Event Notification Report for January 08, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/07/2001 - 01/08/2001
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37653
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DISTRICT 4
Region: 2
City: FT. LAUDERDALE State: FL
County:
License #: 0109-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLEY ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DISTRICT 4
Region: 2
City: FT. LAUDERDALE State: FL
County:
License #: 0109-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLEY ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 01/08/2001
Notification Time: 10:14 [ET]
Event Date: 01/08/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2001
Notification Time: 10:14 [ET]
Event Date: 01/08/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE
The following is taken from a faxed report:
A Troxler gauge containing 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241:Be was stolen. The Ft. Lauderdale Police case number is 013072.
Florida DOT bright orange van parked at owners address was stolen sometime between 6 a.m. Sunday (7th) and 7 a.m. Monday (8th). A Troxler gauge was in a locked box in the van. The keys to the gauge were not in the van. The police have been notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 1120 AM ON 1/16/01 BY CHARLES ADAMS TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The van and gauge were recovered on 1/13/01 in Plantation, FL. The office was notified on 1/16/01. The gauge was undisturbed in the van and is in custody of the owner. The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control notified NRC Region II.
The R2DO (Charles Ogle) and NMSS EO (Joseph Holonich).
The following is taken from a faxed report:
A Troxler gauge containing 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241:Be was stolen. The Ft. Lauderdale Police case number is 013072.
Florida DOT bright orange van parked at owners address was stolen sometime between 6 a.m. Sunday (7th) and 7 a.m. Monday (8th). A Troxler gauge was in a locked box in the van. The keys to the gauge were not in the van. The police have been notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 1120 AM ON 1/16/01 BY CHARLES ADAMS TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The van and gauge were recovered on 1/13/01 in Plantation, FL. The office was notified on 1/16/01. The gauge was undisturbed in the van and is in custody of the owner. The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control notified NRC Region II.
The R2DO (Charles Ogle) and NMSS EO (Joseph Holonich).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37655
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JOBE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JOBE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 01/08/2001
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 01/08/2001
Event Time: 11:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2001
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 01/08/2001
Event Time: 11:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
"The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to an air line leak. The unplanned loss of a single train system (such as HPCI) is reportable as a loss of safety function. The air line supplies air to air-operated valves for draining the steam supply line to ensure that the HPCI steam supply line does not fill with water. Upon a HPCI initiation signal that would cause the steam supply valve to open or on a loss of air pressure, these air-operated valves automatically shut. With the degraded condition of the air supply line, assurance could not be maintained that the steam lines would be maintained clear of water. HPCI is presently available and capable of injecting if required."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @0951 BY WHEELER TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
The affected air line supplies air to air operated drain valves for draining the HPCI System steam supply line. On a HPCI System initiation signal or on a loss of instrument air (i.e. the failure or isolation of the air supply line), the HPCI System steam supply line drain valves would automatically close. In this condition, in the response to high level alarms, manual opening of the HPCI System steam supply line drain valves would have been performed, in accordance with procedures, to ensure the HPCI System steam supply line remains clear of water. However, no water had accumulated in the HPCI System steam supply line prior to or during the condition (as evidenced by the lack of alarms). In the event water had accumulated in the HPCI System steam supply line and had not been removed, the HPCI turbine has been designed and tested to ensure that water carry-over (from the reactor vessel) will not cause damage to the turbine. The HPCI System has adequate capacity to accept the small losses in efficiency due to any moisture carryover. In addition, in preparation for and during maintenance/repair of the air supply line, no actions were taken which would have prevented the HPCI System from functioning. Based on this analysis, the HPCI System was fully capable of performing its safety functions and HPCI System Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements continued to be satisfied at all times. The HPCI System remained operable during this period. Therefore, Event Number 37655 is retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Region 4 RDO (Spitzberg) was notified.
"The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to an air line leak. The unplanned loss of a single train system (such as HPCI) is reportable as a loss of safety function. The air line supplies air to air-operated valves for draining the steam supply line to ensure that the HPCI steam supply line does not fill with water. Upon a HPCI initiation signal that would cause the steam supply valve to open or on a loss of air pressure, these air-operated valves automatically shut. With the degraded condition of the air supply line, assurance could not be maintained that the steam lines would be maintained clear of water. HPCI is presently available and capable of injecting if required."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @0951 BY WHEELER TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
The affected air line supplies air to air operated drain valves for draining the HPCI System steam supply line. On a HPCI System initiation signal or on a loss of instrument air (i.e. the failure or isolation of the air supply line), the HPCI System steam supply line drain valves would automatically close. In this condition, in the response to high level alarms, manual opening of the HPCI System steam supply line drain valves would have been performed, in accordance with procedures, to ensure the HPCI System steam supply line remains clear of water. However, no water had accumulated in the HPCI System steam supply line prior to or during the condition (as evidenced by the lack of alarms). In the event water had accumulated in the HPCI System steam supply line and had not been removed, the HPCI turbine has been designed and tested to ensure that water carry-over (from the reactor vessel) will not cause damage to the turbine. The HPCI System has adequate capacity to accept the small losses in efficiency due to any moisture carryover. In addition, in preparation for and during maintenance/repair of the air supply line, no actions were taken which would have prevented the HPCI System from functioning. Based on this analysis, the HPCI System was fully capable of performing its safety functions and HPCI System Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements continued to be satisfied at all times. The HPCI System remained operable during this period. Therefore, Event Number 37655 is retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Region 4 RDO (Spitzberg) was notified.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37656
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KURT SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KURT SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 01/08/2001
Notification Time: 20:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/08/2001
Event Time: 11:27 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2001
Notification Time: 20:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/08/2001
Event Time: 11:27 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT
"At 1127 hours, 01/08/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent's (PSS) office was notified of a discrepancy in the U-235 Mass log in room 229, X-710 Lab Services Facility. A NCS Anomalous Condition was initiated and NCS Engineer personnel were contacted to investigate the discrepancy. Investigation revealed that two containers were moved from room 229 into room 330 without being logged out of room 229 or logged into room 330. The failure to log the movement of the two containers into and out of the respective mass inventories represents a loss of controls 2a and 2b of NCSA-0710_022.A01. Since the NCSE takes credit for these controls to satisfy both legs of the double contingency principle, this event involves the loss of both controls credited for double contingency. At 1430 hours, 01/08/01, NCS Engineering reported that compliance with NCSA-0710_022.A01 was reestablished This event does not involve greater than a safe mass and moderation is not a control (primary or otherwise) in the affected NCSA/NCSE.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"The safety significance of this event is low. The U-235 mass inventory in Room 330 is 129.1 grams, which is well below the safe mass limit if 230 grams of U-235 for oily material. The failure to log the container movement at no time challenged the safe mass limit. A minimum of 588 grams U-235 (Reference POEF-LMUS-44) would be needed to support a criticality at the analyzed enrichment limit (100%) under optimum conditions
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"If the safe U-235 mass limit was at the maximum allowable value for operations involving oily material, and these two containers were added to the mass present, there would need to be an additional 347 grams of U-235 present in the room before a critical mass for full reflection, optimum moderation and spherical geometry were exceeded for oily conditions. For this amount of U-235 to be present, multiple errors in the log book would need to occur.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"The control Parameter for this operation is mass. NCSA-0710_022 places two controls on this parameter. The combined mass of all fissile material is limited to 350 grams of U-235 for non-oily/greasy material and 230 grams of U-235 if oily/greasy material is present. The NCSA requires that a log of U-235 mass inventory be maintained to demonstrate that the mass limit is not exceeded. Each log entry consists of the mass value plus analytical uncertainty. A log entry is made by the person responsible for the movement of U-235 into the room and is verified by a second knowledgeable person.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT. FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
"There were approximately 100 containers in room 330 that contain 129.1 grams of U-235 in both solid and liquid form. Out of these containers there were approximately 33.7 grams U-235 enriched to greater than 20% in fire room at the time of this event. The NCS analysis assumes 100% enrichment in developing the mass limit and does not control enrichment.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
"Two containers with >500 ppm U-235 concentration and greater than 1.0 weight percent U-235 enrichment were not logged out of room 229 nor were they logged into room 330. Since they were not logged in or out, no verification was performed. The safety significance of this event is low due to the small amount of U-235 involved."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.
"At 1127 hours, 01/08/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent's (PSS) office was notified of a discrepancy in the U-235 Mass log in room 229, X-710 Lab Services Facility. A NCS Anomalous Condition was initiated and NCS Engineer personnel were contacted to investigate the discrepancy. Investigation revealed that two containers were moved from room 229 into room 330 without being logged out of room 229 or logged into room 330. The failure to log the movement of the two containers into and out of the respective mass inventories represents a loss of controls 2a and 2b of NCSA-0710_022.A01. Since the NCSE takes credit for these controls to satisfy both legs of the double contingency principle, this event involves the loss of both controls credited for double contingency. At 1430 hours, 01/08/01, NCS Engineering reported that compliance with NCSA-0710_022.A01 was reestablished This event does not involve greater than a safe mass and moderation is not a control (primary or otherwise) in the affected NCSA/NCSE.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"The safety significance of this event is low. The U-235 mass inventory in Room 330 is 129.1 grams, which is well below the safe mass limit if 230 grams of U-235 for oily material. The failure to log the container movement at no time challenged the safe mass limit. A minimum of 588 grams U-235 (Reference POEF-LMUS-44) would be needed to support a criticality at the analyzed enrichment limit (100%) under optimum conditions
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"If the safe U-235 mass limit was at the maximum allowable value for operations involving oily material, and these two containers were added to the mass present, there would need to be an additional 347 grams of U-235 present in the room before a critical mass for full reflection, optimum moderation and spherical geometry were exceeded for oily conditions. For this amount of U-235 to be present, multiple errors in the log book would need to occur.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"The control Parameter for this operation is mass. NCSA-0710_022 places two controls on this parameter. The combined mass of all fissile material is limited to 350 grams of U-235 for non-oily/greasy material and 230 grams of U-235 if oily/greasy material is present. The NCSA requires that a log of U-235 mass inventory be maintained to demonstrate that the mass limit is not exceeded. Each log entry consists of the mass value plus analytical uncertainty. A log entry is made by the person responsible for the movement of U-235 into the room and is verified by a second knowledgeable person.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT. FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
"There were approximately 100 containers in room 330 that contain 129.1 grams of U-235 in both solid and liquid form. Out of these containers there were approximately 33.7 grams U-235 enriched to greater than 20% in fire room at the time of this event. The NCS analysis assumes 100% enrichment in developing the mass limit and does not control enrichment.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
"Two containers with >500 ppm U-235 concentration and greater than 1.0 weight percent U-235 enrichment were not logged out of room 229 nor were they logged into room 330. Since they were not logged in or out, no verification was performed. The safety significance of this event is low due to the small amount of U-235 involved."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.