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Event Notification Report for January 4, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           01/03/2001 - 01/04/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37642  37643  37644  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37642       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/02/2001|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:05[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        01/02/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:36[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PHIL SANTINI                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/03/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       6.5      Power Operation  |5        Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP AUTOMATIC START                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The plant sustained a main turbine trip on steam generator high level, cause |
| under review.  The turbine trip caused a main feedwater trip which caused an |
| automatic start of the 21 and 23 auxiliary feedwater pumps, as designed.     |
| The licensee review of the event determined, later in the evening, that the  |
| pump starts were reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii).                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATED AT 1633 EST ON 01/03/2001 BY ROBERT ALLEN TO FANGIE JONES * *  |
| *                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "The following is an update to NRC event report 37642:  ESF Actuations       |
|                                                                              |
| "Indian Point Unit 2 sustained inadvertent ESF component actuations          |
| following a main turbine trip on high steam generator level that occurred    |
| during preparation for admitting steam to roll the main turbine for plant    |
| startup. There was no reactor trip nor was one required. The main turbine    |
| was latched with the stop valves open and the control valves closed. Steam   |
| Generator level control was in manual as is normal at low reactor power      |
| levels. A second condensate pump was started which caused an increase in     |
| main feedwater pressure which caused increasing steam generator levels.      |
| Operator attempts to reduce flow were unsuccessful and a high steam          |
| generator level turbine trip signal caused the main turbine stop valves to   |
| close (trip) and caused the main feedwater pump to trip. This high level     |
| trip signal also resulted in the closing of the main feedwater pump          |
| discharge valves (ESF valves), the closing of the steam generator blow down  |
| isolation valves (ESF valves) and the starting of the motor driven Auxiliary |
| Feedwater pumps (ESF) as designed."                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37643       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/03/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:03[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        01/02/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        17:00[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/03/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |MELVYN LEACH         R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |PATRICIA HOLAHAN     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  M.C. PITTMAN                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The following is quoted from the written report:                             |
|                                                                              |
| At 1700, on 1/2/01 The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that    |
| the mass of U-235 was incorrectly copied from a Request for Waste            |
| Classification (RWC) onto the Waste Consolidation Container Log Sheet and    |
| incorrectly independently verified in violation of NCSA.WMO.004. Independent |
| verification of the consolidation drum mass is used to ensure the total mass |
| dose not exceed the 120 gram U-235 limit. The particular drum in question    |
| contains less than 15 grams of U-235. [This event actually occurred on       |
| 6/21/2000 and was found during a normal review of records on 01/02/2001]     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.                  |
|                                                                              |
| PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-01-0024; PGDP event Report No, PAD-2001-001     |
| Event Worksheet                                                              |
| Responsible Division: Production Support                                     |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  Even though less than 15 grams of U-235 was  |
| involved in this incident, independent verification was not properly         |
| performed. This type of administrative control is used throughout the PGDP   |
| NCS program.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:  In order for a criticality to be possible,         |
| multiple drums would have to be incorrectly consolidated and the resulting   |
| mass contained within the drum would need to exceed 1500 grams of U-235 at   |
| an enrichment of 5.5%. (This all was generated onsite and has an enrichment  |
| of less than 2.1 %.)                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION ETC):  Double |
| contingency for this scenario Is established by implementing two independent |
| controls on mass                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS      |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):  Less than 15 grams of U~235 at an    |
| enrichment of less than 2.1%.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  The first leg of double contingency is     |
| based on correctly calculating the cumulative U-235 mass in the              |
| consolidation drum to ensure the 120 gram limit is not exceeded. The actual  |
| mass was incorrectly copied from the RWC onto the consolidation log sheet,   |
| making it impossible to correctly calculate the consolidated mass.           |
| Therefore, the control was violated and the first leg of double contingency  |
| was lost.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The second leg of double contingency is an administrative control to         |
| independently verify that the mass was copied correctly and the cumulative   |
| mass total is correct. The independent verification did not identify that    |
| the incorrect mass was copied. This control was violated and this leg of     |
| double contingency was not maintained.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Since double contingency is based on two controls on mass, double            |
| contingency was not maintained.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
| The area was immediately roped off and posted to control access and prevent  |
| the movement of fissile/potentially fissile material within the area. The    |
| actual mess of U-235 in the consolidation drum was verified to be less than  |
| 15 grams which reestablished control. The waste consolidation container log  |
| sheet was corrected and independently verified prior to removing the ropes   |
| and postings.                                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37644       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FARLEY                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/03/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:27[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        01/03/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:30[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JAMES ODOM                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/03/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MIKE ERNSTES         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PHYSICAL SECURITY REPORT - 1 HOUR                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee discovered a potential compromise of classified safeguards      |
| information and took immediate compensatory measures.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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