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Event Notification Report for August 3, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
08/02/2000 - 08/03/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37173 37203 37204 37205
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37173 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/17/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:18[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 07/17/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:35[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/02/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MICHAEL PARKER R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |M. WAYNE HODGES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF CASTLE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
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| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT - |
| |
| At 1335 on 07/17/00, it was discovered that an NCSA mass control was lost in |
| a compressor seal can storage area in the X-330 building. Two seal cans were |
| identified to contain more items than specifically permitted by |
| NCSA-0330_003.A02 requirement #4 which states: "Only one seal set shall be |
| in each seal can." One seal can was discovered to contain two seal sets and |
| a second seal can was discovered to contain one seal with several (3 or 4) |
| additional seal parts. This deficiency was discovered during recovery |
| activities for NCS event report PTS-00-065 (NRC Event Number #37172) |
| involving a spacing violation of NCSA-0330_003.A02, requirement #8. |
| |
| This event resulted in the loss of one control (mass) of the double |
| criticality control principle. NCS interaction and enrichment control was |
| maintained throughout this event. |
| |
| NCSA-0330_003.A02 requirement #4 compliance was restored at 1415 when the |
| extra seal and seal parts were stored individually in seal cans under NCS |
| Engineering guidance. Complete compliance with NCSA-0330_003.A02 (refer to |
| NCS event #PTS-00-065) was established at 1705. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: |
| |
| The safety significance of this event is low. NCSE-0330_003.101 analyzes |
| greater than safe mass in a group of seal cans. In this analysis it states |
| that with an enrichment limit of 15% U-235, the amount of uranium in a seal |
| can would have to be exceeded by 4.6 times the normal amount to reach the |
| minimum critical mass. In this event two seal cans were found to be double |
| loaded. Assuming that both overloaded seal cans were next to each other, |
| the mass in the cans is less than the minimum critical mass. Note: these |
| cans were found because the group they were in was being moved to correct a |
| spacing violation between two other seal can groups. The overloaded seal |
| cans were not directly involved in the spacing violation. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]: |
| |
| For a criticality to occur, the seal cans would have to have more than a |
| double batch and the enrichment exceed 15% U-235. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, (GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): |
| |
| The controlled parameters in this case are mass, enrichment and |
| interaction. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| The total amount of uranium in the 47 seal cans involved (including the two |
| overloaded cans) is estimated to be 1715 grams uranium or 257.3 grams of |
| U-235. The maximum enrichment for this NCSA is limited to 15% U-235 and the |
| form of the material is dry UO2F2. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| The NCS mass control was lost in this case. Only one seal is allowed to be |
| placed In a seal can. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| At 1415, NCSA-0330_ 003.A02 compliance was restored. The extra seal parts |
| were removed and stored individually in separate seal storage cans. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE Site Representative were notified of |
| this event. |
| |
| PTS-2000-03534 PR-PTS-00-066 |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1252 ON 8/2/00, BY SISLER RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * * |
| |
| On 8/2/00 at 0035 hours maintenance personnel performing walkdown |
| verifications for NRC Event PTS-00-066 discovered a seal can containing |
| several pieces of seals that were more than volume of one seal. Compliance |
| was re-established at 0250hrs under NCS Engineering guidance. The various |
| seal parts were separated into three seal cans and properly stored per the |
| NCSA. At the time of this Update, a 100% Walkdown of all Seal Cans in |
| storage is in progress. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The operations center |
| notified the RDO(Creed); EO (Hickey) |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37203 |
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| FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/02/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:19[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 08/01/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ANDY DISMUKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GEORGE BELISLE R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|HFIT 26.73 FITNESS FOR DUTY | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 24 HOUR FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT |
| |
| Package containing small quantity of a controlled substance discovered in |
| protected area. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37204 |
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| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/02/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:20[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 08/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:37[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID NOYS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JACK MCFADDEN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v) EMERGENCY SIREN INOP | |
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| | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
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EVENT TEXT
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| EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE |
| |
| A FAILURE OF THE SIREN TRANSMITTER HAS CAUSED A FAILURE OF ALL EMERGENCY |
| SIRENS. REPAIR EFFORTS ARE IN PROGRESS AND REPAIR IS EXPECTED TONIGHT. THE |
| LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 37205 |
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| REP ORG: U.S. AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/02/2000|
|LICENSEE: U.S. AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:04[EDT]|
| CITY: KIRKLAND AFB REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 08/02/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: NM |EVENT TIME: 08:00[MDT]|
|LICENSE#: 42-23539-01AF AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/02/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |BLAIR SPITZBERG R4 |
| |SCOTT MOORE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK WROBEL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|IBBF 30.50(b)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| INADVERTENT HALON DISCHARGE AT IRRADIATOR FACILITY |
| |
| The licensee reported that a halon fire suppression system at the Kirkland |
| AFB irradiator facility discharged without an alarm or manual actuation. The |
| source rack was in the shielded position throughout the event. All other |
| safety systems, including the fire detection system, remained functional. |
| The licensee has contacted the fire suppression system vendor to investigate |
| the discharge. |
| |
| The licensee has contacted NRC Region IV (Gaines) regarding this event. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021