Event Notification Report for November 28, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/27/2000 - 11/28/2000
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37554
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BOB COOLIDGE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BOB COOLIDGE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/28/2000
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2000
Event Time: 15:13 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2001
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2000
Event Time: 15:13 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANIELLO DELLA GRECA (R1)
ANIELLO DELLA GRECA (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO INSTRUMENTATION FAILURE
"The HPCI System was taken out of service for surveillance testing earlier in the day. The surveillance's were completed and HPCI was placed back in service in standby lineup. At this time, the high flow isolation instrumentation was found to be reading well beyond the limits of the normal in service band (+10 to -10). At that time, HPCI was removed from service (availability) and isolated. The proper LCO was entered and troubleshooting is underway."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE 1415EST ON 1/12/01 FROM OLSON TO MacKINNON * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"This is a retraction of event no. 37554 made on November 28, 2000 at 1651 in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D).
"An Engineer had noted a flow switch that provides a high steam flow to the HPCI system reading -17 inches of water while the other indicated -2 inches of water. The Primary Containment Isolation capability of the HPCI isolation valves was declared inoperable and the valves de-energized in the isolated condition. HPCI was declared inoperable and a 14 day cold shutdown LCO entered. Subsequent testing of the differential pressure switches found the trip setpoints to be correct. The face plate had not been 'zeroed' during previous calibration. This had no effect on switch operation, therefore could not have prevented fulfillment of safety function."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. Notified R1DO(Lew).
"The HPCI System was taken out of service for surveillance testing earlier in the day. The surveillance's were completed and HPCI was placed back in service in standby lineup. At this time, the high flow isolation instrumentation was found to be reading well beyond the limits of the normal in service band (+10 to -10). At that time, HPCI was removed from service (availability) and isolated. The proper LCO was entered and troubleshooting is underway."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE 1415EST ON 1/12/01 FROM OLSON TO MacKINNON * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"This is a retraction of event no. 37554 made on November 28, 2000 at 1651 in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D).
"An Engineer had noted a flow switch that provides a high steam flow to the HPCI system reading -17 inches of water while the other indicated -2 inches of water. The Primary Containment Isolation capability of the HPCI isolation valves was declared inoperable and the valves de-energized in the isolated condition. HPCI was declared inoperable and a 14 day cold shutdown LCO entered. Subsequent testing of the differential pressure switches found the trip setpoints to be correct. The face plate had not been 'zeroed' during previous calibration. This had no effect on switch operation, therefore could not have prevented fulfillment of safety function."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. Notified R1DO(Lew).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37555
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN SMALL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN SMALL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/28/2000
Notification Time: 17:16 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2000
Event Time: 16:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2000
Notification Time: 17:16 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2000
Event Time: 16:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
GEORGE BELISLE (R2)
GEORGE BELISLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH UNITS OUTSIDE OF DESIGN BASIS DUE TO MOMENTARY LOSS OF BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION
"Presently, 'A' Control Room Ventilation out of service for maintenance. 'B' Control Room Ventilation (VC/YC) inadvertently deenergized causing both trains of VC/YC to be inoperable. 'B' VC/YC restarted with no further complications. Deenergized from 1625 until 1643 which places both units one and two outside design basis. With VC/YC inoperable for 'A' and 'B' trains, entered [TS] 3.0.3 momentarily."
The problem occurred when the technician performing maintenance on the "A" train went to the operating "B" train. The "B" train Chiller was tripped in error. The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
* * * * UPDATE 1159EST ON 11/29/00 FROM JOHN JENKINS TO S. SANDIN * * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"On November 29, 2000, the above notification was made to the NRC under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (1) (ii) (B). Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that this condition did not place the plant outside of design basis.
"The ability to pressurize the Main Control Room was not affected in this condition. The pressurization fans would start and run if needed during an accident. The pressurization function mitigates dose to the control operators.
"During the 18 minutes that the chiller was out of service the temperature in the Control Room increased from 70 degrees to approximately 72 ½ degrees. The temperature rise was evaluated by the System Engineer. The temperature limit for the control room is listed as a maximum of 90 degrees in the Selected Licensee Commitments. This temperature is based on a continuous duty rating for equipment and instrumentation and for habitability of the Control Room. Annunciator alarms would alert the Operators of the increasing temperature and existing procedures would direct actions to be taken to limit the temperature affects. The Engineering evaluation determined that the chiller would need to be out of service for 2 hours before this limit was challenged.
"This occurrence did not increase the probability of barrier failure or radiation releases. Remote shutdown capability outside the control room was not affected. For these reasons the plant remained within its design basis."
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Notified R2DO(Belisle).
"Presently, 'A' Control Room Ventilation out of service for maintenance. 'B' Control Room Ventilation (VC/YC) inadvertently deenergized causing both trains of VC/YC to be inoperable. 'B' VC/YC restarted with no further complications. Deenergized from 1625 until 1643 which places both units one and two outside design basis. With VC/YC inoperable for 'A' and 'B' trains, entered [TS] 3.0.3 momentarily."
The problem occurred when the technician performing maintenance on the "A" train went to the operating "B" train. The "B" train Chiller was tripped in error. The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
* * * * UPDATE 1159EST ON 11/29/00 FROM JOHN JENKINS TO S. SANDIN * * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"On November 29, 2000, the above notification was made to the NRC under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (1) (ii) (B). Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that this condition did not place the plant outside of design basis.
"The ability to pressurize the Main Control Room was not affected in this condition. The pressurization fans would start and run if needed during an accident. The pressurization function mitigates dose to the control operators.
"During the 18 minutes that the chiller was out of service the temperature in the Control Room increased from 70 degrees to approximately 72 ½ degrees. The temperature rise was evaluated by the System Engineer. The temperature limit for the control room is listed as a maximum of 90 degrees in the Selected Licensee Commitments. This temperature is based on a continuous duty rating for equipment and instrumentation and for habitability of the Control Room. Annunciator alarms would alert the Operators of the increasing temperature and existing procedures would direct actions to be taken to limit the temperature affects. The Engineering evaluation determined that the chiller would need to be out of service for 2 hours before this limit was challenged.
"This occurrence did not increase the probability of barrier failure or radiation releases. Remote shutdown capability outside the control room was not affected. For these reasons the plant remained within its design basis."
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Notified R2DO(Belisle).