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Event Notification Report for March 15, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           03/14/2001 - 03/15/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37831  37835  37836  37837  37838  37839  37840  37841  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37831       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:24[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        03/12/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        17:45[EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/14/2001|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOE HALCOMB                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 - 24 HOUR REPORT                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The following is taken from the faxed report:                                |
|                                                                              |
| ON 3/12/01 AT 1745 HOURS X-705 OPERATIONS PERSONNEL WERE CONDUCTING ROUTINE  |
| INSPECTIONS OF THE TUNNEL BASEMENT AREA WHEN THEY IDENTIFIED THAT THE        |
| SCAVENGER SYSTEM WOULD NOT OPERATE IN THE 'AUTOMATIC' OR THE  'MANUAL' MODE. |
| NCSA-0705_035.A05 REQUIREMENT 5d STATES  "THE SCAVENGER PUMP SWITCH VERIFIED |
| NOT TO BE IN THE 'MANUAL' MODE WHILE UNATTENDED." THE STATUS OF THE          |
| SCAVENGER PUMP SWITCH WAS IN  'AUTOMATIC' MODE BUT IT WAS IDENTIFIED WHEN    |
| TESTED THAT THE PUMP WOULD NOT OPERATE IN THE  'AUTOMATIC' OR THE 'MANUAL'   |
| MODE BUT WOULD OPERATE IN THE  'MANUAL BY-PASS'  MODE. THIS VIOLATES THE     |
| INTENT OF THE NCSA REQUIREMENT WHEREBY THE PUMP WOULD NOT START              |
| AUTOMATICALLY  NOR WAS THE PUMP MANNED IN THE 'MANUAL'  MODE. THE FACT THAT  |
| A TIME FRAME EXISTED WHEN THE PUMP WOULD NOT START IN THE 'AUTOMATIC'  MODE  |
| AND DURING THIS SAME TIME FRAME THE PUMP WAS NOT MANNED IN THE 'MANUAL'      |
| MODE CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF ONE CONTROL WHICH IS RELIED ON TO MEET THE DOUBLE |
| CONTINGENCY PRINCIPAL,                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| LOW = The failure of the Scavenger Pump to operate In the automatic mode     |
| represents the loss of one control (5d) relied upon for double contingency.  |
| The failure of the Scavenger Pump to operate in the automatic mode would     |
| allow the Scavenger System Storage Tank to overflow and solution to collect  |
| on the floor of the basement The size of the floor area and the remaining    |
| control on the amount of solution transferred make a criticality nearly      |
| non-credible.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Six of eight Fissile Solution Storage Banks fail in such a way that all of   |
| the Fissile Solution collects in the tunnel basement floor. This is          |
| sufficient Fissile Solution to exceed the safe depth of 1.5 inches for       |
| solutions containing greater than 100 wt.% U-235.                            |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| Volume Control was lost when the Scavenger Pump failed. Geometry Control was |
| maintained throughout this event.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OP CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The Tunnel Storage System receives Fissile Solution for various operations   |
| in the X-705 Facility. The most likely form is UO2F2 in solution with a      |
| maximum enrichment of 100 wt.% U-235.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| Automatic Mode of Scavenger Pump failed. Pump not manned in Manual Mode, 5d  |
| Control lost. Note: Pump would operate in the Manual By-Pass Mode but the    |
| pump was unmanned. Since no Fissile Solution leaked and allowed >1.5 inches  |
| of solution to collect on the floor the second control was maintained.       |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
|                                                                              |
| Entered Anomalous Condition. Assigned Operator to man the system until       |
| facility status was verified. Immediately verified no evolutions in progress |
| that could challenge the Scavenger System. Tagged out the power supplies to  |
| all facility equipment that could challenge the Scavenger System. Emergent   |
| Work authorized by Plant Shift Superintendent for repairs to Scavenger       |
| System. Called in off-duty Nuclear Criticality Safety Staff to assess        |
| compliance, create Anomalous Condition Report and oversee the efforts to     |
| establish the lost control. Control established at 2038 hours by manning the |
| pump controls.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector as well as the DOE          |
| representative.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1808EST ON 3/14/01 FROM JOE HALCOMB TO S. SANDIN * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| The following update was submitted to clarify the above report:              |
|                                                                              |
| "03/14/01 - Update #1 - The Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Group performed |
| a follow up assessment of the above event. A revision to the NCS Anomalous   |
| Condition Report was issued and it determined that the malfunction of the    |
| scavenger system did not constitute a loss of an NCS control and that double |
| contingency was maintained. The previous issue would not have been reported  |
| based on the revised NCS Anomalous Condition Report."                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector and DOE site                |
| representative.  Notified R3DO(Wright) and NMSS(Hickey).                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37835       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  SAINT VINCENT MEDICAL CENTER         |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/14/2001|
|LICENSEE:  BEST INDUSTRIES                      |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:17[EST]|
|    CITY:  BRIDGEPORT               REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        03/12/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  CT |EVENT TIME:        17:00[EST]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/14/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |PETE ESELGROTH       R1      |
|                                                |KEVIN RAMSEY         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  J. MELI                      |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DEFECTIVE IODINE-125 SEEDS.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| One hundred thirty-three (133) I-125 sources each with an activity of        |
| approximately 0.3 millicuries were received by the Saint Vincent Medical     |
| Center located in Bridgeport, CT.  The I-125 seeds are used for prostate     |
| implants.  Upon receiving the sources they were counted and the seeds'       |
| activity was checked.  They were then placed in a sterilization tray which   |
| has 10 wells (the seeds were distributed among the 10 wells).    The tray    |
| has a cover which allows for steam circulation.  The same day or the         |
| following morning the trays were sent forth to be sterilized.  After         |
| sterilization the seeds are taken out of the sterilizer and the sterilizer   |
| surveyed.  Nothing detectable was noted.  Later that day the seeds were      |
| removed from the wells and loaded into needles.  At the conclusion of this   |
| process the licensee did a survey of the area.  It was then when the         |
| licensee found a rather high level of radiation, not high enough to be a     |
| seed.  After further investigation the licensee concluded that the           |
| sterilization tray was contaminated and highly contaminated in the area of   |
| at least 5 of the 10 wells. The licensee's assumption is that one or more    |
| the seeds opened up during sterilization. The seeds were fine prior to       |
| sterilization.  Total estimated removable contamination found on the tray    |
| was 4 microcuries.    A more through survey was performed on everything that |
| had came in contact with the tray.  It was found that the inner wrapping     |
| that goes around the tray before it is placed in the sterilizer was          |
| contaminated.   Nothing else that had come in contact with the tray was      |
| found to be contaminated. Personnel do not seem to be contaminated.  The two |
| people who were involved in the loading process are scheduled to have        |
| thyroid uptake exams today.  This incident was reported to the seed          |
| manufacturer, Best Industries, and the seeds will be shipped back to them.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37836       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEABROOK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/14/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:11[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        03/14/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HUGH HAWKINS                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/14/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PETE ESELGROTH       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*PRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Hot Standby      |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO VARIOUS AGENCIES CONCERNING AN OIL SPILL ONSITE      |
|                                                                              |
| "At 10:30 AM on 3/14/2001 the following agencies were notified of an oil     |
| leak on site.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| New Hampshire DES                                                            |
| National Response Center                                                     |
| US Coast Guard                                                               |
| Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "About 1 gallon of oil was observed on top of a concrete pad near the        |
| vehicle maintenance shop. The oil came through the pad via cracks in the     |
| concrete. There is an oil line that runs under this pad from a 6000 gallon   |
| above ground tank. The tank has been isolated, local storm drains have been  |
| protected and a contractor is on site to excavate the area and determine the |
| extent of the problem. The notifications were made as a precautionary        |
| measure since the quantity of oil under the concrete pad is unknown.  The    |
| oil was first observed on 3/13/01 at approximately 1600."                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Hospital                                         |Event Number:   37837       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  CHRISTIANA CARE HEALTH SERVICE       |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/14/2001|
|LICENSEE:  CHRISTIANA CARE HEALTH SERVICE       |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:15[EST]|
|    CITY:  WILMINGTON               REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        03/14/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  DE |EVENT TIME:        07:10[EST]|
|LICENSE#:  07-12153-02           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/14/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |PETE ESELGROTH       R1      |
|                                                |FRITZ STURZ          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  EDWARD TORVIK                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAE1 20.2202(b)(1)       PERS OVEREXPOSURE      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE                    |
|                                                                              |
| At approximately 0710EST a technician at the Christiana Care Health Services |
| spilled a tube in the corner of the hot lab containing between 30-50 ml of   |
| Technetium-99m milked from the generator.  The activity was measured as 650  |
| millicuries immediately prior to the spill.  The hot lab was promptly        |
| evacuated. There was no personnel contamination involved.  Initial rad       |
| surveys of the affected area showed between 80 and 200 mr/hr prior to        |
| decontamination.  Following final decontamination measured rad levels taken  |
| at 1000EST were approximately 10 to 40 mr/hr.  Access to the lab has been    |
| restored, however, the corner area is taped off and covered by plastic to    |
| minimize the spread of contamination and allow for decay.                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37838       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/14/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:37[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        03/09/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:45[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HARRY RUSSELL                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/14/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*IND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLING INJECTION (HPCI) RENDERED INOPERABLE DUE TO FAULTY     |
| BATTERY CHARGER                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Investigation of the failure of battery charger 1R42-S031 on 3/9/2001       |
| (reference Condition Report 2001001827) has determined that the Unit 1 HPCI  |
| system was inoperable from the time of receipt of the first 'HPCI System     |
| Inverter Circuit Failure' annunciator until the time charger 1R42-S031 was   |
| removed from service. During this time (approximately 15 to 20 minutes), the |
| HPCI system inverter was tripping on high voltage and resetting              |
| automatically when voltage levels returned to normal. The voltage            |
| fluctuations causing the inverter to trip and reset were caused by an        |
| internal fault in charger 1R42-S031: a bad fuse was making intermittent      |
| connection resulting in intermittent firing of the charger's                 |
| silicon-controlled rectifiers (SCRs) and rapidly changing current and        |
| voltage outputs. These fluctuations and the random tripping of the HPCI      |
| system inverter rendered the HPCI system unreliable, and hence inoperable,   |
| until the cause of the fluctuations was corrected, that is, until the        |
| charger was removed from service. Determined to be reportable 3-14-2001 @    |
| 1338 EST."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37839       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/14/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:02[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        03/14/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:08[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT R. BOESCH             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/14/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:                                |PETE ESELGROTH       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |
|*INB 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)   POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED AN UNEXPECTED LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING DUE TO TRIPPING OF |
| VARIOUS POWER SUPPLY BREAKERS                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 2 was in Mode 5 on the fifth day of its 10th Refuel and Inspection     |
| Outage. At 1508 hours, the unit experienced an unexpected loss of Division 1 |
| RPS Power supply. The loss of power was a result of the Electrical           |
| Protection Assembly (EPA) A & C breakers and motor generator output breaker  |
| tripping. The cause is under investigation.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The loss of power caused the RHR Shutdown Cooling suction valve HV251F009   |
| to close. This is a common suction valve to both divisions of RHR and        |
| resulted in the complete loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling. The reactor currently |
| has its head removed with the reactor cavity flooded up with the gates to    |
| the spent fuel pool removed. A Supplemental Decay Heat Removal system was in |
| service at the time, but was not considered fully capable of decay heat      |
| removal. Reactor coolant temperature increased less than 2 degrees during    |
| the 37 minutes SDC was out of service. The RPS power supply was switched to  |
| its alternate supply and SDC was restored at 1545 hours. In accordance with  |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) this represents a loss of a safety system which removes  |
| residual heat and requires an 8 hour ENS call. In addition to the isolation  |
| of RHR SDC, RWCU isolated due to containment valve HV244F001 closing, and    |
| Unit 2 HVAC Zone 3 (refuel floor) isolated. These isolations constitute an   |
| actuation of a Containment Isolation signal that affected multiple systems,  |
| and is reportable per                                                        |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Peak temperature after losing SDC was 105 degrees. The licensee informed the |
| NRC resident inspector.                                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37840       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/14/2001|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:13[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        03/14/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:10[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROSS MOONITZ                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/14/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PETE ESELGROTH       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*IND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILURE OF EXHAUST LINE VACUUM RELIEF VALVES |
| TO FUNCTION DURING IST TESTING                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "During routine testing of the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection system |
| (HPCI) exhaust line vacuum relief valves (VRV), it was discovered that both  |
| VRVs failed to open at their In Service Test (IST) required differential     |
| pressure value. The Unit 2 HPCI system has been declared inoperable and      |
| repairs are in progress.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due  |
| to a failure of a single train system which prevents fulfillment of a safety |
| function."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| With HPCI inoperable this places Unit 2 in a 14-day Limiting Condition of    |
| Operation.  All other ECCS systems have been verified operable.              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37841       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE              REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/14/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:20[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        03/14/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:52[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVE WILLIAMS                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/14/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED A TURBINE TRIP - REACTOR TRIP ON LOSS OF LOAD             |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1752 hours on 3/14/01, the St. Lucie Unit 2 reactor automatically        |
| tripped on a turbine loss of load signal. Prior to the trip, the output      |
| breaker on the 2A Control Element Drive motor generator set opened for an    |
| unknown reason. Shortly thereafter, various Control Rod trouble alarms       |
| annunciated and the Control Rods dropped into the core due to loss of power  |
| on the Control Rod busses. The loss of power to the Control Rod busses       |
| initiated a turbine trip, which in turn generated a Reactor Protective       |
| System trip signal on loss of load. All Control Rods inserted fully.         |
| Standard Post Trip actions were completed satisfactorily with all safety     |
| functions met.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "Following the trip, it was noticed that the 2A1 non-safety related 6.9KV    |
| electric busses did not automatically transfer to the Startup Transformers.  |
| This resulted in the loss of power to the 2A1 and 2B2 Reactor Coolant Pumps  |
| and the 2A Main Feedwater pump. The cause for the failure to transfer is     |
| being investigated. Due to the loss of the Reactor Coolant Pumps, the        |
| Reactor Coolant System was manually depressurized to 1850 psia per plant     |
| procedures.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System automatically actuated on low      |
| Steam Generator level as expected for reactor trips from high power level.   |
| Steam Generator level is currently being maintained by the 2B Main Feedwater |
| pump.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3 and the cause of the trip is      |
| under investigation."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| No primary safety or reliefs lifted during the transient.  Decay heat is     |
| being removed via the bypass valves to the main condenser.  The AFW pumps    |
| are operating but not supplying feed to the Steam Generators.  The licensee  |
| had not verified whether any atmospheric dumps cycled.  There is no known    |
| Steam Generator tube leakage at this time.  Normal offsite power remains     |
| available and there was no impact on Unit 1 which is operating at 100%       |
| power. Unit 2 will remain in Hot Standby pending development and completion  |
| of corrective actions. The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.     |
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