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Event Notification Report for October 26, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/25/2000 - 10/26/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37427  37452  37454  37455  37456  37457  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37427       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  ITT INDUSTRIES                       |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/13/2000|
|LICENSEE:  ITT INDUSTRIES                       |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:20[EDT]|
|    CITY:  ST. GEORGE               REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        08/18/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  SC |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/25/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |KEN BARR             R2      |
|                                                |VERN HODGE           NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+DAVE LOVELESS        R4      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PATTON (BY FAX)              |MONTE PHILLIPS       R3      |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN   R1      |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART 21 INVOLVING POSSIBLE ITT INDUSTRIES TRANSDUCER FAILURES                |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Since the date of discovery, design alternatives continue to be evaluated.   |
| The methods under investigation for corrective action will be mechanical in  |
| nature.  ITT Conoflow expects to conclude the analysis phase of their        |
| investigation by 12/15/00 and currently estimate that replacement units      |
| would be available by 2/15/01.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| Advice to Customers                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Each site location should analyze their system and corresponding potential   |
| for failure with regard to this notification.  In the absence of a seismic   |
| event resulting in radiation and/or a steam line break, they do not believe  |
| this unit will cause an operational problem.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Please note that the product qualification was simulated for a ten, (10)     |
| year design life.  Those units with a service life of ten, (10) years or     |
| more should not be considered qualified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Individual customers will be advised by letter when replacement IEEE I/P     |
| transducers are available.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Nature of the Deviation                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The nature of the deviation is to the test and performance requirements      |
| associated with IEEE 323 and IEEE 344. An inappropriate bonding process was  |
| utilized in the manufacture of the IEEE I/P Transducer. This process change  |
| began in 1986 and could, during a seismic event involving high radiation     |
| and/or high temperature steam, result in the potential failure of the        |
| transducer to perform its intended safety function.                          |
|                                                                              |
| Product Models involved                                                      |
| GT25CA1826     GT65CA1826    GT45CA1826                                      |
| GT25FA1826     GT45FA1826     GT65FA1826                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Identification of the Company                                                |
|                                                                              |
| ITT Conoflow                                                                 |
| ITT Conoflow, Division of ITT Grinnell Valve Company                         |
| ITT Conoflow, Division of ITT Fluid Technology Corporation                   |
| ITT Conoflow, ITT Industries                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Location of Components in Use                                                |
|                                                                              |
| DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION, CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION                             |
|                                                                              |
| FORT CALHOUN STATION                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| KOREA ELECTRIC POWER CORPORATION, KANONAM                                    |
|                                                                              |
| ERGYTECH INCORPORATED, HOUSTON, TEXAS                                        |
|                                                                              |
| PONTON INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED, SANTA FE SPRINGS, CALIFORNIA                |
|                                                                              |
| ONTARIO POWER GENERATION, DNGD, BOWMANVILLE, ONTARIO LIC 3Z8 CANADA          |
|                                                                              |
| COMMONWEALTH EDISON, MAY WOOD, ILLINOIS                                      |
|                                                                              |
| COPES-VULCAN, INCORPORATED, LAKE CITY, PENNSYLVANIA                          |
|                                                                              |
| PETRO-CHEM EQUIPMENT COMPANY,  BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA                        |
|                                                                              |
| ASIAM INTERNATIONAL (TAIWAN) INCORPORATED, TAIPEI 105 TAIWAN, R.O.C.         |
|                                                                              |
| NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY, JA FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR PLANT                       |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROL COMPONENTS, INC., RANCHO SANTA MARGARITA, CALIFORNIA                 |
|                                                                              |
| NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT                              |
|                                                                              |
| These companies were also informed.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT, FORT CALHOUN STATION                            |
|                                                                              |
| DETROIT EDISON COMPANY                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY                    |
|                                                                              |
| GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION, C/O GPU SERVICE CORPORATION                         |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/25/00 @ 1425 BY FAX(PATTON) TO GOULD * * *                |
|                                                                              |
| This deviation to IEEE 323 and IEEE 344 was discovered during a design       |
| change history review. Their records indicate that in September, 1986, a     |
| change was made to the magnet assembly which was not properly documented for |
| compliance to the IEEE standards. This change was to the adhesive used to    |
| bond the magnet assembly together.  Upon researching the new adhesive, there |
| is no test data, either in ITT Conoflow records or the adhesive supplier     |
| adhesive properties data, which assures that the bond will withstand the     |
| rigors of thermal shock, radiation or high temperature/steam exposure. These |
| facts are what prompted the Part 21 NRC notification.                        |
| The potential failure of the adhesive bonds within the I/P transducer magnet |
| assembly could, under seismic loading, cause the magnet to shift laterally   |
| and bind the floating coil which drives the pilot nozzle flapper valve.  If  |
| that were to occur, the transducer would fail in the last operating output   |
| pressure.  A change in electrical signal to the transducer may not cause the |
| corresponding change in output pressure.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| To date, no units have failed. The potential failure mode will require two   |
| conditions to occur:                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| 1. The thermal/steam or radiation conditions must exist for the adhesive     |
| bond to fail.                                                                |
| 2. There must be sufficient seismic energy (vibration/shock) to move the     |
| magnet in a lateral direction.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| Nature of the Deviation                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The nature of the deviation is to the test and performance requirements      |
| associated with IEEE 323 and IEEE 344. An inappropriate bonding process was  |
| utilized in the manufacture of the IEEE I/P Transducer.  This process change |
| began in 1986 and could, during a seismic event involving high radiation     |
| and/or high temperature steam, result in the potential failure of the        |
| transducer to perform its intended safety function.                          |
|                                                                              |
| Corrective Action                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Since the date of discovery, design alternatives continue to be evaluated.   |
| The methods under investigation for corrective action will be mechanical in  |
| nature. ITT Conoflow expects to conclude the analysis phase of our           |
| investigation by 12/15/00 and currently estimate that replacement units      |
| would be available by 2/15/01                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Advice to Customers                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Each site location should analyze their system and corresponding potential   |
| for failure with regard to this notification.  In the absence of a seismic   |
| event resulting in radiation and/or a steam line break, we do not believe    |
| this unit will cause an operational problem.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Please note that the product qualification was simulated for a ten, (10)     |
| year design life.  Those units with a service life often, (10) years or more |
| should not be considered qualified.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Individual customers will be advised by letter when replacement IEEE I/P     |
| transducers are available.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Two more models have been added to the list:                                 |
|                                                                              |
| GT25CD1826                                                                   |
| GT25FD1826                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| NRR(Hodge), RDOs(Silk, Boland, Vegel, and Pick) were notified.               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37452       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/24/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:35[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/24/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:58[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BILL MOOKHOEK                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/25/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GREG PICK            R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ESF ACTUATION RESULTING IN A SINGLE VALVE ISOLATION                          |
|                                                                              |
| "On October 24, 2000, at 0458 hours, while Unit 1 was operating at 100%      |
| power, a spurious actuation of the Train C Phase B Containment Isolation     |
| Signal occurred. This actuation resulted in the closure of a single          |
| Engineered Safety Features Containment Isolation Valve servicing the cooling |
| supply to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. Cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pumps    |
| was not interrupted since there are two parallel paths in this penetration   |
| to prevent inadvertent isolation of the cooling supply. No other components  |
| changed position and the Unit continued to operate at 100% power. The cause  |
| of the actuation is not yet known, but the actuation only effected valve     |
| 1-CC-MOV-0404. Trouble shooting is in process to determine the cause of the  |
| event, No other components are controlled by the Train C Phase B actuation   |
| logic."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/25/00 @ 1557 BY MOOKHOEK TO GOULD * * *   RETRACTION      |
|                                                                              |
| South Texas Project notified the NRC of an Engineered Safety Feature         |
| actuation at 0835 CDT on October 24, 2000 (Event #37452) as a result of a    |
| spurious actuation of the Train C Phase B Containment Isolation Signal.      |
| Review of the guidance in NUREG 1022 Revision 1 on ESF actuations indicates  |
| that the actuation of single components would not be reportable. The         |
| referenced notification reported the actuation of a single component.        |
| 1-CC-MOV-0404. Cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pumps was not interrupted by   |
| the closure of 1-CC-MOV-0404 since there are two parallel paths in this      |
| penetration to prevent inadvertent isolation of the cooling supply.  Since   |
| this actuation did not stop the flow of cooling water through the            |
| containment penetration and only a single component was actuated, South      |
| Texas Project has determined that this event is not reportable and retracts  |
| the notification.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident has been informed.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| REG 4 RDO(Pick) was notified.                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37454       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:28[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        10/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:47[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  UNDERWOOD                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/25/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ANNE BOLAND          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SECURITY EVENT INVOLVING AN INDIVIDUAL GRANTED SITE ACCESS                   |
|                                                                              |
| Unescorted access granted inappropriately.  Immediate compensatory measures  |
| taken upon discovery.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37455       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON            REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:07[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:59[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BAHNER                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/25/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GREG PICK            R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ISOLATION CAPABILITY OF MANUAL VALVES IN THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM  |
|                                                                              |
| During the tenth refueling outage on Unit 1(1 R10), a leakage test of        |
| several component cooling water (CCW) System manual valves was conducted.    |
| The subject valves are used to separate the two vital normally cross-tied    |
| CCW trains in case of a CCW leak either as an independent event or as a      |
| passive failure following a loss of coolant accident.  The leakage rate was  |
| determined to be approximately 70 gpm.  Manual adjusting of the valves       |
| reduced the leakage rate to an insignificant level.                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensing/design bases for the CCW system, as discussed in Table 9.2-7   |
| of the FSAR and in SER 16, is for a maximum 200 gpm leak to occur.  Leakage  |
| would be detected by falling level in the CCW surge tank. Because of the     |
| remaining 4000 gallons in the CCW surge tank after receipt of the low-level  |
| alarm, there would be at least 20 minutes for the operator to isolate the    |
| leak before the surge tank is empty.  The period is extended if the          |
| automatically operated, Design Class II, normal makeup path functions as     |
| designed and adds makeup water to the system.  PG&E's abnormal operating     |
| procedure, OP AP-11, has provision for aligning a 250 gpm Class I supply of  |
| water to the CCW surge tank.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The design/licensing basis of a 200 gpm leak being isolated in 20 minutes    |
| assumes that manual valves used during the isolation operation hold and      |
| terminate the leak. There is no evidence that PG&E nor the NRC have          |
| considered that a leak would not be isolated upon completion of actions to   |
| separate the trains.  The identified condition, though not believed to       |
| represent a safety concern, is different than that discussed in SSER 16.     |
| Therefore, the condition is considered to be outside the design basis for    |
| the plant.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Preliminary investigations of the Unit 2 valves have, not identified any     |
| gross leakage.   Additional investigations are ongoing.                      |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37456       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MONTICELLO               REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:06[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        10/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:30[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CHRISTIAN                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/25/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ANTON VEGEL          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION(CRV) TRAINS DECLARED INOPERABLE.                    |
|                                                                              |
| Both CRV trains declared inoperable due to degraded relays.  An              |
| investigation continues to determine the affects on Emergency Filter train(  |
| EFT) systems as well. (share the same type of relays)  Repair/replacement    |
| has been initiated and an investigation is ongoing.  The plant is in a 24    |
| hour LCO action statement which returning one train to service or be in hot  |
| shutdown in the following 12 hours.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/25/00 @ 1816 BY WITSCHEN TO GOULD * * *                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee verified that both Emergency Filter trains are also affected by |
| the degraded relays.  They are in the same LCO action statement, but they    |
| have to restore one Control Room Vent train and one Emergency Filter train   |
| to service within 24 hours.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident was notified.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The REG3 RDO(Vegel) was informed.                                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37457       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER             |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/26/2000|
|LICENSEE:  UNKNOWN                              |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:25[EDT]|
|    CITY:  MISHAWAKA                REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        10/25/2000|
|  COUNTY:  ST. JOSEPH                STATE:  IN |EVENT TIME:        20:10[CST]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/26/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |ANTON VEGEL          R3      |
|                                                |PATRICIA HOLAHAN     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CREWS                        |CINDY PEDERSON       R3      |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |LARRY CAMPER         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NINF                     INFORMATION ONLY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RECOVERY OF TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE FROM THE LOADING DOCK OF A        |
| DEPARTMENT STORE.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| AT 2010 LOCAL TIME ON 10/25/00 A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE [MODEL 3430, |
| S/N 29119] CONTAINING BOTH A CESIUM-137 AND AMERICIUM-241 SOURCE WAS         |
| DISCOVERED ON THE LOADING DOCK OF A DEPARTMENT STORE LOCATED IN MISHAWAKA,   |
| IN.  THE RESPONDING FIRE DEPARTMENT CONTACTED THE SOUTH BEND FIRE DEPARTMENT |
| FOR HAZMAT (RADIOLOGICAL) ASSISTANCE.  A PRELIMINARY RAD SURVEY SHOWED       |
| APPROXIMATELY 2mR/HR CONTACT.  THE INDIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH WAS    |
| INFORMED.  THE CONDITION OF THE TROXLER TRANSPORT CASE SUGGESTS THAT IT MAY  |
| HAVE BEEN STOLEN.  FIRE STATION #3 IN MISHAWAKA HAS TAKEN CUSTODY OF THE     |
| TROXLER AND IS STORING THE DEVICE IN A LOCKED SECURE AREA.  THE INITIAL      |
| REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER INDICATED THAT 75 MEMBERS OF THE    |
| PUBLIC WERE EVACUATED.  REGION 3 WILL FOLLOWUP IN THE MORNING.  SEVERAL      |
| FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES WERE INFORMED BY THE STATE OF INDIANA AND THE     |
| NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER.                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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