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Event Notification Report for March 14, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           03/13/2001 - 03/14/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37805  37831  37832  37833  37834  

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37805       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: COOPER                   REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/03/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:48[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        03/03/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:28[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN MYERS                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/13/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LINDA HOWELL         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |
|*INB 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)   POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Hot Shutdown     |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| VARIOUS SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATIONS DURING A PLANNED SHUTDOWN                   |
|                                                                              |
| "While performing a planned shutdown for maintenance, an automatic scram and |
| group isolations occurred due to low Reactor water level.                    |
|                                                                              |
| "The sequence of events was as follows: Initial manual scram was inserted at |
| 09:42 CST to complete the shutdown as part of the plant shutdown procedure.  |
| Following the initial manual scram, 'B' Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) tripped on   |
| high water level. 'A' RFP was previously secured as part of the shutdown     |
| procedure. For undetermined reasons, 'B' RFP was unable to be returned to    |
| service. An attempt was made to start the 'A' RFP but efforts were stopped   |
| due to high vibrations received on 'A' RFP. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling   |
| (RCIC) was manually started to provide make up to the RPV [Reactor Pressure  |
| Vessel]. The subsequent shrink due to the relatively cool water being added  |
| caused water level to lower to the low level scram set point (level 3), and  |
| at 10:28 CST an automatic scram initiated, together with Group 2 (Primary    |
| Containment), Group 3 (Reactor Water Cleanup) and Group 6 (Secondary         |
| Containment) isolations. The Scram and automatic isolations functioned as    |
| designed, except Group 3 had been previously actuated due to high            |
| Non-regenerative Heat Exchanger temperature while initiating blowdown to the |
| main condenser for level control. Level was restored to approximately 17     |
| inches above the low level scram set point and the scram was reset. RCIC     |
| flow was lowered in anticipation of swell due to heating, and level again    |
| lowered. A manual scram was inserted approximately 4 inches prior to the low |
| level scram set point. Level was recovered using RCIC, and, following        |
| resetting of the scram, water level was restored to the normal level, RCIC   |
| secured, and condensate system used to raise level to the shutdown level     |
| band. Level is presently being maintained using the condensate system.       |
|                                                                              |
| "Investigation is on-going for the cause of being unable to restore 'B' RFP  |
| to service following the high level trip, and the reason for the high        |
| temperature isolation of RWCU [Reactor Water Cleanup].                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is making preparations to place the unit in cold shutdown in    |
| the next 2-4 hours.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE  1215EST ON 3/13/01 FROM DAVID VANDERKAMP TO S. SANDIN * * *    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is providing the following clarification as an update:          |
|                                                                              |
| "This is a follow-up report for event #37805 which was reported 3/3/2001 by  |
| Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS). The purpose of this follow-up is to clarify    |
| information provided in the initial eight hour report and to provide         |
| additional event information.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "The initial report described reactor water level anomalies during a normal  |
| planned shutdown for a scheduled mid-cycle outage. The initial report        |
| indicated that the 'B' reactor feedwater pump could not be reset and         |
| restarted. It was also reported that the 'A' reactor feedwater pump was      |
| unavailable. However, a more accurate characterization of the condition is   |
| that the 'A' reactor feedwater pump was started after being shutdown for     |
| some time. Due to the  cold  condition, vibration levels higher than         |
| expected were observed. The highest vibrations seen were well below the      |
| procedural limit requiring turbine trip. Operators made a conscious decision |
| not to use the 'A' reactor feedwater pump other injection sources were       |
| available. The 'A' reactor feedwater pump was available and operators were   |
| aware of its availability, if needed.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The shrink of water level that caused the automatic scram on low water      |
| level was initially attributed to the injection of cold water by RCIC.       |
| Subsequent evaluation has found that the shrink was due to a combination of  |
| the RCIC injection and that of steaming down due to normal pressure control  |
| via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves. Operators did not fully understand this  |
| interaction at the time of its occurrence.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "An additional condition not described in the initial report is concerned    |
| with a transient on the Reactor Equipment Cooling (REC) System. In an        |
| attempt to control high reactor water level, a blowdown was established via  |
| the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System. This blowdown was excessive and     |
| caused boiling in the REC system at the RWCU Non-Regenerative Heat           |
| Exchanger. This boiling resulted in a rapid expansion of the REC system      |
| volume with the excess spilling out the REC surge tank vent. An automatic    |
| isolation of the RWCU system due to high temperature terminated the          |
| condition. Subsequent collapse of the steam voids in the REC System caused   |
| the level in the REC surge tank to drop below the Technical Specifications   |
| allowed value for 5 minutes. During this time period the REC System was      |
| declared inoperable and then was returned to operable status after operators |
| refilled the surge tank. The REC System continued to operate during this     |
| transient.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "The REC System is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat |
| from equipment, such as the room coolers for the core spray pump rooms and   |
| HPCI pump room, required for a safe reactor shutdown following a Design      |
| Basis Accident or transient. With a loss of room cooling, the ability of the |
| Emergency Core Cooling Systems to perform their required safety functions    |
| can no longer be assured. The investigation into the REC surge tank event    |
| continues, and the evidence to date indicates that the REC System transient  |
| was very short and REC remained available during the entire event. In        |
| addition, the reactor was shutdown during this transient. This potential     |
| loss of safety function is reportable as an eight hour report under          |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) pending a final evaluation. This is in addition to    |
| the eight hour report (Event #37805) previously made due to the valid        |
| actuation of the Reactor Protection System and Containment Isolation         |
| Systems. Both of these reports will be discussed in one Licensee Event       |
| Report (LER)."                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.  Notified               |
| R4DO(Johnson).                                                               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37831       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:24[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        03/12/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        17:45[EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/13/2001|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOE HALCOMB                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 - 24 HOUR REPORT                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The following is taken from the faxed report:                                |
|                                                                              |
| ON 3/12/01 AT 1745 HOURS X-705 OPERATIONS PERSONNEL WERE CONDUCTING ROUTINE  |
| INSPECTIONS OF THE TUNNEL BASEMENT AREA WHEN THEY IDENTIFIED THAT THE        |
| SCAVENGER SYSTEM WOULD NOT OPERATE IN THE 'AUTOMATIC' OR THE  'MANUAL' MODE. |
| NCSA-0705_035.A05 REQUIREMENT 5d STATES  "THE SCAVENGER PUMP SWITCH VERIFIED |
| NOT TO BE IN THE 'MANUAL' MODE WHILE UNATTENDED." THE STATUS OF THE          |
| SCAVENGER PUMP SWITCH WAS IN  'AUTOMATIC' MODE BUT IT WAS IDENTIFIED WHEN    |
| TESTED THAT THE PUMP WOULD NOT OPERATE IN THE  'AUTOMATIC' OR THE 'MANUAL'   |
| MODE BUT WOULD OPERATE IN THE  'MANUAL BY-PASS'  MODE. THIS VIOLATES THE     |
| INTENT OF THE NCSA REQUIREMENT WHEREBY THE PUMP WOULD NOT START              |
| AUTOMATICALLY  NOR WAS THE PUMP MANNED IN THE 'MANUAL'  MODE. THE FACT THAT  |
| A TIME FRAME EXISTED WHEN THE PUMP WOULD NOT START IN THE 'AUTOMATIC'  MODE  |
| AND DURING THIS SAME TIME FRAME THE PUMP WAS NOT MANNED IN THE 'MANUAL'      |
| MODE CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF ONE CONTROL WHICH IS RELIED ON TO MEET THE DOUBLE |
| CONTINGENCY PRINCIPAL,                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| LOW = The failure of the Scavenger Pump to operate In the automatic mode     |
| represents the loss of one control (5d) relied upon for double contingency.  |
| The failure of the Scavenger Pump to operate in the automatic mode would     |
| allow the Scavenger System Storage Tank to overflow and solution to collect  |
| on the floor of the basement The size of the floor area and the remaining    |
| control on the amount of solution transferred make a criticality nearly      |
| non-credible.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Six of eight Fissile Solution Storage Banks fail in such a way that all of   |
| the Fissile Solution collects in the tunnel basement floor. This is          |
| sufficient Fissile Solution to exceed the safe depth of 1.5 inches for       |
| solutions containing greater than 100 wt.% U-235.                            |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| Volume Control was lost when the Scavenger Pump failed. Geometry Control was |
| maintained throughout this event.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OP CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The Tunnel Storage System receives Fissile Solution for various operations   |
| in the X-705 Facility. The most likely form is UO2F2 in solution with a      |
| maximum enrichment of 100 wt.% U-235.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| Automatic Mode of Scavenger Pump failed. Pump not manned in Manual Mode, 5d  |
| Control lost. Note: Pump would operate in the Manual By-Pass Mode but the    |
| pump was unmanned. Since no Fissile Solution leaked and allowed >1.5 inches  |
| of solution to collect on the floor the second control was maintained.       |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
|                                                                              |
| Entered Anomalous Condition. Assigned Operator to man the system until       |
| facility status was verified. Immediately verified no evolutions in progress |
| that could challenge the Scavenger System. Tagged out the power supplies to  |
| all facility equipment that could challenge the Scavenger System. Emergent   |
| Work authorized by Plant Shift Superintendent for repairs to Scavenger       |
| System. Called in off-duty Nuclear Criticality Safety Staff to assess        |
| compliance, create Anomalous Condition Report and oversee the efforts to     |
| establish the lost control. Control established at 2038 hours by manning the |
| pump controls.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector as well as the DOE          |
| representative.                                                              |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   37832       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY        |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/2001|
|LICENSEE:  PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY        |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:39[EST]|
|    CITY:  UNIVERSITY PARK          REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        03/13/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  PA |EVENT TIME:             [EST]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/13/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |PETE ESELGROTH       R1      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ERIC BOELDT                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MISSING TRITIUM TUBE FROM EXIT SIGN                                          |
|                                                                              |
| During removal of tritium exit signs from the campus, one of the signs in    |
| the Academic Projects Building was found to be missing one of four tubes of  |
| tritium.  The tube originally contained a maximum of 6 Curies in April, 1983 |
| and 2.3 Curies today, it is not considered a hazard to the public.  The      |
| licensee does not know if the tube was missing when the sign was installed   |
| or has been removed since.  The sign was originally in a different building. |
| The sign is a Everglow Safety Sign, model #710-1 and serial #14867.  The     |
| licensee will contact NRC Region 1 (Thompson).                               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37833       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:18[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        03/13/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        14:15[EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/13/2001|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOE HALCOMB                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)        SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILUR|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|  SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE RELATED TO STEAM LEAK ON AUTOCLAVE #3              |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1415 hours on 3/13/01 after questioning by the Senior NRC Resident       |
| Inspector concerning a steam leak on autoclave (A/C) #3 in the X-344, it was |
| discovered that an as found reading (pressure decay test) was not performed  |
| on A/C #3 prior to the Maintenance department replacing the o-ring during    |
| the evening of 3/12/01. Without performing the pressure decay test there is  |
| no possible method to verify if the o-ring would have performed its safety   |
| function. This test would have been used to determine if an observed steam   |
| leak on A/C #3 that occurred at 1050 hours during the early phase of an      |
| applicable heating mode on 3/12/01 would have been classified as a Safety    |
| Equipment Failure per the plant's NRC Event reporting Criteria.              |
|                                                                              |
| "Since the As Found Reading (pressure decay test) was not performed, the     |
| failure of the o-ring as observed by the steam leak on A/C #3 in the X-344   |
| building, is being reported as a 'Safety Equipment Failure' per table 6.9.1  |
| section J of the SAR."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Operations has informed the NRC resident inspector and the DOE site          |
| representative.                                                              |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37834       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:07[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        03/13/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:45[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN HODDY                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/13/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PETE ESELGROTH       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*IND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE EXCESSIVE     |
| MOISTURE IN LUBE OIL                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "At approximately 1100 hours, operators observed oil puddled around the HPCI |
| lube oil sump vents and observed a slightly higher than normal sump level.   |
| The system engineer was consulted and recommended lowering sump level and    |
| sampling for moisture.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1445, water was observed in the sample taken from the HPCI lube oil      |
| sump.  The amount of water observed (approximately 1/2 gallon) was such that |
| compliance with a maximum recommended lube oil moisture content of 5% could  |
| not be assured.  A conservative decision was made to declare HPCI            |
| inoperable.  The system is inoperable but available.  The plant is in a 7    |
| day LCO per T.S. 3.5.C."                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+