Event Notification Report for October 02, 2000

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING THE LOSS OF FIVE SEALED SOURCES AT ADAC LABORATORIES IN MILPITAS, CALIFORNIA

Adac Laboratories (State license #2760-43) in Milpitas, California, manufactures nuclear medicine equipment and utilizes sealed sources for testing cameras, etc. The sources are stored in a depleted uranium storage container.

On 09/26/00, Adac Laboratories performed an audit, and the location of five sealed sources could not be determined (one 28.5 mCi cesium-137 source and four gadolinium-153 sources with activities of 14.2 mCi, 0.87 mCi, 0.2 mCi, and 0.15 mCi). Adac Laboratories has taken action to secure that remaining sources and is making efforts to locate the missing sources.

The licensee notified the State of California at approximately 1000 PDT on 10/02/00, and a representative from the State of California Radiologic Health Branch (Kent Prendergast) in turn notified the NRC Operations Center of the loss of five sealed sources at 1617 on 10/03/00.

(Call the NRC operations officer for a State contact telephone number, licensee address, and licensee radiation safety officer name.)

REACTOR WAS MANUALLY SCRAMMED FROM <1% DUE TO INDICATIONS OF THE ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE(ERV) BEING OPEN.

The manual scram was inserted due to indications of main steam ERV 111 being stuck open. All rods fully inserted, no ECCS initiations, no relief valves lifted and all systems functioned as expected. They also had isolation of the main steam isolation valves due to the mode switch being in the shutdown position, condenser vacuum less than LoLoLo and reactor pressure less than 600 psig.

Following the reactor scram they declared an Unusual Event (@0712) due to unidentified drywell internal leakage greater than 10 gpm (they have not yet determined the maximum leakage rate). Initial indication of this problem is the #11 main steam line ERV 111 is stuck open. The cause of the Drywell leakage is suspected to be a failure of one of the ERV line vacuum breakers to close resulting in leakage from Torus back to the Drywell.

The unit also entered TS S/D LCO 3.2.5.a(1&2), Reactor Coolant System Leakage, which requires the plant to be in cold shutdown within 24 hours. They plan to depressurize and cool down the reactor using shutdown cooling to reach cold shutdown.

The NRC Resident Inspector, State and Local Agencies were notified.

There will be a press release issued by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE 0912 10/2/00 FROM MICHAUD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

The Unusual Event was terminated at 0905 EDT. Total unidentified leakage is approximately 0.5 gpm. The unit is in cold shutdown, and is continuing to cool down. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Linville), EO (Goodwin), IRO(Congel), and FEMA (Steindurf).

RECEIPT OF A PACKAGE WITH EXTERIOR RADIATION LEVELS GREATER THAT THE LIMIT

A package containing radioactive tools was received onsite, and the bottom side of one of the packages had a dose rate of 550 mR/hour on contact. (The limit is 200 mR/hour on contact.) The package came from a Chem Nuclear facility on a flat bed truck, and the radioactive tools were going to be used for a spent fuel pool cleanup effort.

The box in question is still located on the truck. Radiation Protection Department personnel have posted the area and roped it off as a Radiation Area in order to control access. The licensee plans to unload the box and perform an investigation to find out what is in the box and why the event happened. The licensee also plans to continue controlling access to the area until the investigation is complete.

The licensee reported this event as a 1-hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(2).

Radiation Protection Department personnel notified Chem Nuclear. The licensee plans to notified the NRC resident inspector and the Vermont Department of Public Service.

DISCOVERY THAT A HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM STEAM ADMISSION VALVE MAY NOT CLOSE AGAINST DESIGN BASIS DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"Engineering review has determined that the steam admission valve (inboard primary containment isolation valve) for the HPCI system may not close against design basis differential pressure (dP). Engineering review has determined that the valve position limit switch may not indicate true stem and disc position and, therefore, under design basis dP conditions, may stop closure before hard seat contact. Evaluation of operability is continuing. A review of 1995 test data is underway which may determine that this valve is in fact operable. In the event this review determines that this valve is operable, this notification will be retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

SCHNABEL ENGINEERING ASSOCIATES REPORT OF A VEHICLE CONTAINING A LOCKED TROXLER NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE THAT WAS STOLEN FROM AN EMPLOYEE'S RESIDENCE IN RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

Schnabel Engineering Associates reported that an employee worked over the weekend and locked a Troxler nuclear density gauge in the back of his 1988 Chevy Blazer located in the parking lot at his residence (an apartment building or townhouse complex in Richmond, Virginia). At approximately 0700 on 10/02/00, the employee discovered that his Chevy Blazer had been stolen from the parking lot at his residence. Bob Hill (the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer for the Richmond, Hampden, Charlottesville, Leesburg Office) was notified at approximately 1000 on 10/02/00, and several attempts were made to located the vehicle. The licensee notified the Police of the stolen vehicle and that a locked nuclear density gauge was in the back of the stolen vehicle. So far, there has been no record of the truck being found. The licensee also checked with local towing companies, and there is also no record of the vehicle being towed.

The missing nuclear density gauge (model #3430, serial #29171) had a sealed source containing 40 mCi of Americium-241/beryllium and 8 mCi of cesium-137. The gauge also had two locks on it (one on the trigger and one on the box), and the box was locked inside the back of the enclosed vehicle. The vehicle was also locked.

The licensee notified the NRC Region 2 office (Wade Loo) via telephone at approximately 1130 on 10/02/00. The licensee also reported to the NRC Operations Center that the NRC Region 2 office planned to notify the Virginia Bureau of Radiological Health and planned to issue a Preliminary Notification. The licensee also plans to submit a 30-day written report.

(Call the NRC operations officer for licensee contact telephone numbers, a licensee address, the employee's name, and the employee's address.)

DISCOVERY OF A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN A PROCEDURE, THE PLANT CONFIGURATION TO ESTABLISH PORTABLE SHIELDING, AND THE FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (FSAR) ANALYSIS FOR CONTROL ROOM DOSE

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"During a engineering review for placing a table adjacent to an exterior Control Room wall, it was noticed that the calculation for placing portable shielding in front of the Control Room window and South access door assumes the shielding [is] in place from the on set of the event. A discrepancy exists between the procedure and the plant configuration to establish the portable shielding to limit the whole body dose to Control Room operators and the FSAR analysis for Control Room dose (FSAR 14.3.5). The analysis (FSAR 14.3.5-1 of 14, last paragraph, Calculation 97-0115) assumes that the portable shielding is in place at initiation of event; however, the procedure necessary to implement the portable shielding (EOP-1, step 18) provides instructions to set up the portable shielding some time after the initiating event."

"At this time, portable shielding is being installed until further engineering reviews of this calculation and its assumptions can be made."

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.

HISTORICAL INFORMATION REGARDING A FAILURE TO COMPLETE X-333 LOW ASSAY WITHDRAWAL (LAW) COMPRESSOR PYROTRONIC SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEM ENGINEERING MODIFICATIONS AS DESIGNED (24-hour report)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth personnel:

"The engineering modifications to the X-333 LAW compressor Pyrotronic smoke detection system were not completed as designed. The modifications were intended to cause the safety system to alarm with only one smoke head firing instead of requiring two smoke heads to activate the alarm. The investigation into this matter was completed 10/02/00 at 1541 [hours]. The investigation identified that on one occasion, a LAW station compressor was in an applicable operating mode where the Pyrotronic smoke detection safety system was required to be operable and one of the heads was in fact inoperable making the system inoperable. Operations personnel did post an immediate smoke watch to maintain [Technical Safety Requirement (TSR)] compliance."

"This finding is reportable to the NRC as a 24-hour event due to the fact the equipment was required by the TSR to be available and operable and should have been operating, and no redundant equipment was available to provide the required safety function."

"Note: The engineering modifications were completed 10/01/00, and applicable [post-maintenance tests were completed satisfactorily]."

It was reported that the inoperable head that was identified to be inoperable on 10/01/99, but this issue was not identified until the investigation was completed today (10/02/00) at 1541 hours. It was also reported that there was nothing unusual or misunderstood and that all systems functioned as required.

NOTE: The X-333 building LAW station was reported to be a UF6 withdrawal station.

Portsmouth personnel have notified the NRC resident inspector and plan to notify the Department of Energy site representative.

* * * UPDATE 2125EDT ON 10/17/00 FROM KURT SISLER TO S. SANDIN * * *

"NRA [Nuclear Regulatory Affairs] has reviewed the basis for the above NRC event notification and determined that this event can be retracted. The following provides the basis for this conclusion.

"On October 2, 2000, the NRC was notified of a design problem which caused the LAW UF6 Smoke Detection system to be inoperable at a time when the system was required to be operable in accordance with TSR 2.5.3.3 (outside each compressor housing one smoke detector must be operable in modes II or III). The design problem resulted from the fact that Pyrotronics smoke detectors were installed in series. In this configuration, the failure of one detector could prevent the redundant detector from activating the alarm contacts in the event of a UF6 release.

"A review was conducted by engineering to determine if LAW had ever been in Mode II or III with a failed outside compressor housing Pyrotronics detector. The review identified one occasion in the past where this was the case. As a result of the series configuration, the remaining Pyrotronics detector would not have been able to perform its design function at that time. Although there were CADP smoke detectors available for this area, operating procedures did not recognize that CADP smoke detectors provided backup to the Pyrotronics detectors. Based on the fact that the Pyrotronics smoke detection system was inoperable and no redundant equipment was available to perform the required safety function, the PSS notified the NRC of this past safety system failure. This safety system failure was documented on Problem Report PR-PTS-00-04649.

"A followup evaluation by engineering confirmed that there was an outside compressor housing CADP smoke detector available and operable at the time the event occurred. The evaluation also confirmed that the SAR, Table 3.2-4B, recognizes that CADP detectors provide smoke detection for outside compressor enclosures. Engineering also confirmed that CADP detectors were available and operable in all cases since March 3,1997, when any single Pyrotronics head was inoperable.

"Based on the above, redundant outside compressor housing CADP smoke coverage was available at all times when the Pyrotronics heads were inoperable and this event may be retracted."

The NRC resident inspector was informed. Notified R3DO(Lanksbury) and NMSS(Holonich).