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Event Notification Report for May 1, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           04/30/2001 - 05/01/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37953  37954  37955  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37953       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GRAND GULF               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/30/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:24[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        04/29/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:50[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVE HANKS                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/30/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BILL JONES           R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*COM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)   LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EXPECTED LOSS OF SPDS FOR GREATER THAN 8 HOURS                               |
|                                                                              |
| Planned maintenance removed safety parameters display system (SPDS) from     |
| service for greater than 8 hours.  This requires a notification per 10 CFR   |
| 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for loss of assessment capabilities.                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37954       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FERMI                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/30/2001|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:38[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        04/30/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MILLER                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/30/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MELVYN LEACH         R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*COM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)   LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       46       Power Operation  |48       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT LOST BOTH COMMERCIAL AND ENS PHONE SYSTEMS                             |
|                                                                              |
| The plant lost both their commercial and ENS phone systems due to a fiber    |
| optics cable cut.   Ameritech is currently troubleshooting and they do not   |
| know at this time when service will be restored.  The licensee has microwave |
| communication available.  They have verified communications with other       |
| agencies.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1702EDT ON 4/30/01 FROM MILLER TO S. SANDIN * * *               |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1100 on 4/30/01 The Emergency Notification System (ENS) and the          |
| commercial telecommunications capability to dial offsite was found to be     |
| non-functioning. Communications with outside agencies has been verified      |
| through the microwave transmission lines (RERP Lines). The cause is being    |
| attributed to a problem with an offsite fiber optics cable and an            |
| investigation is underway by the local telecommunications company. The ENS   |
| and commercial telecommunications lines were verified functional at 1650."   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.  Notified R3DO(Leach)      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37955       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/30/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:54[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        03/08/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PETE ORPHANOS                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/30/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*INV 50.73(a)(1)         INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM A|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       88       Power Operation  |88       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION CAUSED BY SETPOINT    |
| DRIFT                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "This 60-day optional report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being     |
| made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe  |
| an invalid actuation of a specific system, namely Primary Containment        |
| Isolation System (PCIS).                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "On March 8, 2001 at 08:45 hours the main control room received a 2A         |
| Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)/Reactor Protection System (RPS) trouble   |
| alarm and verified the following Engineered Safety Features (ESF)            |
| isolations: Drywell Chilled Water (DWCW), Reactor Enclosure Cooling Water    |
| (RECW), Instrument Gas and Containment Leak Detector.                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The control room also received an electro-hydraulic control (EHC)           |
| electrical malfunction alarm with a loss of cooling fans and inaccurate      |
| indication of stop valve and combined intercept valves. Additionally, some   |
| cabinet fans, 60 Hz solenoid valves and the bypass jack were also lost.      |
|                                                                              |
| "These expected isolations were bypassed by procedure for the given          |
| condition, and were subsequently restored to their normal operating          |
| position. The isolations were due to an invalid signal resulting from the    |
| failure of a circuit board trim potentiometer for the undervoltage relay     |
| (27-AY24801) of the 2A RPS breaker (2A-C248-52). Failure analysis of the     |
| undervoltage relay (ABB Model No. 211T4175F) identified that the trim        |
| potentiometer was heat sensitive (manufacturing defect) which caused the     |
| relay setpoint to drift up to the actual line voltage, tripping the          |
| breaker.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "The 2A RPS undervoltage relay was replaced and the isolations were reset at |
| 15:39 hours.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "The impact on the plant from this event was minimal. The selective          |
| isolations and equipment losses during the transient did not result in a     |
| plant transient, and the equipment performed as expected.                    |
|                                                                              |
| "This event has been entered into the site-specific corrective action        |
| program for resolution and generic implications. Industry operational        |
| experience (CE) and vendor database searches identified no related issues    |
| for this model relay.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC site resident has been informed."                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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