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Event Notification Report for October 2, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           09/29/2000 - 10/02/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37383  37386  37389  37390  37391  37392  37393  37394  37395  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37383       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/26/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:40[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        09/26/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        17:30[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/01/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JIM McCLEERY                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING THE X-705, DECON FACILITY,        |
| COMPLEXING HANDTABLE DUCTWORK                                                |
|                                                                              |
| At 1730 during a review of Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA)        |
| Corrective Action Plan (CAP) with NCS it was noted that the X-705 Complexing |
| Handtable was not covered by an active NCSA.  NCSA 705_014A00 had been       |
| cancelled and the PORC approved 705_014A01 was not activated.  Based on      |
| security sweep data completed by Applied Nuclear Technology (ANT) personnel  |
| it can be conservatively estimated that greater than 15 grams of U-235 exist |
| in the duct work associated with the handtable.  TSR 3.11.2 Requires a NCSA  |
| when operations involve uranium enriched to 1.0% or higher U-235 and 15      |
| grams or more U-235.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The complexing handtable has not been in operation since NRC transition on   |
| 03/03/97 and remains out of service.  Upon notification of this issue the    |
| Plant Staff Superintendent office directed the facility management to enter  |
| an anomalous condition.  This is reportable under UE2-RA-RE1030 (Event       |
| Report Criteria) 3.C.1 as a 4 hour NRC Bulletin 91-01 event.                 |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT:                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The safety significance of this event is very low.  No operation had taken   |
| place on the complexing handtable since transition on 03/03/97.  The small   |
| amount of hold up may be greater than 15 grams of U-235, however, the        |
| available data for the remainder of the handtable operation shows reading at |
| or near background levels.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO OF HOW CRITICALITY , |
| ETC.):                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Since the handtable and associated piping are favorable geometry for any     |
| enrichment, material would have to accumulate in the ductwork or pile up to  |
| achieve a critical configuration.  The operation is not currently being      |
| performed and the ductwork is not connected to any system, therefore, a      |
| criticality does not appear credible.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| The controlled parameter is geometry.  The approved, but not implemented     |
| NCSA establishes two controls based on geometry.                             |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The amount of U-235 is not more than 25 grams.  Enrichment is not known, but |
| could be as high as 100%.  The form of material is either uranyl fluoride or |
| uranyl nitrate.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL OR CONTROL SYSTEMS AND DESCRIPTION OF THE |
| FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The only deficiency is that the ductwork for the handtable potentially       |
| contains more than 15 grams U-235 without an active NCSA to establish the    |
| necessary controls to ensure double contingency.                             |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
|                                                                              |
| Anomalous condition remains in effect until evaluations and testing are      |
| completed.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate     |
| holder.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/01/00 @ 1010 BY SPAETH TO GOULD * * *                     |
|                                                                              |
| Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) analysis completed on 9/28/00 indicates less     |
| than 15 grams of U-235 are present in the X-705 complexing handtable and     |
| associated ductwork. The total U-235 identified in the and associated        |
| ductwork is less than 6 grams including measurement uncertainties.  An NCSA  |
| is, therefore, not required for this equipment per TSR 3.11.2.               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.  The DOE Representative will be     |
| notified.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The Reg 3 RDO(Clayton) and NMSS(Hickey) were notified.                       |
|                                                                              |
| HOO Note: Portsmouth does not retract 91-01 Bulletins reports.               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37386       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK                     REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/28/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:23[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        09/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:21[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE CHERBA                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/01/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v)      OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ELECTRICAL BUS OUTAGE WILL AFFECT TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM                     |
|                                                                              |
| "This event notification is for planned maintenance on Cook Unit 1's         |
| electrical buses that remove power from a portion of the TSC ventilation     |
| system. Contingencies are established to restore power to the TSC            |
| ventilation fan (if needed) to support Emergency Plan execution. The fan     |
| that will be unavailable boosts airflow through the TSC ventilation charcoal |
| clean-up filter subsystem. Ventilation flow will still pass through this     |
| filter without the booster fan, but TSC pressure will not be boosted to      |
| limit infiltration. Use of this fan is dependent on radiological conditions, |
| if radiological conditions warrant its use, and it is not available, the TSC |
| will relocate to the Unit 2 Control Room in accordance with plant            |
| procedures. Reporting this event is consistent with NUREG-1022, Rev 1        |
| criteria for reporting loss of ERFs.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "No adverse consequences are expected from this outage. The TSC ventilation  |
| booster fan is expected to be unavailable for 48 hours, starting at 0121     |
| hours on 9-28-2000. Contingencies have been planned to restore power to the  |
| booster fan in 8 to 10 hours if needed. Follow-up notification will be made  |
| when the TSC is again fully available. The NRC Senior Site Resident          |
| Inspector has been informed of this planned evolution."                      |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/01/00 @ 0948 BY COBB TO GOULD * * *                       |
|                                                                              |
| The onsite TSC emergency response facility has been restored as of 0515 and  |
| it is fully available for use.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.  The Reg 3 RDO(Clayton) has been    |
| notified.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37389       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  NC DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/29/2000|
|LICENSEE:  UNION REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER        |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:40[EDT]|
|    CITY:  MONROE                   REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        09/29/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NC |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/29/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |CHARLES R. OGLE      R2      |
|                                                |FRITZ STURZ          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  S. JEFFRIES                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:                                |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| An employee of the Union Regional Medical Center received an overexposure    |
| based upon the results of dosimetery readings for the May-June 2000          |
| monitoring period. The individual's whole body TLD indicated the following   |
| doses: 7762 mrem deep, 8168 mrem eye lens, and 8577 mrem shallow. In         |
| addition, the individual's ring TLD indicated a dose of 11460 mrem. The      |
| State of North Carolina is currently investigating this incident.            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37390       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/29/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:54[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        09/29/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:57[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PAUL UNDERWOOD               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/29/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES R. OGLE      R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       55       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FROM 55% POWER                                          |
|                                                                              |
| At 1357 on 09/29/00,  while performing planned refueling outage shutdown     |
| activities, a manual scram (RPS actuation) was actuated in response to       |
| decreasing reactor water level due to both reactor feed pump turbines (RFPT) |
| being tripped.   RFPT 'B' had been secured as per planned activities; RFPT   |
| 'A'  tripped on low suction pressure (cause unknown at this time).           |
|                                                                              |
| At the time of the manual scram, reactor water level was  22" and            |
| decreasing.  HPCI and RCIC both automatically actuated to recover reactor    |
| water level.  The lowest observed reactor water level was  - 48".            |
|                                                                              |
| PCIV Groups 2 and 5, and Secondary Containment isolated as expected.  SBGT   |
| actuated as expected.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Investigation is continuing.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Recirculation pumps continued to run and decay heat is being removed by      |
| steaming to the main condenser.   The 'A' reactor feed pump has been         |
| started.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37391       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/29/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:40[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        09/29/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:20[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARSHALL FUNKHOUSER          |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/29/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       99       Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABLE                         |
|                                                                              |
| At 1320 hours on 9/29/00,  the seismic bolts of the Division 3 Diesel        |
| Generator (DG) control panel door were discovered missing.   At 1450,        |
| Engineering determined that the seismic qualification of the control panel   |
| was in question with these bolts missing.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| On 9/27/00, during the day shift, the Division 3 DG was tested per Clinton   |
| Power Station (CPS) procedure 9080.02,  DIESEL GENERATOR 1C OPERABILITY -    |
| MANUAL AND QUICK START OPERABILITY.  This procedure requires instrumentation |
| to be connected within the local control panel (1E22-S001B).  The bolts to   |
| this panel were discovered missing today at 1320.   It is possible that they |
| had been missing since the performance of CPS 9080.02 but is unknown at this |
| time.  The Division 3 DG is not analyzed for these missing bolts and is      |
| considered inoperable while in this condition.                               |
|                                                                              |
| This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D) as a      |
| condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the High        |
| Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system, a single-train safety system needed to    |
| mitigate the consequences of an accident, since the Division 3 DG is an      |
| essential support system for the HPCS system needed to mitigate a small      |
| break LOCA concurrent with a Loss of offsite power.                          |
|                                                                              |
| The bolts were restored at 1442 today and the Division 3 DG is operable.     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37392       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/29/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:46[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        09/29/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        15:22[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/29/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  UNDERWOOD                    |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NCFR                     NON CFR REPORT REQMNT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATION                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| At 1522 on 09/29/00, the PSS office was notified that a secondary condensate |
| alarm was received on the C-360 position 3 autoclave Water Inventory Control |
| System (WICS).  The WICS system is required to be operable while heating in  |
| mode 5 according to TSR 2.1.4.3.  The autoclave was checked according to the |
| alarm response procedure,  removed from service and the WICS system was      |
| declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent.  Troubleshooting was  |
| initiated and is continuing in order to determine the reason for the alarm.  |
|                                                                              |
| The safety system actuation is reportable to the NRC as required by Safety   |
| Analysis Report section 6.9, table 1 criterion J.2 Safety System actuation   |
| due to a valid signal as a 24-hour event notification                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Senior Resident has bean notified of this event.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37393       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/30/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:14[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3                    |EVENT DATE:        09/30/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:10[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HILL                         |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/30/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       85       Power Operation  |85       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE AND THE UNIT ENTERED A 14 DAY LCO ACTION            |
| STATEMENT.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| At 0110 hours on September 30, 2000, the Unit One High Pressure Cooling      |
| Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable following failure to         |
| successfully complete QCOS 2300-26, HPCI CCST Suction Check Valve Closure    |
| Test.  QCOS 2300-26 is an Inservice Testing surveillance used to verify      |
| closure of the HPCI pump Contaminated Condensate Storage Tank (CCST) suction |
| check valve. The valve could not be verified to be closed by the             |
| surveillance and the system was declared inoperable, as required by the      |
| procedure. The time of the LCO entry was at 0048 hours when the system was   |
| made inoperable for performance of the surveillance.  Unit One is currently  |
| in a 14 day LCO per Technical Specification 3.5.A.3.  The HPCI system is     |
| currently in the normal standby line-up, available for injection if          |
| required, pending troubleshooting.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37394       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: RIVER BEND               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:56[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        09/30/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:33[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HUSTON                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/01/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHUCK CAIN           R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT ENTERED LCO ACTION STATEMENT WHEN BOTH PRIMARY CONTAINMENT UNIT        |
| COOLERS WHERE DECLARED INOPERABLE.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| On 09130/00 at 2333, both Primary Containment Unit Coolers were declared     |
| inoperable based on an apparent failure to fully meet required volumetric    |
| flow rates.  The Tech Spec SR 3.6.1.7.2 required values are greater than or  |
| equal to 50,000 CFM.   Actual calculated values were determined to be        |
| approximately 45,000 CFM for Unit cooler A and 48,000 CFM for Unit cooler B. |
| This condition may impact the ability of these unit coolers to perform their |
| design safety functions.  This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 |
| b.2.iii.D for loss of function required to mitigate an accident.             |
| Activities to restore function include evaluation of test data and           |
| methodology, cleaning of unit cooler coils, verification of calibration      |
| data, and verification of system alignment.                                  |
| The plant is in a 8 hour LCO to restore one of the coolers to operable       |
| status or be in mode 3 within the following 12 hours.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/1/00 AT 2320 BY HUSTON, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| Both Primary Containment Unit Coolers A and B (Divisions I and II) have been |
| re-tested satisfactorily verifying both safety function and Tech Spec        |
| operability. The station declared both Containment Unit Cooler A and B       |
| operable and exited the LCO regarding Primary Containment Unit Coolers at    |
| 1048 hours on 10/1/00                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The station is evaluating information developed to determine whether a       |
| retraction is warranted.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.  The Operations Center  |
| notified the R4DO (Cain).                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37395       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2000|
|    UNIT:  [2] [3] []                STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:40[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/01/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CALLER                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/01/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |AARON DANIS          IAT     |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
|                                                |RICHARD ROSANO       IAT     |
|                                                |ELINOR ADENSAM       NRR     |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| NONCREDIBLE BOMB THREAT RECEIVED BY HOO.  FOR DETAILS SEE HOO LOG            |
| BOOK/MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| NOTIFIED INDIAN POINT 2 (MONTROSS) AND INDIAN POINT 3 (MC ELROY).            |
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