Event Notification Report for September 05, 2000

"2B" AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (CA) PUMP RAN 2 HOURS AND 55 MINUTES BEFORE BEING DISCOVERED IT WAS OPERATING. STEAM GENERATORS WERE ISOLATED FROM THE AFW SYSTEM.

At 0200 ET the "B" Train of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) was deenergized for part of their refueling outage maintenance. When the SSPS was deenergized the blocks for the Main Feedwater Pump blocks cleared, which resulted in an automatic start signal to the "2B" AFW pump. The on shift reactor operator did not notice the "2B" AFW pump run light was on until 0455 ET due to refueling outage maintenance activities in Control Room. The "2B" AFW pump recirculated water to the Upper Surge Tank since the Steam Generators were isolated. No damage occurred to the AFW pump. The licensee is investigating this event.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event.

* * * RETRACTED AT 1630 EDT ON 9/6/00 BY LARRY TUMBLESON TO FANGIE JONES * * *

"Further investigation has determined that, prior to and during the automatic start, the 2B CA Pump had been properly removed from service. This was accomplished when valves that isolate flow from the pump to the Unit 2 Steam Generators were closed as a result of planned Unit 2 shutdown operations using plant procedures. In addition, the automatic start of the 2B CA Pump was not the result of a valid ESF actuation intended to mitigate the consequences of an event. Instead, the ESF actuation signal which started the pump upon reset of the SSPS relay was present because the MFP's were already off as a result of planned refueling outage shutdown operations.

"Based upon the above, the September 5, 2000, automatic start of the 2B CA Pump occurred as a result of an invalid ESF actuation signal received while the pump was properly removed from service. Consequently, this is not reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii) - Actuation of An Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) and NRC Notification 37289 is retracted.

"The Resident Inspector has been notified."

The R2DO (Mark Lessor) has been notified.

SURFACE CONTAMINATION OF 6,300 DPM/100 CM² FOUND ON PACKAGE DELIVERED BY SYNCOR OF RALEIGH, NC.

Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for the VA Medical Center located in Durham, NC gave the following information.

A metal ammo box containing Thallium-201 (cyclotron produced) delivered by Syncor to the VA Medical Center was found to have outside surface contamination levels as high as 6,300 disintegration per minute per 100 cm² on the opening lid of the ammo box. The RSO called Syncor and informed them of the surface contamination found on the ammo box lid. The RSO will take another reading in about 6 hours using a sodium iodide probe to make sure that the surface contamination is Thallium-201 instead of Technetium-99m, after which the ammo box will be placed in a store room to decay. The ammo box will be returned to Syncor after the outside surface contamination has decayed off.

* * * UPDATE ON 09/05/00 AT 1059 ET BY FURR TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *

RSO Furr has determined that the surface contamination on the outside of the ammo box is Technetium-99m. R2DO (Mark Lesser) and NMSS EO (Brian Smith) notified.

PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO POTENTIAL FOR LOOSE PARTS AFFECTING EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM OPERABILITY

The licensee was conducting radiography examinations and discovered at 1800 EDT that the internal parts of check valve CK-3332 are not in place. The valve is the common miniflow recirculation line check valve for train 'A' emergency core coolant system (ECCS) . A second radiography of the valve, at 1825 EDT, was inclusive in determining if all the parts are located in the valve body. Train 'A' ECCS was declared inoperable. Technical specification 3.0.3 was entered at 1901 EDT due to the possibility that loose parts may adversely affect the operability of other ECCS components and the plant has commenced shutdown.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

BOTH TRAINS OF RIVER WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE

The licensee had a failure of the river water instrument air system at 1810 CDT, resulting in the loss of the automatic traveling screen control and the high screen differential level alarm function. With both automatic screen wash functions inoperable, both river water supply systems were declared inoperable. The systems were returned to operable at 1820 CDT when the alternate air dryer was placed in service, the problem being the air dryer that had been in service stopped passing air.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION 1600 9/19/2000 FROM KARRICK TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

"The DAEC is retracting event reports 37248 (8/24/00) and 37292 (9/5/00) that involved a loss of the River Water Supply (RWS) System's instrument air. These two 10CFR50.72(b)(2(ii) reports (an event or condition alone that could have prevented safety function fulfillment) were based on the initial determination that both loops of RWS System were inoperable, due, in part, to a Precaution and Limitation (P&L) contained in the system's Operating Instruction (OI-410). The loss of air had impacted a portion of the RWS screen wash support system. The P&L provides guidance on the screen wash subsystem's impact on RWS System operability. Follow-up engineering assessment has concluded that a loss of instrument air, by design, does not prevent the RWS system from fulfilling its intended safety function. The RWS system would have been capable of fulfilling its intended safety function during both events.

"Technical Specification (TS) Bases 3.7.2 defines RWS subsystem operability as having, 'an OPERABLE UHS, one OPERABLE pump, and an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the intake structure and transferring the water to the RHRSW/ESW Stilling Basin in the pump house.' For both of the events, the only question regarding operability was that of the OPERABLE flowpath. The follow-up engineering assessment concluded that the flowpath remained operable. Actual river water flow, as indicated in the control room, was not impacted by the loss of instrument air throughout the (short) duration of these events. Also, there is no question regarding past or historical operability because the cause of the loss of air was related to air system modifications, which were in process at the time or the events.

"Therefore, there was no event or condition alone that could have prevented safety function fulfillment. Once discovered, the appropriate TS action statements were entered. No TS 3.0.3. entry was made (or required to be made). There were no Operations or Conditions Prohibited by TS. No other reporting criteria apply to these events. These events are considered not-reportable under 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73."

Notified R3DO (Burgess).