Event Notification Report for October 26, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/25/2000 - 10/26/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37427 37452 37454 37455 37456 37457
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37427 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: ITT INDUSTRIES |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/13/2000|
|LICENSEE: ITT INDUSTRIES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:20[EDT]|
| CITY: ST. GEORGE REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 08/18/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: SC |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/25/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |KEN BARR R2 |
| |VERN HODGE NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+DAVE LOVELESS R4 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PATTON (BY FAX) |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1 |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| PART 21 INVOLVING POSSIBLE ITT INDUSTRIES TRANSDUCER FAILURES |
| |
| |
| Since the date of discovery, design alternatives continue to be evaluated. |
| The methods under investigation for corrective action will be mechanical in |
| nature. ITT Conoflow expects to conclude the analysis phase of their |
| investigation by 12/15/00 and currently estimate that replacement units |
| would be available by 2/15/01. |
| |
| Advice to Customers |
| |
| Each site location should analyze their system and corresponding potential |
| for failure with regard to this notification. In the absence of a seismic |
| event resulting in radiation and/or a steam line break, they do not believe |
| this unit will cause an operational problem. |
| |
| Please note that the product qualification was simulated for a ten, (10) |
| year design life. Those units with a service life of ten, (10) years or |
| more should not be considered qualified. |
| |
| Individual customers will be advised by letter when replacement IEEE I/P |
| transducers are available. |
| |
| Nature of the Deviation |
| |
| The nature of the deviation is to the test and performance requirements |
| associated with IEEE 323 and IEEE 344. An inappropriate bonding process was |
| utilized in the manufacture of the IEEE I/P Transducer. This process change |
| began in 1986 and could, during a seismic event involving high radiation |
| and/or high temperature steam, result in the potential failure of the |
| transducer to perform its intended safety function. |
| |
| Product Models involved |
| GT25CA1826 GT65CA1826 GT45CA1826 |
| GT25FA1826 GT45FA1826 GT65FA1826 |
| |
| Identification of the Company |
| |
| ITT Conoflow |
| ITT Conoflow, Division of ITT Grinnell Valve Company |
| ITT Conoflow, Division of ITT Fluid Technology Corporation |
| ITT Conoflow, ITT Industries |
| |
| Location of Components in Use |
| |
| DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION, CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION |
| |
| FORT CALHOUN STATION |
| |
| KOREA ELECTRIC POWER CORPORATION, KANONAM |
| |
| ERGYTECH INCORPORATED, HOUSTON, TEXAS |
| |
| PONTON INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED, SANTA FE SPRINGS, CALIFORNIA |
| |
| ONTARIO POWER GENERATION, DNGD, BOWMANVILLE, ONTARIO LIC 3Z8 CANADA |
| |
| COMMONWEALTH EDISON, MAY WOOD, ILLINOIS |
| |
| COPES-VULCAN, INCORPORATED, LAKE CITY, PENNSYLVANIA |
| |
| PETRO-CHEM EQUIPMENT COMPANY, BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA |
| |
| ASIAM INTERNATIONAL (TAIWAN) INCORPORATED, TAIPEI 105 TAIWAN, R.O.C. |
| |
| NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY, JA FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR PLANT |
| |
| CONTROL COMPONENTS, INC., RANCHO SANTA MARGARITA, CALIFORNIA |
| |
| NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT |
| |
| These companies were also informed. |
| |
| OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT, FORT CALHOUN STATION |
| |
| DETROIT EDISON COMPANY |
| |
| ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY |
| |
| GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION, C/O GPU SERVICE CORPORATION |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/25/00 @ 1425 BY FAX(PATTON) TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| This deviation to IEEE 323 and IEEE 344 was discovered during a design |
| change history review. Their records indicate that in September, 1986, a |
| change was made to the magnet assembly which was not properly documented for |
| compliance to the IEEE standards. This change was to the adhesive used to |
| bond the magnet assembly together. Upon researching the new adhesive, there |
| is no test data, either in ITT Conoflow records or the adhesive supplier |
| adhesive properties data, which assures that the bond will withstand the |
| rigors of thermal shock, radiation or high temperature/steam exposure. These |
| facts are what prompted the Part 21 NRC notification. |
| The potential failure of the adhesive bonds within the I/P transducer magnet |
| assembly could, under seismic loading, cause the magnet to shift laterally |
| and bind the floating coil which drives the pilot nozzle flapper valve. If |
| that were to occur, the transducer would fail in the last operating output |
| pressure. A change in electrical signal to the transducer may not cause the |
| corresponding change in output pressure. |
| |
| To date, no units have failed. The potential failure mode will require two |
| conditions to occur: |
| |
| 1. The thermal/steam or radiation conditions must exist for the adhesive |
| bond to fail. |
| 2. There must be sufficient seismic energy (vibration/shock) to move the |
| magnet in a lateral direction. |
| |
| Nature of the Deviation |
| |
| The nature of the deviation is to the test and performance requirements |
| associated with IEEE 323 and IEEE 344. An inappropriate bonding process was |
| utilized in the manufacture of the IEEE I/P Transducer. This process change |
| began in 1986 and could, during a seismic event involving high radiation |
| and/or high temperature steam, result in the potential failure of the |
| transducer to perform its intended safety function. |
| |
| Corrective Action |
| |
| Since the date of discovery, design alternatives continue to be evaluated. |
| The methods under investigation for corrective action will be mechanical in |
| nature. ITT Conoflow expects to conclude the analysis phase of our |
| investigation by 12/15/00 and currently estimate that replacement units |
| would be available by 2/15/01 |
| |
| Advice to Customers |
| |
| Each site location should analyze their system and corresponding potential |
| for failure with regard to this notification. In the absence of a seismic |
| event resulting in radiation and/or a steam line break, we do not believe |
| this unit will cause an operational problem. |
| |
| Please note that the product qualification was simulated for a ten, (10) |
| year design life. Those units with a service life often, (10) years or more |
| should not be considered qualified. |
| |
| Individual customers will be advised by letter when replacement IEEE I/P |
| transducers are available. |
| |
| Two more models have been added to the list: |
| |
| GT25CD1826 |
| GT25FD1826 |
| |
| NRR(Hodge), RDOs(Silk, Boland, Vegel, and Pick) were notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37452 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/24/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:35[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/24/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:58[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL MOOKHOEK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/25/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GREG PICK R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ESF ACTUATION RESULTING IN A SINGLE VALVE ISOLATION |
| |
| "On October 24, 2000, at 0458 hours, while Unit 1 was operating at 100% |
| power, a spurious actuation of the Train C Phase B Containment Isolation |
| Signal occurred. This actuation resulted in the closure of a single |
| Engineered Safety Features Containment Isolation Valve servicing the cooling |
| supply to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. Cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pumps |
| was not interrupted since there are two parallel paths in this penetration |
| to prevent inadvertent isolation of the cooling supply. No other components |
| changed position and the Unit continued to operate at 100% power. The cause |
| of the actuation is not yet known, but the actuation only effected valve |
| 1-CC-MOV-0404. Trouble shooting is in process to determine the cause of the |
| event, No other components are controlled by the Train C Phase B actuation |
| logic." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/25/00 @ 1557 BY MOOKHOEK TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| South Texas Project notified the NRC of an Engineered Safety Feature |
| actuation at 0835 CDT on October 24, 2000 (Event #37452) as a result of a |
| spurious actuation of the Train C Phase B Containment Isolation Signal. |
| Review of the guidance in NUREG 1022 Revision 1 on ESF actuations indicates |
| that the actuation of single components would not be reportable. The |
| referenced notification reported the actuation of a single component. |
| 1-CC-MOV-0404. Cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pumps was not interrupted by |
| the closure of 1-CC-MOV-0404 since there are two parallel paths in this |
| penetration to prevent inadvertent isolation of the cooling supply. Since |
| this actuation did not stop the flow of cooling water through the |
| containment penetration and only a single component was actuated, South |
| Texas Project has determined that this event is not reportable and retracts |
| the notification. |
| |
| The NRC Resident has been informed. |
| |
| REG 4 RDO(Pick) was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37454 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:28[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 10/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:47[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: UNDERWOOD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/25/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ANNE BOLAND R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SECURITY EVENT INVOLVING AN INDIVIDUAL GRANTED SITE ACCESS |
| |
| Unescorted access granted inappropriately. Immediate compensatory measures |
| taken upon discovery. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37455 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:07[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:59[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BAHNER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/25/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GREG PICK R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ISOLATION CAPABILITY OF MANUAL VALVES IN THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM |
| |
| During the tenth refueling outage on Unit 1(1 R10), a leakage test of |
| several component cooling water (CCW) System manual valves was conducted. |
| The subject valves are used to separate the two vital normally cross-tied |
| CCW trains in case of a CCW leak either as an independent event or as a |
| passive failure following a loss of coolant accident. The leakage rate was |
| determined to be approximately 70 gpm. Manual adjusting of the valves |
| reduced the leakage rate to an insignificant level. |
| |
| The licensing/design bases for the CCW system, as discussed in Table 9.2-7 |
| of the FSAR and in SER 16, is for a maximum 200 gpm leak to occur. Leakage |
| would be detected by falling level in the CCW surge tank. Because of the |
| remaining 4000 gallons in the CCW surge tank after receipt of the low-level |
| alarm, there would be at least 20 minutes for the operator to isolate the |
| leak before the surge tank is empty. The period is extended if the |
| automatically operated, Design Class II, normal makeup path functions as |
| designed and adds makeup water to the system. PG&E's abnormal operating |
| procedure, OP AP-11, has provision for aligning a 250 gpm Class I supply of |
| water to the CCW surge tank. |
| |
| |
| The design/licensing basis of a 200 gpm leak being isolated in 20 minutes |
| assumes that manual valves used during the isolation operation hold and |
| terminate the leak. There is no evidence that PG&E nor the NRC have |
| considered that a leak would not be isolated upon completion of actions to |
| separate the trains. The identified condition, though not believed to |
| represent a safety concern, is different than that discussed in SSER 16. |
| Therefore, the condition is considered to be outside the design basis for |
| the plant. |
| |
| |
| Preliminary investigations of the Unit 2 valves have, not identified any |
| gross leakage. Additional investigations are ongoing. |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37456 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MONTICELLO REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:06[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 10/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:30[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHRISTIAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/25/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ANTON VEGEL R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION(CRV) TRAINS DECLARED INOPERABLE. |
| |
| Both CRV trains declared inoperable due to degraded relays. An |
| investigation continues to determine the affects on Emergency Filter train( |
| EFT) systems as well. (share the same type of relays) Repair/replacement |
| has been initiated and an investigation is ongoing. The plant is in a 24 |
| hour LCO action statement which returning one train to service or be in hot |
| shutdown in the following 12 hours. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/25/00 @ 1816 BY WITSCHEN TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| The licensee verified that both Emergency Filter trains are also affected by |
| the degraded relays. They are in the same LCO action statement, but they |
| have to restore one Control Room Vent train and one Emergency Filter train |
| to service within 24 hours. |
| |
| The NRC Resident was notified. |
| |
| The REG3 RDO(Vegel) was informed. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37457 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/26/2000|
|LICENSEE: UNKNOWN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:25[EDT]|
| CITY: MISHAWAKA REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 10/25/2000|
| COUNTY: ST. JOSEPH STATE: IN |EVENT TIME: 20:10[CST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/26/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |ANTON VEGEL R3 |
| |PATRICIA HOLAHAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CREWS |CINDY PEDERSON R3 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN |LARRY CAMPER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RECOVERY OF TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE FROM THE LOADING DOCK OF A |
| DEPARTMENT STORE. |
| |
| AT 2010 LOCAL TIME ON 10/25/00 A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE [MODEL 3430, |
| S/N 29119] CONTAINING BOTH A CESIUM-137 AND AMERICIUM-241 SOURCE WAS |
| DISCOVERED ON THE LOADING DOCK OF A DEPARTMENT STORE LOCATED IN MISHAWAKA, |
| IN. THE RESPONDING FIRE DEPARTMENT CONTACTED THE SOUTH BEND FIRE DEPARTMENT |
| FOR HAZMAT (RADIOLOGICAL) ASSISTANCE. A PRELIMINARY RAD SURVEY SHOWED |
| APPROXIMATELY 2mR/HR CONTACT. THE INDIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH WAS |
| INFORMED. THE CONDITION OF THE TROXLER TRANSPORT CASE SUGGESTS THAT IT MAY |
| HAVE BEEN STOLEN. FIRE STATION #3 IN MISHAWAKA HAS TAKEN CUSTODY OF THE |
| TROXLER AND IS STORING THE DEVICE IN A LOCKED SECURE AREA. THE INITIAL |
| REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER INDICATED THAT 75 MEMBERS OF THE |
| PUBLIC WERE EVACUATED. REGION 3 WILL FOLLOWUP IN THE MORNING. SEVERAL |
| FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES WERE INFORMED BY THE STATE OF INDIANA AND THE |
| NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021