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Event Notification Report for March 9, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           03/08/2001 - 03/09/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37813  37814  37815  37816  

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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37813       |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/08/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:03[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        03/07/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        09:00[EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/08/2001|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |DONALD COOL          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KURT SISLER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| 24 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "On 3-7-01 at 0900 hours , in preparation to implement NCSA-PLANT091 it was  |
| discovered that PORTS has a plutonium-239 (Pu-239) source that exceeds the   |
| mass control limit of the unimplemented NCSA. This new NCSA was Plant        |
| Operations Review Committee (PORC) approved but is not activated.            |
| NCSA-PLANT091 establishes minimum masses for several fissile isotopes for    |
| determining when Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls are required.     |
| For Pu-239, the control limit is 7.2 grams.  The sealed source contains 32   |
| grams of Pu-239.  An anomalous condition was entered and a boundary          |
| established around the source pending NCS review.  Upon further review, NCS  |
| determined that there is not an active NCSA/NCSE to control the Pu-239       |
| source.  The storage of the Pu-239 source is considered unanalyzed since     |
| there is not an active NCSA/NCSE documenting the double contingency of this  |
| storage.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "The safety significance of this event is very low.  The Pu-239 source is in |
| a storage unit at the X-326 Health Physics (HP) Source Storage Vault.  The   |
| storage unit provides spacing from other materials and there were no other   |
| fissile materials near the storage unit that would require NCSA controls.    |
| Spacing from other fissile material is not an issue. NCSA-PLANT021           |
| determined that the safe mass of Pu-239 is 207 grams. The source contains 32 |
| grams Pu-239 and is well below the safe mass value of 207 grams.  Double     |
| contingency exists, but has not been formally documented in an implemented   |
| Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The discovery of this source is a legacy issue This source was transported  |
| to PORTS in 1961 from offsite. This source has not been used since NRC       |
| regulation of PORTS.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The safety significance of this event is very low. The discovery of this    |
| source is a legacy issue. This source was transported to PORTS In 1961 from  |
| offsite. The subcritical mass limit for Pu-239 per ANSI/ANS-8.15 is 450      |
| grams.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "This source has not been used since coming under NRC regulation.  There are |
| no Radiation Work permits (RWP) or procedures that use this source. There is |
| no reason to believe that the source has been removed from its storage unit. |
| The storage unit provides some spacing from other materials and there were   |
| no other fissile materials in the storage area that would require spacing    |
| for NCS.  Double contingency exists, but it has not been documented in an    |
| Implemented Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation.                           |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "A violation of an NCSA for other fissile materials in conjunction with      |
| placement near the Pu-239 source would be required before criticality would  |
| be credible or a much larger mass of Pu-239 would be required.               |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
|                                                                              |
| "Although an NCSA was not in place, the mass of Pu-239 was only a fraction   |
| of the Pu-239 safe mass and there were no other fissile materials in the     |
| storage area that would require spacing for NCS.                             |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "The licensed material was 32 grams of Pu-239 in the form of a sealed        |
| source. This is approximately 7% of a subcritical mass (450 grams per        |
| ANSI/ANS-8.15).                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "There were no established controls over this material. However, much less   |
| than a safe mass was involved and there were no other fissile materials in   |
| the storage area that would require spacing for NCS.  Therefore, the         |
| significance of this event is very low.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| "Upon discovery, a boundary was established and an anomalous condition       |
| entered."                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event.                  |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37814       |
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| FACILITY: PILGRIM                  REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/08/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:44[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        03/08/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:59[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN NEAL                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/08/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RONALD BELLAMY       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |ROBERT DENNIG        NRR     |
|HFIT 26.73               FITNESS FOR DUTY       |NADER MAMISH         IRO     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A SUPERVISOR                               |
|                                                                              |
| A non-licensed supervisor was determined to be under the influence of        |
| alcohol during a random test.  The employee's access has been terminated.    |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.  Contact the Operations |
| Center for additional details.                                               |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37815       |
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| FACILITY: MONTICELLO               REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/08/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:04[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        03/05/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:08[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PAT DECKER                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/08/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*UNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)  UNANALYZED COND OP     |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER ALL POSSIBLE    |
| FLOW CONDITIONS                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "On March 5, 2001, it was discovered that the structural analysis of         |
| in-vessel Core Spray piping did not consider all applicable flow conditions. |
| A notification should have been made at that time because the effect of the  |
| unanalyzed condition on degradation of plant safety was not considered with  |
| respect to all plant operating conditions (i.e., the plant was shut down at  |
| the time of discovery).  Preliminary analysis results indicated that         |
| previous analyses are bounding."                                             |
|                                                                              |
| This issue will be resolved before the next plant startup.                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.                         |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37816       |
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| FACILITY: MONTICELLO               REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:30[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        03/09/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:30[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TIM ROGERS                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/09/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*SHU 50.72(b)(2)(i)      PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A          N       0        Refueling        |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| MODE CHANGE DUE TO LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF REQUIREMENTS                    |
|                                                                              |
| "To meet compliance with literal interpretation of Tech Spec 3.7.A.5 and     |
| 3.8.B.6, containment venting and purging using SBGT is required above 'Cold  |
| Shutdown.'  Plant is < 212, all rods in BUT mode switch was in 'Refuel.' To |
| comply with Tech Specs, a Tech Spec shutdown with mode switch was performed. |
| All rods were already in but it wasn't a preplanned shutdown evolution.      |
| Other similar 'Cold Shutdown' Tech Spec compliance issues are being looked   |
| at."                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| An automatic scram signal was generated when the mode switch was taken to    |
| the 'Shutdown' position. Although all control rods were already inserted,    |
| the licensee considers this action to be reportable as a valid safety system |
| actuation. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the  |
| licensee.                                                                    |
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