Event Notification Report for March 14, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
03/13/2001 - 03/14/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37805 37831 37832 37833 37834
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37805 |
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| FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/03/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:48[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/03/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:28[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN MYERS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/13/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LINDA HOWELL R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
|*INB 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) POT RHR INOP | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| VARIOUS SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATIONS DURING A PLANNED SHUTDOWN |
| |
| "While performing a planned shutdown for maintenance, an automatic scram and |
| group isolations occurred due to low Reactor water level. |
| |
| "The sequence of events was as follows: Initial manual scram was inserted at |
| 09:42 CST to complete the shutdown as part of the plant shutdown procedure. |
| Following the initial manual scram, 'B' Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) tripped on |
| high water level. 'A' RFP was previously secured as part of the shutdown |
| procedure. For undetermined reasons, 'B' RFP was unable to be returned to |
| service. An attempt was made to start the 'A' RFP but efforts were stopped |
| due to high vibrations received on 'A' RFP. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling |
| (RCIC) was manually started to provide make up to the RPV [Reactor Pressure |
| Vessel]. The subsequent shrink due to the relatively cool water being added |
| caused water level to lower to the low level scram set point (level 3), and |
| at 10:28 CST an automatic scram initiated, together with Group 2 (Primary |
| Containment), Group 3 (Reactor Water Cleanup) and Group 6 (Secondary |
| Containment) isolations. The Scram and automatic isolations functioned as |
| designed, except Group 3 had been previously actuated due to high |
| Non-regenerative Heat Exchanger temperature while initiating blowdown to the |
| main condenser for level control. Level was restored to approximately 17 |
| inches above the low level scram set point and the scram was reset. RCIC |
| flow was lowered in anticipation of swell due to heating, and level again |
| lowered. A manual scram was inserted approximately 4 inches prior to the low |
| level scram set point. Level was recovered using RCIC, and, following |
| resetting of the scram, water level was restored to the normal level, RCIC |
| secured, and condensate system used to raise level to the shutdown level |
| band. Level is presently being maintained using the condensate system. |
| |
| "Investigation is on-going for the cause of being unable to restore 'B' RFP |
| to service following the high level trip, and the reason for the high |
| temperature isolation of RWCU [Reactor Water Cleanup]. |
| |
| "The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| |
| The licensee is making preparations to place the unit in cold shutdown in |
| the next 2-4 hours. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1215EST ON 3/13/01 FROM DAVID VANDERKAMP TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The licensee is providing the following clarification as an update: |
| |
| "This is a follow-up report for event #37805 which was reported 3/3/2001 by |
| Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS). The purpose of this follow-up is to clarify |
| information provided in the initial eight hour report and to provide |
| additional event information. |
| |
| "The initial report described reactor water level anomalies during a normal |
| planned shutdown for a scheduled mid-cycle outage. The initial report |
| indicated that the 'B' reactor feedwater pump could not be reset and |
| restarted. It was also reported that the 'A' reactor feedwater pump was |
| unavailable. However, a more accurate characterization of the condition is |
| that the 'A' reactor feedwater pump was started after being shutdown for |
| some time. Due to the cold condition, vibration levels higher than |
| expected were observed. The highest vibrations seen were well below the |
| procedural limit requiring turbine trip. Operators made a conscious decision |
| not to use the 'A' reactor feedwater pump other injection sources were |
| available. The 'A' reactor feedwater pump was available and operators were |
| aware of its availability, if needed. |
| |
| "The shrink of water level that caused the automatic scram on low water |
| level was initially attributed to the injection of cold water by RCIC. |
| Subsequent evaluation has found that the shrink was due to a combination of |
| the RCIC injection and that of steaming down due to normal pressure control |
| via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves. Operators did not fully understand this |
| interaction at the time of its occurrence. |
| |
| "An additional condition not described in the initial report is concerned |
| with a transient on the Reactor Equipment Cooling (REC) System. In an |
| attempt to control high reactor water level, a blowdown was established via |
| the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System. This blowdown was excessive and |
| caused boiling in the REC system at the RWCU Non-Regenerative Heat |
| Exchanger. This boiling resulted in a rapid expansion of the REC system |
| volume with the excess spilling out the REC surge tank vent. An automatic |
| isolation of the RWCU system due to high temperature terminated the |
| condition. Subsequent collapse of the steam voids in the REC System caused |
| the level in the REC surge tank to drop below the Technical Specifications |
| allowed value for 5 minutes. During this time period the REC System was |
| declared inoperable and then was returned to operable status after operators |
| refilled the surge tank. The REC System continued to operate during this |
| transient. |
| |
| "The REC System is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat |
| from equipment, such as the room coolers for the core spray pump rooms and |
| HPCI pump room, required for a safe reactor shutdown following a Design |
| Basis Accident or transient. With a loss of room cooling, the ability of the |
| Emergency Core Cooling Systems to perform their required safety functions |
| can no longer be assured. The investigation into the REC surge tank event |
| continues, and the evidence to date indicates that the REC System transient |
| was very short and REC remained available during the entire event. In |
| addition, the reactor was shutdown during this transient. This potential |
| loss of safety function is reportable as an eight hour report under |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) pending a final evaluation. This is in addition to |
| the eight hour report (Event #37805) previously made due to the valid |
| actuation of the Reactor Protection System and Containment Isolation |
| Systems. Both of these reports will be discussed in one Licensee Event |
| Report (LER)." |
| |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Notified |
| R4DO(Johnson). |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37831 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:24[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/12/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 17:45[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/13/2001|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOE HALCOMB | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 - 24 HOUR REPORT |
| |
| The following is taken from the faxed report: |
| |
| ON 3/12/01 AT 1745 HOURS X-705 OPERATIONS PERSONNEL WERE CONDUCTING ROUTINE |
| INSPECTIONS OF THE TUNNEL BASEMENT AREA WHEN THEY IDENTIFIED THAT THE |
| SCAVENGER SYSTEM WOULD NOT OPERATE IN THE 'AUTOMATIC' OR THE 'MANUAL' MODE. |
| NCSA-0705_035.A05 REQUIREMENT 5d STATES "THE SCAVENGER PUMP SWITCH VERIFIED |
| NOT TO BE IN THE 'MANUAL' MODE WHILE UNATTENDED." THE STATUS OF THE |
| SCAVENGER PUMP SWITCH WAS IN 'AUTOMATIC' MODE BUT IT WAS IDENTIFIED WHEN |
| TESTED THAT THE PUMP WOULD NOT OPERATE IN THE 'AUTOMATIC' OR THE 'MANUAL' |
| MODE BUT WOULD OPERATE IN THE 'MANUAL BY-PASS' MODE. THIS VIOLATES THE |
| INTENT OF THE NCSA REQUIREMENT WHEREBY THE PUMP WOULD NOT START |
| AUTOMATICALLY NOR WAS THE PUMP MANNED IN THE 'MANUAL' MODE. THE FACT THAT |
| A TIME FRAME EXISTED WHEN THE PUMP WOULD NOT START IN THE 'AUTOMATIC' MODE |
| AND DURING THIS SAME TIME FRAME THE PUMP WAS NOT MANNED IN THE 'MANUAL' |
| MODE CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF ONE CONTROL WHICH IS RELIED ON TO MEET THE DOUBLE |
| CONTINGENCY PRINCIPAL, |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| LOW = The failure of the Scavenger Pump to operate In the automatic mode |
| represents the loss of one control (5d) relied upon for double contingency. |
| The failure of the Scavenger Pump to operate in the automatic mode would |
| allow the Scavenger System Storage Tank to overflow and solution to collect |
| on the floor of the basement The size of the floor area and the remaining |
| control on the amount of solution transferred make a criticality nearly |
| non-credible. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| Six of eight Fissile Solution Storage Banks fail in such a way that all of |
| the Fissile Solution collects in the tunnel basement floor. This is |
| sufficient Fissile Solution to exceed the safe depth of 1.5 inches for |
| solutions containing greater than 100 wt.% U-235. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| Volume Control was lost when the Scavenger Pump failed. Geometry Control was |
| maintained throughout this event. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OP CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| The Tunnel Storage System receives Fissile Solution for various operations |
| in the X-705 Facility. The most likely form is UO2F2 in solution with a |
| maximum enrichment of 100 wt.% U-235. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| Automatic Mode of Scavenger Pump failed. Pump not manned in Manual Mode, 5d |
| Control lost. Note: Pump would operate in the Manual By-Pass Mode but the |
| pump was unmanned. Since no Fissile Solution leaked and allowed >1.5 inches |
| of solution to collect on the floor the second control was maintained. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| Entered Anomalous Condition. Assigned Operator to man the system until |
| facility status was verified. Immediately verified no evolutions in progress |
| that could challenge the Scavenger System. Tagged out the power supplies to |
| all facility equipment that could challenge the Scavenger System. Emergent |
| Work authorized by Plant Shift Superintendent for repairs to Scavenger |
| System. Called in off-duty Nuclear Criticality Safety Staff to assess |
| compliance, create Anomalous Condition Report and oversee the efforts to |
| establish the lost control. Control established at 2038 hours by manning the |
| pump controls. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector as well as the DOE |
| representative. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 37832 |
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| REP ORG: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/2001|
|LICENSEE: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:39[EST]|
| CITY: UNIVERSITY PARK REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 03/13/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: PA |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/13/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |PETE ESELGROTH R1 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC BOELDT | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| MISSING TRITIUM TUBE FROM EXIT SIGN |
| |
| During removal of tritium exit signs from the campus, one of the signs in |
| the Academic Projects Building was found to be missing one of four tubes of |
| tritium. The tube originally contained a maximum of 6 Curies in April, 1983 |
| and 2.3 Curies today, it is not considered a hazard to the public. The |
| licensee does not know if the tube was missing when the sign was installed |
| or has been removed since. The sign was originally in a different building. |
| The sign is a Everglow Safety Sign, model #710-1 and serial #14867. The |
| licensee will contact NRC Region 1 (Thompson). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37833 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:18[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/13/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:15[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/13/2001|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOE HALCOMB | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2) SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILUR| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE RELATED TO STEAM LEAK ON AUTOCLAVE #3 |
| |
| "At 1415 hours on 3/13/01 after questioning by the Senior NRC Resident |
| Inspector concerning a steam leak on autoclave (A/C) #3 in the X-344, it was |
| discovered that an as found reading (pressure decay test) was not performed |
| on A/C #3 prior to the Maintenance department replacing the o-ring during |
| the evening of 3/12/01. Without performing the pressure decay test there is |
| no possible method to verify if the o-ring would have performed its safety |
| function. This test would have been used to determine if an observed steam |
| leak on A/C #3 that occurred at 1050 hours during the early phase of an |
| applicable heating mode on 3/12/01 would have been classified as a Safety |
| Equipment Failure per the plant's NRC Event reporting Criteria. |
| |
| "Since the As Found Reading (pressure decay test) was not performed, the |
| failure of the o-ring as observed by the steam leak on A/C #3 in the X-344 |
| building, is being reported as a 'Safety Equipment Failure' per table 6.9.1 |
| section J of the SAR." |
| |
| Operations has informed the NRC resident inspector and the DOE site |
| representative. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37834 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:07[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/13/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:45[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN HODDY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/13/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PETE ESELGROTH R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*IND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE EXCESSIVE |
| MOISTURE IN LUBE OIL |
| |
| "At approximately 1100 hours, operators observed oil puddled around the HPCI |
| lube oil sump vents and observed a slightly higher than normal sump level. |
| The system engineer was consulted and recommended lowering sump level and |
| sampling for moisture. |
| |
| "At 1445, water was observed in the sample taken from the HPCI lube oil |
| sump. The amount of water observed (approximately 1/2 gallon) was such that |
| compliance with a maximum recommended lube oil moisture content of 5% could |
| not be assured. A conservative decision was made to declare HPCI |
| inoperable. The system is inoperable but available. The plant is in a 7 |
| day LCO per T.S. 3.5.C." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. |
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