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Event Notification Report for September 22, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           09/21/2000 - 09/22/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37251  37300  37304  37330  37358  37359  37360  37361  37362  37363  37364  37365 


!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37251       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/23/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:22[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        08/23/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BOB KIDDER                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PATRICK HILAND       R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       98       Power Operation  |98       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - ECC SYSTEM MOV MAY NOT CLOSE DURING A LOCA AND A LOOP AS REQUIRED  -       |
|                                                                              |
| While reviewing motor operated valve (MOV) data from December, 1999, plant   |
| staff personnel identified an error in the analyzed data for the closing     |
| torque for an MOV in the Emergency Closed Cooling (ECC) System that is       |
| required to close during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and a Loss of     |
| Offsite Power (LOOP).                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The valve, #OP42-F0295B, isolates the ECC System from the Nuclear Closed     |
| Cooling (NCC) Water System.  A second isolation valve, #OP42-F0290, was      |
| subsequently found to have insufficient data to ensure that it alone would   |
| have provided the required isolation.  Failure of both valves to potentially |
| not close completely could cause the ECC System to transfer the system's     |
| cooling water inventory via the NCC Water System to the Intermediate         |
| Building resulting in the loss of cooling capability of the ECC System. This |
| would result in the loss of cooling capability for the systems required to   |
| support the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) 'B' and 'C' Subsystems. The #F0290   |
| valve has been successfully tested to ensure that it has adequate torque to  |
| close under accident conditions; however, there is insufficient leakage test |
| data available on this valve at this time.  Therefore, assuming that valve   |
| #F0290 leaks and valve #F0295B does not fully close, a total loss of         |
| inventory would potentially occur for Division 2.                            |
|                                                                              |
| Therefore, this condition is being conservatively reported to the NRC as a   |
| loss of safety function during a past outage which removed RHR 'A' from      |
| service, until further evaluation is completed.                              |
|                                                                              |
| Valve #OP42-F0295B has been electrically closed under static flow conditions |
| to ensure continued operability of the ECC System.                           |
|                                                                              |
| Licensee planned actions include further evaluation of past test data or     |
| performance of a specific leak test on valve #OP42-F0290 and further         |
| evaluation of data on valve #OP42-F0295B.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1622 EDT ON 9/21/00 BY MICHAEL McFARLAND TO FANGIE JONES  |
| * * *                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "A 10 CFR 50.72, four (4) hour non-emergency notification was initially made |
| on 8-23-2000, due to Emergency Closed Cooling Loop B inoperability           |
| subsequent to valve OP42-F0295B inoperability, due to inadequate closing     |
| torque under dynamic flow conditions concurrent with an outage on the        |
| alternate, Division 1, equipment. it was indeterminate at that time if       |
| sufficient torque existed for the valve to close under accident conditions.  |
|                                                                              |
| "Subsequent to the event notification, the valve has been tested under       |
| dynamic flow and reevaluated. This information has resulted in a             |
| determination that the OP42-F0295B valve has been, and continues to be,      |
| operable under both normal and accident conditions.                          |
|                                                                              |
| "Since the valve was determined to have been continuously operable, no       |
| Technical Specification Required Actions were exceeded and both loops of ECC |
| remained operable. This event was determined not reportable and ENF 37251 is |
| retracted."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  The R3DO (Bruce Burgess)  |
| was notified.                                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37300       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/09/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:21[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        09/08/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        20:00[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/21/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JEFF CASTLE                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATION          |
|                                                                              |
| "On 9/8/2000 at 2000 hours a safety system actuation occurred in the X344    |
| building.  Autoclave #4 was in Mode II 'Heating'  when the High Condensate   |
| Level Shutoff safety system actuated.  Per TSR 2.1.3.7, the autoclave was    |
| placed in Mode VII  'Shutdown', a mode in which the High Condensate level    |
| Shutoff system is not required, and declared inoperable. This is being       |
| reported as a valid safety system actuation.  An engineering evaluation has  |
| been initiated to review the system conditions that surrounded the actuation |
| of the safety system."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Operations notified both the NRC resident inspector and DOE site             |
| representative.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 2323 EDT ON 9/21/00 BY ERIC SPAETH TO FANGIE JONES * * *  |
|                                                                              |
| "RETRACTION:  On 09/21/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent retracted the      |
| above Event. At the time of the High Condensate Level Shutoff (HCLS) system  |
| actuation, the autoclave was being cycled on and off in accordance with the  |
| applicable procedure for heating a Russian cylinder. Follow up investigation |
| by engineering and operations has determined the HCLS actuation occurred     |
| while AC #4 was in Mode VII 'Shutdown'.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Discussions with building supervision and the operator who witnessed the    |
| HCLS actuation revealed the AC #4 had been shutdown as part of the on/off    |
| heating cycle before the actuation occurred. Based on the configuration of   |
| AC #4 at the time, the AC would have been in Mode VII 'Shutdown'.            |
|                                                                              |
| "Since the HCLS system is not required to be operable in Mode VII            |
| 'Shutdown', the HCLS system actuation was invalid, and is not reportable in  |
| accordance with 10CFR76.120(c)(2). Accordingly, this event is being          |
| retracted."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The plant has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  The R3DO (Bruce Burgess) |
| and NMSS EO (John Greeves) has been notified.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37304       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  LAKEHEAD PIPE LINE CO., INC          |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/11/2000|
|LICENSEE:  LAKEHEAD PIPE LINE CO., INC          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:20[EDT]|
|    CITY:  LEWISTON                 REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        09/11/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MI |EVENT TIME:        08:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  22-26732-01           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/21/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |MARK RING            R3      |
|                                                |BRIAN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT POLLOCK               |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NINF                     INFORMATION ONLY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REPORT INVOLVING POSSIBLE EQUIPMENT SAFETY DEVICE FAILURE                    |
|                                                                              |
| THE LAKEHEAD PIPE LINE RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER (RSO), WAS INFORMED  AT 0800 |
| ON 9/11/00 THAT THE COUNTER ON A NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE HAD STOPPED WORKING   |
| SOMETIME IN MAY OF THIS YEAR AT THEIR LEWISTON STATION LOCATED IN LEWISTON,  |
| MICHIGAN.  THE SOURCE IS IN THE SHIELDED AND LOCKED POSITION.  THE DEVICE IS |
| A MODEL 7400 MANUFACTURED BY BERTHOLD SYSTEMS CONTAINING A 350 MILLICURIE    |
| CS-137 SOURCE.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1601 EDT ON 9/21/00 BY ROBERT POLLOCK TO FANGIE JONES * * |
| *                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| After discussion with NRC Region 3 (Geoffrey Wright), it was determined that |
| this event was not reportable as the source was not involved, safely stored  |
| at all times, and the problem was only with the electronics.  This event     |
| notification is retracted.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The R3DO (Bruce Burgess) and the NMSS EO (John Greeves) has been informed.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37330       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/15/2000|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:57[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        09/15/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JESSE JAMES                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES TRAPP          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     M/R        Y       15       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUALLY SCRAMMED THE REACTOR AFTER ENTERING THE RESTRICTIVE AREA OF THE     |
| POWER TO FLOW MAP.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| On September 15, 2000 at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2 was       |
| manually scrammed per operating procedure during turbine testing in          |
| preparation for the refuel outage.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The manual scram was due to entering restricted area of the power to flow    |
| map from Technical Specification 3.4.1, after the trip of the "2B"           |
| recirculation pump.  All rods fully inserted and the reactor was shutdown.   |
| Reactor level during the scram lowered to 0" and a Group II and III primary  |
| and secondary containment isolation was received.  The isolations functioned |
| as designed.  The plant is stable in hot shutdown with the main condenser as |
| a heat sink and the feedwater system is in service for level control.  No    |
| radioactive release or Emergency Core Cooling System injection occurred      |
| during the scram.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The turbine was tripped in accordance with the refuel outage plan when the   |
| recirculation pump tripped.  The plan was to perform turbine testing and     |
| then to manually scram the reactor at the same power level.                  |
|                                                                              |
| The reactor was manually scrammed less than one minute after entering the    |
| restricted area of the power to flow map.  No power oscillations were seen.  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1715 EDT ON 9/21/00 BY ANDREW WINTER TO FANGIE JONES * *  |
| *                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "On September 15, 2000 PBAPS reported that Unit 2 was manually scrammed in   |
| accordance with operating instructions during turbine testing. The report    |
| identified that the manual scram was initiated based on entering the         |
| restricted area of the power to flow map after the tripping of the 2B        |
| Recirculation Pump. This notification is being retracted based on the        |
| following:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "NUREG 1022 Revision 1 specifically states that 'The Commission is           |
| interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the            |
| consequences (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events    |
| where an ESF actuated unnecessarily....This indicates an intent to require   |
| reporting actuations of features that mitigate the consequences of           |
| significant events.' Therefore, the following is an analysis of these two    |
| underlying reasons for reporting ESF actuations:                             |
|                                                                              |
| 1. The need for the ESF to mitigate the consequences of an event:            |
|                                                                              |
| The September 15, 2000 PBAPS manual scram was initiated because the plant    |
| operator made a conservative decision in accordance with station procedures  |
| to initiate a reactor scram. At the time this decision was made, the plant   |
| conditions were approximately 16 percent power and 24 percent core flow.     |
| Although this condition is close to an operational limit conservatively      |
| established by the licensee and the operator made the correct decision to    |
| commence the plant shutdown, the ESF actuation was not necessary to mitigate |
| the consequences of this evolution. Moreover, plant conditions were not      |
| changing in a direction that would have required the manual scram to         |
| mitigate the consequences of significant events.                             |
|                                                                              |
| 2. Events where an ESF actuated unnecessarily:                               |
|                                                                              |
| The actuation of a manual scram and the subsequent PCIS Group II and Ill     |
| actuations were part of a preplanned shutdown for the commencement of the    |
| PBAPS Unit 2's thirteenth refueling outage (2R13) and were necessary to      |
| complete the plant shutdown. The decision to insert the manual scram in      |
| accordance with station procedures, resulted in the preplanned shutdown      |
| commencing slightly early. Therefore, the ESP did not actuate unnecessarily  |
| since it was already planned to shutdown the plant by inserting a manual     |
| scram.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Therefore, based on the above discussion, this event is not reportable      |
| because the manual scram resulted from and was, in accordance with the       |
| licensee's procedure, and part of a preplanned sequence of reactor           |
| operation."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  The R1DO (William Ruland) |
| has been notified.                                                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37358       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/20/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:51[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        09/20/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:05[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RYAN RODE                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT OUTSIDE 10 CFR PART 50 APPENDIX R DESIGN BASIS DUE TO PROCEDURAL       |
| ISSUES                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "During the final review of the new Appendix R rebaselining project, it was  |
| discovered that the refueling water storage tank (RWST) inventory could be   |
| lost if AOP 10A, 'Safe Shutdown-Local Control' and AOP 10B 'Safe to Cold     |
| Shutdown in Local Control' were performed as written. The postulated event   |
| occurs during an Appendix R fire where SI-851(RHR pump suction from          |
| containment sump B) encounters a spurious open signal, causing the RWST to   |
| drain via backflow into containment. The procedures do not address this      |
| potential failure early enough into the event to preclude a potential loss   |
| of RWST inventory. This puts Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant outside of its  |
| design basis because 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.L.2.b performance goals  |
| might not be met for the above scenario."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the      |
| licensee.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1424 EDT ON 9/21/00 BY RYAN RODE TO FANGIE JONES * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| "This is an update to Event Notification 37358. That notification reported a |
| procedural deficiency involving AOP 10A, 'Safe Shutdown - Local Control' and |
| AOP 10B. 'Safe to Cold Shutdown in Local Control,' in the event of a         |
| postulated Appendix R fire which results in a spurious open signal to the    |
| SI-851A/B valves, 'RHR Pump Suction from Containment Sump B.' This           |
| notification discussed the concern with this spurious valve opening          |
| occurring during AOP 10A, which was a potential loss of RWST inventory to    |
| the containment sump through the SI-856A/B, 'RHR Pump Suctions From RWST,'   |
| valves.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Although appropriately identified in the License's condition report, this   |
| notification did not include a discussion of the concern identified during   |
| conduct of procedure AOP 10B. Specifically, since no action is specified to  |
| verify that the SI-851 A/B valves are closed in either AOP 10A or AOP 10B,   |
| in the event of the Appendix R fire which results in the spurious opening of |
| those valves, when the RHR system is aligned for normal recirculation during |
| the cooldown, the RCS inventory could be reduced by leakage through the open |
| SI-851 valve to the containment sump. As mentioned in the original event     |
| notification, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.L.2.b requires the            |
| performance goal for maintaining RCS level within the level indication in    |
| the pressurizer be met. The procedures as written do not assure this         |
| performance goal would be met and are reported as a potential condition that |
| is outside the Appendix R design basis."                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  The R3DO (Bruce Burgess)  |
| has been notified.                                                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37359       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUMMER                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/21/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:51[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        09/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LUCAS                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |THOMAS DECKER        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A)  UNANALYZED COND OP     |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       96       Power Operation  |96       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TURBINE DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEED PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE WAS DISCOVERED LOCKED.    |
|                                                                              |
| The turbine driven Emergency Feed pump discharge valve (XV601036-EF) was     |
| discovered locked closed instead of locked open as required.  This condition |
| rendered the turbine driven Emergency Feed pump inoperable.  The valve was   |
| last operated on 8/4/00.  During the period when the discharge valve was     |
| closed, both diesels had been removed from service for maintenance.  The "A" |
| D/G was removed from service between 9/5/00 - 9/6/00 and the "B" D/G was     |
| removed from service between 9/19/00 - 9/20/00.   The licensee is            |
| investigating the cause.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37360       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  MARYLAND DEPART. OF THE ENVIRONMENT  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/21/2000|
|LICENSEE:  D W KOZERA INC                       |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:48[EDT]|
|    CITY:  BALTIMORE                REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        09/20/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MD |EVENT TIME:        14:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  MD0514901             AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/21/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |WILLIAM RULAND       R1      |
|                                                |JOSIE PICCONE        NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MANLEY                       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOST TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE REPORTED TO THE MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF   |
| THE ENVIRONMENT (MDE)                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Maryland licensee, D W Kozera Inc. of Baltimore, Md. lost a Troxler moisture |
| density gauge model 3430 serial # 25607 in Adamstown, Md.  The gauge was     |
| missing from the back of a flat bed truck , which had its tailgate down,     |
| that was being driven around the Greenhill Manor Residential subdivision(New |
| Design Rd & Union Ridge Rd in Fredrick City).  The gauge, which apparently   |
| fell out of the back of the truck, was not in its case and the source rod    |
| was not padlocked.  The source (7.2 millicuries of cesium 137 and 39.7       |
| millicuries of americium 241), as far as they know, was in the shielded      |
| position and has not been found.  MDE has conducted an initial investigation |
| and it appears that they may issue a press release.                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37361       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/21/2000|
|    UNIT:  [2] [3] []                STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:07[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        09/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN POPIELARSKI             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |WILLIAM RULAND       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v)      EMERGENCY SIREN INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIRENS IN DEGRADED CONDITION                               |
|                                                                              |
| "On September 21, 2000 at 1530, it was identified that at least 17 of Peach  |
| Bottom's 97 Emergency Offsite Sirens were in a degraded condition. The exact |
| cause of the degraded sirens is not known at this time, but the ability of   |
| the licensee to detect the degraded sirens has been compromised due to poor  |
| maintenance practices. A plan is being developed and implemented to repair   |
| the degraded sirens and appropriate interim compensatory measures are being  |
| put in place to compensate for the degraded condition."                      |
|                                                                              |
| An investigation is underway into this matter.  The contractor responsible   |
| for the siren maintenance has no other responsibilities on site.             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37362       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: RIVER BEND               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/21/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:15[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        09/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:38[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DONALD CHASE                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JEFF SHACKELFORD     R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD  |                             |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POSSIBILITY THAT BOTH DIVISION 1 AND 2 DIESEL GENERATORS WERE INOPERABLE FOR |
| 9 HOURS                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "This condition deals with a past Reportability issue. During a condition    |
| report review for Functional Failure/Maintenance Preventable Functional      |
| Failure determination (FF/MPFF), River Bend has determined that both Standby |
| Diesel Generators may have been inoperable at the same time.                 |
|                                                                              |
| "A failure in a light socket related to the Division I Diesel Generator      |
| created a functional failure in that during a seismic event, the breaker     |
| logic for the Division I diesel generator output breaker could have been     |
| affected in such a way that the breaker would not close. The failed light    |
| socket was identified and corrected on 9/5/00 as part of work to replace the |
| light bulb. Since the MAI on the light bulb failure was written on 8/22/00,  |
| it is assumed that the socket failure occurred at that time.                 |
|                                                                              |
| "During the same time period, a lube oil leak developed on the Division II   |
| oil supply which has been determined to be a functional failure. The damaged |
| oil line was replaced on 8/30/00.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Therefore, based on the functional failure determinations, there is an      |
| overlapping period of approximately 9 hours that the Division I and II       |
| diesel generators may not have been capable of performing their design bases |
| function.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "This report is being made based on the information available at this time.  |
| River Bend will continue to evaluate the condition associated with the       |
| potential Division I inoperability and will assess the reportability of this |
| condition further based on the results of that evaluation."                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37363       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAN ONOFRE               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/21/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] [3]                STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:09[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE             |EVENT DATE:        09/19/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        07:30[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CLAY WILLIAMS                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KRISS KENNEDY        R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO A SULFURIC ACID LEAK CONTAINED ON SITE           |
|                                                                              |
| "This 4-hour telephone notification is being provided in accordance with     |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(vi) for notification of other government agencies. For the  |
| event below, on September 19, 2000, at 0920 PDT, SCE notified the Department |
| of Environmental Health and the Office of Emergency Services (OES Incident   |
| number 00-4232). This notification was delayed due to an internal            |
| miscommunication.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "On September 19, 2000, at about 0730 PDT, control room personnel were       |
| notified of a sulfuric acid leak from the High Flow Makeup Demineralizer     |
| Bulk Acid Storage Tank. The leak was from a gasket located between level     |
| transmitter 2/3LT5045 and isolation valve AST-38. The isolation valve was    |
| closed and the leak stopped. All acid (estimated to be about 650 gallons)    |
| was contained within the tank's bermed area and then routed to the waste     |
| neutralization sump. The entire sump contents (about 2,500 gallons of        |
| sulfuric acid and water) were removed for disposal off-site. This occurrence |
| was not a significant impact to the environment and did not hamper site      |
| personnel in the performance of their duties necessary for safe operation.   |
|                                                                              |
| "At the time of this occurrence, both Units 2 and 3 were operating at about  |
| 100 percent power; Unit 1 remains permanently defueled. SCE will notify the  |
| NRC resident inspectors about this notification and will provide them with a |
| copy of this report."                                                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37364       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK                REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:26[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        09/22/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HAMM/SCHALL                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/22/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          UNU                   |THOMAS DECKER        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |BILL BATEMAN         NRR     |
|AAEC                                            |JOSEPH GIITTER       IRO     |
|                                                |LUIS REYES           R2      |
|                                                |HEYMAN               FEMA    |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FIRE IN THE PROTECTED AREA LASTING GREATER THAN 10 MINUTES RESULTING IN A    |
| REACTOR SCRAM.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| AN UNUSUAL EVENT WAS DECLARED @ 0400 DUE TO A FIRE IN THE MAIN TRANSFORMER   |
| THAT LASTED >10 MINUTES.  OFF SITE FIRE DEPARTMENT WAS CALLED IN TO RESPOND  |
| AND THE FIRE WAS EXTINGUISHED WITHIN 14 MINUTES, HOWEVER THE PLANT STILL     |
| REMAINS IN THE UNUSUAL EVENT.   A REACTOR SCRAM FROM 100% POWER OCCURRED     |
| FOLLOWING A MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR LOCKOUT WHICH RESULTED FROM THE           |
| TRANSFORMER FAILURE.  THERE WERE SOME ERRONEOUS INDICATIONS OF CONTROL ROD   |
| POSITION, BUT  ALL RODS APPEAR TO BE FULLY INSERTED.  THERE WAS NO ECCS      |
| ACTUATION AND NO SAFETY RELIEF VALVES LIFTED DURING THIS EVENT.  THE PLANT   |
| DID NOT LOSE OFFSITE POWER DUE TO THE AUTO TRANSFER FROM THE MAIN            |
| TRANSFORMER TO THE STARTUP AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER.  THE DIESELS AUTOMATICALLY |
| STARTED AND WERE STILL RUNNING AT THE TIME OF THIS REPORT.  GROUP 2,6 AND 8  |
| ISOLATIONS WERE ALSO RECEIVED.  THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE STARTUP LEVEL   |
| CONTROL VALVE WHEN THEY REESTABLISHED REACTOR FEED PUMP, VALVE DID NOT OPEN  |
| PROPERLY SO THEY HAD TO USE THE BACKUP PATH IN THE FEED SYSTEM.   AS A       |
| RESULT OF THIS THE LEVEL WENT LOW ENOUGH TO RECEIVE A SECOND REACTOR SCRAM   |
| SIGNAL.  THE CONDENSER IS BEING USED AS THE HEAT SINK AND THE PLANT IS       |
| STABLE.  THE CAUSES FOR THE TRANSFORMER FIRE AND THE ERRONEOUS CONTROL ROD   |
| INDICATIONS ARE BEING INVESTIGATED.  THERE HAVE BEEN NO INJURIES REPORTED    |
| AND IT IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME IF A PRESS RELEASE WILL BE ISSUED.          |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 9/22/00 @ 0528 BY HAMM TO GOULD * * *                        |
|                                                                              |
| THE NOUE WAS TERMINATED AT 0512 DUE TO THE FIRE BEING COMPLETELY             |
| EXTINGUISHED.                                                                |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED.                                 |
| THE EO(BATEMAN), RDO(DECKER), FEMA (HEYMAN)  AND IRO(GIITTER) WERE           |
| NOTIFIED.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| SEE EVENT # 37365.                                                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37365       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK                REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:37[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        09/22/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        03:40[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SCHALL                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/22/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |THOMAS DECKER        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT HAD ESF ACTUATIONS DURING A REACTOR SCRAM                              |
|                                                                              |
| A main turbine trip resulted in a reactor scram.  As expected following the  |
| scram, reactor water level dropped to the actuation setpoint for Groups 2, 6 |
| and 8 isolations. The main turbine trip apparently resulted from a fire in B |
| main power transformer.  The fire was reported to the control room at 0346.  |
| The site fire brigade responded and the fire was extinguished at 0402 using  |
| the automatic deluge system and fire hoses.  Offsite fire department         |
| assistance was requested but was not needed to extinguish the fire.   An     |
| Unusual Event was declared at 0400 in accordance with the plant's emergency  |
| procedures.  The Unusual Event was terminated at 0512 based on the plant     |
| being in a stable condition.   During the transient the startup level        |
| control did not control level in the automatic mode.   Reactor level was     |
| controlled using a feedwater bypass valve.   A second reactor scram signal   |
| was generated due a low reactor water level signal received while manual     |
| level control was being established, however all rods were already tully     |
| inserted.  The plant emergency diesels started but did not load. Offsite     |
| power remained available throughout the event.  The NRC Resident Inspector   |
| was notified.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| HOO Note: see event # 37364                                                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021