Event Notification Report for July 25, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/24/2000 - 07/25/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37185
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PAUL REIMERS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PAUL REIMERS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 07/25/2000
Notification Time: 17:40 [ET]
Event Date: 07/25/2000
Event Time: 17:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2000
Notification Time: 17:40 [ET]
Event Date: 07/25/2000
Event Time: 17:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DEAD AMERICAN JUVENILE CROCODILE FOUND IN THE COOLING CANALS
The licensee discovered a dead juvenile American crocodile in the cooling canals. Notification was made to the Florida Fish and Wildlife Agency and the Federal Fish and Wildlife Agency.
The NRC resident inspector will be notified by the licensee.
The licensee discovered a dead juvenile American crocodile in the cooling canals. Notification was made to the Florida Fish and Wildlife Agency and the Federal Fish and Wildlife Agency.
The NRC resident inspector will be notified by the licensee.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37186
Facility: CE NUCLEAR POWER
Region: 3 State: MO
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SHARKEY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: MO
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SHARKEY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 07/26/2000
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 07/25/2000
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2000
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 07/25/2000
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
ELMO COLLINS (NMSS)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
ELMO COLLINS (NMSS)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT
The following is taken from the report faxed to the NRC concerning a degradation of criticality controls:
EVENT DESCRIPTION
At approximately 1700 on 07/25/2000, six cans without moisture ok tags were discovered on the Erbia can conveyer storage system. Under guidance of the criticality safety engineer, the cans were moved and staged with proper spacing. The cans were than sampled and laboratory results confirmed that each can contained less than the 1.0 wt.% water limit for the conveyer storage. Thus, no unsafe condition existed.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: Medium significance, because most of the scrap generated in cans is unmoderated and confirmatory samples verified that the contents of each can were less than 1.0 wt.% water.
SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: N/A
STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The cans were moved and staged with appropriate spacing.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
Calculations demonstrate that a single row of cans will remain subcritical. Therefore, in order for a criticality to occur, the cans would have to contain moderated contents and additional cans would have to have been misplaced before a criticality would have been possible.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS:
Moderation is the primary controlled parameter. Each can stored on conveyer storage racks is required to contain less than 1.0 wt.% water.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSE MATERIAL:
The six cans contained approximately a total of 106.4 kg of U02 powder and scrap. The maximum enrichment was 4.95% U-235. The cans also contained erbium neutron absorber.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The cans are stored with proper spacing and meetings are planned for each shift to discuss the event and reemphasize criticality safety practices.
Notification of this report was made to NRC Inspector (Frank Gee) who was onsite at the time conducting inspection of the criticality controls.
The following is taken from the report faxed to the NRC concerning a degradation of criticality controls:
EVENT DESCRIPTION
At approximately 1700 on 07/25/2000, six cans without moisture ok tags were discovered on the Erbia can conveyer storage system. Under guidance of the criticality safety engineer, the cans were moved and staged with proper spacing. The cans were than sampled and laboratory results confirmed that each can contained less than the 1.0 wt.% water limit for the conveyer storage. Thus, no unsafe condition existed.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: Medium significance, because most of the scrap generated in cans is unmoderated and confirmatory samples verified that the contents of each can were less than 1.0 wt.% water.
SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: N/A
STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The cans were moved and staged with appropriate spacing.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
Calculations demonstrate that a single row of cans will remain subcritical. Therefore, in order for a criticality to occur, the cans would have to contain moderated contents and additional cans would have to have been misplaced before a criticality would have been possible.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS:
Moderation is the primary controlled parameter. Each can stored on conveyer storage racks is required to contain less than 1.0 wt.% water.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSE MATERIAL:
The six cans contained approximately a total of 106.4 kg of U02 powder and scrap. The maximum enrichment was 4.95% U-235. The cans also contained erbium neutron absorber.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The cans are stored with proper spacing and meetings are planned for each shift to discuss the event and reemphasize criticality safety practices.
Notification of this report was made to NRC Inspector (Frank Gee) who was onsite at the time conducting inspection of the criticality controls.