shutdown (mode |
| 3) to continue troubleshooting the exact cause of the EHC [electrohydraulic |
| control] logic control system causing the main turbine trip. |
| |
| "This event is reportable as a 4 hour ENS report per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) |
| as 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor |
| protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the |
| actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing |
| or reactor Operation.' And an 8 hour report per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as |
| 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the |
| systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(8), ie: RPS'. |
| |
| "This is also reportable per 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) for the above |
| conditions as a 60 day written report." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38172 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/25/2001|
| UNIT: [] [3] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:59[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/25/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:24[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE TANNER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/25/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JOHN WHITE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| |
| "Unit 3 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system inoperable. This |
| constitutes an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) |
| and 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A). The unit 3 HPCI system was considered |
| inoperable while aligned to the suppression pool. This condition was |
| determined during the performance of an approved system operating procedure |
| that would ensure the suction line of the HPCI system is filled and vented |
| while aligned to the suppression pool. Adequate suction pressure could not |
| be developed during the performance of the procedure, therefore Operations |
| placed the auxiliary oil pump in pull-to-lock to prevent automatic starts of |
| the system. |
| |
| "Unit 3 HPCI was aligned to the suppression pool in order to comply with |
| Technical Specification Section 3.3.5.1, Required Action D.2.2. Required |
| Action D.2.2 was performed due to a failure of the condensate storage tank |
| (CST) level switches. The failed CST level switches caused an unplanned |
| automatic swap of the HPCI suction line from the CST to the suppression |
| pool. |
| |
| "The problem is being investigated and the cause is unknown at this time." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38173 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/25/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:02[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/25/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:11[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: WAYNE HARRISON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/25/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |GARY SANBORN R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL TO DRAIN AFW STORAGE TANK DURING PLANT FLOODING SCENARIO |
| |
| "STPNOC Engineering identified a condition outside the station's design |
| basis that has been determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) |
| as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. |
| Notification is required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). |
| |
| "During review of design calculations, a new internal flooding condition was |
| identified that could have resulted in depletion of the AFW Storage Tank to |
| the point where the plant would not be able to transition from AFW to RHR as |
| designed. Each of STP's four trains of AFW is enclosed in its own |
| water-tight compartment directly beneath its associated MFW line RCB |
| penetration. Operator response to a main feedline break includes isolation |
| of the faulted steam generator, including AFW. If the MFW break is |
| postulated to occur in the MFW penetration area above AFW, the AFW cubicle |
| beneath the break will flood. In the case of the D train steam-driven AFW, |
| the water level will submerge the turbine-driven AFW pump, its trip/throttle |
| valve and AFW isolation valves in about 6 to 30 minutes, depending on break |
| size. As a consequence of the accident, the submerged motor-operated valves |
| are assumed to fail as-is, supplying steam to the turbine-driven pump and |
| allowing AFW flow. In addition, the analysis assumes the single failure of |
| one unsubmerged steam supply isolation valve. The steam-driven pump will |
| continue to function while submerged and continue to take suction from the |
| AFWST and expel it out the break. Unless the pump is secured, its continued |
| operation could accelerate the depletion of the AFWST to the point that the |
| plant would not be able to transition from AFW to RHR as designed. This |
| condition affects only the D train steam-driven AFW. Trains A, B, and C are |
| motor driven and can be readily secured at their power source if necessary. |
| |
| "Compensatory action is being taken to implement a temporary modification to |
| allow operator action to isolate the AFW supply to the steam-driven AFW pump |
| at the AFWST." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this condition by the |
| licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021