Event Notification Report for May 26, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/25/2000 - 05/26/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
3704337044370393704037036370373703841619
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37043
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NICK LIZZO
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NICK LIZZO
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 05/30/2000
Notification Time: 09:07 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 14:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2000
Notification Time: 09:07 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 14:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MAY 26, 2000, DISCOVERY OF A VIOLATION OF ELECTRICAL SEPARATION CRITERIA (DETERMINED TO BE REPORTABLE ON MAY 30, 2000 AT 0835)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At approximately 0835 hours on May 30, 2000, operations [personnel] determined that plant cable separation criteria had been violated placing the plant outside the design basis. A cable routed from a Channel 'C' instrument bus had been retired in place by terminating the cable from the equipment it was routed to, taping the cable end, and placing the rolled cable in a cable tray. The rolled cable, still power by the instrument bus, was placed in a Channel 'B' cable tray. This resulted in a condition outside the plant's design basis since channel electrical separation criteria is defined by the [Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)]. The event was originally identified on May 26, 2000, at approximately 1442 hours, but [it was] not recognized as reportable at the time. Corrective action was taken when the event was identified by removing the Channel 'C' cable from the Channel 'B' cable tray."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At approximately 0835 hours on May 30, 2000, operations [personnel] determined that plant cable separation criteria had been violated placing the plant outside the design basis. A cable routed from a Channel 'C' instrument bus had been retired in place by terminating the cable from the equipment it was routed to, taping the cable end, and placing the rolled cable in a cable tray. The rolled cable, still power by the instrument bus, was placed in a Channel 'B' cable tray. This resulted in a condition outside the plant's design basis since channel electrical separation criteria is defined by the [Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)]. The event was originally identified on May 26, 2000, at approximately 1442 hours, but [it was] not recognized as reportable at the time. Corrective action was taken when the event was identified by removing the Channel 'C' cable from the Channel 'B' cable tray."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37044
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: SPRINGSTEAD ENGINEERING, INC., d/b/a CENTRAL TESTING LAB
Region: 2
City: FLORAL CITY State: FL
County:
License #: 1347-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLEY E. ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: SPRINGSTEAD ENGINEERING, INC., d/b/a CENTRAL TESTING LAB
Region: 2
City: FLORAL CITY State: FL
County:
License #: 1347-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLEY E. ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 05/30/2000
Notification Time: 10:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2000
Notification Time: 10:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
EDWARD MCALPINE (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
EDWARD MCALPINE (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE OWNED BY SPRINGSTEAD ENGINEERING, INC., d/b/a CENTRAL TESTING LABORATORY LOCATED IN FLORAL CITY, FLORIDA
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control:
"Licensee: Springstead Engineering, Inc., d/b/a Central Testing Laboratory"
"City, State, and Zip Code: Floral City, FL 34436"
"Isotope(s): Cs-137; Am-241:Be"
"Activity(s): 6.0, 39.2 mCi, respectively"
"Material Form; Chemical Form; Physical Form: By-product: Special Form"
"Probable Disposition of Material: Transferred to Another Licensee"
"Exposure? No"
"Number: N/A"
"Type of Individual(s): N/A"
"Exposure Source: N/A"
"Dose Delivered to: N/A"
"Maximum Dose Received: N/A"
"Incident Category: Equipment Problems (Licensed Material)"
"Incident Location: Intersection of CR 226 and US 27, just west of I-75 exit 70"
"Incident Description: While gauge was in use (calibration position, with sources retracted), a front loader ran over the gauge. The housing and case were destroyed, but the lead case around the source was intact with the source retracted. The licensee asked for assistance in surveying the area, the loader, and the source housing. Survey of the area and the front loader were background. Wipes of the source housing were background. Troxler has been notified and will pick up the gauge for repair. Cause of the accident was front loader driver inattention."
"Device Type (Quantity): Soil/Moisture Density Gauge (1)"
"Manufacturer: Troxler"
"Model Number: 3440"
"Serial Number: 14821"
"Emergency Groups at Scene: None"
"Organizations Notified: NRC"
"Media Contacted: None"
"Investigator's Name; Title: Reno Fabii, Environmental Specialist II"
"Office: Environmental Radiation Control"
"Date; Time Investigated: 26-May-00; 1115"
Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control:
"Licensee: Springstead Engineering, Inc., d/b/a Central Testing Laboratory"
"City, State, and Zip Code: Floral City, FL 34436"
"Isotope(s): Cs-137; Am-241:Be"
"Activity(s): 6.0, 39.2 mCi, respectively"
"Material Form; Chemical Form; Physical Form: By-product: Special Form"
"Probable Disposition of Material: Transferred to Another Licensee"
"Exposure? No"
"Number: N/A"
"Type of Individual(s): N/A"
"Exposure Source: N/A"
"Dose Delivered to: N/A"
"Maximum Dose Received: N/A"
"Incident Category: Equipment Problems (Licensed Material)"
"Incident Location: Intersection of CR 226 and US 27, just west of I-75 exit 70"
"Incident Description: While gauge was in use (calibration position, with sources retracted), a front loader ran over the gauge. The housing and case were destroyed, but the lead case around the source was intact with the source retracted. The licensee asked for assistance in surveying the area, the loader, and the source housing. Survey of the area and the front loader were background. Wipes of the source housing were background. Troxler has been notified and will pick up the gauge for repair. Cause of the accident was front loader driver inattention."
"Device Type (Quantity): Soil/Moisture Density Gauge (1)"
"Manufacturer: Troxler"
"Model Number: 3440"
"Serial Number: 14821"
"Emergency Groups at Scene: None"
"Organizations Notified: NRC"
"Media Contacted: None"
"Investigator's Name; Title: Reno Fabii, Environmental Specialist II"
"Office: Environmental Radiation Control"
"Date; Time Investigated: 26-May-00; 1115"
Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 37039
Rep Org: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES
Licensee: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES
Region: 4
City: CRAWFORD State: NE
County:
License #: SUA-1534
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RHONDA GRANTHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES
Region: 4
City: CRAWFORD State: NE
County:
License #: SUA-1534
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RHONDA GRANTHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/26/2000
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2000
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
SULFATE AND CHLORIDE LIMITS EXCEEDED
The licensee reported that their confirmatory samples that they received back today confirmed that monitor Well # SM 613 exceeded its sulfate limit and monitor Well # SM 628 exceeded its sulfate and chloride limits. The licensee has not started mining the site.
Both the initial and confirmatory samples taken for monitor Well # SM 613 showed a sulfate level of 25ppm. The multiple limit for sulfate is 18 ppm and the single limit for sulfates is 21 ppm.
Monitor Well # SM 628 initial sample indicated a chloride level of 7.7 ppm and the confirmatory sample indicated a chloride level of 7.3 ppm. The multiple parameter limit for chlorides is 7.0 ppm and the multiple parameter limit is 7.3 ppm. Initial sulfate sample indicated a sulfate level of 46 ppm and the confirmatory sulfate sample indicated a sulfate level of 43 ppm. The multiple parameter limit for sulfates is 33 ppm and the single parameter limit for sulfates is 39 ppm.
Initial samples were taken on 05/25/00 and the confirmatory samples were taken on 05/26/00. The licensee thinks that the base line water quality is very clean and that they are seeing natural variations of the water.
The licensee reported that their confirmatory samples that they received back today confirmed that monitor Well # SM 613 exceeded its sulfate limit and monitor Well # SM 628 exceeded its sulfate and chloride limits. The licensee has not started mining the site.
Both the initial and confirmatory samples taken for monitor Well # SM 613 showed a sulfate level of 25ppm. The multiple limit for sulfate is 18 ppm and the single limit for sulfates is 21 ppm.
Monitor Well # SM 628 initial sample indicated a chloride level of 7.7 ppm and the confirmatory sample indicated a chloride level of 7.3 ppm. The multiple parameter limit for chlorides is 7.0 ppm and the multiple parameter limit is 7.3 ppm. Initial sulfate sample indicated a sulfate level of 46 ppm and the confirmatory sulfate sample indicated a sulfate level of 43 ppm. The multiple parameter limit for sulfates is 33 ppm and the single parameter limit for sulfates is 39 ppm.
Initial samples were taken on 05/25/00 and the confirmatory samples were taken on 05/26/00. The licensee thinks that the base line water quality is very clean and that they are seeing natural variations of the water.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37040
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM WEBB
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM WEBB
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/26/2000
Notification Time: 18:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 16:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2000
Notification Time: 18:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 16:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii) - DEGRAD COND DURING OP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii) - DEGRAD COND DURING OP
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) HEAT EXCHANGER (HX) TO SAFETY INJECTION (SI) PUMP MOTOR VALVES DO NOT MEET THEIR DESIGN BASIS.
At 1610 on May 26,2000 it was determined that the as built condition of the plant did not meet its design basis. The condition involves the RHR HX to SI (low head injection) pump motor valves. These valves are interlocked with a pressure signal from the RHR system. The signal that allows these valves to open, was found not to meet the requirement of IEEE 279. The pressure signal prevents the valves from opening when RHR pressure is greater than the design pressure of the SI suction piping. This permissive was designed to prevent the valves from being inadvertently opened when RHR is in its cooldown line up. Its only function when the RHR system is in its at power line up is to not malfunction and thus allowing the valves to open.
Original documentation from the plant construction and discussions with Westinghouse, the NSSS vendor, indicates that the original design intent was that this interlock did not need to meet IEEE 279. This was based on the assumption that local manual action could be taken if the interlock malfunctioned. However the USAR does not reflect this design philosophy. The USAR appears to assume the valves can be positioned from the control room and that no local manual action is required.
A temporary change has been initiated to defeat the interlock while the plant is at power. This will ensure the plant meets its design basis.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
At 1610 on May 26,2000 it was determined that the as built condition of the plant did not meet its design basis. The condition involves the RHR HX to SI (low head injection) pump motor valves. These valves are interlocked with a pressure signal from the RHR system. The signal that allows these valves to open, was found not to meet the requirement of IEEE 279. The pressure signal prevents the valves from opening when RHR pressure is greater than the design pressure of the SI suction piping. This permissive was designed to prevent the valves from being inadvertently opened when RHR is in its cooldown line up. Its only function when the RHR system is in its at power line up is to not malfunction and thus allowing the valves to open.
Original documentation from the plant construction and discussions with Westinghouse, the NSSS vendor, indicates that the original design intent was that this interlock did not need to meet IEEE 279. This was based on the assumption that local manual action could be taken if the interlock malfunctioned. However the USAR does not reflect this design philosophy. The USAR appears to assume the valves can be positioned from the control room and that no local manual action is required.
A temporary change has been initiated to defeat the interlock while the plant is at power. This will ensure the plant meets its design basis.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37036
Rep Org: HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL
Licensee: NAC INTERNATIONAL
Region: 1
City: MARLTON State: NJ
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN GUTHERMAN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: NAC INTERNATIONAL
Region: 1
City: MARLTON State: NJ
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN GUTHERMAN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 05/26/2000
Notification Time: 10:59 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2000
Notification Time: 10:59 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
DAN HOLODY (R1)
VERN HODGE (FAX) (NRR)
KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX) (NMSS)
DAN HOLODY (R1)
VERN HODGE (FAX) (NRR)
KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX) (NMSS)
10 CFR PART 21 REPORT
An audit of the company's Holtite-A shielding material test qualification and manufacturing program identified that a 10 CFR 21 report was not made in the wake of the company's discovery of defective neutron shielding material supplied under a safety significant procurement. The material, NS-4-FR, used for dry cask storage use contained internal voids where solid material was expected. The problem is lack of specific installation procedure to eliminate voids in the poured samples. The samples were still considered suitable for use in thermal stability testing. However, the samples failed and together with the voids was considered unsuitable for use. The firm supplying the basic component was NAC International of Norcross, GA. The problem was originally noted in April 1998. NAC was not informed, in part because Holtec was not aware of any installation in any cask with significant heat loads. Holtec has no information on actual usage or locations of use as they are not the supplier of the hardware with the potential defect.
Holtec has no NAC supplied NS-4-FR in any cask system supplied to its customers.
An audit of the company's Holtite-A shielding material test qualification and manufacturing program identified that a 10 CFR 21 report was not made in the wake of the company's discovery of defective neutron shielding material supplied under a safety significant procurement. The material, NS-4-FR, used for dry cask storage use contained internal voids where solid material was expected. The problem is lack of specific installation procedure to eliminate voids in the poured samples. The samples were still considered suitable for use in thermal stability testing. However, the samples failed and together with the voids was considered unsuitable for use. The firm supplying the basic component was NAC International of Norcross, GA. The problem was originally noted in April 1998. NAC was not informed, in part because Holtec was not aware of any installation in any cask with significant heat loads. Holtec has no information on actual usage or locations of use as they are not the supplier of the hardware with the potential defect.
Holtec has no NAC supplied NS-4-FR in any cask system supplied to its customers.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37037
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: GLEN HUTTON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: GLEN HUTTON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 05/26/2000
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2000
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
DAN HOLODY (R1)
DAN HOLODY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
"B" CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
The 'B' control room HVAC system has been determined to be outside design basis per Generic Letter 91-18. There is a non-conforming condition in the system. There is reasonable expectation that the HVAC system is Operable, due to a new methodology, Acron 96, expected results indicate that the HVAC system would be within the design basis. Some of the assumptions made in the original calculations, when the system was installed, were determined to be incorrect.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The 'B' control room HVAC system has been determined to be outside design basis per Generic Letter 91-18. There is a non-conforming condition in the system. There is reasonable expectation that the HVAC system is Operable, due to a new methodology, Acron 96, expected results indicate that the HVAC system would be within the design basis. Some of the assumptions made in the original calculations, when the system was installed, were determined to be incorrect.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Transportation Event
Event Number: 37038
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD CONTROL
Licensee: FRANK W. HAKE & ASSOCOATES, INC.
Region: 2
City: MEMPHIS State: TN
County:
License #: R-79171
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHAWN DRAKE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: FRANK W. HAKE & ASSOCOATES, INC.
Region: 2
City: MEMPHIS State: TN
County:
License #: R-79171
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHAWN DRAKE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/26/2000
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2000
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
300 MILLIREM/HR SPOT FOUND ON A B-25 CONTAINER.
On 05/26/00, the Radiation Safety Officer at Frank W. Hake & Associates notified the Memphis field office of the Division of Radiological Health of a transportation event. The licensee received a shipment from GTS Duratek in Oak Ridge, TN. One of the B-25 containers had a hot spot on the bottom of the container that exceeded the limits in 49CFR173.441 for an uncovered conveyance. The licensee offloaded the shipment to investigate.
This event dose does not pose a risk to public health and safety.
The State of Tennessee event report ID number for this event is TN-00-088.
On 05/26/00, the Radiation Safety Officer at Frank W. Hake & Associates notified the Memphis field office of the Division of Radiological Health of a transportation event. The licensee received a shipment from GTS Duratek in Oak Ridge, TN. One of the B-25 containers had a hot spot on the bottom of the container that exceeded the limits in 49CFR173.441 for an uncovered conveyance. The licensee offloaded the shipment to investigate.
This event dose does not pose a risk to public health and safety.
The State of Tennessee event report ID number for this event is TN-00-088.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41619
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: KING COUNTY WASHINGTON
Region: 4
City: Seattle State: WA
County: King
License #: WN-R0593
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: KING COUNTY WASHINGTON
Region: 4
City: Seattle State: WA
County: King
License #: WN-R0593
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/21/2005
Notification Time: 11:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2005
Notification Time: 11:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
RICH CARREIA (NMSS)
CANADA EPC (EMAIL)
TROY PRUETT (R4)
RICH CARREIA (NMSS)
CANADA EPC (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE - LOST KAY-RAY/SENSALL MOISTURE ANALYZER
The following information was received from the Washington State via E-mail:
"Location of Event: The former Pendleton Flour Mills / Fisher Flour Mills site (located on Harbor Island, at 13th Avenue Southwest and Klickitat Avenue Southwest, Seattle, Washington).
"This is to report a missing [Generally Licensed] GL radioactive material device and its radioactive source (one Kay-Ray/Sensall moisture analyzer, device model 7062P, housing serial number 9954, source serial number 9310V, containing 50 millicuries cesium-137 (as of May 31, 1979). The last known location of the device / radioactive source is the former Pendleton Flour Mills / Fisher Flour Mills site (located on Harbor Island, at 13th Avenue Southwest and Klickitat Avenue Southwest, Seattle, Washington). Presumed missing after May 26, 2000 (date of last apparently reliable inventory confirmation from Fisher).
"The apparent cause is loss of physical control of general license material during sale of mill site; or possibly inadequate documentation of proper disposal / transfer of the device / radioactive source. Since 1979 the device / radioactive source was reportedly located at that site. Washington State sales records indicate that Pendleton bought the mill site from Fisher on April 24, 2001, and that King County bought the mill site from Pendleton on July 28, 2003. [Office of Radiation Protection] ORP discovered the discrepancy during GL registration for material indicated to be on site. After an extensive investigation, ORP can not determine the status of the material.
"Corrective Actions:
Pendleton and Fisher replied to ORP March 18, 2005, notice of noncompliance letter for potential loss of control of the device. The replies were unacceptable since they are inconsistent and do not confirm the location of the material. Fisher reported they transferred said device / source to Pendleton; and Pendleton reported that Fisher removed said device / source). The ORP April 18, 2005, noncompliance letter directs Pendleton and Fisher to jointly conduct a thorough and exhaustive physical search of the entire mill site, since both still have spaces there, and for Pendleton and Fisher to perform additional interviews of current and former company employees who may know more about the status of the device. Pendleton and Fisher must cooperate with ORP to provide ORP with a written and acceptable reply identifying the disposition of the missing device.
"Event Number WA-05-014, missing Generally Licensed (GL) device."
The following information was received from the Washington State via E-mail:
"Location of Event: The former Pendleton Flour Mills / Fisher Flour Mills site (located on Harbor Island, at 13th Avenue Southwest and Klickitat Avenue Southwest, Seattle, Washington).
"This is to report a missing [Generally Licensed] GL radioactive material device and its radioactive source (one Kay-Ray/Sensall moisture analyzer, device model 7062P, housing serial number 9954, source serial number 9310V, containing 50 millicuries cesium-137 (as of May 31, 1979). The last known location of the device / radioactive source is the former Pendleton Flour Mills / Fisher Flour Mills site (located on Harbor Island, at 13th Avenue Southwest and Klickitat Avenue Southwest, Seattle, Washington). Presumed missing after May 26, 2000 (date of last apparently reliable inventory confirmation from Fisher).
"The apparent cause is loss of physical control of general license material during sale of mill site; or possibly inadequate documentation of proper disposal / transfer of the device / radioactive source. Since 1979 the device / radioactive source was reportedly located at that site. Washington State sales records indicate that Pendleton bought the mill site from Fisher on April 24, 2001, and that King County bought the mill site from Pendleton on July 28, 2003. [Office of Radiation Protection] ORP discovered the discrepancy during GL registration for material indicated to be on site. After an extensive investigation, ORP can not determine the status of the material.
"Corrective Actions:
Pendleton and Fisher replied to ORP March 18, 2005, notice of noncompliance letter for potential loss of control of the device. The replies were unacceptable since they are inconsistent and do not confirm the location of the material. Fisher reported they transferred said device / source to Pendleton; and Pendleton reported that Fisher removed said device / source). The ORP April 18, 2005, noncompliance letter directs Pendleton and Fisher to jointly conduct a thorough and exhaustive physical search of the entire mill site, since both still have spaces there, and for Pendleton and Fisher to perform additional interviews of current and former company employees who may know more about the status of the device. Pendleton and Fisher must cooperate with ORP to provide ORP with a written and acceptable reply identifying the disposition of the missing device.
"Event Number WA-05-014, missing Generally Licensed (GL) device."