Event Notification Report for March 9, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 03/08/2001 - 03/09/2001 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 37813 37814 37815 37816 +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37813 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/08/2001| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:03[EST]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/07/2001| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:00[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/08/2001| | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN MADERA R3 | | DOCKET: 0707002 |DONALD COOL NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: KURT SISLER | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 24 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT | | | | "On 3-7-01 at 0900 hours , in preparation to implement NCSA-PLANT091 it was | | discovered that PORTS has a plutonium-239 (Pu-239) source that exceeds the | | mass control limit of the unimplemented NCSA. This new NCSA was Plant | | Operations Review Committee (PORC) approved but is not activated. | | NCSA-PLANT091 establishes minimum masses for several fissile isotopes for | | determining when Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls are required. | | For Pu-239, the control limit is 7.2 grams. The sealed source contains 32 | | grams of Pu-239. An anomalous condition was entered and a boundary | | established around the source pending NCS review. Upon further review, NCS | | determined that there is not an active NCSA/NCSE to control the Pu-239 | | source. The storage of the Pu-239 source is considered unanalyzed since | | there is not an active NCSA/NCSE documenting the double contingency of this | | storage. | | | | "The safety significance of this event is very low. The Pu-239 source is in | | a storage unit at the X-326 Health Physics (HP) Source Storage Vault. The | | storage unit provides spacing from other materials and there were no other | | fissile materials near the storage unit that would require NCSA controls. | | Spacing from other fissile material is not an issue. NCSA-PLANT021 | | determined that the safe mass of Pu-239 is 207 grams. The source contains 32 | | grams Pu-239 and is well below the safe mass value of 207 grams. Double | | contingency exists, but has not been formally documented in an implemented | | Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation. | | | | "The discovery of this source is a legacy issue This source was transported | | to PORTS in 1961 from offsite. This source has not been used since NRC | | regulation of PORTS. | | | | "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | | | "The safety significance of this event is very low. The discovery of this | | source is a legacy issue. This source was transported to PORTS In 1961 from | | offsite. The subcritical mass limit for Pu-239 per ANSI/ANS-8.15 is 450 | | grams. | | | | "This source has not been used since coming under NRC regulation. There are | | no Radiation Work permits (RWP) or procedures that use this source. There is | | no reason to believe that the source has been removed from its storage unit. | | The storage unit provides some spacing from other materials and there were | | no other fissile materials in the storage area that would require spacing | | for NCS. Double contingency exists, but it has not been documented in an | | Implemented Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation. | | | | "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): | | | | "A violation of an NCSA for other fissile materials in conjunction with | | placement near the Pu-239 source would be required before criticality would | | be credible or a much larger mass of Pu-239 would be required. | | | | "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | | | "Although an NCSA was not in place, the mass of Pu-239 was only a fraction | | of the Pu-239 safe mass and there were no other fissile materials in the | | storage area that would require spacing for NCS. | | | | "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): | | | | "The licensed material was 32 grams of Pu-239 in the form of a sealed | | source. This is approximately 7% of a subcritical mass (450 grams per | | ANSI/ANS-8.15). | | | | "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES | | | | "There were no established controls over this material. However, much less | | than a safe mass was involved and there were no other fissile materials in | | the storage area that would require spacing for NCS. Therefore, the | | significance of this event is very low. | | | | "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | | | "Upon discovery, a boundary was established and an anomalous condition | | entered." | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 37814 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/08/2001| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:44[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 03/08/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:59[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN NEAL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/08/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RONALD BELLAMY R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: |ROBERT DENNIG NRR | |HFIT 26.73 FITNESS FOR DUTY |NADER MAMISH IRO | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A SUPERVISOR | | | | A non-licensed supervisor was determined to be under the influence of | | alcohol during a random test. The employee's access has been terminated. | | The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Contact the Operations | | Center for additional details. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 37815 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: MONTICELLO REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/08/2001| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:04[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 03/05/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:08[CST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAT DECKER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/08/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN MADERA R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |*UNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED COND OP | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER ALL POSSIBLE | | FLOW CONDITIONS | | | | "On March 5, 2001, it was discovered that the structural analysis of | | in-vessel Core Spray piping did not consider all applicable flow conditions. | | A notification should have been made at that time because the effect of the | | unanalyzed condition on degradation of plant safety was not considered with | | respect to all plant operating conditions (i.e., the plant was shut down at | | the time of discovery). Preliminary analysis results indicated that | | previous analyses are bounding." | | | | This issue will be resolved before the next plant startup. | | | | The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 37816 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: MONTICELLO REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2001| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:30[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 03/09/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:30[CST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: TIM ROGERS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/09/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN MADERA R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |*SHU 50.72(b)(2)(i) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | | |*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 A N 0 Refueling |0 Cold Shutdown | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MODE CHANGE DUE TO LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF REQUIREMENTS | | | | "To meet compliance with literal interpretation of Tech Spec 3.7.A.5 and | | 3.8.B.6, containment venting and purging using SBGT is required above 'Cold | | Shutdown.' Plant is < 212�, all rods in BUT mode switch was in 'Refuel.' To | | comply with Tech Specs, a Tech Spec shutdown with mode switch was performed. | | All rods were already in but it wasn't a preplanned shutdown evolution. | | Other similar 'Cold Shutdown' Tech Spec compliance issues are being looked | | at." | | | | An automatic scram signal was generated when the mode switch was taken to | | the 'Shutdown' position. Although all control rods were already inserted, | | the licensee considers this action to be reportable as a valid safety system | | actuation. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the | | licensee. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021