Event Notification Report for September 11, 2000

CONTRACTOR TESTED POSITIVE DURING RANDOM TEST FOR DRUGS AND ALCOHOL

Contract Supervisor determined to test positive as a result of a random drug and alcohol screening. Per applicable administrative procedures the individual's access authorization to the protected area was terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

REPORT INVOLVING POSSIBLE EQUIPMENT SAFETY DEVICE FAILURE

THE LAKEHEAD PIPE LINE RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER (RSO), WAS INFORMED AT 0800 ON 9/11/00 THAT THE COUNTER ON A NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE HAD STOPPED WORKING SOMETIME IN MAY OF THIS YEAR AT THEIR LEWISTON STATION LOCATED IN LEWISTON, MICHIGAN. THE SOURCE IS IN THE SHIELDED AND LOCKED POSITION. THE DEVICE IS A MODEL 7400 MANUFACTURED BY BERTHOLD SYSTEMS CONTAINING A 350 MILLICURIE CS-137 SOURCE.

* * * RETRACTED AT 1601 EDT ON 9/21/00 BY ROBERT POLLOCK TO FANGIE JONES * * *

After discussion with NRC Region 3 (Geoffrey Wright), it was determined that this event was not reportable as the source was not involved, safely stored at all times, and the problem was only with the electronics. This event notification is retracted.

The R3DO (Bruce Burgess) and the NMSS EO (John Greeves) has been informed.

OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - STATION BATTERY CALCULATIONS

An engineering review of voltage drop calculations for station battery systems (A & B) has identified an error in the assumed value for the current rating for the starting coil on the A & B ESW pump motor starter. The starting coil is actually rated for 44 amps vs. 6 amps as originally assumed. This discrepancy results in a calculated terminal voltage at the coil below that stated on the name plate. This condition is considered to be outside the design basis of the plant.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

* * * RETRACTION on 10/06/00 at 1059 ET by Abramski taken by MacKinnon * * *

Subsequent testing has determined that there would in fact be sufficient terminal voltage at the starting coil of the A & B ESW Pump motor starters during a postulated Loss of Offsite Power. Therefore the plant was not outside its design basis and this event is being retracted. R1DO (Linville) notified

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.

ESF ACTUATION - CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

During performance of procedure 34SV-SUV-026-1S, Primary containment Isolation valves Logic Sequence Functional Test , valves 1B21-F111 and 1B21-F112 (post accident reactor coolant containment isolation valves) were opened for prerequisites. When 1B21-F111 and 1B21-F112 were opened the 1B21-F051C EFCV isolated. 1B21-F051C is the EFCV (Excess Flow Check Valve) for jet pump #20 instrument piping. The isolation caused instrumented core flow, process computer flow and jet pump #20 flow to increase. Isolations were reset and 1B21-F051C was reopened at 1022 (It had closed at 1020). All indications returned to normal.

The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE

"On September 11, 2000, Fuller, Mossbarger, Scot and May Engineers, Inc., reported a stolen moisture/density gauge. The gauge was a Troxler 3440, serial number 24606, containing an 8 millicurie cesium-137 and a 40 millicurie americium-241 source.

"The gauge was stolen sometime between 12:00 am. and 6:00 a.m. on September 11 from an employee's residence located in Lexington, KY. The police have been notified. The employee had stored the gauge, in its transport container, in his garage. He put the gauge, in its transport container in the bed of his truck at about midnight in order to be ready to leave for the job Site the next morning. One of the owners of the company stated that the container was locked to the bed of the truck with a chain and padlock. The thief used a hacksaw to cut the chain and remove the transport container with the gauge inside.

"The owner stated he believed the source rod to also be locked and that the employee would have still have the keys to this lock."

* * * UPDATE 1133 9/18/2000 FROM VICKI JEFFS VIA FACSIMILE * * *

"The gauge, Troxler 3440, S/N 24606, was found, undamaged, on the side of the road. The licensee now has possession of it. Licensee was cited for improper gauge storage."

Notified R2DO (Cahill).

FOUR HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN

At 1555 on 9/11/00 during review of flowdown of NCSA-PLANT012.A01 (Favorable Geometry Vacuum Cleaner) it was discovered that the NCSA failed to provide adequate guidance for handling and storing sintered metal filters removed from favorable geometry vacuum cleaners. The vacuums are used during maintenance and operational activities to collect potentially contaminated material. The filters are therefore handled as uranium bearing materials once removed from the favorable geometry vacuum cleaners. The NCSA fails to provide adequate guidance for handling these filters and has therefore been identified to be deficient in that necessary controlled parameters were not established by the NCSA.

Geometry control was not maintained in this event, interaction and moderation control were in place, although not required by the NCSA. Therefore one control of the double control contingency principle was lost.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:

The safety significance of this is low. The filter assembly is a favorable geometry while installed in the vacuum. The maximum internal volume of the filter is less than 5.49 liters which is less than a minimum critical volume (5.67 liters) assuming optimum conditions for criticality (fully enriched, optimum geometry, optimum moderation, and full reflection). Therefore, a criticality could not occur even if the uranium in the filter achieved an optimum configuration. All filters were safely spaced from other uranium bearing material.


POTENTIAL .CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):

The potential pathway for a criticality are that the fitter assembly is removed from the vacuum, it is placed in a plastic bag, spaced adjacent to other uranium bearing material, the material becomes moderated and is reflected.


CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):

The controlled parameters are geometry. interaction, and moderation.


ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):

The maximum internal volume of the filter is less than 5.49 liters. This amount of material is less than a minimum critical volume (5.67 liters) assuming fully enriched, optimally moderated and fully reflected conditions. The maximum enrichment that could credibly be on the filters is 20% U-235. The material in the filters is bounded by UO2F2, and the likely moderation level is less than H/U=20.


NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES

The geometry control was lost.


CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:

Corrective actions are in progress and consist of performing walkdowns of all potentially affected facilities and then quantifying the material in any filters discovered through Non-Destructive Assay analysis.

The NRC Resident Inspector and DOE Representative were notified.

THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED A CONDITION THAT COULD BE POTENTIALLY OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS

At 1930 hours on September 11 2000, a condition potentially outside the design basis of the facility was identified at TMI-1. The condition is that in the event of a small break loss of cooling accident involving the core flood line at TMI-1, it may be necessary to shut down the TMI-1 reactor coolant pumps within 1 minute of loss of subcooling margin in order to limit peak cladding temperatures to less than 2200 degrees Fahrenheit (the 10 CFR 50.46 limit for peak cladding temperatures). The current design basis analysis assumes that the pumps are shut down within 2 minutes of loss of subcooling margin.

Existing procedural guidance in site procedure 12 10-10 requires turning off the reactor coolant pumps as an immediate manual action in response to loss of subcooling margin. Operator training supervision and training instructors have been queried. They report that the action to turn off the reactor coolant pumps upon loss of subcooling margin is routinely completed within 1 minute in plant simulator accident training unannounced casualty scenarios.

The Shift Manager for TMI-1 has determined that based upon the existing procedural guidance and the past simulator training experience, there is reasonable expectation that procedurally directed operator actions will successfully shut down the reactor coolant pumps within 1 minute of loss of sub-cooling margin and therefore, the peak cladding temperature will remain below the 2200 degrees Fahrenheit limit of 10 CFR 50.46. Thus, the TMI-1 emergency core cooling systems continue to be operable because, based upon engineering judgement, the systems are capable of performing their intended safety function.

This determination that a condition potentially outside the design basis of the plant will be followed with more detailed evaluation and analysis of the issue. It is expected that the follow-up analysis will either provide technical justification that demonstrates that TMI-1 remains within the existing design basis or that action will be taken to place TMI-1 back to within conformance to the design basis. The actions to be taken based upon the follow-up analysis will be provided to the NRC in a Licensee Event Report that follows this immediate notification per 10 CFR 50.73.

The Resident Inspector will be informed.

UNEXPECTED EXPOSURE TO IRIDIUM-192 SOURCES

An individual at Mercy Hospital thought that she had ordered both dummy seeds and real iridium-192 seeds. A package containing seeds from Best Industries, Inc. was delivered to Mercy Hospital on 09/11/00. The shipping papers for the package stated 1 each leader, and on the next line 1 each ribbon with six seeds. The person thought that the 1 each leader was the dummy iridium-192 seeds and the 1 each ribbon with six seeds was the real iridium-192 seeds. The individual did not realize that the package shipping papers meant 1 each leader with 1 each ribbon with six seeds. The individual did not make a routine radiation survey before removing a ribbon of iridium-192 seeds from a lead pig. The individual carried the ribbon of seeds in her hand to a room where a practice simulation of a upcoming operation was to be performed using dummy seeds. The simulation was never performed because of some problems with loading the ribbon of seeds into a catheter. The ribbon of iridium-192 seeds was stored in a storeroom overnight at the foot of a bench. That night, the individual realized that she may have handled iridium-192 seeds instead of dummy seeds. The next morning, she discovered that she had handled actual iridium-192 seeds. Total activity of the iridium-192 seeds was 18.54 mCi.

The state of Iowa has calculated that the individual received 29 rem to her right hand and a whole body dose of 55 mrem (she had the ribbon of iridium-192 seeds in her hand for an estimated time of 20 minutes.) The doctor who was to have performed the simulated operation received a calculated whole body dose of 60 mrem.

This event was initially reported to NRC Region 3 (Jim Lynch).

UNESCORTED ACCESS GRANTED INAPPROPRIATELY

On September 11, 2000, TVA reported that inappropriate access may have been granted to some TVA employees based upon developed references utilized by RCM Power Services (formally Cataract Engineering, Inc.) in background investigations. TVA-IG discovered five individuals may have been granted access based on incomplete information. Workers at other licensees may be affected. Immediate compensatory measures were taken upon discovery.

Refer to HOO log for additional details.

Hoo Note: This applies to the following reactor sites, as reported: Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, and Watts Bar.