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Event Notification Report for May 23, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           05/22/2001 - 05/23/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38011  38021  38022  38023  

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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38011       |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:37[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/07/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:37[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/22/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |SUSAN FRANT          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  WHITE                        |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE                                          |
|                                                                              |
| At 1640 CDT on 05/17/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified   |
| that the independent verification required by procedure CP2-CU-CH2137 was    |
| not performed.  The maintenance segment was not independently verified to be |
| isolated.  The same person signed for performance as well as the             |
| verification of the segment isolation.  NCSA 400.009 requires that fissile   |
| operations that credit AQ-NCS function that is disabled due to maintenance   |
| must be identified independently and disabled using a tagout prior to        |
| disabling the feature and commencing maintenance.  This is done to prevent   |
| operation of a system while an AQ-NCS component function is disabled. Since  |
| the independent verification was not performed, the process condition was    |
| not maintained.  Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.           |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| While the NCS control was violated, the fissile operation containing the     |
| component(s) undergoing maintenance was tagged out using LOTO both as a      |
| standard maintenance practice in C-400 and due to other NCS requirements.    |
| In addition, the equipment items removed had no AQ-NCS function which was    |
| affected by the maintenance actions.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| In order for criticality to be possible, the components undergoing           |
| maintenance must have an AQ-NCS function that is disabled, and the affected  |
| operations must be subsequently performed with fissile solution.             |
| Additionally, the maintenance activity must be one of the relatively few     |
| maintenance activities that do not require tagout for another NCS reason,    |
| such as to prevent fissile solution from leaking from the system.            |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing          |
| independently verifying the prevention of the affected fissile operation.    |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Maximum assay of 2.75 wt. % U-235.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The first leg of double contingency is based on preventing operation of the  |
| Cylinder Wash Facility during maintenance affecting the AQ-NCS component.    |
| The components were properly identified as non-AQ-NCS; therefore, this       |
| control was not violated.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The second leg of double contingency is based on independently preventing    |
| operation of the Cylinder Wash Facility during maintenance affecting the     |
| AQ-NCS component.  The requirement to independently verify the AQ-NCS        |
| function of all components affected by maintenance was not performed.  The   |
| control was violated, and the process condition was not maintained.          |
|                                                                              |
| Since the independent verification was not performed, the process condition  |
| was not maintained.  Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.       |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| This condition was identified while reviewing completed maintenance work     |
| packages.  There is no action that can be performed to resolve this          |
| condition and bring the process back into compliance since the maintenance   |
| activity has been completed.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified, and the DOE Representative will be  |
| informed.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 5/22/01 @ 1235 BY HUDSON TO GOULD * * *                      |
|                                                                              |
| As a result of this NCS violation, a review of work packages was initiated   |
| to determine if other instances exist where the required second signature    |
| was not obtained.  On 05/21/01 at 1520 CDT, the PSS was notified that        |
| another incident involving the violation of this requirement was discovered  |
| pertaining to maintenance on the RF (radio frequency) furnace.               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Senior Resident has been notified of this event by Paducah           |
| personnel.  The Reg 3 RDO (Burgess) and the NMSS EO (Cool) were informed by  |
| the NRC Operations Officer.                                                  |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38021       |
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| FACILITY: SALEM                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/22/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:42[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/22/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:16[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  E BOGGS                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/22/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |FRANK COSTELLO       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP.  ALL SYSTEMS OPERATED AS EXPECTED.                |
|                                                                              |
| This notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 1 has experienced  |
| an automatic reactor trip.  All rods fully inserted into the core.  The      |
| reactor trip was caused by a main turbine trip.  The cause of the main       |
| turbine trip is under investigation.  Post trip, main feedwater to steam     |
| generators was isolated due to the feedwater air lock, which is expected on  |
| a reactor trip.  The auxiliary feedwater system automatically started on low |
| steam generator water levels, and this was also expected on a reactor trip.  |
| Auxiliary feedwater pumps "21," "22," and "23" all automatically started and |
| fed the steam generators. The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, "23," |
| has been shut down by procedure since the "21" and "22" motor-driven         |
| auxiliary feedwater pumps were maintaining adequate feedwater flow.  Main    |
| feedwater restoration is in progress.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Salem Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3 (Hot Standby).  Reactor coolant          |
| temperature is currently 547 degrees F, and plant pressure is 2235 psi.  All |
| emergency core cooling systems and all engineered safety feature systems are |
| available.  There are no shutdown technical specification limiting           |
| conditions for operation (LCO) in effect.  There is one non-shutdown         |
| technical specification LCO in effect due to the power distribution          |
| monitoring system being inoperable.  The system is functional, but post      |
| isolation testing will not be completed for some time.  The only major       |
| secondary equipment unavailable is number one station air compressor, which  |
| is out of service for oil filter replacement.  It is expected to be restored |
| to service today.  The emergency diesel generators are fully operable if     |
| needed, and the electrical grid is stable.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township of this       |
| event.  The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the         |
| licensee.                                                                    |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38022       |
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| FACILITY: PALISADES                REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/22/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:24[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE                               |EVENT DATE:        05/22/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:35[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MALONE                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/22/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |SONIA BURGESS        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JOHN DAVIDSON        IAT     |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |ROBERT SKELTON       IAT     |
|                                                |JOSEPH HOLONICH      IRO     |
|                                                |BRUCE BOGER          NRR     |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| SUSPECTED ARSON                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| COMPENSATORY MEASURES WERE TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY.                             |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| (CONTACT THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.)             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Research Reactor                                 |Event Number:   38023       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY              |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/22/2001|
|   RXTYPE: 1000 KW TRIGA MARK II                |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:17[EDT]|
| COMMENTS:                                      |EVENT DATE:        05/22/2001|
|                                                |EVENT TIME:        16:35[PDT]|
|                                                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/22/2001|
|    CITY:  CORVALLIS                REGION:  4  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  BENTON                    STATE:  OR |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  R-106                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |MARK SHAFFER         R4      |
|  DOCKET:  05000243                             |AL ADAMS             NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BINNEY                       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| LOST/UNACCOUNTED FOR KEYS                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| COMPENSATORY MEASURES WERE PUT INTO PLACE BUT WERE INADVERTENTLY REMOVED FOR |
| A                                                                            |
| 1-HOUR PERIOD.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| (CONTACT THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.)                 |
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