Event Notification Report for June 22, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/21/2000 - 06/22/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37051 37060 37098 37099 37100 37101
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37051 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/02/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:24[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 06/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:21[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM CHWALEK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD BARKLEY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO A FAULTY LEVEL |
| SWITCH - |
| |
| At 1721 on 06/02/00, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 received a Reactor Core |
| Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System high point vent low level annunciator alarm. |
| This alarm came in and cleared repeatedly. The licensee declared the RCIC |
| System inoperable but functional and entered Technical Specification 3.7.4 |
| which requires the RCIC System to be restored to operable status within 14 |
| days. The licensee closed the RCIC System turbine trip throttle valve, |
| #2ICS*MOV150 in accordance with the annunciator response procedure. The |
| licensee then performed the RCIC System fill and vent procedure |
| #N2-OSP-ICS-M001 satisfactorily with a solid stream of water being vented |
| and no evidence of air in the system. The high point vent low level |
| annunciator alarm remained in solid following the fill and vent procedure. |
| The licensee suspects that a faulty high point vent level switch is the |
| problem and prepared a Problem Identification to repair the switch. The |
| licensee has returned the RCIC System to available status (but still |
| inoperable) and is reviewing compensatory actions for the faulty level |
| switch to support the return of the RCIC System to operable status. |
| |
| This event has no effect on Unit 1 which is at 100% power. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1446 EDT ON 6/21/00 BY MATT WALDECKER TO FANGIE JONES * * |
| * |
| |
| "On June 2, 2000 at 1721 hours, the reactor core isolation cooling system |
| was declared inoperable when a high point vent level low annunciator alarmed |
| and cleared repeatedly. The reactor core isolation cooling trip throttle |
| valve was closed in accordance with the annunciator response procedure. |
| |
| "Subsequent review has determined that the high point vent level low |
| annunciator alarming and clearing repeatedly was due to a failed level |
| switch. Correct high point vent water level was verified utilizing an |
| approved operating procedure. 50.72(b)(2)(iii) and 50.73(a)(2)(v) reporting |
| criteria covers an event or condition where structures, components, or |
| trains of a safety system could have failed to perform their safety function |
| because of equipment failures. The failure of the high point level switch |
| does not constitute an event or condition which rendered the Reactor Core |
| Isolation Cooling System incapable of performing its safety function. In |
| addition, the level switch is only used to warn the operators of decreasing |
| water inventory in the reactor core isolation cooling discharge line. No |
| credit is taken for the level switch in any safety analyses and does not |
| directly control the removal of residual heat (the safety function) from the |
| Reactor Vessel. Therefore, this event is not reportable. |
| |
| "The operator action to close the reactor core isolation cooling trip |
| throttle valve in accordance with the annunciator response procedure does |
| not constitute an event or condition as discussed in the NUREG-1022. |
| Therefore, notification of this event is being retracted." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Robert Summers) |
| was notified. |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37060 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/06/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:02[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 06/06/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:36[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN VAN SICKEL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: |JOHN JACOBSON R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO LOSS OF WATER SEAL CAUSED |
| BY PIPE CORROSION |
| |
| "A 4 inch diameter floor drain outlet pipe inside the Standby Gas Treatment |
| Sump was identified by Operating personnel to be corroded through near the |
| wall of the sump. This piping is designed to act as a Secondary Containment |
| boundary which is used to form a loop seal between the Reactor Building and |
| the SBGT room. Normally, the piping would come out from the wall and make a |
| 90 degree turn to near the bottom of the sump, and open under water. |
| However, with the erosion occurring near the wall of the sump, a breech of |
| secondary containment exists. Due to the amount of corrosion, the opening |
| was estimated to be 12.57 square inches. Additionally, damaged seals on two |
| other doors (#225 and #128) located on airlocks associated with Secondary |
| Containment accounted for another 7 square inches, for a total of 19.57 |
| square inches. Openings in excess of 12.7 square inches in this |
| configuration have not been tested/evaluated. Therefore, Secondary |
| Containment was considered inoperable. Operations entered Technical |
| Specification LCO 3.6.4.1, condition A, for Secondary Containment inoperable |
| in Mode 1 at 0236[CDT]. Required action A.1 is to restore Secondary |
| Containment to operable status in 4 hours. |
| |
| "Operations took actions to prohibit access through the two seal damaged |
| doors/airlocks by posting them to prevent access. Once administrative |
| control of the doors was established, the known opening in secondary |
| containment was reduced to the corroded pipe in the SBGT sump, or 12.57 |
| square inches. This is less than the 12.7 square inches allowed. Technical |
| Specification LCO 3.6.4.1, condition A, was exited at 0258[CDT]." |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0903 ON 06/21/00 BY BOB NURRELL TO JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| Upon further engineering review, the licensee has determined that during |
| this event, secondary containment was operable based on the actual measured |
| opening size (2.25 square inches). Therefore, since secondary containment |
| was not inoperable, this event is not reportable under the specified |
| criterion and no other criteria apply and thus, the licensee desires to |
| retract this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Roger Lanksbury. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37098 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: ROBINSON REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/21/2000|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:08[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:57[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: AL GARROU |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 M/R Y 68 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FROM 68% POWER DUE TO UNISOLABLE EHC SYSTEM OIL LEAK |
| - |
| |
| At 0257 on 06/21/00, control room operators manually tripped the plant from |
| 68% power due to an unisolable electrohydraulic control (EHC) system oil |
| leak which caused main turbine control valve oscillations. Two control rod |
| bottom lights, shutdown bank 'A' and control bank 'C' did not illuminate; |
| however, the control rod position indications showed that all control rods |
| were fully inserted into the core. The auxiliary feedwater system |
| actuated, as expected. Steam is being dumped to the main condenser. The |
| plant is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). |
| |
| The licensee is repairing the oil leak and investigating the problem with |
| the control rod bottom lights. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37099 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: NC DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/21/2000|
|LICENSEE: APA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:28[EDT]|
| CITY: SILER CITY REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 06/20/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: NC |EVENT TIME: 15:10[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/21/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
| |BOB AYRES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LEE COX, NC DRP | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
|NDAM DAMAGED GAUGE/DEVICE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE RUN OVER BY A TRUCK - |
| |
| A truck owned by APA Construction Company backed over a Troxler Moisture |
| Density Gauge, Model #4640, Serial #1717, at State Road 1554, Siler City, |
| NC. The gauge sources, 8 millicuries Cs-137 and 40 millicuries Am-241-Be, |
| were not damaged and are in their shielded position. The gauge appeared to |
| be functioning properly. The licensee plans to send the gauge to Troxler |
| for inspection/repair. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 37100 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: DNX TRANSGENIC SCIENCES |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/21/2000|
|LICENSEE: DNX TRANSGENIC SCIENCES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:35[EDT]|
| CITY: CRANBURY REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 06/07/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: NJ |EVENT TIME: 11:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 29-30350-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/21/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |ROBERT SUMMERS R1 |
| |BOB AYRES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOE D'IPPOLITO, RSO | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - LOSS OF LICENSED MATERIAL - |
| |
| On 06/02/00, one vial of 500 �Ci of [alpha-32] deoxycytidine 5'-Triphosphate |
| (dCTP) was received at DNX Transgenic Sciences, Cranbury, NJ. The |
| concentration of the material was 10 �Ci/�l. Upon arrival, this vial was |
| designated as vial #153. At 1130 on 06/07/00, Roland Felkner, a DNX |
| Transgenic Sciences research associate, was planning to remove 50 �Ci of |
| material from this vial to do a DNA labeling experiment. However, he |
| discovered that there was no material in the vial. According to the isotope |
| inventory log of vial #153, there should have been 150 �Ci of the 500 �Ci |
| still available in the vial. Upon investigation, it was determined that 200 |
| �Ci, rather than 150 �Ci, was actually missing. This error is attributed to |
| a computational mistake made in the log by another research associate. |
| |
| Joe D'Ippolito, DNX Transgenic Sciences Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), |
| interviewed lab personnel, conducted a survey of the lab area and performed |
| an internal investigation to locate the missing material. There was no |
| indication of radiation exposure to lab personnel. Based on the results of |
| the investigation, the RSO and members of the DNX Transgenic Sciences |
| Radiation Safety Committee believe that less material had been sent in vial |
| #153 by their supplier, NEN Life Science Product, than was reported on the |
| vial label. |
| |
| The RSO is continuing his investigation and will determine corrective |
| actions. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37101 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/21/2000|
|LICENSEE: PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING & INSPECTION|NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:01[EDT]|
| CITY: PLANTATION REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 06/21/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: FL |EVENT TIME: 06:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 2113-1 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/21/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
| |BOB AYRES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHARLEY ADAMS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE OWNED BY |
| PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING & INSPECTION COMPANY, INC. (PEICO) LOCATED IN |
| PLANTATION, FLORIDA |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Florida |
| Bureau of Radiation Control about the theft of a Troxler Soil/Moisture |
| Density Gauge, Model #3440, Serial #13201, Isotope(s): Cs-137 (8.0 mCi); |
| Am-241:Be (40 mCi): |
| |
| "Licensee: Professional Engineering & Inspection Company, Inc. (PEICO) |
| |
| "Incident Location: 1385 S.W. 19th St., Miami, Florida 33145 |
| |
| "Incident Description: Licensee reported that a gauge was stolen from a |
| technician's home at approximately 6:30 am.. The technician had come to work |
| and noted that his first job was later in the morning, so he returned home |
| for breakfast. When he came out of his home he noticed that the container, |
| gauge and the securing cable and lock were missing. The keys were not |
| stolen. The Miami Police Department and the Florida Bureau of Radiation |
| Control are investigating. |
| |
| "Miami PD case #173-1159Z |
| |
| "Office: Environmental Radiation Control |
| |
| "Date: Time Investigated: 21-June-00; 0930" |
| |
| Call the NRC operations officer for contact information. |
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