Event Notification Report for June 5, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/02/2000 - 06/05/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36964 37046 37048 37049 37050 37051 37052 37053 37054 37055
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36964 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: GEOTECH ENVIRONMENTAL, INC |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2000|
|LICENSEE: GEOTECH ENVIRONMENTAL, INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:24[EDT]|
| CITY: MAPLE SHADE REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 05/03/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: NJ |EVENT TIME: 08:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 29-28286-02 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/02/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |NIEL DELLA GRECA R1 |
| |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CARL DINICOLANTONIO | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE |
| |
| On April 27, 2000, a technician was involved in an automobile accident in |
| Philadelphia, PA. At that time, the gauge was stored in the trunk of the |
| vehicle. When police arrived on the scene, the technician was arrested. |
| The technician informed the police that the gauge was in the trunk and |
| showed the gauge to the police officers. After the technician was |
| arrested, the vehicle was stolen. The vehicle was recovered on April 29, |
| 2000. The gauge was not in the trunk when the vehicle was recovered. The |
| device contained 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1402 ON 06/02/00 BY CLAIRE PANICO TO JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| The stolen Troxler moisture density gauge was found in a waste management |
| recycling facility in Philadelphia. The undamaged gauge has been returned |
| to Geotech Environmental, Inc. |
| |
| George Pangburn, NRC Region 1 has been notified. NRC Region 1 issued |
| PNO-I-00-013A. |
| |
| The NRC Operations Officer Notified R1DO Dick Barkley and NMSS EO Brian |
| Smith. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37046 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/31/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:04[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 05/31/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:30[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: COVEYOU |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GARY SHEAR R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 97 Power Operation |97 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT ENTERED A 7 DAY LCO DUE TO HPCS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE. |
| |
| While performing monthly surveillance start LOS-DG-M3, for the High-Pressure |
| Core Spray (HPCS) systems Emergency Diesel Generator, the Diesel |
| automatically tripped off on an over-speed signal. The Diesel was being |
| started from an idle condition while an operator was attempting to maintain |
| speed between 400 and 500 rpm. The Diesel does not appear to have been |
| damaged but remains shutdown and unavailable for on-going investigation of |
| the failure. The High-Pressure Core Spray system is inoperable but available |
| from normal power source only. The failure mechanism is being investigated |
| and corrective actions will be performed. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2211 ON 06/01/00 BY SHANE MARIK TO JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| |
| The licensee investigation has determined that the cause of the event was |
| due to operator overcompensation of the engine governor during the start |
| that resulted in the EDG accelerating to the overspeed setpoint and tripping |
| on overspeed. The operator performing the slow (idle) start in accordance |
| with the monthly Technical |
| Specification surveillance procedure was a trainee under supervision by a |
| qualified operator. The EDG was already inoperable for the performance of |
| the monthly surveillance test that verifies operability of the EDG to start |
| and carry full load for at least 60 minutes. During inspection, no |
| mechanical or electrical malfunctions were |
| found associated with governor settings, the start circuitry, the engine |
| fuel racks, or fuel injector linkages. The fuel rack and associated fuel |
| injector linkages were then verified to have freedom of movement without |
| binding. A subsequent fast start was performed (same as an automatic start) |
| that verified that the EDG did not have a malfunction that would cause it to |
| trip on overspeed. The EDG would have satisfied its intended safety |
| function when in standby (no operator interface is required for the |
| governor/fuel rack control. except for surveillance testing). Therefore, |
| the overspeed trip of the High Pressure Core Spray System EDG is not |
| reportable as a |
| condition that alone could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. |
| |
| Since the failure occurred after the EDG was inoperable due to not being |
| lined up for standby operation (removed from service as part of a planned |
| evolution in accordance with an approved procedure), the start was a slow |
| start controlled by an operator and restoration of the EDG was less than 12 |
| hours and well within the 14 day Technical Specification allowed outage |
| time. The licensee has determined that this event is not reportable to the |
| NRC, and desires to retract this event notification. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Jorgensen. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 37048 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: TRI STATE CONSULTANTS |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/02/2000|
|LICENSEE: TRI STATE CONSULTANTS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:26[EDT]|
| CITY: FLINT REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 06/01/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: MI |EVENT TIME: 14:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 37-19640-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/02/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| |SCOTT MOORE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+RICHARD BARKLEY R1 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAT DURKIN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|IBBF 30.50(b)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | |
|IBAE 30.50(b)(1)(iii) ACCESS DENIED OTHER | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SOURCE ASSEMBLY, CONTAINING 24 CURIES OF IRIDIUM-192, BECAME DETACHED FROM |
| ITS DRIVE ASSEMBLY |
| |
| While checking a radiographic exposure device manufactured by AEA |
| Technology, the source assembly became detached from its drive mechanism. |
| The licensee was checking the swage end, the locking mechanism, of the |
| exposure assemble when the assembly failed. The swage connection had a crack |
| and this caused the swage connection to fail, becoming detached. The |
| Assistant Radiation Safety Officer (ARSO) cleared the room and made several |
| trips into the room to place lead shielding over the source assembly. After |
| the source assembly was covered with lead, the ARSO took radiation surveys |
| around the room to make sure radiation levels were within acceptable limits. |
| The ARSO spent the night guarding the entrance to the room to prevent anyone |
| from entering. AEA Technology was notified of this event on 06/01/00 and |
| they are sending a retrieval team out on 06/02/00 to retrieve the source. |
| The source model number is 424-9. |
| |
| The ARSO was the only one to be exposed and he received 78 millirems as |
| indicated by his pocket dosimeter. |
| |
| The source, Iridium-192, was originally manufactured on 12/17/99 with a |
| strength of 114.5 curies. The present strength of the Iridium-192 source is |
| 24 curies (half life of Iridium-192 is 74.2 days). |
| |
| Tri State Consultants' main office is located in Pittsburgh, PA. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37049 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALLAWAY REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/02/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:57[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:15[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAT McKENNA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GARY SANBORN R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii) DEGRAD COND DURING OP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE INOPERABLE DUE TO INCOMPLETE PLANT |
| MODIFICATION |
| |
| At 0415 CDT on 06/02/00, I&C technicians began to perform tech spec |
| surveillance test #ISF-SB-OA30A to test the operability of 'A' train steam |
| line isolation valve slave relay #K-634. In establishing the initial |
| conditions at step 4.2 of the test procedure, solid state protection system |
| white light #26 was not illuminated as required by the procedure. The |
| procedure was exited at that time and the control room crew was informed of |
| the finding. |
| |
| The control room crew replaced the light bulb and the light still did not |
| illuminate. Another light bulb, known to be good, was then installed in the |
| light socket. The light still did not illuminate. The Shift Supervisor |
| contacted the System Engineer at approximately 0530 CDT when the engineer |
| arrived onsite, and requested that the engineer investigate what the white |
| light indicated when the light was not illuminated. |
| |
| After review of the system schematics, the engineer found that there was the |
| possibility of outside containment isolation valve #EGHV-0061 being |
| INOPERABLE if relay #K-802 did not function properly. (Reference electrical |
| drawing #E-23EG09A.) This situation was reported to the control room crew. |
| |
| The Shift Supervisor declared valve #EGHV-0061 INOPERABLE using the time of |
| discovery at 0415 CDT and closed the valve and deenergized power to the |
| valve per Tech Spec action statement 3.6.3.A at 0800 CDT. Equipment out of |
| service log entry #7986 was made. |
| |
| I&C technicians were dispatched to support troubleshooting efforts. After |
| some initial troubleshooting, some results did not agree with the drawing. |
| The engineer noted the drawing showed that the circuitry had recently been |
| changed by Plant Modification #CMP 98-1020. The drawing had been updated on |
| 04/07/00. |
| |
| The engineer called the Construction Supervisor of the plant modification |
| installation. The supervisor reviewed the modification package and found a |
| connection between a terminal block at the motor control center for valve |
| #EGHV-0061 and the solid state protection system cabinet #SB030A had not |
| been performed. This made containment isolation valve #EGHV-0061 INOPERABLE |
| because it would not close on a phase B containment isolation signal. The |
| control room crew was notified of this finding. This finding meant that the |
| valve had been INOPERABLE since the installation of the plant modification |
| on 04/06/00. |
| |
| The Construction Supervisor initiated field change notice #FCN-11 to plant |
| modification package #MP 98-1020 and initiated work document #W657017 to |
| correct the circuitry wiring. Retest documents #R657017A and #R6S70173 was |
| also initiated for post maintenance testing of the circuit. |
| |
| The licensee determined that this event was reportable to the NRC at 1030 |
| CDT. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37050 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: KANSAS DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/02/2000|
|LICENSEE: ALLEN COUNTY HOSPITAL, IOLA, KS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:31[EDT]|
| CITY: IOLA REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 06/01/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: KS |EVENT TIME: 16:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: 19-B366-01 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/02/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GARY SANBORN R4 |
| |SCOTT MOORE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM CONLEY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
|LADM 35.33(a) MED MISADMINISTRATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| I-131 OVERDOSE - MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION/AGREEMENT STATE EVENT - |
| |
| A female patient at Allen County Hospital, Iola, KS, was given 100 |
| microcuries of I-131 for an thyroid uptake measurement during a diagnostic |
| study instead of the prescribed 50 microcuries. The cause of this medical |
| misadministration event was due to the hospital hot lab delivering two |
| capsules of 50 microcuries each; one to be given to the patient and the |
| other to be used as a standard. The patient was mistakenly given both |
| capsules. This overdose poses no adverse medical effects to the patient. |
| The patient's doctor has been informed. The doctor plans to inform the |
| patient. The hospital is determining corrective actions. |
| (KS Case #KS-00-0011). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37051 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/02/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:24[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 06/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:21[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM CHWALEK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD BARKLEY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO A FAULTY LEVEL |
| SWITCH - |
| |
| At 1721 on 06/02/00, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 received a Reactor Core |
| Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System high point vent low level annunciator alarm. |
| This alarm came in and cleared repeatedly. The licensee declared the RCIC |
| System inoperable but functional and entered Technical Specification 3.7.4 |
| which requires the RCIC System to be restored to operable status within 14 |
| days. The licensee closed the RCIC System turbine trip throttle valve, |
| #2ICS*MOV150 in accordance with the annunciator response procedure. The |
| licensee then performed the RCIC System fill and vent procedure |
| #N2-OSP-ICS-M001 satisfactorily with a solid stream of water being vented |
| and no evidence of air in the system. The high point vent low level |
| annunciator alarm remained in solid following the fill and vent procedure. |
| The licensee suspects that a faulty high point vent level switch is the |
| problem and prepared a Problem Identification to repair the switch. The |
| licensee has returned the RCIC System to available status (but still |
| inoperable) and is reviewing compensatory actions for the faulty level |
| switch to support the return of the RCIC System to operable status. |
| |
| This event has no effect on Unit 1 which is at 100% power. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37052 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/03/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:44[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 06/02/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:30[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/03/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |TONY VEGEL R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |TED SHERR NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK LARSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL LOSS OF CRITICALITY |
| CONTROL IN SHUTDOWN CELLS |
| |
| "On 6/2/00 the Plant Shift superintendent was notified of a potential NCSA |
| noncompliance. NCSAs 326_013, NCSA 330_004, and NCSA 333_015 require that |
| cells that are shutdown and at a UF6 negative be buffered with dry air or |
| nitrogen to maintain moderation control as part of double contingency. For |
| cells that have less than a safe mass, procedure guidance allows the cell to |
| be maintained less than atmospheric pressure, when not at a UF6 negative. |
| Various leaks (either from the dry air system or from wet atmospheric air) |
| can enter the cell allowing pressure to increase. This pressure must then be |
| evacuated to maintain the cell less than atmospheric pressure. Repeated |
| cycles of 'leak up' and evacuation will eventually achieve a UF6 negative |
| unknown to operators since there are no periodic sampling requirements. The |
| NCS requirement to buffer a cell within eight hours of achieving a UF6 |
| negative may then be violated because the state of a UF6 negative is not |
| known. |
| |
| "Presently all cells that are shutdown that have less than a safe mass in |
| them are at a UF6 negative, and there is currently no violation of this |
| moderation control. However, it cannot be guaranteed that this control was |
| not violated during past operations, and is being reported as a loss of one |
| control. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "The safety significance of this event is low. Only affected cells that when |
| shutdown have less than a safe mass of material in them. Failure to |
| establish or maintain the buffer as required could result in wet air |
| entering a shutdown cell. This would moderate a UO2F2 deposit due to the |
| hygroscopic properties of UO2F2. If this unbuffered condition were permitted |
| to continue for longer periods, the H/U of the deposit could eventually |
| reach a maximum of 4 (the maximum H/U ratio of a deposit exposed to ambient |
| cascade building air is 4). However, due to being less than a safe mass, a |
| criticality could not occur. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| "For a criticality to occur the mass of the deposit would have to be greater |
| than a safe mass, moderation level would have to reach an H/U ratio of 4, |
| the deposit would have to be reflected. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| "The controlled parameters for this event are mass and moderation. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| "The highest possible enrichment for event is 20% and the material will be |
| at or below a safe mass. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| "The failure in this case is the implementation of the control on |
| moderation. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| [Not specified]." |
| |
| Department Operating Instructions (DOIs) have been issued pending procedural |
| revisions to address this deficiency. The NRC Resident Inspector and DOE |
| Site Representative have been informed. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37053 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/04/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:28[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:12[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE CICCONE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/04/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD BARKLEY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A/R Y 65 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED A REACTOR TRIP ON TURBINE TRIP DURING SURVEILLANCE |
| TESTING OF THE TURBINE |
| |
| AT 0128 EDT ON 6/4/00 WHILE PERFORMING TURBINE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE 2651T, |
| "POWER LOAD UNBALANCED PUSH-TO-TEST", THE TURBINE TRIPPED UNEXPECTEDLY |
| CAUSING A REACTOR TRIP. ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED. ALL SYSTEMS |
| FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED. THE MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM AND MAIN CONDENSER REMAIN |
| IN SERVICE FOR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL . NO PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SAFETIES/PORVs |
| LIFTED DURING THE TRANSIENT. ELECTRICAL LOADS TRANSFERRED TO THE RSST |
| TRANSFORMER WITH ALL EDGs AVAILABLE IF NEEDED. THERE IS NO SAFETY EQUIPMENT |
| OUT OF SERVICE AT THIS TIME. THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT |
| INSPECTOR AND BOTH STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES. A PRESS RELEASE IS |
| ANTICIPATED. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37054 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/04/2000|
| UNIT: [] [3] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:42[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 05:54[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARIE GILLMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/04/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD BARKLEY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|3 A/R Y 22 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 3 EXPERIENCED A REACTOR TRIP ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL |
| FOLLOWING A TURBINE TRIP |
| |
| "[A] plant startup [was] in progress. [The] main turbine generator [was] |
| tied to [the] grid at 0452 [EDT]. Power was being raised to 30% power. |
| |
| "At 22% reactor power while feeding steam generators via manual control of |
| [the] feedwater regulatory valves, '33' Steam Generator level reached a high |
| level trip point and tripped the turbine. The subsequent shrink in steam |
| generator '31' levels resulted in a reactor trip at 0554 [EDT]. |
| |
| "All plant equipment functioned as required, no malfunctions noted at this |
| time. [A] post trip review [is] in progress. ESF Actuation; '31' and '33' |
| auxiliary feed pump[s] started." |
| |
| All rods fully inserted following the trip. There is no safety equipment |
| out of service at this time. Offsite power is supplying electrical loads. |
| The auxiliary feed pumps and main condenser are removing decay heat. |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to issue a press |
| release. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37055 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/04/2000|
| UNIT: [] [3] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:45[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RON CARPINO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/04/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD BARKLEY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|3 N N 0 Startup |0 Startup |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NY STATE DEC TO BE NOTIFIED OF 5 - 15 GALLONS LUBE OIL SPILL INTO PLANT |
| DISCHARGE CANAL - |
| |
| At 1515 on 06/04/00, the licensee notified the DOT National Response Center |
| and plans to notify the NY State Department of Environmental Conservation |
| (DEC), local officials, and the NRC Resident Inspector that 5 to 15 gallons |
| of lube oil had overflowed from the plant oil collection system into the |
| plant discharge canal which drains into the Hudson River. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021