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Event Notification Report for October 30, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/27/2000 - 10/30/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37462  37463  37464  37465  37466  37467  37468  37469  37470  37471  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37462       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  SOIL & MATERIALS ENGINEERS           |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/27/2000|
|LICENSEE:  SOIL & MATERIALS ENGINEERS           |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:02[EDT]|
|    CITY:  PLYMOUTH                 REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        10/25/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MI |EVENT TIME:        07:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  21-17158-02           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/27/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |ANTON VEGEL          R3      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  FRANK HENDERSON              |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN FROM VEHICLE IN MISHAWAKA, INDIANA     |
|                                                                              |
| A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE CONTAINING 8 mCi Cs-137 AND 44 mCi Am-241   |
| WAS STOLEN FROM AN EMPLOYEE'S VEHICLE PARKED OVERNIGHT AT A HOTEL IN         |
| MISHAWAKA, IN.  THE DEVICE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RECOVERED BY THE LOCAL FIRE      |
| DEPARTMENT AND RETURNED TO THE LICENSEE.  THERE DOESN'T APPEAR TO BE ANY     |
| DAMAGE.  THE LICENSEE CONTACTED THE NRC REGION III OFFICE AND WILL SUBMIT A  |
| WRITTEN REPORT.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| HOO NOTE:  SEE EVENT #37457 FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON RECOVERY.                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37463       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/27/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:00[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/27/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:28[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  FRITZIE FLENTJE              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/27/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ANTON VEGEL          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |BILL BEECHER         PAO     |
|                                                |JOE GIITTER          IRO     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL TRIP OF REACTOR DUE TO UNDERWATER DIVER TRAPPED IN FOREBAY.           |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 1 was manually tripped at 1028 CDT as a result of the control room      |
| being contacted by security that an underwater diver was trapped in the      |
| north forebay.  All control rods fully inserted into the core.  All safety   |
| systems operated as expected.  The circulating water system was secured.     |
| Steam Generator Atmospheric valves were used to maintain the plant in a Hot  |
| Standby condition.  Neither Steam Generator has any primary to secondary     |
| leakage.  All personnel involved  with the underwater diving activity were   |
| removed from the circulating water forebay area and were examined by         |
| emergency medical personnel. No personnel were injured.  An incident         |
| investigation is underway.  All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the       |
| Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed.                    |
|                                                                              |
| Reactor restart preparations are in progress.                                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37464       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALLAWAY                 REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/27/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:55[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        10/27/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:10[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE SAMPSON                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/27/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GREG PICK            R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE TO THE MISSOURI  PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION         |
|                                                                              |
| On 10/26/00 at 1300 CT an injured person was transported offsite to the      |
| University of Missouri Burn Center located in Columbia.  The licensee        |
| notified the Missouri Public Service Commission of the incident this morning |
| at 0810 CT.  The injured person should be released from the hospital         |
| sometime today.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37465       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PALO VERDE               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/27/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:06[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE                 |EVENT DATE:        10/27/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:00[MST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAN MARKS                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/27/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GREG PICK            R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EXCESSIVE BACKLEAKAGE OF HPSI TRAIN "B" CHECK VALVE DISCOVERED DURING        |
| SURVEILLANCE TESTING.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| At approximately 1600 MST on October 23, 2000, Palo Verde Unit 2             |
| surveillance testing revealed that the "B" train high pressure safety        |
| injection (HPSI) pump discharge check valve (2PSIBV405) exhibited            |
| backleakage exceeding the acceptance criterion.  Palo Verde Unit 2 is        |
| shutdown in Mode 6 for its ninth refueling outage with RCS at approximately  |
| 105 degrees F and atmospheric pressure.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| As a result of the surveillance test failure, additional testing and         |
| engineering evaluation ensued.  At approximately 1400 MST on October 27,     |
| 2000, upon disassembly of the check valve internals, engineering personnel   |
| observed excessive articulation between the swing arm and the valve disc.    |
| This condition may have developed during the previous operating cycle.       |
| Therefore, during some previous periods of on-line unavailability of the "B" |
| train HPSI system, the redundant "A"  train HPSI system might not have       |
| design basis minimum flow to the RCS due to backleakage through the "B"      |
| train check valve.  During those on-line periods of unavailability, check    |
| valve 2PSIBV405 alone may have prevented the fulfillment of the safety       |
| function of the HPSI system to mitigate the consequences of an accident.     |
| (10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D)). Similarly, had check valve backleakage been      |
| found while the reactor was in operation and on-line maintenance of the "B"  |
| train HPSI in progress, the HPSI system may have been seriously degraded,    |
| (10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)).                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| No Technical Specification were entered since Unit 2 is in Mode 6,           |
| refueling.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37466       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/27/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:53[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/27/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:28[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE SAUER                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/27/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DAVID SILK           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SIGNAL RECEIVED DURING REACTOR CAVITY      |
| DRAINDOWN OPERATION.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "Received containment ventilation signal from the particulate radiation      |
| monitor (2R11A).  Reactor refueling cavity draindown after core reload was   |
| in progress.  Along with other post refueling restoration activities. All    |
| containment isolation valves were closed at the time of the isolation, so no |
| position changes occurred.  The isolation was reset and occurred again at    |
| 2311[EDT] no valves again were open at the time. The signal will not be      |
| reset pending further investigation.  Monitor isolation setpoint is 3960     |
| counts per minute and the current reading is 3750 counts per minute with     |
| occasional spiking into alarm."                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Air samples taken confirm that the particulate radiation monitor is          |
| functioning properly.  The licensee suspects that the airborne activity is   |
| related to the draindown of the reactor cavity.  The licensee will inform    |
| Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC resident inspector.                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37467       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/28/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:24[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        10/27/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        09:10[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/28/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |ANTON VEGEL          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOSEPHINE PICCONE    NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  T. HUDSON                    |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING LOSS OF GEOMETRY CONTROL FOR     |
| STACKED PIPE                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sections of removed seal exhaust/wet air station exhaust piping were    |
| discovered stacked near the C-310 seal exhaust/wet air station in violation  |
| of NCSA 310-002. Requirement 3.1.3.b of this NCSA limits the height of       |
| equipment items stored in the slab configuration less than or equal to 4.75  |
| inches. The purpose of the requirement is to maintain a safe geometry of the |
| removed equipment items.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The safe geometry relied on for double contingency was violated; however    |
| the analysis  demonstrating sub-criticality was performed at an enrichment   |
| above the current assay limit.  In addition the actual configuration of the  |
| violation state is smaller than the analyzed configuration. Therefore,       |
| additional uranium material would be required to initiate a criticality.     |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, the pipes would need to be       |
| entirely full of slugged oil with uranium at an enrichment of 5.5% and an    |
| additional violation would have to occur.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
|                                                                              |
| "Double contingency for this scenario relies upon geometry and a second      |
| independent and concurrent process upset.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The pipes contain an oily film. The assay of any material is less than or   |
| equal to 2 wt. % U235.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "Double contingency for this scenario relies upon geometry and a second      |
| independent and concurrent process upset.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "The first leg of double contingency is based on maintaining a safe          |
| geometry. This is controlled by limiting the slab configuration to no        |
| greater than 4.75 inches. The two pipes were stacked in a manner which       |
| exceeded the 4.75 inch slab height. Thus, the control was violated and the   |
| process condition was not maintained.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The second leg of double contingency is based on the geometry upset being   |
| sub-critical and the need for a second independent violation to occur before |
| a criticality is possible. This control was not violated.                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Since the safe geometry process condition was not maintained, double        |
| contingency was lost.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS              |
| IMPLEMENTED:                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Access to the area has been controlled by ropes and signs. The specific     |
| corrective actions will be specified in a remediation guide."                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector was informed.                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37468       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON            REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/28/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:36[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:09[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BAHNER                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/28/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GREG PICK            R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| GREATER THAN ONE PERCENT OF STEAM GENERATOR 1-2 TUBES WERE DETERMINED TO BE  |
| DEFECTIVE.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| On October 28, 2000, during the Unit 1 tenth refueling outage, analysis of   |
| eddy current data on steam generator (SG) 1-2 indicated that greater than    |
| one percent of the total tubes inspected in SG 1-2 were defective.  Thirty   |
| eight (38) defective tubes in SG 1-2 were detected and plugged.  Most of the |
| pluggable indications are due to either primary water stress corrosion       |
| cracking or outside diameter stress corrosion cracking.  Review of the eddy  |
| current inspections are complete. Results of the steam generator tube        |
| inspection fall into Category C-3, which requires a four-hour non-emergency  |
| report in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) Table 5.5.9-2 and 10  |
| CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C).                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| An LER in accordance with 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and Special Report in      |
| accordance with TS 5.6.10.c will be submitted within thirty days.            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will notified of this event notification by the   |
| licensee.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37469       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SURRY                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/28/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:40[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:11[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HARROW                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/28/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ANNE BOLAND          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          N       0        Hot Shutdown     |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RWST CROSS-TIE VALVES UNEXPECTEDLY OPENED DURING PLANNED MAINTENANCE         |
|                                                                              |
| At 1511 hours, with Unit 2 in Intermediate Shutdown (ISD), approximately 375 |
| degrees F, Unit 1 and Unit 2 RWST Cross-tie-valves opened when the High      |
| Steam Flow SI signal was unblocked for planned maintenance.   By design, the |
| Header to Line SI signal which opens these valves is unblocked when High     |
| Steam Flow is unblocked.  At the time of the unblock, a header to line       |
| condition existed on Unit 2 due to plant conditions.  This design was newly  |
| implemented during the current Unit 2 refueling outage and procedures did    |
| not provide adequate steps to prevent the valves from opening.  A Header to  |
| Line SI signal was not received as it was properly defeated in accordance    |
| with station procedures.  The cross-tie valves were manually closed when the |
| condition was identified as not required.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 1 is currently at 100% power. Unit 2 is in Intermediate Shutdown with   |
| RCS heatup and pressurization in progress.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37470       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/28/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:27[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        10/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PETRELLI                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/28/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DAVID SILK           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       25       Power Operation  |25       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PENETRATION LEAKAGE EXCEEDED BOTH THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE LIMITS AND |
| THE 10CFR100 RELATED LIMITS.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| On May 4, 2000 the Suppression Chamber Containment  Purge System Inlet       |
| valves 2CPS*AOV105 and 2CPS*AOV107 were leak tested as required by Technical |
| Specification Quarterly Leak Rate requirements.  The local leak rate test    |
| (LLRT) determined that the Inboard valve leak rate was out of spec and the   |
| penetration was isolated with the Outboard valve to maintain primary         |
| containment. With the failure of the inboard isolation valve and due to      |
| system configuration the outboard valve could not be tested in the proper    |
| direction.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| On 05/10/00 a leak test was performed on the down stream manual isolation    |
| 2CPS-V1 and this valve was locked closed to satisfy primary containment      |
| requirement.  This was necessary because the surveillance period of the      |
| outboard isolation valve 2CPS*AOV105 would expire with no acceptance test    |
| method available to satisfy the LLRT requirements of the valve.              |
|                                                                              |
| The manual valve 2CPS-V1 has resilient seats and is subject to a quarterly   |
| LLRT requirement.  On 10/20/00 a LLRT was attempted on 2CPS-V1 but was       |
| aborted due to the high leakage past the outboard valve 2CPS*AOV105 and into |
| containment.  On 10/27/00 the leakage past the outboard valve 2CPS*AOV105    |
| was corrected and a LLRT of 2CPS-V1 was performed.  2CPS-V1 failed the LLRT. |
| A blank flange was installed to reestablish  primary containment.  On        |
| 10/28/00 a Mass Flow Leakage test was performed on 2CPS-V1 and it was        |
| determined that the leakage past the valve exceeded measurement capability   |
| of test instrumentation, and therefore leakage was in excess of maximum      |
| pathway leakage.  This means that the penetration leakage exceeded both the  |
| primary containment leakage limits and the 10CFR100 related limits in        |
| Technical Specification Table 3.6.1.2-1.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Therefore this condition could have prevented the Primary Containment from   |
| performing its safety function to limit the release of radioactive           |
| material.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37471       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SURRY                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/29/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:30[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/29/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:08[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RAWLEIGH DILLARD             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/29/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ANNE BOLAND          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v)      OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          N       0        Intermediate Shut|0        Intermediate Shut|
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM NOT FUNCTIONING                              |
|                                                                              |
| At 0008 hours (EST) on 10/29/00, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)  |
| portion of the emergency Response Facility Computer System (ERFCS) was noted |
| to be inoperable, due to all inputs being displayed in magenta color.        |
| Several attempts were made to reboot the system, but  were unsuccessful.     |
|                                                                              |
| Troubleshooting of the ERFCS with Maintenance is continuing at this time.    |
| A return to service time for the SPDS portion of the ERFCS has not been      |
| determined.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(v).                  |
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