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Event Notification Report for March 8, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           03/07/2001 - 03/08/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37810  37812  37813  

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37810       |
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| FACILITY: SEABROOK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/06/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:24[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        03/05/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:24[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JIM CROWLEY                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/07/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          UNU                   |RICHARD CONTE        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |BILL BATEMAN         NRR     |
|*AEC 50.72(a) (1) (i)    EMERGENCY DECLARED     |CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
|*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|CHARLIE BAGWELL      FEMA    |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| DISCRETIONARY UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A MOMENTARY LOSS OF OFFSITE      |
| POWER DURING AN ONGOING SEVERE WINTER STORM AND SUBSEQUENT AUTOMATIC REACTOR |
| TRIP DUE TO GRID INSTABILITY                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| During an ongoing severe winter storm, the 345-kV breakers tripped open and  |
| re-closed resulting in a momentary loss of offsite power.  An automatic      |
| reactor trip also occurred at 2324 on 03/05/01 due to electrical grid        |
| instability.  (The exact cause of the reactor trip is currently under        |
| investigation because there was no first out indication.)  All rods fully    |
| inserted.  The reactor coolant pumps tripped as expected, and one has been   |
| placed back in service.  Both emergency diesel generators automatically      |
| started but did not load.  Availability of the condenser was also lost due   |
| to the loss of power, and operators closed the main steam isolation valves.  |
| There were no radiation releases, and there were no reactor coolant system   |
| or steam generator tube leaks.  All systems functioned as required with one  |
| exception.  The steam-driven emergency feedwater pump failed to              |
| automatically actuate.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| At this time, the unit is in Mode 3.  Normal charging and letdown,           |
| pressurizer heaters and sprays, and one reactor coolant pump are being       |
| utilized for primary system level, pressure, and transport control.  Water   |
| is being supplied to the steam generators via an electric-driven emergency   |
| feedwater pump, and the atmospheric dumps are being utilized as the heat     |
| sink.  Containment parameters are normal.  The grid is currently available   |
| for offsite power, and the emergency diesel generators are still running.    |
|                                                                              |
| Based on a discretionary shift management call, the licensee declared an     |
| Unusual Event at 2336 on 03/05/01.  The licensee stated that a               |
| "Discretionary Event" under item 18A refers to an event in progress (or has  |
| occurred) that indicates a potential degradation of the level of safety of   |
| the station.  The licensee plans to notify the NRC when the Unusual Event    |
| has terminated or if conditions degrade.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| A severe winter storm is currently ongoing.  At the time of the event, the   |
| unit was experiencing winds at a rate of  approximately 50 miles per hour.   |
| The licensee reported that these strong winds were ongoing and that only a   |
| few inches of snow had fallen (although up to 2 feet is expected).           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the state at 2347 on 03/05/01 and plans to notify the  |
| NRC resident inspector as well as applicable local officials.  The licensee  |
| also plans to issue a press release.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE AT 0222 ON 03/06/01 FROM JIM HILL TO LEIGH TROCINE *****        |
|                                                                              |
| This update provides both clarifications/corrections to the original event   |
| notification and additional information regarding licensee plans.            |
|                                                                              |
| CLARIFICATIONS/CORRECTIONS:  Prior to the event, two of three offsite power  |
| lines had been lost in close succession.  The remaining offsite line was     |
| subsequently lost, and its breaker re-closed within a short duration.  This  |
| resulted in the momentary loss of offsite power and subsequent plant         |
| transient.  This initial electrical imbalance was sufficient to result in    |
| the automatic starting and loading of both emergency diesel generators.      |
|                                                                              |
| CURRENT STATUS:  The unit remains in the Unusual Event, and winds are        |
| currently sustained at a rate of approximately 40 miles per hour.  All three |
| offsite power lines have been restored.  Both emergency diesel generators    |
| remain in operation and continue to provide power to both vital (emergency)  |
| buses.  The non-vital buses have been re-energized from offsite power.  An   |
| additional auxiliary pump (the startup feedwater pump) has also been started |
| to provide additional water to the steam generators.  This pump is a         |
| non-safety related housekeeping pump.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| PLANS:  Within the next half hour, the licensee plans to commence a          |
| discretionary plant cooldown and plans to place the unit in Mode 5 (Cold     |
| Shutdown).  At some point in time, the licensee also plans to secure the     |
| electric-driven emergency feedwater pump and rely on the startup feedwater   |
| pump to supply water to the steam generators.                                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and an onsite member of an  |
| NRC residual heat removal inspection team.  The NRC operations officer       |
| notified the R1DO (Conte), NRR EO (Bateman), and IRO (Miller).               |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE AT 0438 ON 03/06/01 FROM JIM HILL TO LEIGH TROCINE *****        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has commenced a plant cooldown and anticipates that it will     |
| take approximately 6 hours for the unit to reach Cold Shutdown.  Other than  |
| commencement of the cooldown, there has been no change in plant conditions   |
| or equipment status.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the criteria for exiting the Unusual Event have     |
| been met.  However, the licensee currently plans to remain in the Unusual    |
| Event for a while longer because the high line insulators onsite are still   |
| arcing and are suspect and because the in-house vital buses are still being  |
| powered by the emergency diesel generators.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified an onsite member of an NRC residual heat removal       |
| inspection team, who in turn notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC   |
| operations officer notified the R1DO (Conte), NRR EO (Bateman), and IRO      |
| (Miller).                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE AT 0800 ON 03/06/01 FROM JOHN LaVALLEY TO LEIGH TROCINE *****   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee called to provide the following status update:                  |
|                                                                              |
| The unit remains in the Unusual Event.  The reactor coolant system is        |
| currently at 445 degrees F, and the cooldown is still in progress via        |
| utilization of boration and the atmospheric steam dumps.  The emergency      |
| diesel generators are still supplying power to the vital buses.              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee currently plans to place the unit in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) and |
| then to restore the secondary side of the plant (assuming that offsite power |
| supplies are stable).                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Conte) and NRR EO (Tappert).   |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE AT 1509 ET ON 03/06/01 FROM JOHN LaVALLEY TO JOHN MACKINNON       |
| *****                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee called to provide the following status update:                  |
|                                                                              |
| The unit remains in the Unusual Event.  The reactor coolant system is        |
| currently 360 degrees F, and cooldown is still in progress.  The licensee    |
| will reduce reactor coolant system temperature to approximately 240 degrees  |
| F.  The emergency diesel generators are still supplying power to the vital   |
| buses.  The licensee is waiting for Load Dispatcher permission to take down  |
| one 345kV line at a time to clean the lines bushing.  After the bushings for |
| the 3 345kV lines have been cleaned and the grid is stable,  the licensee    |
| will make a determination whether to exit the Unusual Event.                 |
| Additional information:  After the reactor trip the Turbine Driven Auxiliary |
| Feedwater pump failed to start.  The licensee thinks that the pump tripped   |
| on overspeed.  Licensee is investigating this problem.                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Bellamy) and NRR EO (C.        |
| Grimes)                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| ****UPDATE AT 1619ET ON 03/06/01 FROM M KILEY TO JOHN MACKINNON*****         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee called to provide the following clarification to event write    |
| up:                                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The exact cause of the reactor trip as indicated by the "First Out Light"    |
| was "Power Range Negative Flux Rate Hi".  Secondly, both Emergency Diesel    |
| Generators automatically started and loaded all safety related loads         |
| associated with Emergency Electrical Buses 5 and 6.                          |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Bellamy) and NRR EO (Tad       |
| Marsh).                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1055 EST FROM RON STRICKLAND TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * *        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1040 EST.  The offsite          |
| electrical grid is stable with two independent sources available. Offsite    |
| power has been restored to emergency bus (E-5), and the licensee is          |
| preparing to realign the other emergency bus to offsite power as well.  The  |
| unit remains stable in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown). The NRC resident inspector has |
| been informed of this update by the licensee.                                |
|                                                                              |
| Notified R1DO (Bellamy), NRR EO (Marsh) and FEMA (Steindurf).                |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37812       |
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| FACILITY: SEABROOK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/07/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:11[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        03/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DENNIS BEMIS                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/07/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RONALD BELLAMY       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Hot Shutdown     |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| MOTOR DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFW) PUMP STARTED UNEXPECTEDLY             |
|                                                                              |
| While paralleling the DG-1B with offsite power, the "B" Motor Driven EFW     |
| pump started .  The start occurred as the Bus 6 Unit Auxiliary Transformer   |
| breaker was closed.  The licensee verified Emergency Feedwater Flow was not  |
| required and secured the Motor Driven EFW pump.  The pump ran for 2 minutes  |
| and 28 seconds.  All four (4) Steam Generator Water Levels increased less    |
| than 10% narrow range.  The licensee is investigating the cause of the pump  |
| start.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37813       |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/08/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:03[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        03/07/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        09:00[EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/08/2001|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KURT SISLER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| 24 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "On 3-7-01 at 0900 hours , in preparation to implement NCSA-PLANT091 it was  |
| discovered that PORTS has a plutonium-239 (Pu-239) source that exceeds the   |
| mass control limit of the unimplemented NCSA. This new NCSA was Plant        |
| Operations Review Committee (PORC) approved but is not activated.            |
| NCSA-PLANT091 establishes minimum masses for several fissile isotopes for    |
| determining when Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls are required.     |
| For Pu-239, the control limit is 7.2 grams.  The sealed source contains 32   |
| grams of Pu-239.  An anomalous condition was entered and a boundary          |
| established around the source pending NCS review.  Upon further review, NCS  |
| determined that there is not an active NCSA/NCSE to control the Pu-239       |
| source.  The storage of the Pu-239 source is considered unanalyzed since     |
| there is not an active NCSA/NCSE documenting the double contingency of this  |
| storage.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "The safety significance of this event is very low.  The Pu-239 source is in |
| a storage unit at the X-326 Health Physics (HP) Source Storage Vault.  The   |
| storage unit provides spacing from other materials and there were no other   |
| fissile materials near the storage unit that would require NCSA controls.    |
| Spacing from other fissile material is not an issue. NCSA-PLANT021           |
| determined that the safe mass of Pu-239 is 207 grams. The source contains 32 |
| grams Pu-239 and is well below the safe mass value of 207 grams.  Double     |
| contingency exists, but has not been formally documented in an implemented   |
| Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The discovery of this source is a legacy issue This source was transported  |
| to PORTS in 1961 from offsite. This source has not been used since NRC       |
| regulation of PORTS.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The safety significance of this event is very low. The discovery of this    |
| source is a legacy issue. This source was transported to PORTS In 1961 from  |
| offsite. The subcritical mass limit for Pu-239 per ANSI/ANS-8.15 is 450      |
| grams.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "This source has not been used since coming under NRC regulation.  There are |
| no Radiation Work permits (RWP) or procedures that use this source. There is |
| no reason to believe that the source has been removed from its storage unit. |
| The storage unit provides some spacing from other materials and there were   |
| no other fissile materials in the storage area that would require spacing    |
| for NCS.  Double contingency exists, but it has not been documented in an    |
| Implemented Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation.                           |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "A violation of an NCSA for other fissile materials in conjunction with      |
| placement near the Pu-239 source would be required before criticality would  |
| be credible or a much larger mass of Pu-239 would be required.               |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
|                                                                              |
| "Although an NCSA was not in place, the mass of Pu-239 was only a fraction   |
| of the Pu-239 safe mass and there were no other fissile materials in the     |
| storage area that would require spacing for NCS.                             |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "The licensed material was 32 grams of Pu-239 in the form of a sealed        |
| source. This is approximately 7% of a subcritical mass (450 grams per        |
| ANSI/ANS-8.15).                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "There were no established controls over this material. However, much less   |
| than a safe mass was involved and there were no other fissile materials in   |
| the storage area that would require spacing for NCS.  Therefore, the         |
| significance of this event is very low.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| "Upon discovery, a boundary was established and an anomalous condition       |
| entered."                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event.                  |
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