Event Notification Report for September 12, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/11/2000 - 09/12/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37303 37304 37305 37306 37307 37308 37309
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37303 |
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| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/10/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:02[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 09/10/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:23[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT PACE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/11/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO CLOSURE OF MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES |
| |
| An automatic reactor trip/turbine trip occurred due to the spurious closure |
| of both main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). The spurious MSIV closure was |
| the result of a failed logic module in the engineered safety features |
| actuation system (ESFAS). All control rods inserted following the trip, and |
| all systems functioned as expected. The auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system |
| automatically started as designed following the trip. The unit is currently |
| stable in Hot Standby with decay heat being removed through steam released |
| via the steam generator atmospheric dump valves. Steam generator water |
| levels are being maintained by the AFW system. |
| |
| The licensee anticipates that replacement of the logic module and |
| establishment of decay heat removal via the main condenser will occur within |
| the next few hours. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this |
| event by the licensee. The licensee reported that nearby residents have |
| contacted emergency services regarding the noises caused by the steam |
| release through the atmospheric dump valves. The licensee plans to make a |
| press release regarding this event. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 0428EDT ON 9/11/00 FROM ROBERT PACE TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The MSIVs were reopened and the main condenser placed back in service at |
| 0420EDT for decay heat removal. Preparations are underway to restore one |
| main feedwater pump and secure the AFW system. Notified R1DO(Dimitriadis). |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37304 |
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| REP ORG: LAKEHEAD PIPE LINE CO., INC |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/11/2000|
|LICENSEE: LAKEHEAD PIPE LINE CO., INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:20[EDT]|
| CITY: LEWISTON REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 09/11/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: MI |EVENT TIME: 08:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 22-26732-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/11/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MARK RING R3 |
| |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT POLLOCK | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| REPORT INVOLVING POSSIBLE EQUIPMENT SAFETY DEVICE FAILURE |
| |
| THE LAKEHEAD PIPE LINE RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER (RSO), WAS INFORMED AT 0800 |
| ON 9/11/00 THAT THE COUNTER ON A NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE HAD STOPPED WORKING |
| SOMETIME IN MAY OF THIS YEAR AT THEIR LEWISTON STATION LOCATED IN LEWISTON, |
| MICHIGAN. THE SOURCE IS IN THE SHIELDED AND LOCKED POSITION. THE DEVICE IS |
| A MODEL 7400 MANUFACTURED BY BERTHOLD SYSTEMS CONTAINING A 350 MILLICURIE |
| CS-137 SOURCE. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37305 |
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| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/11/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:42[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK ABRAMSKI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/11/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES TRAPP R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - STATION BATTERY CALCULATIONS |
| |
| An engineering review of voltage drop calculations for station battery |
| systems (A & B) has identified an error in the assumed value for the current |
| rating for the starting coil on the A & B ESW pump motor starter. The |
| starting coil is actually rated for 44 amps vs. 6 amps as originally |
| assumed. This discrepancy results in a calculated terminal voltage at the |
| coil below that stated on the name plate. This condition is considered to |
| be outside the design basis of the plant. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37306 |
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| FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/11/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:53[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:20[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GUY GRIFFIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/11/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 98 Power Operation |98 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| ESF ACTUATION - CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES |
| |
| During performance of procedure 34SV-SUV-026-1S, Primary containment |
| Isolation valves Logic Sequence Functional Test , valves 1B21-F111 and |
| 1B21-F112 (post accident reactor coolant containment isolation valves) were |
| opened for prerequisites. When 1B21-F111 and 1B21-F112 were opened the |
| 1B21-F051C EFCV isolated. 1B21-F051C is the EFCV (Excess Flow Check Valve) |
| for jet pump #20 instrument piping. The isolation caused instrumented core |
| flow, process computer flow and jet pump #20 flow to increase. Isolations |
| were reset and 1B21-F051C was reopened at 1022 (It had closed at 1020). All |
| indications returned to normal. |
| |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37307 |
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| REP ORG: COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/11/2000|
|LICENSEE: COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:21[EDT]|
| CITY: LEXINGTON REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 09/11/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: KY |EVENT TIME: 06:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: 201-142-51 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/11/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
| |E. WILLIAM BRACH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: VICKI JEFFS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE |
| |
| "On September 11, 2000, Fuller, Mossbarger, Scot and May Engineers, Inc., |
| reported a stolen moisture/density gauge. The gauge was a Troxler 3440, |
| serial number 24606, containing an 8 millicurie cesium-137 and a 40 |
| millicurie americium-241 source. |
| |
| "The gauge was stolen sometime between 12:00 am. and 6:00 a.m. on September |
| 11 from an employee's residence located in Lexington, KY. The police have |
| been notified. The employee had stored the gauge, in its transport |
| container, in his garage. He put the gauge, in its transport container in |
| the bed of his truck at about midnight in order to be ready to leave for the |
| job Site the next morning. One of the owners of the company stated that the |
| container was locked to the bed of the truck with a chain and padlock. The |
| thief used a hacksaw to cut the chain and remove the transport container |
| with the gauge inside. |
| |
| "The owner stated he believed the source rod to also be locked and that the |
| employee would have still have the keys to this lock." |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37308 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/11/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:47[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 09/11/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 15:53[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/11/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MARK RING R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |E. WILLIAM BRACH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CRABTREE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| FOUR HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN |
| |
| At 1555 on 9/11/00 during review of flowdown of NCSA-PLANT012.A01 (Favorable |
| Geometry Vacuum Cleaner) it was discovered that the NCSA failed to provide |
| adequate guidance for handling and storing sintered metal filters removed |
| from favorable geometry vacuum cleaners. The vacuums are used during |
| maintenance and operational activities to collect potentially contaminated |
| material. The filters are therefore handled as uranium bearing materials |
| once removed from the favorable geometry vacuum cleaners. The NCSA fails to |
| provide adequate guidance for handling these filters and has therefore been |
| identified to be deficient in that necessary controlled parameters were not |
| established by the NCSA. |
| |
| Geometry control was not maintained in this event, interaction and |
| moderation control were in place, although not required by the NCSA. |
| Therefore one control of the double control contingency principle was lost. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| The safety significance of this is low. The filter assembly is a favorable |
| geometry while installed in the vacuum. The maximum internal volume of the |
| filter is less than 5.49 liters which is less than a minimum critical volume |
| (5.67 liters) assuming optimum conditions for criticality (fully enriched, |
| optimum geometry, optimum moderation, and full reflection). Therefore, a |
| criticality could not occur even if the uranium in the filter achieved an |
| optimum configuration. All filters were safely spaced from other uranium |
| bearing material. |
| |
| |
| POTENTIAL .CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| The potential pathway for a criticality are that the fitter assembly is |
| removed from the vacuum, it is placed in a plastic bag, spaced adjacent to |
| other uranium bearing material, the material becomes moderated and is |
| reflected. |
| |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| The controlled parameters are geometry. interaction, and moderation. |
| |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| The maximum internal volume of the filter is less than 5.49 liters. This |
| amount of material is less than a minimum critical volume (5.67 liters) |
| assuming fully enriched, optimally moderated and fully reflected conditions. |
| The maximum enrichment that could credibly be on the filters is 20% U-235. |
| The material in the filters is bounded by UO2F2, and the likely moderation |
| level is less than H/U=20. |
| |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| The geometry control was lost. |
| |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| Corrective actions are in progress and consist of performing walkdowns of |
| all potentially affected facilities and then quantifying the material in any |
| filters discovered through Non-Destructive Assay analysis. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and DOE Representative were notified. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37309 |
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| FACILITY: THREE MILE ISLAND REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/11/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:24[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SCHORK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/11/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES TRAPP R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED A CONDITION THAT COULD BE POTENTIALLY OUTSIDE |
| THE DESIGN BASIS |
| |
| At 1930 hours on September 11 2000, a condition potentially outside the |
| design basis of the facility was identified at TMI-1. The condition is that |
| in the event of a small break loss of cooling accident involving the core |
| flood line at TMI-1, it may be necessary to shut down the TMI-1 reactor |
| coolant pumps within 1 minute of loss of subcooling margin in order to limit |
| peak cladding temperatures to less than 2200 degrees Fahrenheit (the 10 CFR |
| 50.46 limit for peak cladding temperatures). The current design basis |
| analysis assumes that the pumps are shut down within 2 minutes of loss of |
| subcooling margin. |
| |
| Existing procedural guidance in site procedure 12 10-10 requires turning off |
| the reactor coolant pumps as an immediate manual action in response to loss |
| of subcooling margin. Operator training supervision and training instructors |
| have been queried. They report that the action to turn off the reactor |
| coolant pumps upon loss of subcooling margin is routinely completed within 1 |
| minute in plant simulator accident training unannounced casualty scenarios. |
| |
| The Shift Manager for TMI-1 has determined that based upon the existing |
| procedural guidance and the past simulator training experience, there is |
| reasonable expectation that procedurally directed operator actions will |
| successfully shut down the reactor coolant pumps within 1 minute of loss of |
| sub-cooling margin and therefore, the peak cladding temperature will remain |
| below the 2200 degrees Fahrenheit limit of 10 CFR 50.46. Thus, the TMI-1 |
| emergency core cooling systems continue to be operable because, based upon |
| engineering judgement, the systems are capable of performing their intended |
| safety function. |
| |
| This determination that a condition potentially outside the design basis of |
| the plant will be followed with more detailed evaluation and analysis of the |
| issue. It is expected that the follow-up analysis will either provide |
| technical justification that demonstrates that TMI-1 remains within the |
| existing design basis or that action will be taken to place TMI-1 back to |
| within conformance to the design basis. The actions to be taken based upon |
| the follow-up analysis will be provided to the NRC in a Licensee Event |
| Report that follows this immediate notification per 10 CFR 50.73. |
| |
| The Resident Inspector will be informed. |
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