Event Notification Report for March 9, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
03/08/2001 - 03/09/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37813 37814 37815 37816
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37813 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/08/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:03[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/07/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:00[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/08/2001|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN MADERA R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |DONALD COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KURT SISLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 24 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT |
| |
| "On 3-7-01 at 0900 hours , in preparation to implement NCSA-PLANT091 it was |
| discovered that PORTS has a plutonium-239 (Pu-239) source that exceeds the |
| mass control limit of the unimplemented NCSA. This new NCSA was Plant |
| Operations Review Committee (PORC) approved but is not activated. |
| NCSA-PLANT091 establishes minimum masses for several fissile isotopes for |
| determining when Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls are required. |
| For Pu-239, the control limit is 7.2 grams. The sealed source contains 32 |
| grams of Pu-239. An anomalous condition was entered and a boundary |
| established around the source pending NCS review. Upon further review, NCS |
| determined that there is not an active NCSA/NCSE to control the Pu-239 |
| source. The storage of the Pu-239 source is considered unanalyzed since |
| there is not an active NCSA/NCSE documenting the double contingency of this |
| storage. |
| |
| "The safety significance of this event is very low. The Pu-239 source is in |
| a storage unit at the X-326 Health Physics (HP) Source Storage Vault. The |
| storage unit provides spacing from other materials and there were no other |
| fissile materials near the storage unit that would require NCSA controls. |
| Spacing from other fissile material is not an issue. NCSA-PLANT021 |
| determined that the safe mass of Pu-239 is 207 grams. The source contains 32 |
| grams Pu-239 and is well below the safe mass value of 207 grams. Double |
| contingency exists, but has not been formally documented in an implemented |
| Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation. |
| |
| "The discovery of this source is a legacy issue This source was transported |
| to PORTS in 1961 from offsite. This source has not been used since NRC |
| regulation of PORTS. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "The safety significance of this event is very low. The discovery of this |
| source is a legacy issue. This source was transported to PORTS In 1961 from |
| offsite. The subcritical mass limit for Pu-239 per ANSI/ANS-8.15 is 450 |
| grams. |
| |
| "This source has not been used since coming under NRC regulation. There are |
| no Radiation Work permits (RWP) or procedures that use this source. There is |
| no reason to believe that the source has been removed from its storage unit. |
| The storage unit provides some spacing from other materials and there were |
| no other fissile materials in the storage area that would require spacing |
| for NCS. Double contingency exists, but it has not been documented in an |
| Implemented Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| "A violation of an NCSA for other fissile materials in conjunction with |
| placement near the Pu-239 source would be required before criticality would |
| be credible or a much larger mass of Pu-239 would be required. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| "Although an NCSA was not in place, the mass of Pu-239 was only a fraction |
| of the Pu-239 safe mass and there were no other fissile materials in the |
| storage area that would require spacing for NCS. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| "The licensed material was 32 grams of Pu-239 in the form of a sealed |
| source. This is approximately 7% of a subcritical mass (450 grams per |
| ANSI/ANS-8.15). |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| "There were no established controls over this material. However, much less |
| than a safe mass was involved and there were no other fissile materials in |
| the storage area that would require spacing for NCS. Therefore, the |
| significance of this event is very low. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| "Upon discovery, a boundary was established and an anomalous condition |
| entered." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37814 |
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| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/08/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:44[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 03/08/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:59[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN NEAL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/08/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RONALD BELLAMY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |ROBERT DENNIG NRR |
|HFIT 26.73 FITNESS FOR DUTY |NADER MAMISH IRO |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A SUPERVISOR |
| |
| A non-licensed supervisor was determined to be under the influence of |
| alcohol during a random test. The employee's access has been terminated. |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Contact the Operations |
| Center for additional details. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37815 |
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| FACILITY: MONTICELLO REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/08/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:04[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 03/05/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:08[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAT DECKER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/08/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN MADERA R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*UNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED COND OP | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER ALL POSSIBLE |
| FLOW CONDITIONS |
| |
| "On March 5, 2001, it was discovered that the structural analysis of |
| in-vessel Core Spray piping did not consider all applicable flow conditions. |
| A notification should have been made at that time because the effect of the |
| unanalyzed condition on degradation of plant safety was not considered with |
| respect to all plant operating conditions (i.e., the plant was shut down at |
| the time of discovery). Preliminary analysis results indicated that |
| previous analyses are bounding." |
| |
| This issue will be resolved before the next plant startup. |
| |
| The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37816 |
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| FACILITY: MONTICELLO REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:30[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 03/09/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:30[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TIM ROGERS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/09/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN MADERA R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*SHU 50.72(b)(2)(i) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
|*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A N 0 Refueling |0 Cold Shutdown |
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EVENT TEXT
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| MODE CHANGE DUE TO LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF REQUIREMENTS |
| |
| "To meet compliance with literal interpretation of Tech Spec 3.7.A.5 and |
| 3.8.B.6, containment venting and purging using SBGT is required above 'Cold |
| Shutdown.' Plant is < 212�, all rods in BUT mode switch was in 'Refuel.' To |
| comply with Tech Specs, a Tech Spec shutdown with mode switch was performed. |
| All rods were already in but it wasn't a preplanned shutdown evolution. |
| Other similar 'Cold Shutdown' Tech Spec compliance issues are being looked |
| at." |
| |
| An automatic scram signal was generated when the mode switch was taken to |
| the 'Shutdown' position. Although all control rods were already inserted, |
| the licensee considers this action to be reportable as a valid safety system |
| actuation. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the |
| licensee. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021