Event Notification Report for January 16, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/12/2001 - 01/16/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37554 37626 37660 37661 37662 37663
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37554 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/28/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:50[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 11/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:13[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BOB COOLIDGE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/12/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ANIELLO DELLA GRECA R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO |
| INSTRUMENTATION FAILURE |
| |
| "The HPCI System was taken out of service for surveillance testing earlier |
| in the day. The surveillance's were completed and HPCI was placed back in |
| service in standby lineup. At this time, the high flow isolation |
| instrumentation was found to be reading well beyond the limits of the normal |
| in service band (+10 to -10). At that time, HPCI was removed from service |
| (availability) and isolated. The proper LCO was entered and troubleshooting |
| is underway." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1415EST ON 1/12/01 FROM OLSON TO MacKINNON * * * |
| |
| The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: |
| |
| "This is a retraction of event no. 37554 made on November 28, 2000 at 1651 |
| in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D). |
| |
| "An Engineer had noted a flow switch that provides a high steam flow to the |
| HPCI system reading -17 inches of water while the other indicated -2 inches |
| of water. The Primary Containment Isolation capability of the HPCI |
| isolation valves was declared inoperable and the valves de-energized in the |
| isolated condition. HPCI was declared inoperable and a 14 day cold shutdown |
| LCO entered. Subsequent testing of the differential pressure switches found |
| the trip setpoints to be correct. The face plate had not been 'zeroed' |
| during previous calibration. This had no effect on switch operation, |
| therefore could not have prevented fulfillment of safety function." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. Notified R1DO(Lew). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37626 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GINNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/20/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:25[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/20/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:14[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT McCOY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/12/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM SHIFT FROM NORMAL TO EMERGENCY |
| RECIRCULATION MODE WHILE A PLANNED GAS DECAY TANK RELEASE WAS IN PROGRESS |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "At 2014, with a gas decay tank release in progress (total activity 0.215 |
| Ci, (Kr-85 = 0.214 Ci, Xe-133 = 0.001 Ci)), control room ventilation gas |
| monitor R-36 went into alarm causing ventilation to shift to mode F. During |
| the [2-second] spike, R-36 counts went from 30 cpm to 856 cpm and back to 30 |
| cpm. Local air samples taken by the RP Tech both in the control room and in |
| the area of the control room ventilation intake revealed no activity." |
| |
| The licensee stated that the gas decay tank release was planned and that the |
| counts going through the plant stack were considered normal. (These counts |
| peaked at 120 cpm.) The licensee stated that the planned gas decay tank |
| release was within both the expected and required release limits. The wind |
| was blowing in a favorable direction, and the stability class for |
| meteorological conditions was stable. Although counts have returned to |
| normal, the licensee plans to leave control room ventilation in the |
| emergency recirculation mode until tomorrow morning. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 1/12/01 @ 1113 BY GOMEZ TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) is retracting this notification. This |
| event was originally thought to be in response to a valid radiological |
| condition because a waste gas decay tank release was in progress at the same |
| time as this event. RG&E has confirmed that the alarm on Control Room Noble |
| Gas radiation monitor |
| R-36 that occurred at 20:14 EST on December 20, 2000, causing the shift in |
| Control Room ventilation to "Mode F" (emergency recirculation mode), was the |
| result of a spurious spike on R-36. The alarm was not in response to any |
| radiation condition, |
| |
| Local samples taken by radiation protection technicians on December 20, both |
| in the Control Room and in the area of the Control Room ventilation intake, |
| revealed no activity. The Plant Process Computer (PPCS) plots show that |
| R-36 counts were steady just before and immediately after the spike. |
| Further engineering evaluation of this event has determined that the alarm |
| on R-36 was caused by a sudden spike and was not in response to any |
| radiation condition. Therefore, this event is not reportable and is |
| retracted. |
| |
| Other occurrences of spiking on R-36 took place during December 2000 and |
| January 2001. Some of these spikes resulted in alarms on R-36 and |
| subsequent shift in Control Room ventilation to "Mode F". These alarms were |
| recognized at the time of alarm as invalid actuations of the HVAC System for |
| the Control Room, and did not result in NRC notification. Trouble-shooting |
| and corrective maintenance is on-going on the R-36 monitor. |
| |
| The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| The Region 1 RDO (Lew) was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37660 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WATTS BAR REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/12/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:36[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/12/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY KNUETTEL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/12/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHARLES R. OGLE R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|HFIT 26.73 FITNESS FOR DUTY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AN ACTING SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR AN ILLEGAL DRUG DURING A RANDOM |
| TEST |
| |
| A non-licensed employee was determined to be under the influence of |
| marijuana during a random test. The employee's access to the plant has been |
| terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional |
| details. |
| |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37661 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALLAWAY REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/12/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:40[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/12/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:28[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: R BARTON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/12/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DALE POWERS R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INVALID ACTUATION OF AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SYSTEM |
| |
| During performance of "A" Train Trip Actuations Device Operational Test a |
| reactor protection signal was generated when a procedure step was |
| inadvertently skipped. At the time this occurred the "A" reactor trip |
| bypass breaker was closed when the trip signal was generated. This caused |
| the "A" reactor trip breaker to open. The reactor did not trip because the |
| "A" bypass breaker was closed. |
| |
| This event resulted in an invalid actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature |
| system. It was concluded that this event was reportable per |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) since: |
| (1) This actuation was not anticipated to occur as part of this pre-planned |
| evolution since the trip signal was expected to be inhibited by the omitted |
| procedure step and |
| (2) The omitted step resulted in the system not being properly removed from |
| service as required by the surveillance procedure (source range trip signal |
| not being bypassed or inhibited). |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37662 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/12/2001|
|LICENSEE: AEROJET ORDNANCE TENNESSEE, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:33[EST]|
| CITY: JONESBOROUGH REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 01/11/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: TN |EVENT TIME: 11:30[EST]|
|LICENSE#: S-90009 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/12/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |CHARLES R. OGLE R2 |
| |JOSEPH HOLONICH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DEBRA SHULTZ (via fax) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING FIRE IN AN INCINERATOR AIR EFFLUENT |
| CLEANING SYSTEM |
| |
| "Event description: The licensee called to report a fire in their |
| incinerator's air effluent cleaning system. The fire in the baghouse lasted |
| approximately two hours. The building was evacuated, and onsite personnel |
| extinguished the fire. The baghouse filter has not yet been opened to assess |
| the damage. The area is secured and no routine operations are ongoing at |
| this time. Smears taken in the area were maximum of 100-dpm/100 sq. cm. |
| Clean up of the area has not begun. The total release from this event is |
| estimated to be 0.013 microcuries of depleted uranium. Sample results will |
| be available soon. |
| |
| "These events do not pose a threat to public health and safety but may be |
| reportable under 1200-2-5-.141(2)c.(4). |
| |
| |
| "Media attention: None" |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37663 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: ABB POWER DISTRIBUTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/15/2001|
|LICENSEE: ABB POWER DISTRIBUTION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:33[EST]|
| CITY: Florence REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 01/15/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: SC |EVENT TIME: 15:20[EST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/15/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |CHARLES R. OGLE R2 |
| |RICHARD BARKLEY R1 |
+------------------------------------------------+JOHN JACOBSON R3 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DARALL HARRIS |DALE POWERS R4 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON |VERN HODGE NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL DEFECT PER 10 CFR PART 21 CONTROL DEVICE FOR HK AND K-LINE CIRCUIT |
| BREAKERS |
| |
| |
| In December 1998, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (Chattanooga, TN) experienced a |
| failure to close of a 7.5HK500/1200 Medium Voltage circuit breaker (Serial |
| Number 48672-A101-1-3B) manufactured 3/30/1973. The cause of the breaker |
| failure as determined by TVA was a failure of the Control Device (Part |
| Number 191921T06). Specifically, a movable contact within the Control Device |
| was found to have a broken spring retainer, which is a protuberance holding |
| the return spring in place on the contact. This broken spring retainer |
| allowed the spring to move out of its intended position, causing failure of |
| the control contacts to make and break properly. This occurrence was |
| documented and evaluated by the Tennessee Valley Authority Central |
| Laboratories & Field Testing Service in their Technical Report #99-0550 on |
| 11 February 1999. |
| |
| On February 29, 2000, Catawba Nuclear Station (York, SC) experienced a |
| failure to close of a 5HK250/1200 Medium Voltage circuit breaker (Serial |
| Number 50465F-1 -10186) manufactured 3/28/1979. The cause of the breaker |
| failure as determined by Duke Power and ABB Florence was similar to the |
| failure reported by TVA in 1998. Material analysis of the failed movable |
| contact concluded that the material for the contact was correct to that |
| specified. A dissected profile analysis of the failed contact revealed that |
| the material at the base of the spring retainer on the movable contact was |
| thin and failed due to fatigue. This failure was documented and evaluated by |
| Duke Engineering Testing and Laboratory Services in their Metallurgical |
| Analysis Report #2624 on 29 March 2000. |
| |
| On October 30, 2000, during a routine inspection of a Control Device on a |
| 7.5HK500/1200 Medium Voltage circuit breaker (Serial Number 50464L-2-07210) |
| manufactured 2/29/1979, Catawba Nuclear Station found a movable contact that |
| had failed in a similar manner as the other two previously reported. This |
| failure was documented and evaluated by Duke Engineering Testing and |
| Laboratory Services in their Metallurgical Analysis Report #2726 on 01 |
| November 2000. |
| |
| The cause of these three failures was fatigue of the metal at the base of |
| the spring retainer on the movable contacts, due to insufficient metal mass |
| at the base of the retainer. The spring retainer on the contact is formed |
| with a die by punching the movable contact from the opposite side of the |
| electrical contact mounting location during fabrication. The height of the |
| spring retainer, therefore, determines the amount of material left at the |
| base. |
| |
| Corrective action for this incident has been taken. After further |
| investigation, ABB Florence has determined that the height of the spring |
| retainer was changed in September 1979 to a lower specification, leaving |
| more material at the base of the spring retainer. The movable contact formed |
| with the greater spring retainer height specification prior to 1979 has a |
| small possibility of failure as discussed above. There have been no other |
| reports of movable contact failures. |
| |
| There have been only these three reports of this movable contact failure |
| since the control device was introduced to the market in 1960. Since its |
| introduction, more than 22,000 control devices have been produced for both |
| HK and K-line type circuit breakers, each with 5 movable contacts. ABB |
| therefore believes this problem is not significant enough to require |
| immediate action from users. However, we recommend that control devices |
| older than 1981 be replaced with new control devices on both HK and K-line |
| breakers at the next scheduled maintenance of the breaker. |
| |
| ABB will notify all customers who purchased this product. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021