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Event Notification Report for January 18, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           01/17/2001 - 01/18/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37647  37658  37664  37665  37666  37667  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37647       |
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| FACILITY: THREE MILE ISLAND        REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/05/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:38[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP            |EVENT DATE:        01/05/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:20[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SCHORK                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/17/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| THE MOTOR FOR MS-V-1C HAS BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE                           |
|                                                                              |
| TMI identified a condition that is outside the design basis of the facility  |
| at 0620 hours on January 5, 2001. The condition is that MS-V-1C may not be   |
| capable of being closed within 120 seconds as described in the bases for     |
| Technical Specification 4.8.2 and FSAR Section 10.3.  The bases for TS 4.8.2 |
| and FSAR Section 10.3 both state that the valve is capable of being remotely |
| closed within 120 seconds from the Control Room.  With the motor inoperable, |
| the valve cannot be remotely closed within 120 seconds. The condition was    |
| found during routine surveillance testing and subsequent evaluation.  During |
| the surveillance testing the valve is stroke closed 10% and then returned to |
| its normal operation position of full open.  The valve stroke closed to the  |
| 10% closed position without incident.  During the return of the valve to the |
| full open position sparks were observed and a burning odor was present.      |
| However, the sparking ceased and the motor successfully traveled to the fail |
| open position (verified by visual observation of the valve stern position).  |
| Subsequent visual inspection of the valve and motor, interviews with the     |
| technicians, the system engineer and the Electrical Foreman resulted in the  |
| declaration of the inoperability of the motor for MS-V-1C.                   |
|                                                                              |
| This deficient condition has been documented in the TMI Corrective Action    |
| program.  Troubleshooting of the motor for MS-V-1C is in progress.  Interim  |
| action has been taken to provide for the expeditious manual closure of the   |
| valve and those actions are contained in an approved plant procedure.        |
|                                                                              |
| The Resident Inspector will be informed.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION ON 01/17/01 AT 1729ET BY J. SCHORK TAKEN BY MACKINNON * *   |
| *                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Based on additional information gathered during trouble shooting and repair  |
| of MS-V-IC conducted on January 5, 2001, subsequent to the submittal of the  |
| immediate notification, it was determined that there is reasonable assurance |
| that MS-V-IC would have performed its intended safety function to remotely   |
| close from the control room when demanded. Therefore, no condition outside   |
| the design basis for the facility existed and the immediate report made on   |
| January 5, 2001 is being withdrawn. The basis for the reasonable assurance   |
| that the valve would have performed its intended safety function is          |
| described below.                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| During the partial stroke surveillance test, the spark and burn smell        |
| occurred very briefly while the valve was traveling open. The sparking       |
| immediately stopped and the valve continued to travel uninterrupted until it |
| was full open. The surveillance was completed satisfactorily.                |
|                                                                              |
| The breaker for the valve motor did not trip and no fuses were blown. Power  |
| remained available to stroke the valve after the event. Based on the short   |
| duration of the spark and the fact that the motor continued to operate,      |
| there was no reason to believe the stroke time would have changed.           |
|                                                                              |
| Prior to opening or disturbing the motor terminal box, the breaker was       |
| manually opened and the resistance from each phase to ground was checked     |
| from the breaker. A high voltage Meggar was used to perform the test. The    |
| Meggar results showed that neither the power cables, termination, nor motor  |
| windings were grounded. This indicated that the motor and cables were in     |
| working condition.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The motor terminal box was opened without disturbing the power cables inside |
| the box. There was clear evidence that a bare point on one of the ring lug   |
| terminations had made contact with the aluminum terminal box. A small        |
| portion of a ring connector was bare. There was a burn mark on the ring      |
| connector and on the terminal box. A small piece of the aluminum terminal    |
| box was missing at the point where the lug would have contacted the box.     |
| The as-found gap between what were the contact points was approximately      |
| 0.25".   Based on this evidence, it was clear that a sharp corner of the     |
| ring lug had rubbed against the terminal box until it wore through the       |
| insulating tape that was wrapped around the lug. The metal lug then          |
| contacted the aluminum terminal box, which temporarily shorted the phase to  |
| ground. The resulting spark knocked off a small piece of the terminal box at |
| the contact point creating a gap that immediately cleared the short.  The    |
| duration of the short was not long enough to cause the breaker to open.      |
|                                                                              |
| Based on the above, there is reasonable certainty that the component would   |
| have performed its function when commanded. Therefore, from a past           |
| operability perspective, the component was always capable of performing its  |
| design basis function. When the component was declared out of service, the   |
| plant entered a maintenance evolution to determine and correct the cause of  |
| the spark. Entering the maintenance evolution to trouble shoot and correct   |
| the cause of the spark was not a condition prohibited by the Technical       |
| Specifications. There is no time clock associated with removing the remote   |
| closing capability from service for maintenance.                             |
| NRC Region 1 RDO (Barkley) notified.                                         |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.  |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37658       |
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| FACILITY: PERRY                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/09/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:08[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        01/09/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:20[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT KIDDER                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/17/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN JACOBSON        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |ED GOODWIN           NRR     |
|KSNM 70.52(a)            LOSS OF SNM/CRIT       |FRITZ STURZ          NMSS    |
|KFIS 70.52(b)            LOSS OF SNM/FISSILE    |JOSEPH GIITTER       IRO     |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |ROBERT SKELTON       IAT     |
|                                                |JOHN DAVIDSON        IAT     |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       87       Power Operation  |87       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| NEUTRON MONITORING DETECTOR MISSING FROM SHIPMENT                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported that one local power range monitor (LPRM) detector was |
| missing out of a shipment from GE Reuter-Stokes in Twinsburg, OH. The        |
| missing detector contains 0.00027g of U-235 (0.00121g total U) in the form   |
| of solid uranium oxide. The licensee has contacted the vendor to determine   |
| whether an error occurred in preparation of the shipping papers. The NRC     |
| resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1529 FROM KIDDER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *                        |
|                                                                              |
| At 1355, the licensee was informed that the missing LPRM detector is         |
| currently located at the GE Reuter-Stokes facility and had not been shipped. |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO   |
| (Jacobson).                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION 1015 01/17/2001 FROM RUSSELL TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *        |
|                                                                              |
| "Investigation by the licensee and the manufacturer discovered that the LPRM |
| had been maintained in a secure, locked area at GE Reuter-Stokes and had     |
| been kept under appropriate controls. Accordingly, no reporting criterion is |
| applicable to this event under 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR70.52. Additionally, the   |
| SNM is not of sufficient quantity that 10CFR73.71(a)(1) or 10CFR20.2201      |
| apply.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Event Notification 37658 is therefore retracted."                           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the       |
| licensee. Notified R3DO (Lanksbury).                                         |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37664       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: PILGRIM                  REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/17/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:47[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        01/16/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:             [EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  J. MILL                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/17/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RICHARD BARKLEY      R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|HFIT 26.73               FITNESS FOR DUTY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| A contract manager tested positive for illegal drug use. The individual's    |
| site access privileges have been terminated. The licensee will contact the   |
| NRC resident inspector regarding this report.                                |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37665       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/17/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] [3]               STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:43[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE:        01/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GAMBRELL                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/17/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |WALTER RODGERS       R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       18       Power Operation  |18       Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DURING A SMALL BREAK LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT PEAK CLADDING TEMPERATURES     |
| COULD EXCEED 2200 DEGREES F.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| B&W Owners Group Preliminary Safety Concern (PSC) was written on July 28,    |
| 2000 to document a concern with RELAPS analyses of Core Flood Tank (CFT)     |
| line break LOCAs. The issue involves the impact of a 2 minute delay in       |
| tripping reactor coolant pumps (RCPs).  In the event of a small break loss   |
| of cooling accident involving the core flood line, peak cladding             |
| temperatures could exceed 2200 degrees F.   However, this issue does not     |
| impact Oconee during normal operation since Oconee has three high pressure   |
| injection (HPI) pumps. The Oconee design basis includes starting a second    |
| HPI pump within 10 minutes,  which would prevent excessive peak clad         |
| temperatures.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| On January 17, 2001, at 1100 hours, preliminary analyses revealed that plant |
| conditions, allowed by Oconee  Technical Specifications 3.5.2.B and 3.5.2.C  |
| may necessitate either reducing reactor power to approximately 50% (versus   |
| 75%) or tripping RCPs within 1 minute versus 2 minutes of loss of subcooling |
| margin to maintain clad temperatures less than 2200 degrees F.   In these    |
| specific plant conditions, the single failure of the second HPI pump or      |
| failure of an HPI train would prevent starting a second HPI pump and         |
| injecting within 10 minutes.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| This is being conservatively reported as a condition that alone could        |
| prevent the fulfillment of a safety function. This condition is only a       |
| concern during extended operation with one HPI pump or train out of service. |
| Procedural guidance in place requires turning off the RCPs as an immediate   |
| manual action in response to loss of subcooling margin.  Operators in        |
| training typically secure the RCPs well within 1 minute of loss of           |
| subcooling margin during unannounced casualty scenarios.  Operators are      |
| evaluated on the time critical action of securing the ROPs within two        |
| minutes; however, the time critical action of securing the RCPs within 1     |
| minute has not yet been validated using our appropriate processes.           |
| Therefore, as an interim measure, Oconee intends to reduce thermal power to  |
| <50% rated thermal power (RTP) instead of <75% RTP whenever TS 3.5.2.B or    |
| 3.5.2.0 is entered.  This action ensures that the acceptance criteria of     |
| 10CFR50.46 are satisfied.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
| Problems encountered during the event: None.                                 |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37666       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH           |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/17/2001|
|LICENSEE:  UNKNOWN                              |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:20[EST]|
|    CITY:  SAN ANTONIO              REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        12/20/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  TX |EVENT TIME:        12:00[CST]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/17/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |KRISS KENNEDY        R4      |
|                                                |DON COOL, EO         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JAMES H. OGDEN JR.           |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOST HUMBOLDT 5001EX NUCLEAR GAUGE                                           |
|                                                                              |
| This is an initial notification of a lost nuclear gauge.  The gauge was lost |
| on December 20, 2000, while being transported in an unsecured manner and not |
| in it's transport case.  The gauge was a one month old Humboldt 5001EX.  The |
| gauge was probably lost along Highway 90 and 36th Street in San Antonio,     |
| Texas.  A Police Report was filed (Report # 00805997/01).  The operator      |
| performed an extensive search for the gauge along the highway.  A notice was |
| posted in the San Antonio Express News with a reward offered.  The gauge has |
| not been recovered to date.  Investigation is on going.                      |
|                                                                              |
| Further details will be sent as they are received at the Texas Department of |
| Health.                                                                      |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37667       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/17/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:12[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        01/17/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:20[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DON BRADLEY                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/17/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |WALTER RODGERS       R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP DURING TURBINE CONTROL TESTING.                    |
|                                                                              |
| Reactor Trip due to Turbine Generator trip greater than 69% power.  All rods |
| fully inserted into the core.  Feedwater isolation due to reactor trip with  |
| Tave less than 564 degrees F (this is a design feature and was expected).    |
| Both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps automatically started as         |
| expected due to the Feedwater Isolation.  As far as the licensee knew at the |
| time of the call no Primary or Secondary PORVs or Code Safety Valves opened. |
| All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are   |
| fully operable.   "1A" Nuclear Service Water pump is out of service for      |
| planned maintenance (currently being returned to service) and the "1A"       |
| Auxiliary Building Ventilation is also inoperable for planned maintenance.   |
|                                                                              |
| Currently the cause of the turbine trip is unknown.  Turbine Control Testing |
| was in progress at the time of the trip.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee will notify North & South Carolina and surrounding counties of  |
| the reactor trip.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
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