Event Notification Report for May 08, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/07/2001 - 05/08/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
379713797237974379753799138005
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37971
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: VEITCH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: VEITCH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 05/08/2001
Notification Time: 01:52 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2001
Event Time: 00:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2001
Notification Time: 01:52 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2001
Event Time: 00:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 22 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR WAS MANUALLY SCRAMMED FROM 22% POWER DUE TO FAILURE OF RECIRC PUMP TO RESTART
A manual scram was inserted at 0009 on 5/8/01. The scram was conducted in accordance with plant procedures, IOI-8 "Manual Scram," due to a failure of the reactor recirculation pump "A" to restart during a downshift from fast to slow speed operation. Plant response to the manual scram was as anticipated, all rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuations occurred and no SRVs opened. Reactor vessel water level reached Level 3 (177.7 inches) and operators entered the Plant Emergency Instructions. At 0016, the Plant Emergency Instructions were exited. The cause of the "A" recirculation pump failure to restart is being investigated.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * RETRACTION 1132 5/14/2001 FROM RUSSELL TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"A 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv), RPS Actuation, four- (4) hour non-emergency notification was initially made on 5-8-2001, due a Manual Reactor Scram while critical. The Shift Supervisor conservatively defaulted with the reportability determination and made the notification. Subsequently the plants corrective action program required a confirmatory review of the condition and its reportability by the staff.
"The reportability review by the plant staff determined that the condition was not event driven since viable options were available. The options included: continue operation in single loop until the Recirculation Pump 'A' breaker was repaired and the pump restarted, shutdown by manually inserting control rods or enter Shutdown by Manual Scram, utilizing plant procedures IOI-4 and IOI-8 respectively. The operators followed IOI-8 which purpose is to provide general directions and guidelines for initiating a planned shutdown by a manual reactor scram. It is intended to be entered during a non-emergency condition with plant conditions stable. Use of this procedure requires prior approval of the Operation's Manager and was obtained.
"After Operations reviewed the available options, it was concluded at management's discretion, that the plant would be shutdown to repair the Recirculation Pump 'A' breaker and the Recirculation Pump 'B' seal, via IOI-8.
"The power plant was then configured for a controlled reactor scram in an orderly manner without delay. House electrical loads were shifted to the startup source: HPCS, which had been out of service for scheduled maintenance was made available to support the scram if required; the Motor Feed Pump was started and reactor level and pressure were adjusted to support the scram. Reactor pressure was raised to support performance of control rod scram time surveillance testing during the scram.
"The reactor was scrammed on 5/8 at 0009 hrs. All equipment functioned as expected. The plant underwent a controlled cooldown resulting in RHR 'A' being placed in service just prior to 0800 hrs. The shutdown evolution as chronologically described below complied with plant procedures, license conditions, and Technical Specifications. License Commitments were reviewed for compliance, and no issues were identified.
"Chronology
"May 7, 2001
16:20 Start 101-3 power reduction for B33 'B' seal temperature.
17:22 Power reduction suspended while seal temperature stable.
19:42 Restarted 101-3 power reduction; B33 'B' seal at 200°F.
20:50 533 pump downshift incomplete. 'B' in slow; 'A' in off.
20:52 Enter ONI-51: B33 Pump 'A' tripped.
Reactor Engineer contacted.
Power 22%; Loop Flow 'B' 6.25%; B33 in Loop Manual.
Technical Specification Power/Flow limits met w/o adjusting power or flow.
21:01 B33-F067A - closed per ONI.
21:10 B33-F067A - reopened per ONI.
22:16 Attempted restart of B33 'A' Pump.
22:46 Raised Reactor Pressure for scram testing.
22:51 House electrical loads transferred to Start-up Transformer.
23:49 Motor Feed Pump started for SCRAM.
23:55 HPCS In secured status with operator ready to place in standby if needed during SCRAM.
"May 8, 2001
00:09 Manual SCRAM inserted per IOI-8, PEI-B13 entered on Level 3 as expected.
00:13 SCRAM Reset.
00:16 PEI-B13 Exited.
"Subsequent review has determined that although a plant outage was determined to be the appropriate option, there was no urgency and sufficient planning was involved to ensure a controlled shutdown occurred. The determination concluded that this plant shutdown should be considered a pre-planned sequence and was performed at Management's discretion and oversight. The level 3 scram that occurred as part of he post Scram transient was an expected part of the preplanned sequence. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and ENF 37971 is retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Shear).
A manual scram was inserted at 0009 on 5/8/01. The scram was conducted in accordance with plant procedures, IOI-8 "Manual Scram," due to a failure of the reactor recirculation pump "A" to restart during a downshift from fast to slow speed operation. Plant response to the manual scram was as anticipated, all rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuations occurred and no SRVs opened. Reactor vessel water level reached Level 3 (177.7 inches) and operators entered the Plant Emergency Instructions. At 0016, the Plant Emergency Instructions were exited. The cause of the "A" recirculation pump failure to restart is being investigated.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * RETRACTION 1132 5/14/2001 FROM RUSSELL TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"A 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv), RPS Actuation, four- (4) hour non-emergency notification was initially made on 5-8-2001, due a Manual Reactor Scram while critical. The Shift Supervisor conservatively defaulted with the reportability determination and made the notification. Subsequently the plants corrective action program required a confirmatory review of the condition and its reportability by the staff.
"The reportability review by the plant staff determined that the condition was not event driven since viable options were available. The options included: continue operation in single loop until the Recirculation Pump 'A' breaker was repaired and the pump restarted, shutdown by manually inserting control rods or enter Shutdown by Manual Scram, utilizing plant procedures IOI-4 and IOI-8 respectively. The operators followed IOI-8 which purpose is to provide general directions and guidelines for initiating a planned shutdown by a manual reactor scram. It is intended to be entered during a non-emergency condition with plant conditions stable. Use of this procedure requires prior approval of the Operation's Manager and was obtained.
"After Operations reviewed the available options, it was concluded at management's discretion, that the plant would be shutdown to repair the Recirculation Pump 'A' breaker and the Recirculation Pump 'B' seal, via IOI-8.
"The power plant was then configured for a controlled reactor scram in an orderly manner without delay. House electrical loads were shifted to the startup source: HPCS, which had been out of service for scheduled maintenance was made available to support the scram if required; the Motor Feed Pump was started and reactor level and pressure were adjusted to support the scram. Reactor pressure was raised to support performance of control rod scram time surveillance testing during the scram.
"The reactor was scrammed on 5/8 at 0009 hrs. All equipment functioned as expected. The plant underwent a controlled cooldown resulting in RHR 'A' being placed in service just prior to 0800 hrs. The shutdown evolution as chronologically described below complied with plant procedures, license conditions, and Technical Specifications. License Commitments were reviewed for compliance, and no issues were identified.
"Chronology
"May 7, 2001
16:20 Start 101-3 power reduction for B33 'B' seal temperature.
17:22 Power reduction suspended while seal temperature stable.
19:42 Restarted 101-3 power reduction; B33 'B' seal at 200°F.
20:50 533 pump downshift incomplete. 'B' in slow; 'A' in off.
20:52 Enter ONI-51: B33 Pump 'A' tripped.
Reactor Engineer contacted.
Power 22%; Loop Flow 'B' 6.25%; B33 in Loop Manual.
Technical Specification Power/Flow limits met w/o adjusting power or flow.
21:01 B33-F067A - closed per ONI.
21:10 B33-F067A - reopened per ONI.
22:16 Attempted restart of B33 'A' Pump.
22:46 Raised Reactor Pressure for scram testing.
22:51 House electrical loads transferred to Start-up Transformer.
23:49 Motor Feed Pump started for SCRAM.
23:55 HPCS In secured status with operator ready to place in standby if needed during SCRAM.
"May 8, 2001
00:09 Manual SCRAM inserted per IOI-8, PEI-B13 entered on Level 3 as expected.
00:13 SCRAM Reset.
00:16 PEI-B13 Exited.
"Subsequent review has determined that although a plant outage was determined to be the appropriate option, there was no urgency and sufficient planning was involved to ensure a controlled shutdown occurred. The determination concluded that this plant shutdown should be considered a pre-planned sequence and was performed at Management's discretion and oversight. The level 3 scram that occurred as part of he post Scram transient was an expected part of the preplanned sequence. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and ENF 37971 is retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Shear).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37972
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM PRIEST
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM PRIEST
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 05/08/2001
Notification Time: 12:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2001
Event Time: 10:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2001
Notification Time: 12:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2001
Event Time: 10:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN
On 5/8/01, at approximately 1004, the Hope Creek Generating Station initiated a unit shutdown to comply with the provisions of Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3, TS 3.0.3 was entered at 0820 when both trains of the Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Sealing System (MSIVSS) were declared inoperable. The 'B' MSIVSS had been inoperable since 5/4/01 due to a malfunctioning flow transmitter with the associated TS, 3.6.1.4 1 entered. On 5/8/01, at 0508, a Potential Transformer fuse failure associated with the 'C' Class 1E 4.16kV bus tripped two of four channels of Loss of Voltage relay protection for that bus. The tripped channels provide start permissives for the 'C' EDG and have actuated to the tripped condition to provide those permissives. During subsequent investigation of the extent and consequences of the fuse failure, it was determined at 0820 hours that the fuse failure also affected the 'C' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) synchroscope rendering the 'C' EDG inoperable due to its inability to meet the surveillance requirement of TS 4.8.1.1.2.h.10 Since the 'C' EDG provides the 1E power to the 'A' MSIV Sealing System both trains of the MSIV Sealing System were considered inoperable and TS 3.0.3 was entered.
Investigation into the cause of the fuse failure is ongoing. With the exception of the 'A' Control Room Emergency Filtration System, all other safety-related systems were operable at the time of the event.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector, the State of New Jersey and Lower Alloways Creek Township.
On 5/8/01, at approximately 1004, the Hope Creek Generating Station initiated a unit shutdown to comply with the provisions of Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3, TS 3.0.3 was entered at 0820 when both trains of the Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Sealing System (MSIVSS) were declared inoperable. The 'B' MSIVSS had been inoperable since 5/4/01 due to a malfunctioning flow transmitter with the associated TS, 3.6.1.4 1 entered. On 5/8/01, at 0508, a Potential Transformer fuse failure associated with the 'C' Class 1E 4.16kV bus tripped two of four channels of Loss of Voltage relay protection for that bus. The tripped channels provide start permissives for the 'C' EDG and have actuated to the tripped condition to provide those permissives. During subsequent investigation of the extent and consequences of the fuse failure, it was determined at 0820 hours that the fuse failure also affected the 'C' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) synchroscope rendering the 'C' EDG inoperable due to its inability to meet the surveillance requirement of TS 4.8.1.1.2.h.10 Since the 'C' EDG provides the 1E power to the 'A' MSIV Sealing System both trains of the MSIV Sealing System were considered inoperable and TS 3.0.3 was entered.
Investigation into the cause of the fuse failure is ongoing. With the exception of the 'A' Control Room Emergency Filtration System, all other safety-related systems were operable at the time of the event.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector, the State of New Jersey and Lower Alloways Creek Township.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37974
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL CLARK
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL CLARK
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 05/08/2001
Notification Time: 18:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2001
Event Time: 16:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2001
Notification Time: 18:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2001
Event Time: 16:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"With the plant in a refueling outage, during restoration of the CRD system, ongoing maintenance prevented restoring and opening the scram discharge volume vents and drains. Leakage slowly filled the scram discharge volume. At 1628, level reached the trip setpoint and initiated a RPS trip signal. This is considered a valid initiation signal. All systems responded as expected. No control rod movement occurred and no refueling operations were in progress. Scram has not been reset due to ongoing maintenance."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
"With the plant in a refueling outage, during restoration of the CRD system, ongoing maintenance prevented restoring and opening the scram discharge volume vents and drains. Leakage slowly filled the scram discharge volume. At 1628, level reached the trip setpoint and initiated a RPS trip signal. This is considered a valid initiation signal. All systems responded as expected. No control rod movement occurred and no refueling operations were in progress. Scram has not been reset due to ongoing maintenance."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37975
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK NANCE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK NANCE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 05/08/2001
Notification Time: 19:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2001
Event Time: 15:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2001
Notification Time: 19:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2001
Event Time: 15:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR TRIP - LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL
On 05/08/2001, Unit 2 experienced a automatic Reactor Trip due to low water level in the 2A Steam Generator. Prior to the reactor trip, Instrument and Control Technicians were tuning the 2A Main Feed Water Regulating Valve digital control system. The 2A Main Feed Water Regulating Valve went fully closed, and the Control Room Staff was unable to reopen the valve.
At the same time as the Reactor Trip, the Auxiliary Feed Water System actuated due to low water level in the 2A Steam Generator. After the Reactor Trip all Control Rods Fully inserted into the core, all automatic systems operated as designed, and no primary to secondary leakage was detected.
The plant is stable in Mode 3, reactor coolant pumps are running and decay heat is being removed by using the main turbine bypass valves. Steam generator water level has been restored and main feed is being used to feed the steam generators.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
On 05/08/2001, Unit 2 experienced a automatic Reactor Trip due to low water level in the 2A Steam Generator. Prior to the reactor trip, Instrument and Control Technicians were tuning the 2A Main Feed Water Regulating Valve digital control system. The 2A Main Feed Water Regulating Valve went fully closed, and the Control Room Staff was unable to reopen the valve.
At the same time as the Reactor Trip, the Auxiliary Feed Water System actuated due to low water level in the 2A Steam Generator. After the Reactor Trip all Control Rods Fully inserted into the core, all automatic systems operated as designed, and no primary to secondary leakage was detected.
The plant is stable in Mode 3, reactor coolant pumps are running and decay heat is being removed by using the main turbine bypass valves. Steam generator water level has been restored and main feed is being used to feed the steam generators.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 37991
Rep Org: STORK TWIN CITY TESTING
Licensee: STORK TWIN CITY TESTING
Region: 3
City: ST. PAUL State: MN
County: RAMSEY
License #: 22-01376-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATRICK LIEBL
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: STORK TWIN CITY TESTING
Region: 3
City: ST. PAUL State: MN
County: RAMSEY
License #: 22-01376-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATRICK LIEBL
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 05/15/2001
Notification Time: 15:31 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2001
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2001
Notification Time: 15:31 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2001
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
STUCK IRIDIUM-192 SOURCE AND FAILURE TO MAKE AN EVENT NOTIFICATION WITHIN 24 HOURS
On 05/05/01, an X-ray crew in Heron Lake, MN, was inspecting a flat bottom tank using an Amertest-660A device containing 80 curies of iridium-192. At 0900 CDT, during performance of an exposure, the stand that the guide tube was connected to fell over and kinked the tube. As a result, the crew could not initially retract the source. The crew subsequently followed procedures and successfully retracted the source to its shielded position. There were no overexposures as a result of this event.
In preparation for submitting a 30-day letter, the licensee discovered (today) that this event should have been reported as a 24-hour event notification.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)
On 05/05/01, an X-ray crew in Heron Lake, MN, was inspecting a flat bottom tank using an Amertest-660A device containing 80 curies of iridium-192. At 0900 CDT, during performance of an exposure, the stand that the guide tube was connected to fell over and kinked the tube. As a result, the crew could not initially retract the source. The crew subsequently followed procedures and successfully retracted the source to its shielded position. There were no overexposures as a result of this event.
In preparation for submitting a 30-day letter, the licensee discovered (today) that this event should have been reported as a 24-hour event notification.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38005
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FIRTH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FIRTH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 05/17/2001
Notification Time: 14:46 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2001
Event Time: 02:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/02/2001
Notification Time: 14:46 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2001
Event Time: 02:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/02/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
JOHN TAPPERT (NRR)
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
JOHN TAPPERT (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INTERRUPTION OF THE COOLING FUNCTION PERFORMED BY THE PRIMARY LOOP OF THE BACKUP SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM OCCURRED FOR 20 MINS.
"On May 8, 2001 P3 was in RO-11, and the reactor was de-fueled with all discharged fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). SFP cooling was provided by the Backup Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system (B/U SFPCS) because the normal Spent Fuel Cooling system was out of service for maintenance. At approximately 0210 hours on May 8, 2001, the water supply to the secondary loop of the B/U SFPCS was interrupted due to a loss of power involving IP3's demineralized water source. This water interruption subsequently caused a low differential pressure trip of the primary loop pump of the B/U SFPCS. Operator response re-gained the dernineralized water supply to the secondary loop. SFP cooling from this system was restored. The cooling function performed by the primary loop of the B/U SFPCS was interrupted for approximately 20 minutes total. A Root Cause Team investigation was commenced the morning of May 8, 2001 to review this event. This event is being considered potentially reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B). Investigation into the cause and reportability of this event is ongoing and this ENS report is being made at this time due to the continuing investigation of reportability."
Temperature increased from 151 to 155°F.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with state and local agencies. Their US Congressman was also notified.
* * * RETRACTION 0912 7/2/2001 FROM PRUSSMAN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"On May 17, 2001, Entergy notified the Operations Center that a loss of Back-up Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (BUSFPCS) was potentially reportable (ENS 38005). Reporting was under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to... (B) remove residual heat.' Entergy is hereby retracting that notification. The event was subsequently determined to be not reportable. Section 3.2.7 of NUREG-1022, Revision 2 (NRC guidance for reporting), says the 'intent of these criteria is to capture events that would have been a failure of a safety system to properly complete a safety function, regardless of whether there was an actual demand.' The NUREG goes on to say that the 'definition of the systems included in the scope of these criteria is provided in the rules themselves. It includes systems required by the TS to be operable to perform one of the four functions (A) through (D) specified in the rule.' Examples 1 and 2 in NUREG 1022, Section 3.2.7 illustrate that events or conditions associated with a system not in the TS are not reportable because of that fact. Example 2 states 'If such systems are required by Technical Specifications to be operational and the system is needed to fulfill one of the safety functions identified in this section of the rule then system level failures are reportable. If the system is not covered by Technical Specifications and is not required to meet the single failure criterion, then failures of the system are not reportable under this criterion.' Based on the statements contained in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, Entergy concluded that the event was not reportable. The BUSFPCS and SFPCS are not in IP3 TS and the only TS parameter associated with this event was the pool level. The pool level was maintained within limits at all times."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified R1DO (Barkley).
"On May 8, 2001 P3 was in RO-11, and the reactor was de-fueled with all discharged fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). SFP cooling was provided by the Backup Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system (B/U SFPCS) because the normal Spent Fuel Cooling system was out of service for maintenance. At approximately 0210 hours on May 8, 2001, the water supply to the secondary loop of the B/U SFPCS was interrupted due to a loss of power involving IP3's demineralized water source. This water interruption subsequently caused a low differential pressure trip of the primary loop pump of the B/U SFPCS. Operator response re-gained the dernineralized water supply to the secondary loop. SFP cooling from this system was restored. The cooling function performed by the primary loop of the B/U SFPCS was interrupted for approximately 20 minutes total. A Root Cause Team investigation was commenced the morning of May 8, 2001 to review this event. This event is being considered potentially reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B). Investigation into the cause and reportability of this event is ongoing and this ENS report is being made at this time due to the continuing investigation of reportability."
Temperature increased from 151 to 155°F.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with state and local agencies. Their US Congressman was also notified.
* * * RETRACTION 0912 7/2/2001 FROM PRUSSMAN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"On May 17, 2001, Entergy notified the Operations Center that a loss of Back-up Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (BUSFPCS) was potentially reportable (ENS 38005). Reporting was under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to... (B) remove residual heat.' Entergy is hereby retracting that notification. The event was subsequently determined to be not reportable. Section 3.2.7 of NUREG-1022, Revision 2 (NRC guidance for reporting), says the 'intent of these criteria is to capture events that would have been a failure of a safety system to properly complete a safety function, regardless of whether there was an actual demand.' The NUREG goes on to say that the 'definition of the systems included in the scope of these criteria is provided in the rules themselves. It includes systems required by the TS to be operable to perform one of the four functions (A) through (D) specified in the rule.' Examples 1 and 2 in NUREG 1022, Section 3.2.7 illustrate that events or conditions associated with a system not in the TS are not reportable because of that fact. Example 2 states 'If such systems are required by Technical Specifications to be operational and the system is needed to fulfill one of the safety functions identified in this section of the rule then system level failures are reportable. If the system is not covered by Technical Specifications and is not required to meet the single failure criterion, then failures of the system are not reportable under this criterion.' Based on the statements contained in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, Entergy concluded that the event was not reportable. The BUSFPCS and SFPCS are not in IP3 TS and the only TS parameter associated with this event was the pool level. The pool level was maintained within limits at all times."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified R1DO (Barkley).