Event Notification Report for April 2, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
03/30/2001 - 04/02/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37875 37876 37877 37878 37879
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37875 |
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| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/30/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:08[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 03/30/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:05[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHARLES MARPLE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/30/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |EDWARD MCALPINE R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*PRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - DEAD GREEN SEA TURTLE FOUND IN PLANT INTAKE |
| |
| At 1005 EST on 3/30/01, a notification was made to the Florida Fish and |
| Wildlife Conservation Commission regarding a dead green sea turtle found in |
| the plant's intake net. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37876 |
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| FACILITY: PALISADES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/31/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:43[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 03/31/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:45[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: R A VINCENT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/31/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*DEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) DEGRAD COND DURING OP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Hot Standby |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| BORIC ACID DEPOSIT DISCOVERED AROUND ONE CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM (CRDM) |
| MECHANICAL SEAL HOUSING. |
| |
| During an inspection of the reactor head area following shutdown for a |
| refueling outage, a boric acid deposit and a small amount of water were |
| found on one (of 45) CRDM mechanical seal housing. These deposits may |
| potentially indicate reactor coolant system through-wall leakage. Further |
| investigation will be performed following plant cooldown to determine |
| whether deposits resulted from through-wall leakage or mechanical joint |
| leakage, and appropriate corrective actions will be taken prior to startup |
| from the refueling outage. |
| |
| Boric acid was spread over a one square foot area and there is not any |
| significant buildup of boric acid deposits. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37877 |
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| FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/31/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:17[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/30/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:16[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: OHRABLO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/31/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAVE LOVELESS R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| Safeguards system degradation related to detection alarms being inoperable. |
| Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. The licensee will |
| notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| Call Headquarters Operation Officer for further details. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37878 |
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| FACILITY: PALO VERDE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/31/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:05[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 03/31/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:58[MST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAN MARKS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/31/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAVE LOVELESS R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*DEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) DEGRAD COND DURING OP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| DISCOVERY OF BORIC ACID RESIDUE BUILDUP ON RCS HOT LEG SPARE THERMOWELL |
| |
| On March 31, 2001, at approximately 10:58 mountain standard time (MST) |
| engineering personnel performing preplanned visual examinations of reactor |
| coolant system (RCS) piping in accordance with procedure requirements |
| discovered boric acid residue on RCS hot leg spare thermowell 1JRCETW0121HB. |
| The visual observation was characterized as white streaks fanning out from |
| the hot leg and continuing up the taper of the thermowell with some build-up |
| on the top of the tapered portion. There were no signs of dripping, |
| spraying, puddles of liquid, or liquid running down the nozzle or hot leg |
| The residue appeared dry. |
| |
| Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 |
| permits no reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leakage and |
| therefore, the discovery of leakage (presumed boric acid residue) from the |
| hot leg thermowell was a degradation of a principal safety barrier. |
| Therefore, the ENS notification of this event is in accordance with |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). The control room personnel entered LCO 3.4.14 |
| Condition B and are continuing to place the plant in Mode 5. |
| |
| The RCS was being cooled down in preparation for Unit 1's ninth refueling |
| outage. At the time of discovery, the RCS was at approximately 300 degrees |
| F and 725 psia. |
| |
| An investigation of this event will be conducted in accordance with the |
| licensee's corrective action program. The cracking of Alloy 600 components |
| both at Palo Verde and industry-wide has been attributed to axially |
| oriented, primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). PWSCC is not |
| considered a significant threat to the structural integrity of the RCS |
| boundary or the thermowell as this type of cracking typically results only |
| in small leaks, The bases for this conclusion is that if PWSCC occurred at |
| Palo Verde, the cracks would be predominately axial in orientation. As in |
| this case, the cracks would result in visibly detectable leakage that would |
| be apparent during visual examinations, performed as part of walkdown |
| inspections, before significant damage to the reactor coolant boundary |
| occurred. |
| |
| Palo Verde has a program for replacing the Alloy 600 thermowells. This |
| thermowell was scheduled for replacement during this refueling outage. The |
| plans to replace the thermowell remain unchanged. |
| |
| No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. There were no |
| structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the time of |
| discovery that contributed to this condition. There were no failures that |
| rendered a train of a safety system inoperable and no failures of components |
| with multiple functions were involved. The event did not result in the |
| release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the |
| safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37879 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/02/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:42[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 04/01/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 01:45[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/02/2001|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MICHAEL JORDAN R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |PATRICIA HOLAHAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: W. F. CAGE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING REFRIGERANT-114 (R-114) |
| NOT IMMEDIATELY SAMPLED TO DETERMINE MOISTURE CONTENT |
| |
| On 03/31/01, R-114 was transferred from a rail car to the C-335 R-114 drain |
| tank. Following the transfer from the rail car it was determined that the |
| C-335 R-114 drain tank was over the desired fill level and the decision was |
| made to transfer the R-114 from the drain tank to C-335 Unit 4 Cell 9 R-114 |
| system. The R-114 transfer to C-335 Unit 4 Cell 9 from the C-335 drain tank |
| was completed at 1740 CST on 03/31/01. Following the 1900 shift change on |
| 03/31/01 the C-335 building personnel questioned if the R-114 in C-335 Unit |
| 4 Cell 9 should be sampled for moisture. A review of the independent assay |
| verification for C-335 Unit 4 Cell 9 revealed the assay was greater than 1 |
| wt% U235 assay and at 0145 CST on 04/01/01 it was determined that moisture |
| sampling was required and the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified. NCSA |
| CAS-011 requires that if R-114 is transferred to a cell that is above |
| 1wt%U235 assay, the R-114 in the cell must be immediately sampled to |
| determine the moisture content. Since the time between the transfer of the |
| R-114 to the cell and the actual sampling was determined to not meet the |
| NCSA requirement of immediate sampling and is therefore an NCS violation. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT: |
| |
| Although a time limit to determine moisture is not possible, the control |
| requires sampling to start immediately as defined in the TSR. Sampling was |
| delayed in violation of the control procedure. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: |
| |
| In order for criticality to be possible, the following sequence must occur: |
| Wet R-114 must leak into the process gas portion of the system which |
| contains a larger that critical mass fissile deposit. Sufficient time to |
| enable the hydrogen of the deposit must pass and the deposit must be in a |
| critical geometry for criticality to be possible. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two |
| controls on moderation. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS AND |
| % CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| 1.5185 wt%U235 |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| The first leg of double contingency is based on immediately sampling of |
| R-114 for water content. Actual moisture content was within acceptable |
| specifications but the sample was not taken in accordance with the time |
| requirement for control. Specifically the control requires immediate |
| sampling upon completion of the addition of R-114. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| |
| The R-114 was sampled at 0300 on 04/1/01 with the moisture level determined |
| to be within specifications. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the Certificate |
| Holder. |
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