Event Notification Report for January 31, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/30/2001 - 01/31/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37655 37691 37693 37696 37701 37702
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37655 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/08/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:32[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 01/08/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:50[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEPHEN JOBE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/30/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DALE POWERS R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| |
| "The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable |
| due to an air line leak. The unplanned loss of a single train system (such |
| as HPCI) is reportable as a loss of safety function. The air line supplies |
| air to air-operated valves for draining the steam supply line to ensure that |
| the HPCI steam supply line does not fill with water. Upon a HPCI initiation |
| signal that would cause the steam supply valve to open or on a loss of air |
| pressure, these air-operated valves automatically shut. With the degraded |
| condition of the air supply line, assurance could not be maintained that the |
| steam lines would be maintained clear of water. HPCI is presently available |
| and capable of injecting if required." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the |
| licensee. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @0951 BY WHEELER TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| The affected air line supplies air to air operated drain valves for draining |
| the HPCI System steam supply line. On a HPCI System initiation signal or on |
| a loss of instrument air (i.e. the failure or isolation of the air supply |
| line), the HPCI System steam supply line drain valves would automatically |
| close. In this condition, in the response to high level alarms, manual |
| opening of the HPCI System steam supply line drain valves would have been |
| performed, in accordance with procedures, to ensure the HPCI System steam |
| supply line remains clear of water. However, no water had accumulated in the |
| HPCI System steam supply line prior to or during the condition (as evidenced |
| by the lack of alarms). In the event water had accumulated in the HPCI |
| System steam supply line and had not been removed, the HPCI turbine has been |
| designed and tested to ensure that water carry-over (from the reactor |
| vessel) will not cause damage to the turbine. The HPCI System has adequate |
| capacity to accept the small losses in efficiency due to any moisture |
| carryover. In addition, in preparation for and during maintenance/repair of |
| the air supply line, no actions were taken which would have prevented the |
| HPCI System from functioning. Based on this analysis, the HPCI System was |
| fully capable of performing its safety functions and HPCI System Technical |
| Specification Surveillance Requirements continued to be satisfied at all |
| times. The HPCI System remained operable during this period. Therefore, |
| Event Number 37655 is retracted. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| Region 4 RDO (Spitzberg) was notified. |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37691 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: TURKEY POINT REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/25/2001|
| UNIT: [] [4] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:03[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/25/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:51[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: THOMAS S. WACH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/30/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|4 M/R Y 50 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TWO DROPPED RODS IN DIFFERENT BANKS |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "While conducting a plant shutdown due to a dropped rod in shutdown bank 'B' |
| (H-6), another rod in control bank 'D' (H-10) dropped. In accordance with |
| [procedure] 4-ONOP-028.3, 'Dropped RCC,' with two dropped rods in different |
| banks the reactor was manually tripped and [procedure] 4-EOP-E-0 was |
| entered. All equipment operated as expected, and [the] plant is stable in |
| Mode 3. [An] investigation is in progress to determine [the] reason for |
| [the] dropped rods." |
| |
| The licensee stated that all rods fully inserted. Auxiliary feedwater |
| automatically started as expected and has since been secured. Normal |
| feedwater is currently being utilized to supply water to the steam |
| generators, and the main condenser is available as the heat sink for |
| secondary steam. Normal charging, makeup, and letdown are being utilized |
| for primary system inventory control. Pressurizer heaters and sprays are |
| being utilized for primary system pressure control, and the reactor coolant |
| pumps are being utilized for primary system transport control. Offsite |
| power is available. There were no emergency core cooling system actuations, |
| and none were required. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @ 1123 BY HICKEY TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| The H-6 rod drop was determined to be due to a circuit discontinuity In a |
| bulkhead connector. One hundred percent of the bulkhead connectors for the |
| 45 Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs) were inspected. Investigation is in |
| progress to determine the cause of the connector discontinuity. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Reg 2 RDO(Wert) was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37693 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: TURKEY POINT REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/26/2001|
| UNIT: [] [4] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:29[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/26/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: P LAFONTAINE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/30/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |FRANK CONGEL IRO |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY |ED GOODWIN NRR |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|4 N N 0 Hot Standby |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POSSIBLE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAKAGE |
| |
| Possible RCS boundary leakage from around a part length CRDM housing. Dry |
| boric acid crystal buildup, less than one cup, was found around a part |
| length CRDM housing. Licensee will have to remove missile shield, etc. to |
| determine which part length CRDM housing has the leak or possibly leaked in |
| the past. Currently the licensee is cooling down the plant and should be in |
| a cold shutdown condition in 6 or 7 hours from 1130 ET. |
| |
| The NRC Resident was notified of this by the licensee. |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @ 1123 BY HICKEY TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| Wet boric acid was identified on the mechanical seal area at the top of CRDM |
| H-14. and a small ring of dry boric acid was found at the CRDM B-8 vent plug |
| cap. Neither leak point constituted RCS pressure boundary leakage, as |
| defined in Technical Specifications. H-14 and B-8 are both abandoned |
| part-length CRDM housings. Boric acid had run down the outside of the H-14 |
| housing, but there was no visual indication of leakage in the welded areas. |
| The welds on H-14 were examined by NDE; no indications were found. Unit 4 |
| was refueled in October, 2000. Neither of these leaks was identified during |
| the restart inspection at the end of the refueling outage. The top closure |
| assembly on both housings was replaced with a threaded and welded plug |
| design. Preparations are underway to return Unit 4 to service. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Reg 2 RDO(Wert) was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 37696 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: CITIZENS GENERAL HOSPITAL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/26/2001|
|LICENSEE: CITIZENS GENERAL HOSPITAL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:58[EST]|
| CITY: NEW KENSINGTON REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 01/25/2001|
| COUNTY: ALLEGHENY STATE: PA |EVENT TIME: 16:00[EST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/30/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |STEVEN DENNIS R1 |
| |C.W. (BILL) REAMER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+DALE POWERS R4 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ANDREW BUKOVITZ |FRANK CONGEL IRO |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF TWO GADOLINIUM-153 SOURCES AT CITIZENS |
| GENERAL HOSPITAL IN NEW KENSINGTON, PENNSYLVANIA |
| |
| Due to an ongoing merger with Allegheny Valley Hospital, Citizens General |
| Hospital ceased nuclear medical activities and properly transferred all |
| sources (except for two gadolinium-153 sources) to Allegheny Valley Hospital |
| (located within approximately 2 miles). The gadolinium sources were not |
| included because Allegheny Valley Hospital was not licensed for |
| gadolinium-153. (A license amendment has been requested.) Accordingly, the |
| gadolinium-153 sources were being kept in Hot Lab at Citizens General |
| Hospital in the meantime. |
| |
| Approximately 3 weeks ago, a closeout survey was preformed of the Nuclear |
| Medicine Department at Citizens General Hospital (where the gamma camera was |
| located and recorded were done). The results indicated that there were no |
| activities. There was also documentation in place to prohibit use of the |
| Hot Lab because it had not yet been closed out. |
| |
| It was reported that an unknown individual made arrangements to de-install |
| and sell the gamma camera and other equipment. Two individuals (middlemen |
| for other companies) arrived yesterday (01/25/01) with a crew. The |
| individuals were told that they could take the gamma camera and other items |
| but not to touch the gadolinium sources, which were located in the Hot Lab. |
| |
| This morning (01/26/01), it was discovered that the gadolinium sources were |
| missing. Apparently, the de-installation crew left a mess and took more |
| than they were authorized to take including a refrigerator, survey meters, |
| signs off the walls, etc. The Director of Materials Management did not have |
| a list. It is currently believed that the sources were removed at |
| approximately 1600 EST on 01/25/01 by an individual who worked for BC |
| Technical, and it was reported that the sources may currently be in Salt |
| Lake City, Utah. |
| |
| The other individual worked as an independent for Jet Services and was |
| believed to be involved with removal of the gamma camera. The licensee was |
| able to contact this individual, who in turn informed the licensee that the |
| other individual's company (BC Technical in Salt Lake City) had a license to |
| transfer radioactive materials. Therefore, there was an impression that |
| they were doing the hospital a favor by getting rid of sources for the |
| hospital. |
| |
| The licensee also contacted the company based in Salt Lake City, Utah. The |
| individual who actually removed the sources was not available because he was |
| performing a de-installation at another hospital. |
| |
| The missing gadolinium sources had an activity of 200 millicuries each |
| approximately 2 years ago. The current activity level was conservatively |
| estimated to be approximately 50 millicuries each. |
| |
| The licensee has notified the NRC Region 1 office (Michelle Beardsley). |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for licensee contact information and |
| contact information regarding the individuals involved in the |
| de-installation and removal of equipment.) |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1330 ON 1/30/01 BY BUKOVITZ, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * * |
| |
| The sources were returned to the hospital on 1/27/01. The sources had been |
| shielded the entire time and the radiation field on the exterior of the |
| shielding was less than 1 mr/hr. The licensee has notified the NRC Region |
| 1 office (Michelle Beardsley). The Operations Center notified the R1DO |
| (Holody). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37701 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MONTICELLO REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/30/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:34[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 01/30/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:15[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TEMPOE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/30/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*SHU 50.72(b)(2)(i) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |99 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFETY RELIEF VALVES WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| |
| A Technical Specification shutdown was initiated as required by T.S. 3.6.E.2 |
| following the discovery that not all of Section XI requirements were met |
| with respect to the safety relief valves. The safety relief valves were |
| declared inoperable @ 1830 on 1/29/01. The reactor conditions shall be as |
| follows within 24 hrs: reactor pressure <110 psig and reactor temperature |
| <345�F. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @ 1049 BY CORRIGAN TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| "At 0126 CST, January 30, 2001, NRC approved the Licensee's verbal request |
| for a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) concerning Technical |
| Specification 3.15.A. 1. Specifically, this allows us to use the corrective |
| action process, including consideration of Generic Letter 91-18, to resolve |
| non-conformances with Section Xl of the ASME code. In the case of SRVs, a |
| favorable operability determination will allow us to consider SRVs operable |
| in spite of existing non-conformances with Section Xl of the ASME code. |
| Further, the NOED allows us to assess operability of any additional |
| identified non-conformances with Section Xl through our condition report |
| process rather than to immediately declare the affected component inoperable |
| as required by Technical Specification 3.15.A.1. Continuance of this NOED is |
| contingent on NRC receipt, by close of business on February 1, 2001, of our |
| written NOED request and a license amendment request to move inservice |
| inspection requirements to a licensee controlled program. The NOED remains |
| in effect until the license amendment request is dispositioned (expected |
| about March 5, 2001)." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| The Reg 3 RDO(Hills) was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37702 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/30/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:40[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 01/30/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:25[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RANDY HAISLET |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/30/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DANIEL HOLODY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*IND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOW CONTROL ROOM PRESSURE WHEN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION IN OPERATION |
| |
| During testing of CRHEAFS (Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration |
| System) the licensee was not able to maintain the control room at a positive |
| pressure as required. CRHEAFS was inoperable at the time the problem was |
| noted due to planned maintenance (but still available). The area outside |
| the control room is at a higher pressure causing air inflow into the control |
| room while CRHEAFS is operating. When the ventilation in the area outside |
| the control is secured, the proper positive pressure is maintained in the |
| control room. |
| |
| Procedures are being revised to require securing of the outside ventilation |
| system if CRHEAFS operation is required. The licensee is continuing to |
| investigate this problem and has notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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