Event Notification Report for June 22, 2000

- AUTO REACTOR SCRAM FROM 98% POWER CAUSED BY LOSS OF REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMP -

At 0728 CDT on 06/22/00, LaSalle Unit 2 experienced an automatic reactor scram from 98% power due to low reactor vessel water level (+12.5 inches, Level 3). Normal reactor vessel water level is +36 inches. The low reactor vessel water level was caused by a loss of the #2A turbine driven reactor feedwater pump for unknown reasons. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was -23 inches on the wide range recorders. All control rods inserted completely. Steam is being dumped to the main condenser. No emergency core cooling system actuations occurred or were required during the transient. All systems operated as designed with the exception of the Unit 2 station air compressor, which went into a surge condition. The air compressor has been secured and the Unit 0 station air compressor was started to pick up the additional load. Unit 2 is stable in Condition 3 (Hot Shutdown) with reactor vessel water level and pressure being maintained in their normal bands. The licensee is investigating the cause of the #2A reactor feedwater pump loss.

This event had no effect on Unit 1 which is at 100% power.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

THE LICENSEE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE REGARDING A FIRE IN A PLANT SUPPORT BUILDING:

"BURLINGTON, KS - A small, localized fire occurred early this afternoon at Wolf Creek Generating Station. The fire was contained in the welding area of a support building about 150 yards from where electricity is generated. The fire appears to have originated from an equipment malfunction.

No injuries were reported.

The plant's fire brigade responded and with assistance from the Coffey County Fire Department, quickly extinguished the fire. The fire was extinguished at about 1:41 p.m.

The equipment, a plasma-arc cutter, is used to cut metal such as stainless steel. Workers were cutting one and one-half inch stainless when the fire started.

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation operates Wolf Creek Generating Station near Burlington, Kan.
Wolf Creek is owned by Kansas City Power & Light Company; KGE, a Western Resources Company; and
Kansas Electric Power Cooperative, inc. The plant is in Coffey County, Kansas, about four miles northeast of
Burlington. The plant is 55 miles south of Topeka, 90 miles southwest of Kansas City, and 120 miles northeast
of Wichita."

The fire lasted for approximately 20 minutes (1321-1341 CDT) and the only damage was to the piece of equipment.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.

At 1100 hours on 06/22/00, it was determined by the Plant Shift Superintendent, Engineering, and Nuclear Regulatory Affairs that Criticality Accident Alarm System Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) required actions were not entered as required. The concern was whether a TSR Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) should be entered prior to performing Safety Analysis Review required horns and light testing.

All previous testing has correctly been accomplished under site operability procedures, even though no LCO actions were initiated due to taking credit for the nitrogen system. The issue was raised due to the fact that when the cascade strombos horns are sounding, the nitrogen horns could not be heard to meet required LCO requirements. Currently, all plant site Criticality Accident Alarm Systems are fully operable.

This condition is reportable to the NRC per 10CFR76.120(c) "Safety Equipment Failure/Actuation". The equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

The DOE Site Representative and NRC Resident Inspector were notified by the licensee..

THE PLANT ENTERED A 14 DAY LCO ACTION STATEMENT DUE TO HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE.

During routine surveillance testing of the Containment Cooling Water System (CCWS), required system flow through the HPCI Room Cooler could not be obtained due to leakage past 2-3999-252 check valve.

With the HPCI Room Cooler inoperable, the HPCI System was declared INOPERABLE, a 14 day LCO Action Statement was entered, and an action request for repair of the 2-3999-252 valve was submitted.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE AT 1917 ON 07/19/00 BY MARK RUNION TO JOLLIFFE * * *

Upon further review of this event by Dresden Operations and Engineering Department personnel, the licensee determined that with the HPCI Room Cooler blower available, even without CCWS flow to the HPCI Room Cooler, the HPCI System will perform its required function and remain operable. Thus, the HPCI System was not inoperable at the time of the notification of this event and therefore, this event is not reportable to the NRC. Based on this, the licensee desires to retract this event.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Mike Parker.

AT 1616 PDT ON 06/22/00, THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES AND THE SAN DIEGO DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH OF A SODIUM HYPOCHLORIDE LEAK.

At 0830 PDT on 06/22/00, a 3 to 5 gpm leak occurred from the Unit 2 sodium hypochloride storage tank. As a precaution, the licensee evacuated nonessential personnel from the area of the leak. The spilled liquid was fully contained by a berm around the tank. This event did not pose a threat to the nuclear power plant or hamper site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for safe plant operation. Even though there was no threat to control room personnel and plant conditions did not require it, at 1005 PDT, operators manually initiated Toxic Gas Isolation Signal (TGIS) as a precautionary measure in response to changing wind direction. (TGIS is designed to terminate the supply of outside air to the control room and initiate operation of the control room emergency HVAC system to minimize operator exposure.) All system components operated as expected.

The event was terminated at approximately 1145 PDT. There were no injuries.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed by the licensee.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT

"Date of event: June 22, 2000
"Location of Event: Rochester, NY

"During a device sales demonstration the potential customer happened to measure higher than expected dose rates on a MAP-4 series model FA4C2 portable x-ray fluorescence device. It was later determined that the source, 125 millicuries of Am-241, had fallen out of the source block but was still contained within the device, although unshielded. The device was shielded and subsequently returned to the manufacturer, EDAX, Inc. To compound matters, the device was being referred to as a model 'CT3000' by the sales demonstrator and the initial reporting of the incident by the state of New York was believed to concern the recently approved, but unrelated, CT5000 series devices. On June 28, 2000, the EDAX RSO responded to the state of Washington Department of Health that EDAX had manufactured four MAP-4 (FA4C2) devices for research and development with source blocks that had not been approved by the department for general production. One of the research devices had been mistakenly assembled with an experimental source block design that was previously rejected as unsatisfactory. This device was involved in the incident in New York State while being tested for effectiveness and market potential.

"EDAX has accounted for all its experimental source blocks and has removed the one faulty block from the device and marked it so that it can not be used in the future. The remaining R&D devices will be surveyed whenever used. Although this manufacturing error did not involve the production of devices intended for sale to licensees, staff from the Division of Radiation Protection will be reviewing the manufacturer's quality control process as well as model designation practices.

"What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? WAC 246-221-250; re: Equipment failure.

"Activity and isotope(s) involved: 125 mCi Am-241 source, serial number 7887LQ.

"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer code: EDAX, Inc., MAP-4 series model FA4C2 x-ray fluorescence device, serial number 1525."