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Event Notification Report for November 13, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           11/09/2000 - 11/13/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37439  37507  37508  37509  37510  37511  37512  37513  37514  37515  37516  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37439       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: RIVER BEND               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/18/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:45[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        10/18/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:37[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TOM LYNCH                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/10/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN PELLET          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       99       Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT EXPERIENCED A MOMENTARY GRID DISTURBANCE RENDERING SEVERAL              |
| SAFETY-RELATED RADIATION MONITORS INOPERABLE                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1437CDT on 10/18/00, River Bend Station experienced an electrical        |
| perturbation in the Baton Rouge area.  Line 758 [138 kV]  was lost which     |
| feeds a local refinery and this loss resulted in a momentary grid            |
| undervoltage condition.  This undervoltage condition lasted less than one    |
| (1) second.  As a result of this undervoltage condition, power to selected   |
| radiation monitor sample pumps was lost.  Specifically, the Control Room     |
| Fresh air intake radiation monitors on both Division I and Division II lost  |
| sample pump power and this resulted in these monitors being inoperable for   |
| approximately three (3) minutes.  The monitors were subsequently restarted.  |
| As a result of this condition, the radiation monitors would have been unable |
| to initiate the Control Room Fresh Air Filter trains upon receipt of a high  |
| radiation signal.  This signal is required to be operable when handling      |
| irradiated fuel; modes 1, 2, 3 and/or performing operations with the         |
| potential to drain the reactor vessel.  No fuel handling or reactor vessel   |
| drain activities were in progress.  This condition also existed for the Fuel |
| Building ventilation radiation monitors.  This condition is conservatively   |
| being reported as a loss of safety function for the Control Room Fresh Air   |
| System.  Further evaluation if this condition is in progress."               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION 1111 11/10/2000 FROM HUSTON TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *         |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1746 on October 18. 2000 River Bend Station (RBS) reported a loss of     |
| power to radiation monitors in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D).   |
| Both divisions lost power for approximately 3 minutes until the units were   |
| restored due to operator action.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "A review indicated a concern for two safety functions related to charcoal   |
| filtration. One was related to control room fresh air and one related to the |
| fuel building, specifically related to fuel handling accidents.              |
|                                                                              |
| "The radiation monitors sensed low voltage during the grid transient and     |
| correctly shut down. They restarted automatically when voltage was restored: |
| however, the sample pump must be restarted by the operator. The radiation    |
| monitors operated correctly per design for the conditions they sensed.       |
|                                                                              |
| "Review of the event by RBS Engineering and Licensing personnel indicate     |
| that the loss of both divisions of radiation monitors for Control Room Fresh |
| Air (CRFA) is covered by technical specifications. The allowed outage time   |
| in technical specifications was met when the radiation monitor sample pumps  |
| were restored within about three minutes. Additionally, plant procedures     |
| account for operator action to ensure the safety related monitors are        |
| operating and restarting the sample pumps is considered non-heroic, assessed |
| action. Therefore this occurrence is not reportable.                         |
|                                                                              |
| "A review of the alarm history for the fuel building radiation monitors      |
| indicated that one division did not lose the sample pump and remained        |
| operable throughout the transient. Therefore, there was no loss of safety    |
| function for the fuel handling accident.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "Based on this information, RBS concluded that the loss of the radiation     |
| monitor sample pumps is not reportable and the previous report is            |
| retracted."                                                                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37507       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION            |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/09/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:29[EST]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)          |EVENT DATE:        11/08/2000|
|           FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY         |EVENT TIME:        08:35[PST]|
|           COMMERICAL LWR FUEL                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/09/2000|
|    CITY:  RICHLAND                 REGION:  4  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  BENTON                    STATE:  WA |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  SNM-1227              AGREEMENT:  Y  |JOE TAPIA            R4      |
|  DOCKET:  07001257                             |BRIAN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LOREN WAAS                   |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Event Description:                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| On 11/08/00 at about 8:35 a.m., while conducting an accountability audit of  |
| waste material transfers, a Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) process operator |
| identified that a single 4-gallon container of uranium-containing waste      |
| material with a net weight of 10.73 kg had been transferred to a 30-gallon   |
| drum without first being sampled.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Further investigation revealed that the 30-gallon drum contained 40 grams    |
| 235U exclusive of the material from the unanalyzed 4-gallon bucket, A high   |
| 235U value under normal conditions for a 4-gallon container of this waste    |
| weighing 10.73 kg would be 54 grams 235U (waste containing 10% U and         |
| assuming 5% 235U enrichment). Based on the highest U content observed in     |
| waste from this process (25 %U), the worst case 235U content in this 10.73   |
| kg of waste material would be less than 135 grams.                           |
|                                                                              |
| Safety Significance Of Event:                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The safety significance of this event is low. Assuming the material from the |
| unanalyzed single 4-gallon container contained uranium at historic maximum   |
| levels from this process, the mass of 235U present in the 30-gallon waste    |
| drum would be less than 175 g (40g + 135g), which is less than 10% of a      |
| minimum critical mass. A safe mass of 235U (45% of minimum critical) is 792  |
| grams, assuming 5 wt.% enriched material. If one assumes that all of the     |
| waste material in the unanalyzed 4-gallon container was UO2 (an unrealistic  |
| assumption), the mass of 235U present in the 30 gallon waste drum would      |
| still be less than 513 g assuming 5 wt.% enriched material. The material     |
| actually present is < 3.5 wt.% enriched.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| This waste drum had been stored in a two tier array. However, this type of   |
| waste drum is allowed to be stored in a 3 tier array. If this drum, as       |
| postulated above to contain 175g 235U, and two additional drums each at      |
| SPC's 100 g 235U waste disposal limit were present in a three tier stack,    |
| the total mass in the stack would have been approximately 375 g 235U. This   |
| is less than 22% of a minimum critical mass.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Potential Criticality Pathways Involved:                                     |
|                                                                              |
| For criticality to occur in a single waste drum, a minimum of about 1760 g   |
| 235U is required. Current SOPs require that two independent individuals      |
| verify that waste container U contents have been determined by three         |
| independent means before the waste container contents are tabulated on a     |
| load list (as acceptable for incorporation into a single drum) and allowed   |
| to be transferred to a waste packaging area. Two independent individuals are |
| then required to verify the selected buckets are on the load list before the |
| individual bucket contents can be placed into a 30-gallon waste drum.        |
|                                                                              |
| At least 1 3 unanalyzed 4-gallon containers of this type of waste material   |
| (at historic high U levels from this process) would have to be placed into a |
| drum before criticality is possible.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| Multiple additional failures would be required to reach conditions that      |
| approach a critical mass in a single drum or in an allowed 3 tier array of   |
| drums.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Controlled Parameters:                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| For waste drums the controlled criticality parameter mass/allowed surface    |
| density                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| Estimated Amount, Enrichment, and Form Of Licensed Material:                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensed material is uranium bearing solid waste. The total 235U present |
| in the waste drum in question was calculated at worst case historic process  |
| waste conditions to be <125 grams, with an actual enrichment of < 3.5 wt.%   |
| 235U. This is < 10% of the minimum critical mass of material enriched to 5   |
| wt.% 235U.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) Or Control Systems and a Description   |
| of the Failures Or Deficiencies:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| Nuclear criticality safety controls imposed on this waste generation,        |
| packaging, and storage process include:                                      |
|                                                                              |
| analysis of uranium content in the initial waste buckets by three            |
| independent means;                                           second party    |
| verification of drum load lists for compliance with waste drum limits;       |
| second party verification that buckets actually received at the drum loading |
| area match those called for by the drum load list.                           |
|                                                                              |
| The control system failed when an operator selected a 4-gallon waste bucket  |
| not on the approved load list and the error was not caught by the waste      |
| handler tasked to verify that buckets received in the waste handling area    |
| matched those on the approved drum load list.                                |
|                                                                              |
| A number of factors may have contributed to the failure, including but not   |
| limited to:                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| 1  Human factors issues related to reading very similar alpha-numeric        |
| characters (in this case AA4072 vs. AC4072);                                 |
|                                                                              |
| 2  The practice of placing waste buckets inside plastic bags for the sake of |
| contamination control, prior to their being stored in an unlit cargo         |
| container. This necessitates transcribing the container ID number to a piece |
| of tape on the outside of the plastic bag, allowing for the possibility of   |
| transcription errors.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| 3  The practice of storing unanalyzed waste buckets destined for process     |
| recycle with buckets destined for placement into waste drums.                |
|                                                                              |
| A formal SPC Incident investigation Board (IIB) is investigating the         |
| incident.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Corrective Actions To Restore Safety Systems and When Each Was Implemented:  |
|                                                                              |
| The process operators finding the infraction promptly notified Criticality   |
| Safety.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| Criticality Safety assembled a multi-disciplinary team to review the         |
| infraction and determined the safety significance of the incident to be low  |
| but that it met the NRC Bulletin 91-01 Criteria as a 24 hour reportable      |
| condition.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| This team also recommended the following immediate actions:                  |
|                                                                              |
| 1  Stop loading waste drums with this type of material. (completed           |
| 2  Account for and label all unanalyzed waste buckets of this type of        |
| material to assure that no other buckets intended for process recycle have   |
| been, or will be, erroneously placed into waste drums. complete)             |
|                                                                              |
| The SPC IIB is formally evaluating incident cause(s) and potential           |
| corrective actions.                                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37508       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY            REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/09/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:15[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        11/09/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:24[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DANIEL MURRAY                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/09/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MICHELE EVANS        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Offsite Notification of an oil spill.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| At 1024 hours, a report was made to the Unit 2 control room identifying a    |
| possible oil spill in progress from near the intake structure to the Ohio    |
| River.  There was a sheen in front of the intake structure; it is not clear  |
| if Beaver Valley is the source of the discharge.  The abnormal operating     |
| procedure for oil spills (1/2AOP-53C.4A.75.6) was entered to respond to the  |
| reports.  On-site catch basins and oil separators were checked with no       |
| evidence of oil in the process streams.  On-site equipment was checked for   |
| leakage that may have contributed to the spill; none was identified.  A boom |
| was placed in front of the apparent discharge point to stop any further      |
| release of oil into the Ohio River.  Further observation indicated that the  |
| oil sheen also existed up river on th e water and on the shore.  The source  |
| of the oil appears to be the Ohio River, not Beaver Valley Power Station.    |
| This report is being made due to the notification of other government        |
| agencies as directed by the plant procedure. The notifications began at 1149 |
| hours.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the National Response Center, Pennsylvania Department  |
| of Environmental Protection, Beaver County Emergency Management Agency and   |
| the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.                                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37509       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE                 REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/09/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:01[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        11/09/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:25[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEVIN HUJET                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/09/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       96       Power Operation  |96       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - TRAVELING SCREEN COVERS NOT KEPT IN PLACE             |
|                                                                              |
| A review of USAR Section 2.6 identified an apparent discrepancy between      |
| plant design and current configuration.  USAR and original plant Safety      |
| Evaluation identified modification to the plant to mitigate high lake level  |
| conditions to preclude flooding within safety related areas.  Included in    |
| these features are closed and strengthened traveling water screen covers.    |
| KNPP has historically operated with these covers in the open position, which |
| is contrary to the USAR.  This is being considered as outside of design      |
| basis.  Actions have been taken to close and brace the covers in the closed  |
| position.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37510       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/09/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:59[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        11/09/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:20[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BENNETT                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/09/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|HFIT 26.73               FITNESS FOR DUTY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FITNESS FOR DUTY                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| A CONTRACT SUPERVISOR RECEIVED A CONFIRMED POSITIVE TEST RESULT.  THE        |
| INDIVIDUAL WAS ESCORTED FROM THE PROTECTED AREA AND ACCESS WAS SUSPENDED.    |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37511       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/10/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:54[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        11/10/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        02:17[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEVIN PHILLIPS               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/10/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF POWER TO 4kV ESF BUS DURING TESTING                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "A failure of a voltage regulator transformer on 1B diesel generator         |
| occurred during a planned ESF test, requiring an emergency shutdown of the   |
| diesel generator. This resulted in a loss of power to 4160V essential bus    |
| 1ETB. Systems required for the current mode of operation were unaffected as  |
| the B train components were removed from service for the test. Power has     |
| been restored to the bus from offsite power at this time."                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37512       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/10/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:52[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        11/10/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:10[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  D. COVEYOU                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/10/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Hot Shutdown     |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFGAS ISOLATION VALVE FAILED TO CLOSE UPON DEMAND                           |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0610 on November 10, 2000, the offgas isolation valve to the station     |
| ventilation stack (2N62-F057) failed to close when the main control room     |
| control switch for the valve was placed in the 'close' position. The valve   |
| subsequently closed approximately 20 minutes later without other action      |
| taken. The valve is air operated and is designed to close upon receipt of a  |
| high offgas release rate or via the control switch. There were no abnormal   |
| radiological releases occurring at the time of the failure. The unit was in  |
| the process of being shut down for a planned refueling outage. No other      |
| problems occurred during the event. All systems operated as designed except  |
| as described. A prompt investigation has been initiated to determine the     |
| cause of the valve failure. Corrective actions will be taken to address the  |
| cause."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37513       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM                  REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/10/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:29[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        11/10/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:55[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BOB COOLIDGE                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/10/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          UNU                   |MICHELE EVANS        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |TAD MARSH            NRR     |
|AAEC                                            |DAVID BARDEN         FEMA    |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO FIRE ONSITE                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee declared an Unusual Event due to a small fire in the radwaste   |
| truck lock. Grinding was being performed as part of maintenance activities,  |
| igniting some material beneath the floor. The site fire brigade responded to |
| the fire, but did not extinguish the fire within 10 minutes. The licensee    |
| believes that the fire has been extinguished, but there is still some smoke  |
| in the area. The licensee reported that the local fire department also       |
| responded to the site. No radiological release has occurred as a result of   |
| the fire.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.   |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1220 ON 11/10/00 BY COOLIDGE, RECEIVED BY WEAVER ***         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee terminated the Unusual event at 1217.   The fire is out, there  |
| was no extension and all air samples measured showed no airborne             |
| contamination.    The resident inspector has been informed.                  |
|                                                                              |
| The operations center notified the RDO (Evans); EO (Marsh) and Fema (Eches). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37514       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/10/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:33[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        11/10/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:29[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RANDY HASTINGS               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/10/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ESF ACTUATION - EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR STARTS                            |
|                                                                              |
| During the performance of the procedure for protective relay calibration and |
| testing on Unit 2 Safeguards Bus 2A06, an undervoltage signal was generated  |
| on bus 2A06.  The undervoltage signal was generated when the technicians     |
| checked the continuity between two test points on bus 2A06 as specified in   |
| the procedure.  On the undervoltage signal, the main feed breaker to bus     |
| 2A06 opened, bus 2A06 de-energized G-03 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)     |
| started, G-04 EDG started, and the G-04 EDG output breaker closed to         |
| re-energize bus 2A06. These actuations are as designed for an undervoltage   |
| condition on bus 2A06.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 2 is currently defueled in a refueling outage. Spent fuel pool cooling  |
| was not interrupted. Unit 1 is at 100% power.                                |
|                                                                              |
| The appropriate Abnormal Operating Procedure was entered and completed. G-03 |
| EDG, which was running unloaded, has been shutdown. After determining the    |
| cause of the undervoltage and verifying bus 2A06 condition was acceptable,   |
| we have re-established normal offsite power to bus 2A06.  G-04 EDG has been  |
| shutdown.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is investigating the cause of this event.  The NRC resident     |
| inspector has been notified.                                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37515       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/10/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:31[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        11/10/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:07[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PAUL MCINTYRE                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/10/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ESF ACTUATION                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| ESF actuation due to a invalid Train B Safety Injection signal.  No ECCS     |
| system discharge to the Reactor Coolant System occurred.  The event cause    |
| appears to be a procedure deficiency during scheduled calibration / testing  |
| of a Pressurizer Pressure instrument channel.  The calibration procedure did |
| not require adequate verification of other channel parameters prior to       |
| removing this channel from service, and did not veify blocks normally in     |
| place for this plant condition.    One channel of Pressurizer Pressure was   |
| already in a tripped condition when this channel was removed from service.   |
| This satisfied the two out of four logic to initiate the Safety Injection    |
| signal.  Only the Train B equipment was actuated.                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37516       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE              REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/11/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:55[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        11/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:19[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVE WILLIAMS                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/11/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - DEAD GREEN SEA TURTLE                                 |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1119 ON 11/11/00, a notification was made to the Florida Fish and         |
| Wildlife Conservation Commission regarding a dead green sea turtle found in  |
| the plant's intake canal.  The fatality is not believed to be related to     |
| plant operation.                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021