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Event Notification Report for May 5, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           05/04/2000 - 05/05/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36967  36969  36970  36971  36972  36973  36974  36975  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36967       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:27[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        05/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TONY PETRELLI                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |NIEL DELLA GRECA     R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A)   PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |96       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 TECH SPEC REQD SHUTDOWN DUE TO 2 CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVES FAILING     |
| THEIR LLRT-                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is shutting Unit 2 down from 100% power in accordance with Tech |
| Spec 3.6.3.A, 12 Hour Shutdown LCO, due to containment purge valves          |
| #CPS*AOV-104 & 106 failing their local leak rate test #N2-ISP-CPS-Q001.      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * *UPDATE ON 05/04/00 AT 0002 ET BY M. ERON TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| Licensee exited Technical Specification 3.6.3.A at 2350 ET after manual      |
| Containment Purge Supply valve, 2CPS-V6, an upstream valve to #CPS*AOV-104 & |
| 106 was leak tested and verified closed. Lowest reactor power level reached  |
| was 92%.  R1DO (Della Greca) notified.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36969       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/04/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:46[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/03/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        08:00[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/04/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOSEPHINE PICCONE    NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SISLER                       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL FOR ACCUMULATION OF SLUDGE CONTAINING HEAVY METALS ON/IN THE LID   |
| OF TUB                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 hour notification                                      |
|                                                                              |
| On 5/3/00 at 0800 hours it was discovered that a NCSA-0705_027.A003 control  |
| was not in place. The sludge tub used for accumulating heavy metal           |
| (including uranium) sludge had an unsafe/unfavorable geometry molded into    |
| the design. The unfavorable dimensions created by the raised lip is 7.75" by |
| 37" by 2". This could have resulted in the potential accumulation, of an     |
| unsafe volume on the sludge tub lid had a leak developed In a nearby system  |
| containing uranium-bearing solution.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| NCSA-705_027.A003 requirement #17 states "Geometrically unfavorable          |
| containers shall not be left uncovered while unattended in the heavy metals  |
| precipitation process area or on the mezzanine in the area of the heavy      |
| metals precipitation raffinate storage (HMPRS)". This was a loss of one      |
| control (geometry/volume) in the double contingency principle for the afore  |
| mentioned NCSA. The second control (physical integrity of nearby             |
| uranium-bearing systems) was maintained throughout the event.                |
|                                                                              |
| At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS), the requirements   |
| for the NCS anomalous condition were initiated. At 1015 hours compliance was |
| regained by covering the molded design                                       |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| On May 3, 2000, it was discovered that the sludge tub used for accumulating  |
| sludge containing heavy metals (including uranium) contains an accumulation  |
| point on/in the lid. That accumulation point is created by a raised lip and  |
| has unfavorable geometric dimensions (7.75" by 37" by 2"). This is a         |
| violation of NCSA-0705_027 and NCSA-0705_076. This could have resulted in    |
| the potential accumulation of an unsafe volume of solution on/in the sludge  |
| tub lid had a leak developed in a nearby system which contain                |
| uranium-bearing solution. No uranium-bearing material was involved in the    |
| violation, since the remaining barrier to criticality (i.e., the physical    |
| integrity of nearby uranium-bearing systems) was maintained. Therefore, the  |
| safety significance of this event is low.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| If a leak had developed in a nearby uranium-bearing system such that the     |
| solution could have accumulated on/in the sludge tub lid, an unsafe geometry |
| of solution could have resulted. If the leaking solution had contained a     |
| sufficient amount of uranium, the resulting configuration could have been    |
| sufficient for a criticality to occur. It should be noted that the allowed   |
| safe geometry and volume limits established In NCSA-0705_076 are based on    |
| potentially moderated, UO2F2 and water solution which contains uranium       |
| enriched to 100 wt%.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| The parameter which was violated during this upset was the geometry of       |
| potential accumulation present in the sludge tub lid (i.e., the volume in    |
| which uranium-bearing solution could have accumulated in the event of a      |
| leak). The physical integrity of the nearby systems containing               |
| uranium-bearing material was maintained.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| No uranium bearing material was actually introduced into the lid of the      |
| sludge tub.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                              |
|                                                                              |
| NCSA-0705_076.A00 and NCSA-0705_027 take credit for the physical integrity   |
| of Systems which contain uranium-bearing material and that unsafe            |
| volume/geometry containers are either modified, covered, or oriented to      |
| prevent an unsafe configuration from resulting In the event of a leak. The   |
| lid of the sludge tub observed was not protected from a potential            |
| accumulation and it had been left unattended.                                |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
|                                                                              |
| At 0800 hours, a NCS anomalous condition was initiated.                      |
|                                                                              |
| At 1015 hours compliance was re-established                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event.                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36970       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH          |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/04/2000|
|LICENSEE:  STUDSVICK PROCESSING FACILITY, LLC   |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:45[EDT]|
|    CITY:  ERWIN                    REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        04/30/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  TN |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  R-S1001               AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/04/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |
|                                                |JOSEPHINE PICCONE    NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DEBRA SHULTS                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 5000 SQUARE FOOT AREA CONTAMINATED WITH AN ESTIMATED 0.49 MILLICURIES OF     |
| PRIMARILY COBALT-60.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| On 05/01/2000, the licensee called to report a spill of residue inside their |
| processing building.   A 5000 square foot area was affected/contaminated     |
| with an estimated 0.49 millicuries of mixed fission/activation products      |
| (primary Co-60) when the event occurred on 04/30/00.  Gross maslin smears    |
| revealed 30,000 dpm with a maximum small area smear of 6,600 dpm/100 square  |
| centimeter.  There was no release of radioactive material to the             |
| environment.  There were two minor personnel contamination incidents:  one   |
| involving an individual's shoes and one involving an individual's hair.      |
| Both were easily decontaminated and released.  There was no damage to        |
| equipment.  Decontamination had already begun when reported.  This event     |
| does not pose a risk to public health and safety but is reportable under     |
| 1200-2-5-141 (2)(c)1 i, ii, and iii.  It required restricted access for      |
| greater than 24 hours, 0.49 millicuries is greater than 5 times the lowest   |
| ALI for Co-60, and access was restricted to allow isotopes with less than 24 |
| half-lives to decay.                                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36971       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HARRIS                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:36[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        05/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:24[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CASPER JERNIGAN              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INADVERTENT SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Harris Nuclear Plant was in Mode-5 with Reactor Vessel level at -12 inches  |
| following Mid-Loop operations. A Safety Injection Signal was actuated when   |
| Instrument Bus S-III was de-energized to return it to its normal power       |
| supply. Plant procedure MST-I0604 (Time Response Test for Channel 1          |
| Pressurizer Pressure) was in progress. This procedure had channel 1          |
| Pressurizer Pressure in test. When S-III was de-energized, the Low           |
| Pressurizer Pressure SI and Low Steam Generator Pressure SI Block signal     |
| (P-11) were unblocked due to Pressurizer channel III being de-energized      |
| concurrent with Pressurizer channel 1 in test. The plant was in Mode-5 with  |
| Pressurizer Pressure and Steam Generator Pressure at approximately 0 psig.   |
| Pressurizer Low Pressure SI and Low Steam Generator Pressure SI actuated the |
| SI signal after P-11 was unblocked. Preparations to perform OST 1826 "Safety |
| Injection: ESF Response Time, Train B 18 Month Interval test"  were in       |
| progress. This test had the BIT injection valves closed with power off,      |
| which prevented ECCS discharge to the RCS. Other equipment operated as       |
| required in response to the Safety Injection Signal in these plant           |
| conditions. This actuation did not have any negative impact on RCS           |
| temperature or inventory control. The plant is currently stable in Mode-5."  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   36972       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  U.S. ARMY                            |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/04/2000|
|LICENSEE:  U.S. ARMY                            |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:54[EDT]|
|    CITY:  REDSTONE ARSENAL         REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        05/04/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  AL |EVENT TIME:             [CDT]|
|LICENSE#:  SNM1998               AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/04/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |
|                                                |JOSEPHINE PICCONE    NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+NIEL DELLA GRECA     R1      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JERRY GRAY                   |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SOURCE SET LOST DURING SHIPPING                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Operations for US Army Communications Electronics Command at Fort Monmouth,  |
| New Jersey shipped, via FedEx, an Amersham large area alpha calibration      |
| source to US Army at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama on 3/15/2000.  The            |
| calibration set (serial # LAAS-003) contains 3 sources (serial #'s ES-927,   |
| 928 and 929) with a total of about 18 microcuries of Pu-238.  On 4/18/2000,  |
| Redstone Arsenal contacted US Army Communications Electronics Command in New |
| Jersey to inquire about a leak test that was due on the calibration source,  |
| who in turn informed them that it had been shipped to them in March.  A      |
| search was conducted at Redstone Arsenal without the calibration source set  |
| being found.  FedEx was contacted and a search of the sort center in New     |
| Jersey, to which the shipment was traced, failed to locate the shipment.     |
| The US Army is reporting that the source set is missing, assumed lost or     |
| stolen.                                                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36973       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [3] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:00[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:41[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RUSSELL LONG                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |NIEL DELLA GRECA     R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ABOUT 25 DEAD FISH DISCOVERED IN DISCHARGE CANAL                             |
|                                                                              |
| "On May 4, 2000, at approximately 1441 hours, plant personnel discovered     |
| dead fish in the discharge canal. There were no plant events or occurrences  |
| that appear to be causally related. The fish numbered about 25, had an       |
| average length of about one foot and consisted of gizzard shad, not an       |
| endangered species. The water in the discharge canal is river water used for |
| cooling plant equipment in both Indian Point 2 and 3 during plant operation. |
| The fish could not have traveled through the plant to the discharge canal    |
| since the river water intake has screens to prevent this type of fish        |
| intrusion.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "This event is reported, within 24 hours, pursuant to Non-radiological       |
| Environmental Technical Specification 4.1 as an unusual event, a fish kill.  |
| The cause is being evaluated."                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36974       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:02[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        05/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:18[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICHARD CALVIN               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM AUTOMATICALLY ISOLATED                          |
|                                                                              |
| The reactor water cleanup system (RWCU) isolated due to ESF signal "high     |
| flow isolation signal".  Originally it was determined to be an invalid       |
| signal caused by a pressure pulse induced by human error.  Additional        |
| information indicates that it cannot be proven that the isolation was not    |
| caused by system flow, therefore it has been determined that the event is    |
| reportable.  The system isolated as designed and has been restored.          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36975       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DRESDEN                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:09[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3           |EVENT DATE:        05/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:18[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVID SLAGER                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     M/R        Y       44       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DECREASING CONDENSER VACUUM REQUIRED MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM                    |
|                                                                              |
| "During unit startup from D3F30 forced outage, condenser vacuum was reducing |
| on 2 of 3 condenser hoods and condensate demin inlet temperatures were       |
| rising.  The abnormal operating procedure for loss of condenser vacuum was   |
| entered and actions followed to scram at 135 �F condensate temp.  All        |
| systems responded as designed with no abnormalities noted.  Investigation    |
| into cause in progress."                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| All rods fully inserted following the manual reactor scram.  Group 2 and 3   |
| isolations were received as expected on reduced reactor vessel level.        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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