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Event Notification Report for July 12, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           07/11/2001 - 07/12/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37985  38058  38129  38130  38131  38132  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37985       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  INOVISION                            |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/11/2001|
|LICENSEE:  INOVISION                            |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:05[EDT]|
|    CITY:  CLEVELAND                REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        05/10/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  OH |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/11/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |VERN HODGE (FAX)     NRR     |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JANICE BROWNLEE              |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR 21 REPORT - INTERIM REPORT ABOUT R-11 MONITOR PROBLEM                 |
|                                                                              |
| The following is taken from a faxed report:                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Deviation being evaluated:  An R-11 Monitor installed in Korea has been      |
| reported as having a rapid increase in displayed concentration and analog    |
| output values. Initial evaluation of the problem indicates the cause may be  |
| in one of the base 960 firmware modules, which are also installed in some US |
| nuclear power plants. The significance of the problem is still under         |
| evaluation to determine if it could create a substantial safety hazard. The  |
| initial report was received on March 15, 2001.                               |
|                                                                              |
| Evaluation information to date: The problem is a rapid increase in displayed |
| concentration and analog output values. The problem is not apparent at low   |
| levels of activity where low count rates and statistical variation mask the  |
| increase. When activity is near the upper range of the monitor, this spike   |
| in calculated activity has triggered radiation alarms and could place the    |
| channel into over range. The spiking in activity is believed to be due to    |
| the microprocessor being unable to read and clear a register within the      |
| allotted time. This results in a higher accumulated count value when the     |
| register is finally read. Since the problem is directly related to processor |
| workload, the problem is most likely to occur in a complex channel           |
| configuration with multiple detectors (such as a PIG or Extended Range) and  |
| where the microprocessor is highly tasked with RMS computer or isolator      |
| communications.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| For single range channels, the result of the spike would be a false          |
| radiation alarm and possibly an over range condition as well, although this  |
| has not been reported to the best of our knowledge. The other possibility is |
| that this situation could occur on an Extended Range monitor thereby placing |
| the channel in 'accident' or high range mode. If this occurs, the normal     |
| range is shut down and/or by-passed. If the accident range detector is       |
| brought online below its minimum operating range and the normal range        |
| detector is shut down, an unmonitored release might be possible.             |
|                                                                              |
| A more detailed analysis of the firmware in specific channels is needed to   |
| determine if this last condition is possible.                                |
|                                                                              |
| The possible defect is believed at this time to only affect Model 960        |
| firmware modules upgraded or purchased since 1992.                           |
|                                                                              |
| Evaluation completion date: July 10. 2001                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATED AT 1215 EDT ON 7/11/2001 BY JANICE BROWNLEE TO FANGIE JONES *  |
| * *                                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Inovision faxed a follow-up to the interim report.                           |
|                                                                              |
| "Component containing defect: Firmware in Type IIA 960 Systems with a Real   |
| Time Clock (RTC) integrated circuit, programmed for use in pulse counting    |
| applications, and equipped with the following controller modules:            |
| Model 960CD-220 (P/N 960CD-220-10)                                           |
| Model 960CD-221 (P/N 960CD-221-10)                                           |
| Model 960CD-223 (P/N 960CD-223-10)                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "Monitors utilizing ionization chamber detectors are not affected            |
|                                                                              |
| "The above controllers were equipped with Real Timer Clock and additional    |
| firmware to control the RTC.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Affected facilities: The Pacific Gas and Electric's' Diablo Canyon Nuclear  |
| Power Plant is the only domestic, NRC licensed user affected by this defect. |
| Their purchase orders ZS-7204A-AAO and ZS-7204B-AAO are affected and were    |
| shipped from 1991-1993. There were 20 potentially affected PROMs from those  |
| orders. Other potentially affected customers are located in Korea (KEPCO,    |
| KAREI) and in Belgium (SEMO, Electrabel). Notifications have been or will be |
| sent to the affected facilities with further specific information.           |
|                                                                              |
| "Corrective Action: Although there is a sporadic firmware program problem,   |
| we do not believe that problem represents a significant safety concern. It   |
| is our intention to notify the customers that are potentially affected by    |
| this anomaly and to identify for them the affected monitors/channels within  |
| their facility within 30 days The problem is only potentially present if the |
| facility has the TARGET COUNT algorithm enabled. We will recommend that the  |
| facilities discontinue use of this algorithm. (Diablo Canyon does not use    |
| this function).                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "As discussed earlier, a preliminary firmware fix has been identified. The   |
| decision to take further action will be addressed with each of the           |
| potentially affected facilities."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The R4DO (Chuck Cain) and NRR (Vern Hodge) have been notified                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38058       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD             REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/08/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:41[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        06/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:33[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBINSON                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/11/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       47       Power Operation  |47       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO A FAULTY FLOW INDICATING SWITCH              |
|                                                                              |
| With DAEC operating in mode 1, at approximately 47% power, HPCI was declared |
| inoperable due to a faulty flow indicating switch which is utilized to       |
| position the minimum flow valve.  A 14-day LCO was entered per Technical     |
| Specification 3.5.1, condition F, at 2133 on 6/7/01.  This condition is      |
| reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as a failure of a   |
| single train of equipment required to mitigate the consequences of an        |
| accident.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| While an in-plant operator was performing his rounds within the HPCI room,   |
| he discovered that flow indicating switch, FS2310, which should indicate     |
| total HPCI flow, indicated approximately -170 gpm rather than the expected   |
| zero gpm.  The HPCI pump was not in operation.  This flow switch is          |
| interlocked with the HPCI minimum flow valve, allowing it to open with total |
| HPCI flow less than 300 gpm and HPCI discharge pressure greater than 125     |
| psig.  The flow switch would close the minimum flow valve once HPCI total    |
| flow reached 600 gpm.  With the correct operation of the HPCI minimum flow   |
| valve in question, HPCI was declared inoperable.                             |
|                                                                              |
| It is believed that the cause of the faulty indication is air in the         |
| instrument sensing lines feeding the flow switch. Troubleshooting efforts    |
| will begin early tomorrow morning.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified                                      |
|                                                                              |
| HOO NOTE:  see event #38029                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1359 EDT ON 7/11/2001 BY JOHN KARRICK TO FANGIE JONES * * |
| *                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "This condition was reported (EN #38058, June 7, 2001) as 'Any event or      |
| condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment |
| of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to [D]       |
| mitigate the consequences of an accident.' NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 guidance for   |
| this reporting criterion essentially requires any unplanned HPCI LCO at BWRs |
| to be reported as a loss of a single train safety system. Further review of  |
| this event indicates that, since only the flow switch for the HPCI minimum   |
| flow valve was inoperable, the minimum flow valve instrument Tech Spec could |
| and should have been entered instead of the HPCI system LCO. The instrument  |
| spec. (TS 3.3.5.1, Condition E) provides a 7-day completion time to return   |
| the instrument to service. If the instrument is not restored in 7 days, then |
| the 14-day HPCI system LCO would be entered. The instrument was returned to  |
| service the following day. In addition, an assessment of the as-found        |
| condition (irrespective of TS) concluded that the HPCI system was capable of |
| performing its intended safety function with this switch in its as-found     |
| condition. Therefore, there was no event or condition that could have        |
| prevented safety function fulfillment and this event is being retracted. No  |
| other reporting criteria apply to this event."                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  The R3DO (David Hills)    |
| was notified.                                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38129       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND           REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:47[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        07/10/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:30[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRAD ELLISON                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/11/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)  UNANALYZED CONDITION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 16 OF 17 FLOOD PANELS FOUND TO BE NON-FUNCTIONAL                             |
|                                                                              |
| "A second quarter 2001 inspection per Procedure PM-3586-10 identified        |
| miscellaneous deficiencies (e.g., deteriorated gasket material,              |
| obstructions, deficient bolting) with flood panels such that 16 of 17 are    |
| considered non-functional.  There is no current operability concern due to   |
| the river level and the analyzed need for both snow melt and heavy rains to  |
| require the use of these panels.  We are currently working on a plan to      |
| correct deficiencies.  Reference:  USAR Section 2.4.3.5"                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee noted that this report was due yesterday.  However, the         |
| licensee determined this afternoon (7/11/2001) that a report should have     |
| been made.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38130       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MONTICELLO               REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:01[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        07/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:50[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVID BARNETT                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/12/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)  DEGRADED CONDITION     |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)   POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(2)(i)      PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE - TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee found a shipping restraint installed on a drywell-to-torus vent |
| pipe bellows, apparently in place since construction (about 30 years).  This |
| device was discovered due to another licensee with similar containment       |
| configuration notifying Monticello of their discovery.  This device would    |
| partially impede axial motion.  The primary containment was declared         |
| inoperable at 1650 CDT on 07/11/01, and removal was initiated.  This is an   |
| 8-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(a) as a degraded condition and      |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c and d), control of radiation release and accident      |
| mitigation.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee initiated a required shutdown at 2050 CDT on 07/11/01 per       |
| Technical Specification 3.7.A.2.a, as a result of declaring primary          |
| containment inoperable because the drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows        |
| shipping installation attachments were still installed.  This is a 4-hour    |
| report under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), technical specification required           |
| shutdown.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and intends to notify state |
| and local agencies.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE FROM DAVE BARNETT RECEIVED BY LEIGH TROCINE AT 0039 EDT ON      |
| 07/12/01 *****                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The four shipping fasteners have been removed from each of the eight         |
| drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows, and primary containment was declared     |
| operable at 2304 CDT on 07/11/01.  The technical specification required      |
| shutdown was terminated while the reactor was at 90% power.  The licensee    |
| currently plans to restore reactor power to 100%.                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector as well as the       |
| applicable state and county agencies.  The NRC operations officer notified   |
| the R3DO (Hills).                                                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38131       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:29[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        07/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:27[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  FREDERICK W. SMITH           |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/12/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |TAD MARSH            NRR     |
|ACCS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A)  ECCS INJECTION         |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM, HPCS/RCIC SYSTEM INJECTION, AND FULL                |
| BALANCE-OF-PLANT ISOLATION FOLLOWING AN UNSPECIFIED, INTERNAL, ELECTRICAL    |
| TRANSIENT                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| An unspecified, internal, electrical transient affected balance-of-plant     |
| (BOP) systems and resulted in a feedwater control circuitry problem.         |
| Following this electrical transient, the reactor automatically scrammed from |
| 100% power when reactor vessel water level reached level 3 (178 inches       |
| narrow range).  All control rods fully inserted.  When reactor vessel water  |
| level decreased to level 2 (approximately 120 inches narrow range), the high |
| pressure core spray (HPCS) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems |
| automatically initiated and injected into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). |
| A BOP isolation signal was also received on level 2, and a full BOP          |
| isolation occurred.  In addition, the Division 3 emergency diesel generator  |
| (EDG) automatically started on level 2 (in support of HPCS).  The EDG did    |
| not load, nor was it required to.  The lowest reactor vessel water level     |
| received was 107 inches narrow range.  This was reported to be well above    |
| the top of the active full, which is at 0 inches wide range.                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that all safety systems functioned as required.  The     |
| extent and cause of the electrical transient are currently under             |
| investigation.  It was reported that the cause may be related to a possible  |
| auctioneered power supply failure which affected BOP systems and the         |
| feedwater system control circuitry.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The unit is currently in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown).  The RCIC system and the     |
| main turbine bypass valves are being utilized for reactor water level        |
| control and RPV pressure control, respectively.  The main steam isolation    |
| valves are open, and the condenser is available as a heat sink.  HPCS has    |
| been placed in standby.  (The quantity of water injected was not available   |
| at the time of this event notification.)  The full BOP isolation has been    |
| reset, and the Division 3 EDG is still running (unloaded).  (The licensee    |
| needs to load the EDG for 1 hour before securing it.)  Containment           |
| parameters were reported to be normal, and there were no challenges to       |
| offsite power.  All emergency core cooling systems and engineered safety     |
| feature systems are currently available.  The feedwater system remains       |
| unavailable pending resolution of the transient's root cause.                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector (who was in the control     |
| room at the time of this event notification).                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38132       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:21[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        07/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GENE MICHELSON               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/12/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS  R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINA 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A)   POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF AN EXCESSIVE ACCUMULATION OF WATER IN TWO UNDERGROUND FUEL OIL  |
| STORAGE TANKS                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "[An] excessive accumulation of water [was] discovered in both [the] D11 and |
| D12 underground fuel oil storage tanks.  [There was 33 inches of water in    |
| D11 and 22.5 inches of water in D12.]  This event would prevent both diesel  |
| generators from fulfilling their required safety function.  [Technical       |
| Specification 3.8.1.1, Actions 'b' and 'e,' were] entered, and reportability |
| manual event SAF 1.8 [was also] entered."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Actions Taken:  Water has been removed from both [the] D11 and D12          |
| underground fuel oil storage tanks.  [The licensee is] currently performing  |
| [an] operability determination."                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the unit is remains in the 72-hour limiting         |
| condition for operation due to the ongoing operability determination.        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+