Event Notification Report for October 30, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/27/2000 - 10/30/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37462 37463 37464 37465 37466 37467 37468 37469 37470 37471
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37462 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: SOIL & MATERIALS ENGINEERS |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/27/2000|
|LICENSEE: SOIL & MATERIALS ENGINEERS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:02[EDT]|
| CITY: PLYMOUTH REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 10/25/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: MI |EVENT TIME: 07:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 21-17158-02 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/27/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |ANTON VEGEL R3 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: FRANK HENDERSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN FROM VEHICLE IN MISHAWAKA, INDIANA |
| |
| A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE CONTAINING 8 mCi Cs-137 AND 44 mCi Am-241 |
| WAS STOLEN FROM AN EMPLOYEE'S VEHICLE PARKED OVERNIGHT AT A HOTEL IN |
| MISHAWAKA, IN. THE DEVICE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RECOVERED BY THE LOCAL FIRE |
| DEPARTMENT AND RETURNED TO THE LICENSEE. THERE DOESN'T APPEAR TO BE ANY |
| DAMAGE. THE LICENSEE CONTACTED THE NRC REGION III OFFICE AND WILL SUBMIT A |
| WRITTEN REPORT. |
| |
| HOO NOTE: SEE EVENT #37457 FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON RECOVERY. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37463 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/27/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:00[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/27/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:28[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: FRITZIE FLENTJE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/27/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ANTON VEGEL R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |FRANK CONGEL IRO |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION |BILL BEECHER PAO |
| |JOE GIITTER IRO |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL TRIP OF REACTOR DUE TO UNDERWATER DIVER TRAPPED IN FOREBAY. |
| |
| Unit 1 was manually tripped at 1028 CDT as a result of the control room |
| being contacted by security that an underwater diver was trapped in the |
| north forebay. All control rods fully inserted into the core. All safety |
| systems operated as expected. The circulating water system was secured. |
| Steam Generator Atmospheric valves were used to maintain the plant in a Hot |
| Standby condition. Neither Steam Generator has any primary to secondary |
| leakage. All personnel involved with the underwater diving activity were |
| removed from the circulating water forebay area and were examined by |
| emergency medical personnel. No personnel were injured. An incident |
| investigation is underway. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the |
| Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. |
| |
| Reactor restart preparations are in progress. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37464 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALLAWAY REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/27/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:55[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/27/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:10[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE SAMPSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/27/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GREG PICK R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE TO THE MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION |
| |
| On 10/26/00 at 1300 CT an injured person was transported offsite to the |
| University of Missouri Burn Center located in Columbia. The licensee |
| notified the Missouri Public Service Commission of the incident this morning |
| at 0810 CT. The injured person should be released from the hospital |
| sometime today. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37465 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PALO VERDE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/27/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:06[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/27/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:00[MST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAN MARKS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/27/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GREG PICK R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EXCESSIVE BACKLEAKAGE OF HPSI TRAIN "B" CHECK VALVE DISCOVERED DURING |
| SURVEILLANCE TESTING. |
| |
| At approximately 1600 MST on October 23, 2000, Palo Verde Unit 2 |
| surveillance testing revealed that the "B" train high pressure safety |
| injection (HPSI) pump discharge check valve (2PSIBV405) exhibited |
| backleakage exceeding the acceptance criterion. Palo Verde Unit 2 is |
| shutdown in Mode 6 for its ninth refueling outage with RCS at approximately |
| 105 degrees F and atmospheric pressure. |
| |
| As a result of the surveillance test failure, additional testing and |
| engineering evaluation ensued. At approximately 1400 MST on October 27, |
| 2000, upon disassembly of the check valve internals, engineering personnel |
| observed excessive articulation between the swing arm and the valve disc. |
| This condition may have developed during the previous operating cycle. |
| Therefore, during some previous periods of on-line unavailability of the "B" |
| train HPSI system, the redundant "A" train HPSI system might not have |
| design basis minimum flow to the RCS due to backleakage through the "B" |
| train check valve. During those on-line periods of unavailability, check |
| valve 2PSIBV405 alone may have prevented the fulfillment of the safety |
| function of the HPSI system to mitigate the consequences of an accident. |
| (10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D)). Similarly, had check valve backleakage been |
| found while the reactor was in operation and on-line maintenance of the "B" |
| train HPSI in progress, the HPSI system may have been seriously degraded, |
| (10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)). |
| |
| No Technical Specification were entered since Unit 2 is in Mode 6, |
| refueling. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37466 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/27/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:53[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/27/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:28[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE SAUER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/27/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAVID SILK R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SIGNAL RECEIVED DURING REACTOR CAVITY |
| DRAINDOWN OPERATION. |
| |
| "Received containment ventilation signal from the particulate radiation |
| monitor (2R11A). Reactor refueling cavity draindown after core reload was |
| in progress. Along with other post refueling restoration activities. All |
| containment isolation valves were closed at the time of the isolation, so no |
| position changes occurred. The isolation was reset and occurred again at |
| 2311[EDT] no valves again were open at the time. The signal will not be |
| reset pending further investigation. Monitor isolation setpoint is 3960 |
| counts per minute and the current reading is 3750 counts per minute with |
| occasional spiking into alarm." |
| |
| Air samples taken confirm that the particulate radiation monitor is |
| functioning properly. The licensee suspects that the airborne activity is |
| related to the draindown of the reactor cavity. The licensee will inform |
| Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37467 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/28/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:24[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/27/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:10[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/28/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |ANTON VEGEL R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |JOSEPHINE PICCONE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: T. HUDSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING LOSS OF GEOMETRY CONTROL FOR |
| STACKED PIPE |
| |
| "Two sections of removed seal exhaust/wet air station exhaust piping were |
| discovered stacked near the C-310 seal exhaust/wet air station in violation |
| of NCSA 310-002. Requirement 3.1.3.b of this NCSA limits the height of |
| equipment items stored in the slab configuration less than or equal to 4.75 |
| inches. The purpose of the requirement is to maintain a safe geometry of the |
| removed equipment items. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "The safe geometry relied on for double contingency was violated; however |
| the analysis demonstrating sub-criticality was performed at an enrichment |
| above the current assay limit. In addition the actual configuration of the |
| violation state is smaller than the analyzed configuration. Therefore, |
| additional uranium material would be required to initiate a criticality. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: |
| |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, the pipes would need to be |
| entirely full of slugged oil with uranium at an enrichment of 5.5% and an |
| additional violation would have to occur. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| "Double contingency for this scenario relies upon geometry and a second |
| independent and concurrent process upset. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| "The pipes contain an oily film. The assay of any material is less than or |
| equal to 2 wt. % U235. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| "Double contingency for this scenario relies upon geometry and a second |
| independent and concurrent process upset. |
| |
| "The first leg of double contingency is based on maintaining a safe |
| geometry. This is controlled by limiting the slab configuration to no |
| greater than 4.75 inches. The two pipes were stacked in a manner which |
| exceeded the 4.75 inch slab height. Thus, the control was violated and the |
| process condition was not maintained. |
| |
| "The second leg of double contingency is based on the geometry upset being |
| sub-critical and the need for a second independent violation to occur before |
| a criticality is possible. This control was not violated. |
| |
| "Since the safe geometry process condition was not maintained, double |
| contingency was lost. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS |
| IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| "Access to the area has been controlled by ropes and signs. The specific |
| corrective actions will be specified in a remediation guide." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector was informed. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37468 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/28/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:36[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:09[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BAHNER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/28/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GREG PICK R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| GREATER THAN ONE PERCENT OF STEAM GENERATOR 1-2 TUBES WERE DETERMINED TO BE |
| DEFECTIVE. |
| |
| On October 28, 2000, during the Unit 1 tenth refueling outage, analysis of |
| eddy current data on steam generator (SG) 1-2 indicated that greater than |
| one percent of the total tubes inspected in SG 1-2 were defective. Thirty |
| eight (38) defective tubes in SG 1-2 were detected and plugged. Most of the |
| pluggable indications are due to either primary water stress corrosion |
| cracking or outside diameter stress corrosion cracking. Review of the eddy |
| current inspections are complete. Results of the steam generator tube |
| inspection fall into Category C-3, which requires a four-hour non-emergency |
| report in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) Table 5.5.9-2 and 10 |
| CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C). |
| |
| An LER in accordance with 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and Special Report in |
| accordance with TS 5.6.10.c will be submitted within thirty days. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will notified of this event notification by the |
| licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37469 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SURRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/28/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:40[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:11[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HARROW |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/28/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ANNE BOLAND R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N N 0 Hot Shutdown |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RWST CROSS-TIE VALVES UNEXPECTEDLY OPENED DURING PLANNED MAINTENANCE |
| |
| At 1511 hours, with Unit 2 in Intermediate Shutdown (ISD), approximately 375 |
| degrees F, Unit 1 and Unit 2 RWST Cross-tie-valves opened when the High |
| Steam Flow SI signal was unblocked for planned maintenance. By design, the |
| Header to Line SI signal which opens these valves is unblocked when High |
| Steam Flow is unblocked. At the time of the unblock, a header to line |
| condition existed on Unit 2 due to plant conditions. This design was newly |
| implemented during the current Unit 2 refueling outage and procedures did |
| not provide adequate steps to prevent the valves from opening. A Header to |
| Line SI signal was not received as it was properly defeated in accordance |
| with station procedures. The cross-tie valves were manually closed when the |
| condition was identified as not required. |
| |
| Unit 1 is currently at 100% power. Unit 2 is in Intermediate Shutdown with |
| RCS heatup and pressurization in progress. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37470 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/28/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:27[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 10/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PETRELLI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/28/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAVID SILK R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 25 Power Operation |25 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PENETRATION LEAKAGE EXCEEDED BOTH THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE LIMITS AND |
| THE 10CFR100 RELATED LIMITS. |
| |
| On May 4, 2000 the Suppression Chamber Containment Purge System Inlet |
| valves 2CPS*AOV105 and 2CPS*AOV107 were leak tested as required by Technical |
| Specification Quarterly Leak Rate requirements. The local leak rate test |
| (LLRT) determined that the Inboard valve leak rate was out of spec and the |
| penetration was isolated with the Outboard valve to maintain primary |
| containment. With the failure of the inboard isolation valve and due to |
| system configuration the outboard valve could not be tested in the proper |
| direction. |
| |
| On 05/10/00 a leak test was performed on the down stream manual isolation |
| 2CPS-V1 and this valve was locked closed to satisfy primary containment |
| requirement. This was necessary because the surveillance period of the |
| outboard isolation valve 2CPS*AOV105 would expire with no acceptance test |
| method available to satisfy the LLRT requirements of the valve. |
| |
| The manual valve 2CPS-V1 has resilient seats and is subject to a quarterly |
| LLRT requirement. On 10/20/00 a LLRT was attempted on 2CPS-V1 but was |
| aborted due to the high leakage past the outboard valve 2CPS*AOV105 and into |
| containment. On 10/27/00 the leakage past the outboard valve 2CPS*AOV105 |
| was corrected and a LLRT of 2CPS-V1 was performed. 2CPS-V1 failed the LLRT. |
| A blank flange was installed to reestablish primary containment. On |
| 10/28/00 a Mass Flow Leakage test was performed on 2CPS-V1 and it was |
| determined that the leakage past the valve exceeded measurement capability |
| of test instrumentation, and therefore leakage was in excess of maximum |
| pathway leakage. This means that the penetration leakage exceeded both the |
| primary containment leakage limits and the 10CFR100 related limits in |
| Technical Specification Table 3.6.1.2-1. |
| |
| Therefore this condition could have prevented the Primary Containment from |
| performing its safety function to limit the release of radioactive |
| material. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37471 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SURRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/29/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:30[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/29/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:08[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RAWLEIGH DILLARD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/29/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ANNE BOLAND R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v) OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N N 0 Intermediate Shut|0 Intermediate Shut|
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM NOT FUNCTIONING |
| |
| At 0008 hours (EST) on 10/29/00, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) |
| portion of the emergency Response Facility Computer System (ERFCS) was noted |
| to be inoperable, due to all inputs being displayed in magenta color. |
| Several attempts were made to reboot the system, but were unsuccessful. |
| |
| Troubleshooting of the ERFCS with Maintenance is continuing at this time. |
| A return to service time for the SPDS portion of the ERFCS has not been |
| determined. |
| |
| This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(v). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021