Event Notification Report for January 18, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/17/2001 - 01/18/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37647 37658 37664 37665 37666 37667
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37647 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: THREE MILE ISLAND REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/05/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:38[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/05/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 06:20[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SCHORK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/17/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES NOGGLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE MOTOR FOR MS-V-1C HAS BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| |
| TMI identified a condition that is outside the design basis of the facility |
| at 0620 hours on January 5, 2001. The condition is that MS-V-1C may not be |
| capable of being closed within 120 seconds as described in the bases for |
| Technical Specification 4.8.2 and FSAR Section 10.3. The bases for TS 4.8.2 |
| and FSAR Section 10.3 both state that the valve is capable of being remotely |
| closed within 120 seconds from the Control Room. With the motor inoperable, |
| the valve cannot be remotely closed within 120 seconds. The condition was |
| found during routine surveillance testing and subsequent evaluation. During |
| the surveillance testing the valve is stroke closed 10% and then returned to |
| its normal operation position of full open. The valve stroke closed to the |
| 10% closed position without incident. During the return of the valve to the |
| full open position sparks were observed and a burning odor was present. |
| However, the sparking ceased and the motor successfully traveled to the fail |
| open position (verified by visual observation of the valve stern position). |
| Subsequent visual inspection of the valve and motor, interviews with the |
| technicians, the system engineer and the Electrical Foreman resulted in the |
| declaration of the inoperability of the motor for MS-V-1C. |
| |
| This deficient condition has been documented in the TMI Corrective Action |
| program. Troubleshooting of the motor for MS-V-1C is in progress. Interim |
| action has been taken to provide for the expeditious manual closure of the |
| valve and those actions are contained in an approved plant procedure. |
| |
| The Resident Inspector will be informed. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION ON 01/17/01 AT 1729ET BY J. SCHORK TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * |
| * |
| |
| |
| Based on additional information gathered during trouble shooting and repair |
| of MS-V-IC conducted on January 5, 2001, subsequent to the submittal of the |
| immediate notification, it was determined that there is reasonable assurance |
| that MS-V-IC would have performed its intended safety function to remotely |
| close from the control room when demanded. Therefore, no condition outside |
| the design basis for the facility existed and the immediate report made on |
| January 5, 2001 is being withdrawn. The basis for the reasonable assurance |
| that the valve would have performed its intended safety function is |
| described below. |
| |
| During the partial stroke surveillance test, the spark and burn smell |
| occurred very briefly while the valve was traveling open. The sparking |
| immediately stopped and the valve continued to travel uninterrupted until it |
| was full open. The surveillance was completed satisfactorily. |
| |
| The breaker for the valve motor did not trip and no fuses were blown. Power |
| remained available to stroke the valve after the event. Based on the short |
| duration of the spark and the fact that the motor continued to operate, |
| there was no reason to believe the stroke time would have changed. |
| |
| Prior to opening or disturbing the motor terminal box, the breaker was |
| manually opened and the resistance from each phase to ground was checked |
| from the breaker. A high voltage Meggar was used to perform the test. The |
| Meggar results showed that neither the power cables, termination, nor motor |
| windings were grounded. This indicated that the motor and cables were in |
| working condition. |
| |
| The motor terminal box was opened without disturbing the power cables inside |
| the box. There was clear evidence that a bare point on one of the ring lug |
| terminations had made contact with the aluminum terminal box. A small |
| portion of a ring connector was bare. There was a burn mark on the ring |
| connector and on the terminal box. A small piece of the aluminum terminal |
| box was missing at the point where the lug would have contacted the box. |
| The as-found gap between what were the contact points was approximately |
| 0.25". Based on this evidence, it was clear that a sharp corner of the |
| ring lug had rubbed against the terminal box until it wore through the |
| insulating tape that was wrapped around the lug. The metal lug then |
| contacted the aluminum terminal box, which temporarily shorted the phase to |
| ground. The resulting spark knocked off a small piece of the terminal box at |
| the contact point creating a gap that immediately cleared the short. The |
| duration of the short was not long enough to cause the breaker to open. |
| |
| Based on the above, there is reasonable certainty that the component would |
| have performed its function when commanded. Therefore, from a past |
| operability perspective, the component was always capable of performing its |
| design basis function. When the component was declared out of service, the |
| plant entered a maintenance evolution to determine and correct the cause of |
| the spark. Entering the maintenance evolution to trouble shoot and correct |
| the cause of the spark was not a condition prohibited by the Technical |
| Specifications. There is no time clock associated with removing the remote |
| closing capability from service for maintenance. |
| NRC Region 1 RDO (Barkley) notified. |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37658 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/09/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:08[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 01/09/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:20[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT KIDDER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/17/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN JACOBSON R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |ED GOODWIN NRR |
|KSNM 70.52(a) LOSS OF SNM/CRIT |FRITZ STURZ NMSS |
|KFIS 70.52(b) LOSS OF SNM/FISSILE |JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |ROBERT SKELTON IAT |
| |JOHN DAVIDSON IAT |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 87 Power Operation |87 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NEUTRON MONITORING DETECTOR MISSING FROM SHIPMENT |
| |
| The licensee reported that one local power range monitor (LPRM) detector was |
| missing out of a shipment from GE Reuter-Stokes in Twinsburg, OH. The |
| missing detector contains 0.00027g of U-235 (0.00121g total U) in the form |
| of solid uranium oxide. The licensee has contacted the vendor to determine |
| whether an error occurred in preparation of the shipping papers. The NRC |
| resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1529 FROM KIDDER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| At 1355, the licensee was informed that the missing LPRM detector is |
| currently located at the GE Reuter-Stokes facility and had not been shipped. |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO |
| (Jacobson). |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION 1015 01/17/2001 FROM RUSSELL TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Investigation by the licensee and the manufacturer discovered that the LPRM |
| had been maintained in a secure, locked area at GE Reuter-Stokes and had |
| been kept under appropriate controls. Accordingly, no reporting criterion is |
| applicable to this event under 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR70.52. Additionally, the |
| SNM is not of sufficient quantity that 10CFR73.71(a)(1) or 10CFR20.2201 |
| apply. |
| |
| "Event Notification 37658 is therefore retracted." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the |
| licensee. Notified R3DO (Lanksbury). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37664 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/17/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:47[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 01/16/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: [EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: J. MILL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/17/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD BARKLEY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|HFIT 26.73 FITNESS FOR DUTY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT |
| |
| A contract manager tested positive for illegal drug use. The individual's |
| site access privileges have been terminated. The licensee will contact the |
| NRC resident inspector regarding this report. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37665 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/17/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:43[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 01/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GAMBRELL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/17/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |WALTER RODGERS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 18 Power Operation |18 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DURING A SMALL BREAK LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT PEAK CLADDING TEMPERATURES |
| COULD EXCEED 2200 DEGREES F. |
| |
| B&W Owners Group Preliminary Safety Concern (PSC) was written on July 28, |
| 2000 to document a concern with RELAPS analyses of Core Flood Tank (CFT) |
| line break LOCAs. The issue involves the impact of a 2 minute delay in |
| tripping reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). In the event of a small break loss |
| of cooling accident involving the core flood line, peak cladding |
| temperatures could exceed 2200 degrees F. However, this issue does not |
| impact Oconee during normal operation since Oconee has three high pressure |
| injection (HPI) pumps. The Oconee design basis includes starting a second |
| HPI pump within 10 minutes, which would prevent excessive peak clad |
| temperatures. |
| |
| On January 17, 2001, at 1100 hours, preliminary analyses revealed that plant |
| conditions, allowed by Oconee Technical Specifications 3.5.2.B and 3.5.2.C |
| may necessitate either reducing reactor power to approximately 50% (versus |
| 75%) or tripping RCPs within 1 minute versus 2 minutes of loss of subcooling |
| margin to maintain clad temperatures less than 2200 degrees F. In these |
| specific plant conditions, the single failure of the second HPI pump or |
| failure of an HPI train would prevent starting a second HPI pump and |
| injecting within 10 minutes. |
| |
| This is being conservatively reported as a condition that alone could |
| prevent the fulfillment of a safety function. This condition is only a |
| concern during extended operation with one HPI pump or train out of service. |
| Procedural guidance in place requires turning off the RCPs as an immediate |
| manual action in response to loss of subcooling margin. Operators in |
| training typically secure the RCPs well within 1 minute of loss of |
| subcooling margin during unannounced casualty scenarios. Operators are |
| evaluated on the time critical action of securing the ROPs within two |
| minutes; however, the time critical action of securing the RCPs within 1 |
| minute has not yet been validated using our appropriate processes. |
| Therefore, as an interim measure, Oconee intends to reduce thermal power to |
| <50% rated thermal power (RTP) instead of <75% RTP whenever TS 3.5.2.B or |
| 3.5.2.0 is entered. This action ensures that the acceptance criteria of |
| 10CFR50.46 are satisfied. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| Problems encountered during the event: None. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37666 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/17/2001|
|LICENSEE: UNKNOWN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:20[EST]|
| CITY: SAN ANTONIO REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 12/20/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: TX |EVENT TIME: 12:00[CST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/17/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |KRISS KENNEDY R4 |
| |DON COOL, EO NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JAMES H. OGDEN JR. | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| LOST HUMBOLDT 5001EX NUCLEAR GAUGE |
| |
| This is an initial notification of a lost nuclear gauge. The gauge was lost |
| on December 20, 2000, while being transported in an unsecured manner and not |
| in it's transport case. The gauge was a one month old Humboldt 5001EX. The |
| gauge was probably lost along Highway 90 and 36th Street in San Antonio, |
| Texas. A Police Report was filed (Report # 00805997/01). The operator |
| performed an extensive search for the gauge along the highway. A notice was |
| posted in the San Antonio Express News with a reward offered. The gauge has |
| not been recovered to date. Investigation is on going. |
| |
| Further details will be sent as they are received at the Texas Department of |
| Health. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37667 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/17/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:12[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/17/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:20[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DON BRADLEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/17/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |WALTER RODGERS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP DURING TURBINE CONTROL TESTING. |
| |
| Reactor Trip due to Turbine Generator trip greater than 69% power. All rods |
| fully inserted into the core. Feedwater isolation due to reactor trip with |
| Tave less than 564 degrees F (this is a design feature and was expected). |
| Both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps automatically started as |
| expected due to the Feedwater Isolation. As far as the licensee knew at the |
| time of the call no Primary or Secondary PORVs or Code Safety Valves opened. |
| All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are |
| fully operable. "1A" Nuclear Service Water pump is out of service for |
| planned maintenance (currently being returned to service) and the "1A" |
| Auxiliary Building Ventilation is also inoperable for planned maintenance. |
| |
| Currently the cause of the turbine trip is unknown. Turbine Control Testing |
| was in progress at the time of the trip. |
| |
| The licensee will notify North & South Carolina and surrounding counties of |
| the reactor trip. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
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