Event Notification Report for July 12, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/11/2001 - 07/12/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37985 38058 38129 38130 38131 38132
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37985 |
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| REP ORG: INOVISION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/11/2001|
|LICENSEE: INOVISION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:05[EDT]|
| CITY: CLEVELAND REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 05/10/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: OH |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/11/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |VERN HODGE (FAX) NRR |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JANICE BROWNLEE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 10 CFR 21 REPORT - INTERIM REPORT ABOUT R-11 MONITOR PROBLEM |
| |
| The following is taken from a faxed report: |
| |
| Deviation being evaluated: An R-11 Monitor installed in Korea has been |
| reported as having a rapid increase in displayed concentration and analog |
| output values. Initial evaluation of the problem indicates the cause may be |
| in one of the base 960 firmware modules, which are also installed in some US |
| nuclear power plants. The significance of the problem is still under |
| evaluation to determine if it could create a substantial safety hazard. The |
| initial report was received on March 15, 2001. |
| |
| Evaluation information to date: The problem is a rapid increase in displayed |
| concentration and analog output values. The problem is not apparent at low |
| levels of activity where low count rates and statistical variation mask the |
| increase. When activity is near the upper range of the monitor, this spike |
| in calculated activity has triggered radiation alarms and could place the |
| channel into over range. The spiking in activity is believed to be due to |
| the microprocessor being unable to read and clear a register within the |
| allotted time. This results in a higher accumulated count value when the |
| register is finally read. Since the problem is directly related to processor |
| workload, the problem is most likely to occur in a complex channel |
| configuration with multiple detectors (such as a PIG or Extended Range) and |
| where the microprocessor is highly tasked with RMS computer or isolator |
| communications. |
| |
| For single range channels, the result of the spike would be a false |
| radiation alarm and possibly an over range condition as well, although this |
| has not been reported to the best of our knowledge. The other possibility is |
| that this situation could occur on an Extended Range monitor thereby placing |
| the channel in 'accident' or high range mode. If this occurs, the normal |
| range is shut down and/or by-passed. If the accident range detector is |
| brought online below its minimum operating range and the normal range |
| detector is shut down, an unmonitored release might be possible. |
| |
| A more detailed analysis of the firmware in specific channels is needed to |
| determine if this last condition is possible. |
| |
| The possible defect is believed at this time to only affect Model 960 |
| firmware modules upgraded or purchased since 1992. |
| |
| Evaluation completion date: July 10. 2001 |
| |
| * * * UPDATED AT 1215 EDT ON 7/11/2001 BY JANICE BROWNLEE TO FANGIE JONES * |
| * * |
| |
| Inovision faxed a follow-up to the interim report. |
| |
| "Component containing defect: Firmware in Type IIA 960 Systems with a Real |
| Time Clock (RTC) integrated circuit, programmed for use in pulse counting |
| applications, and equipped with the following controller modules: |
| Model 960CD-220 (P/N 960CD-220-10) |
| Model 960CD-221 (P/N 960CD-221-10) |
| Model 960CD-223 (P/N 960CD-223-10) |
| |
| "Monitors utilizing ionization chamber detectors are not affected |
| |
| "The above controllers were equipped with Real Timer Clock and additional |
| firmware to control the RTC. |
| |
| "Affected facilities: The Pacific Gas and Electric's' Diablo Canyon Nuclear |
| Power Plant is the only domestic, NRC licensed user affected by this defect. |
| Their purchase orders ZS-7204A-AAO and ZS-7204B-AAO are affected and were |
| shipped from 1991-1993. There were 20 potentially affected PROMs from those |
| orders. Other potentially affected customers are located in Korea (KEPCO, |
| KAREI) and in Belgium (SEMO, Electrabel). Notifications have been or will be |
| sent to the affected facilities with further specific information. |
| |
| "Corrective Action: Although there is a sporadic firmware program problem, |
| we do not believe that problem represents a significant safety concern. It |
| is our intention to notify the customers that are potentially affected by |
| this anomaly and to identify for them the affected monitors/channels within |
| their facility within 30 days The problem is only potentially present if the |
| facility has the TARGET COUNT algorithm enabled. We will recommend that the |
| facilities discontinue use of this algorithm. (Diablo Canyon does not use |
| this function). |
| |
| "As discussed earlier, a preliminary firmware fix has been identified. The |
| decision to take further action will be addressed with each of the |
| potentially affected facilities." |
| |
| The R4DO (Chuck Cain) and NRR (Vern Hodge) have been notified |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38058 |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/08/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:41[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 06/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:33[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBINSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/11/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 47 Power Operation |47 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO A FAULTY FLOW INDICATING SWITCH |
| |
| With DAEC operating in mode 1, at approximately 47% power, HPCI was declared |
| inoperable due to a faulty flow indicating switch which is utilized to |
| position the minimum flow valve. A 14-day LCO was entered per Technical |
| Specification 3.5.1, condition F, at 2133 on 6/7/01. This condition is |
| reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as a failure of a |
| single train of equipment required to mitigate the consequences of an |
| accident. |
| |
| While an in-plant operator was performing his rounds within the HPCI room, |
| he discovered that flow indicating switch, FS2310, which should indicate |
| total HPCI flow, indicated approximately -170 gpm rather than the expected |
| zero gpm. The HPCI pump was not in operation. This flow switch is |
| interlocked with the HPCI minimum flow valve, allowing it to open with total |
| HPCI flow less than 300 gpm and HPCI discharge pressure greater than 125 |
| psig. The flow switch would close the minimum flow valve once HPCI total |
| flow reached 600 gpm. With the correct operation of the HPCI minimum flow |
| valve in question, HPCI was declared inoperable. |
| |
| It is believed that the cause of the faulty indication is air in the |
| instrument sensing lines feeding the flow switch. Troubleshooting efforts |
| will begin early tomorrow morning. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified |
| |
| HOO NOTE: see event #38029 |
| |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1359 EDT ON 7/11/2001 BY JOHN KARRICK TO FANGIE JONES * * |
| * |
| |
| "This condition was reported (EN #38058, June 7, 2001) as 'Any event or |
| condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment |
| of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to [D] |
| mitigate the consequences of an accident.' NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 guidance for |
| this reporting criterion essentially requires any unplanned HPCI LCO at BWRs |
| to be reported as a loss of a single train safety system. Further review of |
| this event indicates that, since only the flow switch for the HPCI minimum |
| flow valve was inoperable, the minimum flow valve instrument Tech Spec could |
| and should have been entered instead of the HPCI system LCO. The instrument |
| spec. (TS 3.3.5.1, Condition E) provides a 7-day completion time to return |
| the instrument to service. If the instrument is not restored in 7 days, then |
| the 14-day HPCI system LCO would be entered. The instrument was returned to |
| service the following day. In addition, an assessment of the as-found |
| condition (irrespective of TS) concluded that the HPCI system was capable of |
| performing its intended safety function with this switch in its as-found |
| condition. Therefore, there was no event or condition that could have |
| prevented safety function fulfillment and this event is being retracted. No |
| other reporting criteria apply to this event." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (David Hills) |
| was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38129 |
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| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:47[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/10/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:30[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRAD ELLISON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/11/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| 16 OF 17 FLOOD PANELS FOUND TO BE NON-FUNCTIONAL |
| |
| "A second quarter 2001 inspection per Procedure PM-3586-10 identified |
| miscellaneous deficiencies (e.g., deteriorated gasket material, |
| obstructions, deficient bolting) with flood panels such that 16 of 17 are |
| considered non-functional. There is no current operability concern due to |
| the river level and the analyzed need for both snow melt and heavy rains to |
| require the use of these panels. We are currently working on a plan to |
| correct deficiencies. Reference: USAR Section 2.4.3.5" |
| |
| The licensee noted that this report was due yesterday. However, the |
| licensee determined this afternoon (7/11/2001) that a report should have |
| been made. |
| |
| The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38130 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MONTICELLO REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:01[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 07/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:50[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID BARNETT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) DEGRADED CONDITION | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(2)(i) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |99 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE - TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN |
| |
| The licensee found a shipping restraint installed on a drywell-to-torus vent |
| pipe bellows, apparently in place since construction (about 30 years). This |
| device was discovered due to another licensee with similar containment |
| configuration notifying Monticello of their discovery. This device would |
| partially impede axial motion. The primary containment was declared |
| inoperable at 1650 CDT on 07/11/01, and removal was initiated. This is an |
| 8-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(a) as a degraded condition and |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c and d), control of radiation release and accident |
| mitigation. |
| |
| The licensee initiated a required shutdown at 2050 CDT on 07/11/01 per |
| Technical Specification 3.7.A.2.a, as a result of declaring primary |
| containment inoperable because the drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows |
| shipping installation attachments were still installed. This is a 4-hour |
| report under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), technical specification required |
| shutdown. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and intends to notify state |
| and local agencies. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE FROM DAVE BARNETT RECEIVED BY LEIGH TROCINE AT 0039 EDT ON |
| 07/12/01 ***** |
| |
| The four shipping fasteners have been removed from each of the eight |
| drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows, and primary containment was declared |
| operable at 2304 CDT on 07/11/01. The technical specification required |
| shutdown was terminated while the reactor was at 90% power. The licensee |
| currently plans to restore reactor power to 100%. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector as well as the |
| applicable state and county agencies. The NRC operations officer notified |
| the R3DO (Hills). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38131 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:29[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 07/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:27[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: FREDERICK W. SMITH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |TAD MARSH NRR |
|ACCS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) ECCS INJECTION | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM, HPCS/RCIC SYSTEM INJECTION, AND FULL |
| BALANCE-OF-PLANT ISOLATION FOLLOWING AN UNSPECIFIED, INTERNAL, ELECTRICAL |
| TRANSIENT |
| |
| An unspecified, internal, electrical transient affected balance-of-plant |
| (BOP) systems and resulted in a feedwater control circuitry problem. |
| Following this electrical transient, the reactor automatically scrammed from |
| 100% power when reactor vessel water level reached level 3 (178 inches |
| narrow range). All control rods fully inserted. When reactor vessel water |
| level decreased to level 2 (approximately 120 inches narrow range), the high |
| pressure core spray (HPCS) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems |
| automatically initiated and injected into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). |
| A BOP isolation signal was also received on level 2, and a full BOP |
| isolation occurred. In addition, the Division 3 emergency diesel generator |
| (EDG) automatically started on level 2 (in support of HPCS). The EDG did |
| not load, nor was it required to. The lowest reactor vessel water level |
| received was 107 inches narrow range. This was reported to be well above |
| the top of the active full, which is at 0 inches wide range. |
| |
| The licensee stated that all safety systems functioned as required. The |
| extent and cause of the electrical transient are currently under |
| investigation. It was reported that the cause may be related to a possible |
| auctioneered power supply failure which affected BOP systems and the |
| feedwater system control circuitry. |
| |
| The unit is currently in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown). The RCIC system and the |
| main turbine bypass valves are being utilized for reactor water level |
| control and RPV pressure control, respectively. The main steam isolation |
| valves are open, and the condenser is available as a heat sink. HPCS has |
| been placed in standby. (The quantity of water injected was not available |
| at the time of this event notification.) The full BOP isolation has been |
| reset, and the Division 3 EDG is still running (unloaded). (The licensee |
| needs to load the EDG for 1 hour before securing it.) Containment |
| parameters were reported to be normal, and there were no challenges to |
| offsite power. All emergency core cooling systems and engineered safety |
| feature systems are currently available. The feedwater system remains |
| unavailable pending resolution of the transient's root cause. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector (who was in the control |
| room at the time of this event notification). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38132 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:21[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GENE MICHELSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINA 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF AN EXCESSIVE ACCUMULATION OF WATER IN TWO UNDERGROUND FUEL OIL |
| STORAGE TANKS |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "[An] excessive accumulation of water [was] discovered in both [the] D11 and |
| D12 underground fuel oil storage tanks. [There was 33 inches of water in |
| D11 and 22.5 inches of water in D12.] This event would prevent both diesel |
| generators from fulfilling their required safety function. [Technical |
| Specification 3.8.1.1, Actions 'b' and 'e,' were] entered, and reportability |
| manual event SAF 1.8 [was also] entered." |
| |
| "Actions Taken: Water has been removed from both [the] D11 and D12 |
| underground fuel oil storage tanks. [The licensee is] currently performing |
| [an] operability determination." |
| |
| The licensee stated that the unit is remains in the 72-hour limiting |
| condition for operation due to the ongoing operability determination. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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