Event Notification Report for November 20, 2000

HPCI INOPERABLE - TURBINE EXHAUST LINE FLOODED

HPCI turbine exhaust drain pot level switch has malfunctioned. This has potentially led to a condition where exhaust line from the turbine is flooded. GE SIL 580 recognizes that a slug of water can create a momentary high pressure and rupture both exhaust line rupture diaphragms if HPCI should initiate.

HPCI system has been declared inoperable and the licensee entered a 7 day LCO.

The NRC resident inspector has been notified.

REACTOR TRIP - SPURIOUS RATE TRIP

A reactor trip signal was generated from the power range neutron flux rate signal. With one power range NI out of service, personnel performing incore flux maps operated a test meter on another power range NI. A spurious rate trip signal was generated, resulting in a 2 of 4 coincidence causing a reactor trip. All equipment functioned as designed. All three Auxiliary feedwater pumps started on low S/G level. All control and shutdown bank control rods fully inserted.

The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector and the local sheriff's office.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DOWNED TRANSMISSION LINE ACROSS OHIO RIVER

"At 1028 hours on 11/20/2000, with both Beaver Valley units at full power, several alarms were received at both units and control room lights flickered. There were no actuations of components or electrical protection devices at the site. Reports were received that an electrical power line, which crosses the Ohio river, was down in the river and draped over the auxiliary intake structure. This structure is located outside the Beaver Valley protected area and contains emergency backup river water systems for both units. There were no fires near the auxiliary intake structure. There were no injuries to plant personnel. The control room also received reports of a small brush fire which was caused by the downed line on the opposite side of the Ohio river, which is outside the owner controlled property.

"Operators were dispatched, and reported that the downed line is a static wire from the top of a high tension tower. The static wire contacted scaffolding being built at the auxiliary intake structure, causing some sparking. The high voltage line has been deenergized.

"Control room shift supervisors contacted the Beaver county Emergency Management Agency to report the downed line and the fire across the river. This report is submitted as a courtesy as the local emergency management agency was notified. The downed line does not affect the operation to either Beaver Valley unit. Offsite power sources are fully available."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.

4-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT

"At 1015 hours on 11/20/00, Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) personnel determined that NCSA-0705-076 was deficient in that it had not adequately considered conditions created by a 1 1/2" dike installed in several areas of the X-705 decontamination building. Holes in some dry active waste (DAW) containers may allow spilled solution to be absorbed into the containers and exceed the 1 1/2" favorable thickness allowed by the NCSA. DAW containers were removed from the areas in question to establish compliance with the double contingency principle.

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"The safety significance of this event is low because no leak of uranium bearing solution has occurred. However the potential existed for absorbent materials to collect an unsafe amount of material in the event of a leak within a diked area. The contingency of unprotected absorbent materials was analyzed to be subcritical in NCSE-0705-076 provided that a spill of an unsafe amount of fissile solution does not occur. Elevating absorbent materials to the wrong height represents a loss of one double contingency control.

"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED:
"For a criticality to occur, the following chain of events would be required. First, a leak of an unsafe concentration or unsafe mass of uranium bearing solution must occur in an Inadvertent Container Area. Secondly, the area must have a dike and the solution must collect in the area to a height greater than one inch (dikes are typically 1 1/2"). Third, absorbent materials which are required to be covered and elevated (e.g. a DAW barrel) must be present in same diked area. Fourth, the solution must absorb into the materials in an amount greater than the minimum critical mass.

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS:
"The controlled parameter related to this event is geometry. Control #6 of NCSA-0705-076 requires that absorbent materials protected by covering be elevated above the floor by one inch. This height is insufficient if dikes are present in the area. NCSA-0705-076 is deficient because it fails to consider diked areas when establishing the required elevation height.

"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL:
"No leak or spill of uranium bearing material has occurred. There is no estimate of how much material could have spilled in the event of a leak. NCSAs for the X-705 building approve the processing of up to 100% enriched material.

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"NCSA-0705-076 fails to establish the correct height for elevating absorbing materials such as DAW barrels in Inadvertent Container Areas. Storage of absorbent materials in accordance with control #6 will be placed on hold until NCSA-0705-076 can be revised.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
At 1230 hours, barrels were removed from the areas in question and compliance established."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.