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Event Notification Report for May 15, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           05/14/2001 - 05/15/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37748  37839  37937  37971  37987  37988  

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|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37748       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH           |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/14/2001|
|LICENSEE:  DRASH CONSULTING ENGINEERS, INC.     |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:33[EST]|
|    CITY:  HARLINGEN                REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        01/01/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  TX |EVENT TIME:             [CST]|
|LICENSE#:  TX L04724             AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |GREG PICK            R4      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HELEN WATKINS                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF STOLEN HUMBOLDT GAUGE                              |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Texas       |
| Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control:                           |
|                                                                              |
| "On Monday January 1, 2001, a moisture/density gauge was stolen from the     |
| back of a pickup truck that was parked at an apartment complex in Harlingen, |
| Texas. The technician who had used the gauge went to his apartment from      |
| 10:00 am to 1:00 p.m. after completing work at one job site. When the        |
| technician was getting into his truck, he noticed the lid on the gauge       |
| transport case was cracked open and the gauge was missing.                   |
|                                                                              |
| "The stolen gauge is a Humboldt Model 5001-C, serial number 1467. The gauge  |
| contained two sources:                                                       |
| 10 millicuries of Cs-137, source serial No. 692GH, and 40 millicuries of     |
| Am-241:Be, source serial No.                                                 |
| NJO1429.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "The Licensee notified the Harlingen Police Department, this Agency, and the |
| manufacturer. The Licensee placed an ad in a local newspaper offering a $500 |
| reward for the return of the gauge."                                         |
|                                                                              |
| Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.                     |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1606 EDT ON 05/14/01 FROM HELEN WATKINS TO LEIGH    |
| TROCINE *****                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Texas       |
| Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control:                           |
|                                                                              |
| "This is a followup report.  The gauge was found and returned to the         |
| licensee."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a letter provided to the Texas Department |
| of Health by the licensee on 03/12/01:                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "[...]  This gauge has been recovered.  [...]  The gauge was in good working |
| order, and had not visibly been abused.  The lock that keeps the source rod  |
| from being exposed was intact, and no visible signs of removal were visible. |
| Upon transporting [the] gauge back to the laboratory[, ... ] a leak test     |
| [was performed,] and [the gauge was] sent  [...] to  SUNTRAC Services for    |
| [analysis.  ... Less] than 0.0001 ÁCi were found on Alpha, Beta, and Gamma   |
| rays.  [...]"                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R4 DO (Spitzberg) and NMSS EO        |
| (Reamer).                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37839       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/14/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:02[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        03/14/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:08[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT R. BOESCH             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:                                |PETE ESELGROTH       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*INV 50.73(a)(1)         INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM A|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED AN UNEXPECTED LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING DUE TO TRIPPING OF |
| VARIOUS POWER SUPPLY BREAKERS                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 2 was in Mode 5 on the fifth day of its 10th Refuel and Inspection     |
| Outage. At 1508 hours, the unit experienced an unexpected loss of Division 1 |
| RPS Power supply. The loss of power was a result of the Electrical           |
| Protection Assembly (EPA) A & C breakers and motor generator output breaker  |
| tripping. The cause is under investigation.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The loss of power caused the RHR Shutdown Cooling suction valve HV251F009   |
| to close. This is a common suction valve to both divisions of RHR and        |
| resulted in the complete loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling. The reactor currently |
| has its head removed with the reactor cavity flooded up with the gates to    |
| the spent fuel pool removed. A Supplemental Decay Heat Removal system was in |
| service at the time, but was not considered fully capable of decay heat      |
| removal. Reactor coolant temperature increased less than 2 degrees during    |
| the 37 minutes SDC was out of service. The RPS power supply was switched to  |
| its alternate supply and SDC was restored at 1545 hours. In accordance with  |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) this represents a loss of a safety system which removes  |
| residual heat and requires an 8 hour ENS call. In addition to the isolation  |
| of RHR SDC, RWCU isolated due to containment valve HV244F001 closing, and    |
| Unit 2 HVAC Zone 3 (refuel floor) isolated. These isolations constitute an   |
| actuation of a Containment Isolation signal that affected multiple systems,  |
| and is reportable per                                                        |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Peak temperature after losing SDC was 105 degrees. The licensee informed the |
| NRC resident inspector.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1542 ON 05/15/01 FROM GORGON E. ROBINSON TO LEIGH   |
| TROCINE *****                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is updating this event notification to change the event         |
| reporting requirements from an 8-hour event notification to a 60-day         |
| notification of invalid system actuations.  The  following text is a portion |
| of a facsimile received from the licensee:                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "ENS Notification # 37839 documented that the loss of the Unit 2 Division 1  |
| RPS power supply on 3/14/01 required an 8-hour ENS notification for          |
| actuation of a containment isolation signal that affected multiple systems   |
| and a loss of a safety function required to remove residual heat             |
| (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), respectively).  After   |
| subsequent evaluation of the event, the reportability determination is being |
| changed to retract the 8-hour notification and provide the required a 60-day |
| ENS notification for an invalid actuation that affected multiple systems.    |
| See the discussion below."                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "The initial condition was reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), loss of      |
| safety function that is needed to remove residual heat.  A subsequent review |
| of the event and reporting requirements by PPL has concluded that the event  |
| is not reportable per this section of the rule.  In this case, the 37-minute |
| interruption did not and would not have prevented the fulfillment of the RHR |
| shutdown cooling function."                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The original notification stated that an actuation of a containment         |
| isolation signal that affected multiple systems was reportable as an 8-hour  |
| ENS notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).  For this event, a half-scram  |
| while the unit was shutdown, was the result of an invalid signal since it    |
| was due to loss of RPS power.  Except for critical scrams, invalid           |
| actuations are not reportable by telephone under 10CFR50.72.  Therefore,     |
| this 60-day optional report, as allowed by 10CFR50.73(a)(1), is being made   |
| under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an    |
| invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting         |
| isolation valves in more than one system."                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 15:08 on March 14, 2001, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, the primary  |
| power supply to the 'A' Reactor Protection System (RPS) power distribution   |
| panel was lost when the Motor-Generator (MG) Set generator in that division  |
| failed.  This resulted in Primary Containment Isolation System actuations    |
| including isolation of [a] Residual Heat Removal shutdown cooling suction    |
| valve and other automatic system initiations.  RPS as well as other plant    |
| systems functioned as designed in response to the event.  The 'A' RPS        |
| distribution panel was swapped to alternate power, and all isolations were   |
| reset by 16:10.  The loss of power was due to a failure of the 'A' RPS M-G   |
| set generator.  The generator failed due to a manufacturing defect of an     |
| internal conductor connection.  The failed generator was replaced, and other |
| like-in-kind generators will be inspected.  There were no safety             |
| consequences or compromises to the health or safety of the public.  This     |
| event has been entered into the site-specific corrective action program for  |
| resolution.  Internal and industry events were reviewed to assess if a       |
| generic problem exits with this type of generator.  No evidence of similar   |
| failures was found, which indicates that a generic problem does not exist."  |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC site Resident Inspector has been notified."  The NRC operations     |
| officer notified the R1DO (Rogge)                                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37937       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/21/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:02[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3                    |EVENT DATE:        04/21/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        03:20[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN LECHMAIER               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RONALD GARDNER       R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*IND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILED TURBINE EXHAUST LINE VACUUM BREAKER     |
| CHECK VALVES                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0320 [CDT] on April 21, 2001, Unit [2] HPCI was declared inoperable when |
| two check valves failed to meet acceptance criteria during the performance   |
| of [procedure] QCOS 2300-18, HPCI STEAM EXHAUST VACUUM BREAKER LINE CHECK    |
| VALVES IST FUNCTIONAL TEST.  Two of the four HPCI turbine exhaust line       |
| vacuum breaker check valves were found to have failed to close.  The exhaust |
| line containing the failed check valves was isolated at the start of the     |
| surveillance using motor-operated isolation valves contained in the exhaust  |
| line.  The failed check valves remain isolated."                             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that Unit 2 is in a 14-day limiting condition for        |
| operation as a result of this issue.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| ***** RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 1829 EDT ON 05/14/01 FROM TOM OSELAND TO LEIGH  |
| TROCINE *****                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "We have completed our evaluation and have determined that the HPCI [system] |
| was always capable of performing its intended safety function."              |
|                                                                              |
| "BACKGROUND"                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "On 4/21/01 at 0116 hours [CDT], plant operators began surveillance QCOS     |
| 2300-18, 'HPCI Steam Exhaust Vacuum Breaker Line Check Valves IST Functional |
| Test.'  The surveillance test is performed to confirm that valves 2-2399-64  |
| and 2-2399-65 open and close by applying air pressure to the check valves.   |
| During the test, these valves were found to meet the acceptance criteria in  |
| the open direction.  The function of these valves is to open to provide a    |
| flow path from the suppression chamber to the HPCI turbine steam exhaust     |
| piping to prevent a vacuum.  Following HPCI operation, the steam condensing  |
| in the suppression pool and exhaust line would cause the suppression pool    |
| water to be drawn up the exhaust piping."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0320 hours [CDT], the station equipment operator performing the test     |
| indicated that the 2-2399-64 and 2-2399-65 valves failed to close.  These    |
| valves must close during HPCI operation to prevent steam flow from the HPCI  |
| turbine steam exhaust piping to the suppression chamber.  Station operators  |
| declared the HPCI system inoperable when the test revealed that these valves |
| did not close.  Subsequently, operators initiated an ENS phone call to the   |
| NRC in accordance with the Exelon reportability manual SAF 1.8, 'Event or    |
| Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function'        |
| (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v))."                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Repairs were initiated, and at 1806 hours [CDT] on 4/21/01.  Following      |
| repairs, the HPCI vacuum breaker valves 2- 2399-64 and 2- 2399-65 passed the |
| IST test criteria and HPCI was declared operable."                           |
|                                                                              |
| "At approximately 1200 hours [CDT] on 4/22/01, the operators tested the      |
| 2-2399-66 and 2-2399-67 valves.  They were found to meet the acceptance      |
| criteria in both the open and closed direction.  These valves are a          |
| redundant set to the 2-2399-64 and 2-2399-65 valves."                        |
|                                                                              |
| "ANALYSIS"                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "The 2-2399-64 valve and 2-2399-66 valve are in series on the same line.     |
| This same configuration also exists on a different line for the 2- 2399-65   |
| and 2-2399-67 valves [...]."                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "During HPCI operation, either the 2-2399-64 valve or the 2-2399-66 valve    |
| and either the 2-2399-65 valve or the 2-2399-67 valve must close to prevent  |
| HPCI exhaust steam from flowing to the suppression chamber atmosphere which  |
| would cause an increase in containment pressure and temperature.  The HPCI   |
| system is designed to exhaust the steam to the suppression pool.  The        |
| exhaust is discharged below the water level in the suppression pool to       |
| ensure the steam is condensed."                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The acceptable test results of the 2399-67 and 2399-66 valves would allow   |
| HPCI exhaust steam during operation to be discharged below the water level   |
| of the suppression chamber to ensure that steam was condensed and HPCI       |
| operation would not be impeded."                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "Although, the failure of the 2-2399-64 and 2-2399-65 to close was           |
| identified the as-found acceptable condition (ability to close) of the       |
| 2-2399-67 and 2-2399-66 valves would have ensured the ability of the vacuum  |
| breaker line to perform as required and thus allow HPCI to meet its safety   |
| function."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Based on the above, it has been concluded that HPCI was always capable of   |
| performing its safety function."  Therefore, the licensee is retracting this |
| event notification.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations        |
| officer notified the R3DO (Shear).                                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37971       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/08/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:52[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        05/08/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        00:09[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  VEITCH                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       22       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR WAS MANUALLY SCRAMMED FROM 22% POWER DUE TO FAILURE OF RECIRC PUMP   |
| TO RESTART                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| A manual scram was inserted at 0009 on 5/8/01.  The scram was conducted in   |
| accordance with plant procedures, IOI-8 "Manual Scram," due to a failure of  |
| the reactor recirculation pump "A" to restart during a downshift from fast   |
| to slow speed operation.  Plant response to the manual scram was as          |
| anticipated, all rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuations occurred and no     |
| SRVs opened.  Reactor vessel water level reached Level 3 (177.7 inches) and  |
| operators entered the Plant Emergency Instructions.  At 0016, the Plant      |
| Emergency Instructions were exited.  The cause of the "A" recirculation pump |
| failure to restart is being investigated.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION 1132 5/14/2001 FROM RUSSELL TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *         |
|                                                                              |
| "A 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv), RPS Actuation, four- (4) hour non-emergency         |
| notification was initially made on 5-8-2001, due a Manual Reactor Scram      |
| while critical. The Shift Supervisor conservatively defaulted with the       |
| reportability determination and made the notification. Subsequently the      |
| plants corrective action program required a confirmatory review of the       |
| condition and its reportability by the staff.                                |
|                                                                              |
| "The reportability review by the plant staff determined that the condition   |
| was not event driven since viable options were available. The options        |
| included: continue operation in single loop until the Recirculation Pump 'A' |
| breaker was repaired and the pump restarted, shutdown by manually inserting  |
| control rods or enter Shutdown by Manual Scram, utilizing plant procedures   |
| IOI-4 and IOI-8 respectively. The operators followed IOI-8 which purpose is  |
| to provide general directions and guidelines for initiating a planned        |
| shutdown by a manual reactor scram. It is intended to be entered during a    |
| non-emergency condition with plant conditions stable. Use of this procedure  |
| requires prior approval of the Operation's Manager and was obtained.         |
|                                                                              |
| "After Operations reviewed the available options, it was concluded at        |
| management's discretion, that the plant would be shutdown to repair the      |
| Recirculation Pump 'A' breaker and the Recirculation Pump 'B' seal, via      |
| IOI-8.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The power plant was then configured for a controlled reactor scram in an    |
| orderly manner without delay. House electrical loads were shifted to the     |
| startup source: HPCS, which had been out of service for scheduled            |
| maintenance was made available to support the scram if required; the Motor   |
| Feed Pump was started and reactor level and pressure were adjusted to        |
| support the scram. Reactor pressure was raised to support performance of     |
| control rod scram time surveillance testing during the scram.                |
|                                                                              |
| "The reactor was scrammed on 5/8 at 0009 hrs. All equipment functioned as    |
| expected. The plant underwent a controlled cooldown resulting in RHR 'A'     |
| being placed in service just prior to 0800 hrs. The shutdown evolution as    |
| chronologically described below complied with plant procedures, license      |
| conditions, and Technical Specifications. License Commitments were reviewed  |
| for compliance, and no issues were identified.                               |
|                                                                              |
| "Chronology                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "May 7, 2001                                                                 |
| 16:20  Start 101-3 power reduction for B33 'B' seal temperature.             |
| 17:22  Power reduction suspended while seal temperature stable.              |
| 19:42  Restarted 101-3 power reduction; B33 'B' seal at 200■F.               |
| 20:50  533 pump downshift incomplete. 'B' in slow; 'A' in off.               |
| 20:52  Enter ONI-51: B33 Pump 'A' tripped.                                   |
| Reactor Engineer contacted.                                                  |
| Power 22%; Loop Flow 'B' 6.25%; B33 in Loop Manual.                          |
| Technical Specification Power/Flow limits met w/o adjusting power or flow.   |
| 21:01  B33-F067A - closed per ONI.                                           |
| 21:10  B33-F067A - reopened per ONI.                                         |
| 22:16  Attempted restart of B33 'A' Pump.                                    |
| 22:46  Raised Reactor Pressure for scram testing.                            |
| 22:51  House electrical loads transferred to Start-up Transformer.           |
| 23:49  Motor Feed Pump started for SCRAM.                                    |
| 23:55  HPCS In secured status with operator ready to place in standby if     |
| needed during SCRAM.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "May 8, 2001                                                                 |
| 00:09  Manual SCRAM inserted per IOI-8, PEI-B13 entered on Level 3 as        |
| expected.                                                                    |
| 00:13  SCRAM Reset.                                                          |
| 00:16  PEI-B13 Exited.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Subsequent review has determined that although a plant outage was           |
| determined to be the appropriate option, there was no urgency and sufficient |
| planning was involved to ensure a controlled shutdown occurred. The          |
| determination concluded that this plant shutdown should be considered a      |
| pre-planned sequence and was performed at Management's discretion and        |
| oversight. The level 3 scram that occurred as part of he post Scram          |
| transient was an expected part of the preplanned sequence. Therefore, this   |
| condition is not reportable and ENF 37971 is retracted."                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations        |
| officer notified the R3DO (Shear).                                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37987       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MAINE YANKEE             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  ME |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:21[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE                               |EVENT DATE:        05/14/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        00:20[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TERRY WHITE                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN ROGGE           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*PRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Decommissioned   |0        Decommissioned   |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DIESEL FUEL SPILL ONSITE                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the Maine Department of Environmental Protection       |
| regarding the spillage of approximately 25 gallons of diesel fuel.  The fuel |
| oil was spilled when the fuel tank of a truck was punctured as it was        |
| driving over a temporary ramp.  The spill has been contained.                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   37988       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| REP ORG:  US ARMY                              |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/2001|
|LICENSEE:  US ARMY                              |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:16[EDT]|
|    CITY:  ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND  REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        05/11/2001|
|  COUNTY:  HARFORD                   STATE:  MD |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  19-30563-01           AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |JOHN ROGGE           R1      |
|                                                |S. FRANT             NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+BLAIR SPITZBERG      R4      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOYCE KUYKENDALL             |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii)   LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| LOST CHEMICAL AGENT ALARM AT FT. IRWIN, CA.                                  |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Grounds reported the loss of a chemical agent |
| alarm, model number GID-3.  The alarm contains two nickel-63 sources each    |
| with an activity of 15mCi.  The chemical agent alarm was lost at FT. Irwin,  |
| CA during training exercises on May 11, 2001.  Search is in progress to      |
| locate the alarm.                                                            |
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