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Event Notification Report for October 5, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/04/2000 - 10/05/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37392  37393  37407  37408  37409  37410  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37392       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/29/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:46[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        09/29/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        15:22[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/04/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  UNDERWOOD                    |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NCFR                     NON CFR REPORT REQMNT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATION                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| At 1522 on 09/29/00, the PSS office was notified that a secondary condensate |
| alarm was received on the C-360 position 3 autoclave Water Inventory Control |
| System (WICS).  The WICS system is required to be operable while heating in  |
| mode 5 according to TSR 2.1.4.3.  The autoclave was checked according to the |
| alarm response procedure,  removed from service and the WICS system was      |
| declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent.  Troubleshooting was  |
| initiated and is continuing in order to determine the reason for the alarm.  |
|                                                                              |
| The safety system actuation is reportable to the NRC as required by Safety   |
| Analysis Report section 6.9, table 1 criterion J.2 Safety System actuation   |
| due to a valid signal as a 24-hour event notification                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Senior Resident has bean notified of this event.                     |
|                                                                              |
| ***** RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 2155 EDT ON 10/04/00 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO      |
| LEIGH TROCINE *****                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah         |
| personnel:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.  Investigation and troubleshooting by the    |
| System Engineer revealed that the gain adjustment on one of the WICS         |
| channels had drifted out of tolerance.  Historical discussions with the      |
| component manufacturer had concluded that the WICS alarm cards are           |
| susceptible to drift, due to age and fluctuations in temperature.  These     |
| cards are exposed to ambient temperatures, but the cards are rated for the   |
| range of temperatures at the autoclaves.  Given this and other indications   |
| that the WICS actuation signals were invalid, i.e., not the result of water  |
| backing up in the drain, it has been concluded that the subject actuations   |
| were caused by invalid signals (instrument drift) and thus, [do] not meet    |
| the criteria for reporting."                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations   |
| officer notified the R3DO (Madera) and NMSS EO (Hodges).                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37393       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/30/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:14[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3                    |EVENT DATE:        09/30/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:10[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HILL                         |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       85       Power Operation  |85       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE AND THE UNIT ENTERED A 14 DAY LCO ACTION            |
| STATEMENT.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| At 0110 hours on September 30, 2000, the Unit One High Pressure Cooling      |
| Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable following failure to         |
| successfully complete QCOS 2300-26, HPCI CCST Suction Check Valve Closure    |
| Test.  QCOS 2300-26 is an Inservice Testing surveillance used to verify      |
| closure of the HPCI pump Contaminated Condensate Storage Tank (CCST) suction |
| check valve. The valve could not be verified to be closed by the             |
| surveillance and the system was declared inoperable, as required by the      |
| procedure. The time of the LCO entry was at 0048 hours when the system was   |
| made inoperable for performance of the surveillance.  Unit One is currently  |
| in a 14 day LCO per Technical Specification 3.5.A.3.  The HPCI system is     |
| currently in the normal standby line-up, available for injection if          |
| required, pending troubleshooting.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| ***** RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 1724 EDT ON 10/04/00 FROM DAVE BOWMAN TO LEIGH  |
| TROCINE *****                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is retracting this event notification.  The following text is a |
| portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:                           |
|                                                                              |
| "This is a retraction of the ENS call made on 09/30/00 concerning the        |
| inoperabilty of the HPCI system following the failure of the HPCI            |
| Contaminated Condensate Storage Tank (CCST) suction check valve to close     |
| during a surveillance."                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "We have completed our evaluation and have determined that a redundant       |
| isolation valve was operable and would have isolated the CCST suction to     |
| HPCI and would not have prevented the HPCI alternate suction from the torus  |
| to provide an adequate source of water for HPCI to meet its safety           |
| function."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations        |
| officer notified the R3DO (Madera).                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37407       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DRESDEN                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:23[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3           |EVENT DATE:        10/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:51[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SALGADO                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       23       Power Operation  |23       Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE                   |
|                                                                              |
| Failed to receive proper indication of turbine position circuitry indicating |
| lamp following HPCI system run at rated pressure.  Investigation by station  |
| personnel identified a failed oil pressure switch which provides indication  |
| of stop valve closure to turbine reset circuit.                              |
|                                                                              |
| Failure of the switch prevents automatic and remote reset of HPCI turbine    |
| trips.  This failure renders HPCI inoperable and would prevent it from       |
| fulfilling its safety function.  Technical Specification 3.5.a (14 days to   |
| return to service or shutdown) entered.  All other Emergency Core Cooling    |
| Systems are fully operable.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Efforts are proceeding to repair/replace the switch.                         |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37408       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/04/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:33[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        10/03/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        15:28[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/04/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |BRIAN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  M C PITTMAN                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i)     ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOAD CELL CALIBRATION DATA FOR SOME FREEZER SUBLIMERS WERE FOUND TO BE  NON  |
| - CONSERVATIVE.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| At 1528 on 10/03/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified by    |
| engineering that load cell calibration data for some freezer sublimers was   |
| suspected to be in error.  The load cells are part of the High High Weight   |
| Trip System for the freezer sublimers which is required by Technical Safety  |
| Requirement (TSR) to be operable.  Data for many of the load cells           |
| calibrated on site shows the identified load cells do not meet the           |
| specifications credited in the existing setpoint calculations and the        |
| calibration procedures.  The problem appears to be consistent among the load |
| cells.  The load cells data indicates less weight than what was actually     |
| applied.  It has been determined that this deficiency may affect the ability |
| of the freezer sublimers' ability to actuate the High High Weight Trip       |
| System at the required Limited Control Setting (LCS).  This deficiency would |
| not affect the ability of the freezer sublimers to actuate the High High     |
| Weight Trip System below the Safety Limit (SL). There are 30 of the 10,000   |
| lb. Capacity and 4 of the 20,000 lb. capacity load cells that are affected.  |
| Investigation revealed that none of the four 20,000 lb. Load cells have been |
| installed.  The 20,000 lb. Load cells are being controlled to ensure they    |
| are not installed.  The affected in service freezer sublimers were declared  |
| inoperable by the PSS.  Engineering is reviewing work package data and the   |
| freezer sublimers that do not contain suspected load cells are being         |
| returned to service.  Resolution of this issue is being pursued by           |
| Operations, Maintenance, and Engineering.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The equipment is required by TSR to be available and operable and should     |
| have been operating.  No redundant equipment is available and operable to    |
| perform the required safety function.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector ahs been notified of this event.                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37409       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALLAWAY                 REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:12[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        10/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:55[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  OLMSTEAD                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DAVE LOVELESS        R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NON - LICENSED OPERATOR INADVERTENTLY STARTED THE "A" EMERGENCY DIESEL       |
| GENERATOR (EDG).                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| At 2055 on October 3, 2000, the "A"  EDG received an emergency start signal  |
| in response to an inadvertent actuation of the EDG  local emergency start    |
| pushbutton.  The local emergency start pushbutton was inadvertently actuated |
| by non-licensed Operations personnel while reviewing procedural guidance for |
| emergency starting the EDG from the local control panel.                     |
|                                                                              |
| The EDG  achieved rated voltage and speed following the start signal, but    |
| was not required to connect to the Class 1E distribution system during the   |
| event.  The EDG was subsequently secured and restored to a standby status.   |
|                                                                              |
| Evaluations to determine the cause for why reporting requirement             |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) was not initially identified will be addressed within   |
| the station's corrective action program.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37410       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:50[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:20[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE MEYER                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF DOCUMENTATION TO SHOW    |
| THAT ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP VALVE CAPACITY WILL SUPPORT THE COOLDOWN         |
| ASSUMPTIONS FOR A STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT WHEN OFFSITE POWER IS   |
| NOT AVAILABLE                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "During a main steam and steam dump system validation, no documentation      |
| could be found to show that the atmospheric steam dump (ADV) valve capacity  |
| will support the 44-minute cooldown assumptions for a steam generator tube   |
| rupture (SGTR) event as described in the FSAR when offsite power is not      |
| available.  FSAR Chapter 14 and plant procedures include assumptions and     |
| procedure steps that require use of the [ADVs] to cool down the reactor      |
| coolant system (RCS) within 44 minutes of a SGTR event to allow the RCS      |
| pressure to equalize with the faulted steam generator pressure to terminate  |
| primary to secondary break flow.  The SGTR radiological dose assessment is   |
| based upon this 44-minute time frame for ending flow to the ruptured steam   |
| generator."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The current licensing basis calculation for the SGTR event calculates steam |
| releases from the intact and the faulted steam generators for the purpose of |
| determining offsite dose releases.  However, this calculation does not       |
| appear to support a demonstration of the capability of the ADV on the intact |
| steam generator to reduce the primary system temperature (with sufficient    |
| subcooling margin) to allow depressurizing the RCS to equilibrium pressure   |
| with the faulted steam generator.  No calculation or other documentation has |
| been located that provides an evaluation of the amount of heat in the form   |
| of steam to be removed by the intact steam generator's ADV to provide the    |
| cooldown within the 44-minute time assumed in the accident analysis.  An     |
| operability determination is being performed per [Generic Letter] 91-18."    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that there was nothing unusual or not understood and     |
| that all systems functioned as required.  The licensee also stated that the  |
| units were not in any limiting conditions for operation as a result of this  |
| issue.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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