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Event Notification Report for September 12, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           09/11/2000 - 09/12/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37303  37304  37305  37306  37307  37308  37309  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37303       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS           REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/10/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:02[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        09/10/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:23[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT PACE                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/11/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS  R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO CLOSURE OF MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES         |
|                                                                              |
| An automatic reactor trip/turbine trip occurred due to the spurious closure  |
| of both main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). The spurious MSIV closure was   |
| the result of a failed logic module in the engineered safety features        |
| actuation system (ESFAS). All control rods inserted following the trip, and  |
| all systems functioned as expected. The auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system     |
| automatically started as designed following the trip. The unit is currently  |
| stable in Hot Standby with decay heat being removed through steam released   |
| via the steam generator atmospheric dump valves. Steam generator water       |
| levels are being maintained by the AFW system.                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee anticipates that replacement of the logic module and            |
| establishment of decay heat removal via the main condenser will occur within |
| the next few hours. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this     |
| event by the licensee. The licensee reported that nearby residents have      |
| contacted emergency services regarding the noises caused by the steam        |
| release through the atmospheric dump valves. The licensee plans to make a    |
| press release regarding this event.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 0428EDT ON 9/11/00 FROM ROBERT PACE TO S. SANDIN * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| The MSIVs were reopened and the main condenser placed back in service at     |
| 0420EDT for decay heat removal.  Preparations are underway to restore one    |
| main feedwater pump and secure the AFW system.  Notified R1DO(Dimitriadis).  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37304       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  LAKEHEAD PIPE LINE CO., INC          |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/11/2000|
|LICENSEE:  LAKEHEAD PIPE LINE CO., INC          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:20[EDT]|
|    CITY:  LEWISTON                 REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        09/11/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MI |EVENT TIME:        08:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  22-26732-01           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/11/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |MARK RING            R3      |
|                                                |BRIAN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT POLLOCK               |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NINF                     INFORMATION ONLY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REPORT INVOLVING POSSIBLE EQUIPMENT SAFETY DEVICE FAILURE                    |
|                                                                              |
| THE LAKEHEAD PIPE LINE RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER (RSO), WAS INFORMED  AT 0800 |
| ON 9/11/00 THAT THE COUNTER ON A NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE HAD STOPPED WORKING   |
| SOMETIME IN MAY OF THIS YEAR AT THEIR LEWISTON STATION LOCATED IN LEWISTON,  |
| MICHIGAN.  THE SOURCE IS IN THE SHIELDED AND LOCKED POSITION.  THE DEVICE IS |
| A MODEL 7400 MANUFACTURED BY BERTHOLD SYSTEMS CONTAINING A 350 MILLICURIE    |
| CS-137 SOURCE.                                                               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37305       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/11/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:42[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        09/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARK ABRAMSKI                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/11/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES TRAPP          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - STATION BATTERY CALCULATIONS                          |
|                                                                              |
| An engineering review of voltage drop calculations for station battery       |
| systems (A & B) has identified an error in the assumed value for the current |
| rating for the starting coil on the A & B ESW pump motor starter.  The       |
| starting coil is actually rated for 44 amps vs. 6 amps as originally         |
| assumed.  This discrepancy results in a calculated terminal voltage at the   |
| coil below that stated on the name plate.  This condition is considered to   |
| be outside the design basis of the plant.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37306       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/11/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:53[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        09/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:20[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GUY GRIFFIS                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/11/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       98       Power Operation  |98       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ESF ACTUATION - CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES                                 |
|                                                                              |
| During performance of procedure 34SV-SUV-026-1S, Primary containment         |
| Isolation valves Logic Sequence Functional Test ,  valves 1B21-F111 and      |
| 1B21-F112 (post accident reactor coolant containment isolation valves) were  |
| opened for prerequisites.  When 1B21-F111 and 1B21-F112 were opened the      |
| 1B21-F051C EFCV isolated.  1B21-F051C is the EFCV (Excess Flow Check Valve)  |
| for jet pump #20 instrument piping.  The isolation caused instrumented core  |
| flow, process computer flow and jet pump #20 flow to increase.  Isolations   |
| were reset and 1B21-F051C was reopened at 1022 (It had closed at 1020).  All |
| indications returned to normal.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37307       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY             |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/11/2000|
|LICENSEE:  COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:21[EDT]|
|    CITY:  LEXINGTON                REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        09/11/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  KY |EVENT TIME:        06:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#:  201-142-51            AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/11/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|                                                |E. WILLIAM BRACH     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  VICKI JEFFS                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "On September 11, 2000, Fuller, Mossbarger, Scot and May Engineers, Inc.,    |
| reported a stolen moisture/density gauge.  The gauge was a Troxler 3440,     |
| serial number 24606, containing an 8 millicurie cesium-137 and a 40          |
| millicurie americium-241 source.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The gauge was stolen sometime between 12:00 am. and 6:00 a.m. on September  |
| 11 from an employee's residence located in Lexington, KY.  The police have   |
| been notified.  The employee had stored the gauge, in its transport          |
| container, in his garage.  He put the gauge, in its transport container in   |
| the bed of his truck at about midnight in order to be ready to leave for the |
| job Site the next morning.  One of the owners of the company stated that the |
| container was locked to the bed of the truck with a chain and padlock.  The  |
| thief used a hacksaw to cut the chain and remove the transport container     |
| with the gauge inside.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The owner stated he believed the source rod to also be locked and that the  |
| employee would have still have the keys to this lock."                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37308       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/11/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:47[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        09/11/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        15:53[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/11/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |MARK RING            R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |E. WILLIAM BRACH     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CRABTREE                     |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FOUR HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| At 1555 on 9/11/00 during review of flowdown of NCSA-PLANT012.A01 (Favorable |
| Geometry Vacuum Cleaner) it was discovered that the NCSA failed to provide   |
| adequate guidance for handling and storing sintered metal filters removed    |
| from favorable geometry vacuum cleaners. The vacuums are used during         |
| maintenance and operational activities to collect potentially contaminated   |
| material. The filters are therefore handled as uranium bearing materials     |
| once removed from the favorable geometry vacuum cleaners. The NCSA fails to  |
| provide adequate guidance for handling these filters and has therefore been  |
| identified to be deficient in that necessary controlled parameters were not  |
| established by the NCSA.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Geometry control was not maintained in this event, interaction and           |
| moderation control were in place, although not required by the NCSA.         |
| Therefore one control of the double control contingency principle was lost.  |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The safety significance of this is low. The filter assembly is a favorable   |
| geometry while installed in the vacuum. The maximum internal volume of the   |
| filter is less than 5.49 liters which is less than a minimum critical volume |
| (5.67 liters) assuming optimum conditions for criticality (fully enriched,   |
| optimum geometry, optimum moderation, and full reflection). Therefore, a     |
| criticality could not occur even if the uranium in the filter achieved an    |
| optimum configuration. All filters were safely spaced from other uranium     |
| bearing material.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL .CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The potential pathway for a criticality are that the fitter assembly is      |
| removed from the vacuum, it is placed in a plastic bag, spaced adjacent to   |
| other uranium bearing material, the material becomes moderated and is        |
| reflected.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| The controlled parameters are geometry. interaction, and moderation.         |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The maximum internal volume of the filter is less than 5.49 liters. This     |
| amount of material is less than a minimum critical volume (5.67 liters)      |
| assuming fully enriched, optimally moderated and fully reflected conditions. |
| The maximum enrichment that could credibly be on the filters is 20% U-235.   |
| The material in the filters is bounded by UO2F2, and the likely moderation   |
| level is less than H/U=20.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The geometry control was lost.                                               |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
|                                                                              |
| Corrective actions are in progress and consist of performing walkdowns of    |
| all potentially affected facilities and then quantifying the material in any |
| filters discovered through Non-Destructive Assay analysis.                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and DOE Representative were notified.             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37309       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: THREE MILE ISLAND        REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/11/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:24[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP            |EVENT DATE:        09/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        19:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SCHORK                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/11/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES TRAPP          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED A CONDITION THAT COULD BE POTENTIALLY OUTSIDE    |
| THE DESIGN BASIS                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| At 1930 hours on September 11 2000, a condition potentially outside the      |
| design basis of the facility was identified at TMI-1. The condition is that  |
| in the event of a small break loss of cooling accident involving the core    |
| flood line at TMI-1, it may be necessary to shut down the TMI-1 reactor      |
| coolant pumps within 1 minute of loss of subcooling margin in order to limit |
| peak cladding temperatures to less than 2200 degrees Fahrenheit (the 10 CFR  |
| 50.46 limit for peak cladding temperatures). The current design basis        |
| analysis assumes that the pumps are shut down within 2 minutes of loss of    |
| subcooling margin.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| Existing procedural guidance in site procedure 12 10-10 requires turning off |
| the reactor coolant pumps as an immediate manual action in response to loss  |
| of subcooling margin. Operator training supervision and training instructors |
| have been queried. They report that the action to turn off the reactor       |
| coolant pumps upon loss of subcooling margin is routinely completed within 1 |
| minute in plant simulator accident training unannounced casualty scenarios.  |
|                                                                              |
| The Shift Manager for TMI-1 has determined that based upon the existing      |
| procedural guidance and the past simulator training experience, there is     |
| reasonable expectation that procedurally directed operator actions will      |
| successfully shut down the reactor coolant pumps within 1 minute of loss of  |
| sub-cooling margin and therefore, the peak cladding temperature will remain  |
| below the 2200 degrees Fahrenheit limit of 10 CFR 50.46. Thus, the TMI-1     |
| emergency core cooling systems continue to be operable because, based upon   |
| engineering judgement, the systems are capable of performing their intended  |
| safety function.                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| This determination that a condition potentially outside the design basis of  |
| the plant will be followed with more detailed evaluation and analysis of the |
| issue. It is expected that the follow-up analysis will either provide        |
| technical justification that demonstrates that TMI-1 remains within the      |
| existing design basis or that action will be taken to place TMI-1 back to    |
| within conformance to the design basis. The actions to be taken based upon   |
| the follow-up analysis will be provided to the NRC in a Licensee Event       |
| Report that follows this immediate notification per 10 CFR 50.73.            |
|                                                                              |
| The Resident Inspector will be informed.                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+