Event Notification Report for April 25, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 04/24/2001 - 04/25/2001 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 37806 37840 37858 37941 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 37806 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/05/2001| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:25[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/05/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:13[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRUCE BUTLER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/24/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |STEPHEN CAHILL R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |*INB 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) POT RHR INOP | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) TRIPPED UNEXPECTEDLY DURING TESTING. | | | | Received RCIC "B" logic isolation signal causing RCIC in-board isolation | | valve, 2E51-F007, to close resulting in RCIC trip signal. I&C personnel | | were performing 57SV-CAL-003-25 ATTS transmitter calibration for RCIC "B" | | steam line differential pressure transmitter 2E51-N057B when the isolation | | occurred and this instrument caused the isolation. Investigation is in | | progress to determine the cause. Received isolation signal at 1013 ET, I&C | | backed out of the procedure returning 2E51-N057B transmitter to service and | | RCIC isolation was reset and RCIC returned to standby at 1105 ET. | | | | All other Emergency Core Cooling systems were fully operable during the time | | period RCIC was declared inoperable. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. | | | | * * * RETRACTION ON 04/24/01 AT 1453 ET BY S. HOWARD TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * | | * | | | | Plant Hatch FSAR has been revised such that the Control Rod Drop accident | | limiting event path evaluated in the safety analysis (subsection 15.3.2) | | does not rely on RCIC to mitigate this Design Basis Accident (DBA). None of | | the DBAs, as evaluated in the safety analysis (section 15.3), rely on RCIC | | for event mitigation. RCIC will no longer be an NRC notification when | | declared inoperable. Therefore, this NRC notification is being retracted. | | R2DO (Paul Fredrickson) notified. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 37840 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/14/2001| | UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:13[EST]| | RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/14/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:10[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROSS MOONITZ |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/24/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PETE ESELGROTH R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |*IND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILURE OF EXHAUST LINE VACUUM RELIEF VALVES | | TO FUNCTION DURING IST TESTING | | | | "During routine testing of the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection system | | (HPCI) exhaust line vacuum relief valves (VRV), it was discovered that both | | VRVs failed to open at their In Service Test (IST) required differential | | pressure value. The Unit 2 HPCI system has been declared inoperable and | | repairs are in progress. | | | | "This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due | | to a failure of a single train system which prevents fulfillment of a safety | | function." | | | | With HPCI inoperable this places Unit 2 in a 14-day Limiting Condition of | | Operation. All other ECCS systems have been verified operable. | | | | The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. | | | | | | * * * RETRACTION ON 04/24/01 AT 1254 ET BY STEVE BECK TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * | | * | | | | The original design function of the affected vacuum relief valves was to | | prevent damage to the HPCI exhaust line rupture disks. A failure of the | | rupture disks would result in steam being discharged into the HPCI Room and | | subsequent isolation of the HPCI system on high room temperature. A | | modification to the rupture disk installed backing support plates to ensure | | that repetitive vacuum conditions in the exhaust line would not result in | | fatigue failure of the rupture disks. As a result of the modification, the | | vacuum relief valves are no longer required to open to protect the rupture | | disks. | | | | Based on an Engineering evaluation, it was concluded that the HPCI exhaust | | line vacuum relief valves design function is not required to support HPCI | | system operability. | | | | NUREG 1022, Rev. 2, allows "removal of a system or part of a system from | | service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance | | testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's | | TS (unless a condition is discovered that could have prevent the system from | | performing its function)." | | | | In this case, HPCI was removed from service for planned maintenance per | | plant procedures and Technical Specifications. The condition found (vacuum | | relief valve inoperability) would not have prevented HPCI from performing | | its safety function; therefore this event is not reportable per | | 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(D) or 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v). R1DO (David Silk) notified. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 37858 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/22/2001| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:10[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/22/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:10[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: GUY GRIFFIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/24/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MARK LESSER R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |*INB 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) POT RHR INOP | | |*IND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | RCIC DECLARED INOPERABLE | | | | During an investigation of a ground on Div I 125/250 volt D.C. bus, the | | source of the ground was determined to be 2E51-F008 primary containment | | isolation valve. 2E51-F008 is the outboard steam supply to reactor core | | isolation coolant (RCIC). It was closed and de-energized. 2E51-F008 | | closure rendered RCIC system inoperable. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | | | | * * * RETRACTION ON 04/24/01 AT 1453 ET BY S. HOWARD TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * | | * | | | | Plant Hatch FSAR has been revised such that the Control Rod Drop accident | | limiting event path evaluated in the safety analysis (subsection 15.3.2) | | does not rely on RCIC to mitigate this Design Basis Accident (DBA). None of | | the DBAs, as evaluated in the safety analysis (section 15.3), rely on RCIC | | for event mitigation. RCIC will no longer be an NRC notification when | | declared inoperable. Therefore, this NRC notification is being retracted. | | R2DO (Paul Fredrickson) notified. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified was notified of this retraction by | | the licensee. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 37941 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/24/2001| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:23[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/24/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:06[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE MEYER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/24/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: UNU |THOMAS KOZAK R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: |STUART RICHARDS NRR | |*AEC 50.72(a) (1) (i) EMERGENCY DECLARED |NADER MAMISH IRO | | |GENE CANUPP FEMA | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DECLARATION OF AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO A SMALL DEBRIS FIRE ON A STEAM | | GENERATOR PLATFORM DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF EDDY CURRENT TESTING | | | | At 0148 CDT, the control room was notified of a fire in the Unit 1 | | containment. It is currently believed that a problem with eddy current | | testing equipment (possibly an electrical fault) resulted in a fire | | involving a small pile of debris on the 8-foot elevation steam generator 'A' | | platform. The fire brigade was dispatched immediately, and the fire was | | extinguished within 2 to 3 minutes of the time the extinguishing agent | | (water) was applied. Offsite assistance was not required. At 0211 CDT, a | | second team provided the control room with a confirmatory report that the | | fire had been successfully extinguished. There were no reports of injuries | | or the spread of contamination as a result of the fire. | | | | The exact time the extinguishing agent was applied to the fire was not known | | at the time of this event notification. Because the exact duration of the | | fire (i.e., less than or greater than 10 minutes) was not known, the | | licensee declared an Unusual Event at 0206 CDT as a conservative measure. | | | | At the time of this event, Unit 1 was defueled, and Unit 2 was operating at | | 100% power. | | | | The licensee notified Manitowac and Kewaunee Counties, the Sate of | | Wisconsin, and the NRC resident inspector. | | | | ***** UPDATE AT 0343 EDT ON 04/24/01 FROM MIKE MEYER TO LEIGH TROCINE ***** | | | | The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0243 CDT. | | | | The licensee plans to notify Manitowac and Kewaunee Counties, the Sate of | | Wisconsin, and the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer | | notified the R3DO (Kozak), NRR EO (Richards), IRO (Mamish), and FEMA | | (Canupp). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021