Event Notification Report for July 13, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/12/2001 - 07/13/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38045 38123 38130 38131 38132 38133 38134 38135 38136
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38045 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATIREGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/01/2001|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: WA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:53[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 06/01/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:02[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MYRON BAIRD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DALE POWERS R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INADVERTENT LOSS OF POWER TO A SAFETY BUS |
| |
| "At 1402 PST, with Columbia Generating Station in Mode 5, a loss of 230 KV |
| offsite source (startup transformer) occurred. This resulted in a loss of |
| voltage to the Div 2 safety related bus (SM-8) which was automatically |
| reenergized by the 115 KV offsite source (backup transformer). All plant |
| systems and components responded as expected. No core alterations were in |
| progress. SM-8 was inoperable but energized at the time of the event due to |
| planned outage maintenance. There was no challenge to the plant shutdown |
| safety plan as a result of this loss of offsite power. The loss of power |
| was a result of a lightning strike offsite on the Bonneville Power |
| Administration (BPA) electrical grid. Restoration of the 230 KV source is |
| pending repairs to damage on the BPA grid. This notification is being made |
| pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8). This is a valid actuation of an |
| Emergency AC electrical power system." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION 1741 FROM SHERMAN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Columbia Generating Station hereby retracts a report made to the NRC |
| Operations Center on June 1st, 2001 at 1953 hours. Event Notification number |
| was 38045. The report was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8) and |
| documented that a lightning strike resulted in a loss of a 230kV offsite |
| power line to a safety related electrical bus (SM-8) due to a startup |
| transformer tripping offline. At the time of the event, the plant was |
| already shut down in Mode 5. The safety related electrical bus was |
| automatically reenergized by the backup offsite 115 kV electrical source |
| through the backup transformer. |
| |
| "It was assumed at the time of the report that a loss of offsite power was |
| an actuation of an emergency AC power system. Upon further review, we have |
| concluded that an automatic bus transfer of offsite power is an alternate |
| normal power supply and not in the scope of NUREG-1022 as an actuation of an |
| emergency AC power source. Our licensing basis documents also refer to the |
| emergency diesel generators as the source of all emergency AC power." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this retraction. Notified |
| R4DO (Cain). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38123 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/09/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:07[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 07/09/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JAMIE BARTSCH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/13/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| |
| The Division 2 Main Control Room Ventilation System was declared inoperable |
| at 0900 CDT on 7/9/2001 because it was not maintaining the required positive |
| pressure while running in the High Radiation Mode of operation. The system |
| was declared operable at 0913 CDT when the required positive pressure was |
| restored. During the 13 minute period Division 2 was inoperable, Division 1 |
| Main Control Room Ventilation System was inoperable due to a scheduled |
| maintenance outage. Therefore, with both systems inoperable, a condition |
| existed which could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of |
| the Main Control Room Ventilation System needed to mitigate the consequences |
| of an accident. The cause of the perturbation in control room pressure is |
| being investigated. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| *** RETRACTION FROM STEVEN STRICKLAN RECEIVED BY LEIGH TROCINE AT 0451 EDT |
| ON 07/13/01 *** |
| |
| The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a |
| portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "On 07/09/01, at approximately 0900 [CDT], the Clinton Power Station (CPS) |
| experienced a transient situation where, for a period of 13 minutes, the |
| positive pressure in the Main Control Room (MCR) was compromised. Based on |
| this condition, an ENS notification (#38123) was made in accordance with the |
| requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), any event or condition that at the time |
| of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of |
| structures or systems that are needed to: |
| (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; |
| (B) remove residual heat; |
| (C) control the release of radioactive material; or |
| (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident." |
| |
| "An evaluation of the conditions present at the time positive pressurization |
| of the MCR was temporarily interrupted has been performed. The evaluation |
| results indicated that the conditions that potentially existed during this |
| event were bounded by the design basis analysis performed for the [MCR]. |
| The calculated MCR operator thyroid dose for this event was determined to be |
| approximately 23.185 Rem, which is less than the USAR calculated dose of 25 |
| Rem. The USAR dose is calculated based on a 20-minute time delay in |
| starting the system in the high radiation mode. For this event, the high |
| radiation mode was already in operation. Whole body and Beta dose for this |
| event are not governing." |
| |
| "It [has] therefore been demonstrated that, in the event of a design basis |
| event, time dose impact of the condition as it existed would be bounded by |
| the current analyses of record. As such, the safety function would be |
| fulfilled, and the ENS notification is retracted." |
| |
| "Although it has been demonstrated that the safety function would be |
| fulfilled, the situation represented a condition prohibited by Technical |
| Specifications, and this event continues to be evaluated for reportability |
| as a Licensee Event Report under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations center |
| notified the R3DO (Hills). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38130 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MONTICELLO REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:01[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 07/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:50[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID BARNETT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) DEGRADED CONDITION | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(2)(i) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |99 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE - TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN |
| |
| The licensee found a shipping restraint installed on a drywell-to-torus vent |
| pipe bellows, apparently in place since construction (about 30 years). This |
| device was discovered due to another licensee with similar containment |
| configuration notifying Monticello of their discovery. This device would |
| partially impede axial motion. The primary containment was declared |
| inoperable at 1650 CDT on 07/11/01, and removal was initiated. This is an |
| 8-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(a) as a degraded condition and |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c and d), control of radiation release and accident |
| mitigation. |
| |
| The licensee initiated a required shutdown at 2050 CDT on 07/11/01 per |
| Technical Specification 3.7.A.2.a, as a result of declaring primary |
| containment inoperable because the drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows |
| shipping installation attachments were still installed. This is a 4-hour |
| report under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), technical specification required |
| shutdown. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and intends to notify state |
| and local agencies. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE FROM DAVE BARNETT RECEIVED BY LEIGH TROCINE AT 0039 EDT ON |
| 07/12/01 ***** |
| |
| The four shipping fasteners have been removed from each of the eight |
| drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows, and primary containment was declared |
| operable at 2304 CDT on 07/11/01. The technical specification required |
| shutdown was terminated while the reactor was at 90% power. The licensee |
| currently plans to restore reactor power to 100%. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector as well as the |
| applicable state and county agencies. The NRC operations officer notified |
| the R3DO (Hills). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38131 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:29[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 07/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:27[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: FREDERICK W. SMITH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |TAD MARSH NRR |
|ACCS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) ECCS INJECTION | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM, HPCS/RCIC SYSTEM INJECTION, AND FULL |
| BALANCE-OF-PLANT ISOLATION FOLLOWING AN UNSPECIFIED, INTERNAL, ELECTRICAL |
| TRANSIENT |
| |
| An unspecified, internal, electrical transient affected balance-of-plant |
| (BOP) systems and resulted in a feedwater control circuitry problem. |
| Following this electrical transient, the reactor automatically scrammed from |
| 100% power when reactor vessel water level reached level 3 (178 inches |
| narrow range). All control rods fully inserted. When reactor vessel water |
| level decreased to level 2 (approximately 120 inches narrow range), the high |
| pressure core spray (HPCS) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems |
| automatically initiated and injected into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). |
| A BOP isolation signal was also received on level 2, and a full BOP |
| isolation occurred. In addition, the Division 3 emergency diesel generator |
| (EDG) automatically started on level 2 (in support of HPCS). The EDG did |
| not load, nor was it required to. The lowest reactor vessel water level |
| received was 107 inches narrow range. This was reported to be well above |
| the top of the active full, which is at 0 inches wide range. |
| |
| The licensee stated that all safety systems functioned as required. The |
| extent and cause of the electrical transient are currently under |
| investigation. It was reported that the cause may be related to a possible |
| auctioneered power supply failure which affected BOP systems and the |
| feedwater system control circuitry. |
| |
| The unit is currently in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown). The RCIC system and the |
| main turbine bypass valves are being utilized for reactor water level |
| control and RPV pressure control, respectively. The main steam isolation |
| valves are open, and the condenser is available as a heat sink. HPCS has |
| been placed in standby. (The quantity of water injected was not available |
| at the time of this event notification.) The full BOP isolation has been |
| reset, and the Division 3 EDG is still running (unloaded). (The licensee |
| needs to load the EDG for 1 hour before securing it.) Containment |
| parameters were reported to be normal, and there were no challenges to |
| offsite power. All emergency core cooling systems and engineered safety |
| feature systems are currently available. The feedwater system remains |
| unavailable pending resolution of the transient's root cause. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector (who was in the control |
| room at the time of this event notification). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38132 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:21[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GENE MICHELSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINA 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF AN EXCESSIVE ACCUMULATION OF WATER IN TWO UNDERGROUND FUEL OIL |
| STORAGE TANKS |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "[An] excessive accumulation of water [was] discovered in both [the] D11 and |
| D12 underground fuel oil storage tanks. [There was 33 inches of water in |
| D11 and 22.5 inches of water in D12.] This event would prevent both diesel |
| generators from fulfilling their required safety function. [Technical |
| Specification 3.8.1.1, Actions 'b' and 'e,' were] entered, and reportability |
| manual event SAF 1.8 [was also] entered." |
| |
| "Actions Taken: Water has been removed from both [the] D11 and D12 |
| underground fuel oil storage tanks. [The licensee is] currently performing |
| [an] operability determination." |
| |
| The licensee stated that the unit is remains in the 72-hour limiting |
| condition for operation due to the ongoing operability determination. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38133 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: TURKEY POINT REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/2001|
| UNIT: [3] [4] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:21[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/12/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CRAIG MOWREY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |PAUL FREDRICKSON R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|4 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNITS IN POTENTIALLY UNANALYZED CONDITION |
| |
| "On July 12, 2001, Turkey Point determined that a previous failed |
| surveillance may have constituted an unanalyzed condition that significantly |
| degraded plant safety. On June 8, 2001, flow damper D-21 was discovered |
| mispositioned. Damper D-21 controls the amount of recirculation flow in the |
| Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS), when the system is in the emergency |
| (recirculation) mode. |
| |
| "The CRVS is designed such that when it shifts to recirculation mode, the |
| Train B emergency supply fan starts. It draws in a nominal 250 cfm of |
| outside intake air flow, and a nominal 750 cfm of recirculation air flow, |
| for a total of 1000 cfm of flow through the HEPA and charcoal filters. If |
| the Train B fan does not start, the resulting low recirculation flow (less |
| than or equal to 100 cfm) will cause the Train A fan to start. |
| |
| "During the surveillance it was found that, with the damper open too far, |
| the recirculation flow stayed so high (about 250 cfm), that even with no |
| supply fan running, the Train A fan did not receive a low flow start signal. |
| The recirculation flow came from the three running Air Handling Units. As a |
| result, a single failure of the Train B emergency supply fan could have |
| caused a loss of emergency supply air forced flow. |
| |
| "As a result of no forced flow, the outside intake air flow would be |
| reduced, and the recirculation flow from the Air Handling Units would stay |
| at about 250 cfm, as measured. By itself, this situation does not |
| significantly degrade plant safety. If there were no outside air drawn in, |
| the dose to the Control Room operators would be minimal. However, with no |
| filtered outside intake air, Turkey Point cannot assure that the Control |
| Room envelope would be pressurized, the unfiltered inleakage of outside air |
| may be sufficient to increase the dose to operators." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the |
| licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38134 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:17[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 07/12/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:17[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DROWN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |
| |
| The licensee will be notifying the Maryland Department of the Environment |
| (MDE) regarding positive test results for coliform bacteria in drinking |
| water samples taken from the educational center. The NRC resident inspector |
| has been informed of this notification. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38135 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/2001|
|LICENSEE: KLB CONSTRUCTION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:58[EDT]|
| CITY: ISSAQUAH REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 07/12/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: WA |EVENT TIME: [PDT]|
|LICENSE#: ORE-90865 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |CHUCK CAIN R4 |
| |JOSEPHINE PICCONE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN SEIBERT | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT |
| |
| A Troxler Model 3430 gauge (S/N 28872) was stolen from a storage building in |
| Issaquah, WA. The gauge had been transported to a work site in WA and placed |
| into a locked storage building. The local police department has been |
| notified (Case #01-05791). The licensee is offering a reward for the return |
| of the gauge. |
| |
| [See related report 38136] |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38136 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/2001|
|LICENSEE: KLB CONSTRUCTION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:33[EDT]|
| CITY: ISSAQUAH REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 07/12/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: WA |EVENT TIME: [PDT]|
|LICENSE#: ORE-90865 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |CHUCK CAIN R4 |
| |JOSEPHINE PICCONE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY FRAZEE (EMAIL) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT |
| |
| "The Oregon licensee reported that a Troxler model 3430 portable gauge, |
| serial number 28872, containing 10 mCi of cesium-137 and 50 mCi of |
| americium-241 was stolen from a locked cargotainer at a work site in |
| Washington state. The Oregon Licensee had transported the portable gauge to |
| the work site of a Washington licensee in order to complete a sales |
| transaction. The licensee's employee arrived at approximately 5:30 PM on |
| July 11. Since no one from the Washington licensee was available on site to |
| take possession of the gauge, the licensee's employee locked it in a work |
| site cargotainer. The yellow transport box was reported to be locked. When |
| the licensee's employee came back around 7:00 AM on July 12, the locks had |
| been broken and the gauge and several tools had been stolen. The theft was |
| reported to the City of Issaquah Police. The Washington Radiation control |
| Program has been in contact with the Oregon Radiation control Program to |
| coordinate follow-up." |
| |
| [See related report 38135] |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021