United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated With Events > Event Notification Reports > 2000

Event Notification Report for May 1, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           04/28/2000 - 05/01/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36930  36938  36939  36940  36941  36942  36943  36944  36945  36946  36947  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36930       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BROWNS FERRY             REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/26/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:23[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4           |EVENT DATE:        04/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:42[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RODNEY NACOSTE               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/28/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PAUL FREDRICKSON     R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| VARIOUS ESF ACTUATIONS DUE TO RPS BUS 3B DEENERGIZING AS A RESULT OF A       |
| FAILED RELAY                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "At 2342 CDT on 04/25/00, the RPS bus 3B deenergized causing PCIS Group 2    |
| and Group 6 isolation valves to automatically close.  A burnt relay was the  |
| initiating condition. Group 2 outboard drywell equipment drain valve and     |
| drywell floor drain valve closed. Group 6 drywell radiation monitor          |
| isolation valves closed.  All other expected group isolations occurred along |
| with the automatic starts of SBGT and CREV Systems.                          |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 3 is in Mode 5 with primary containment integrity not required.        |
|                                                                              |
| "This event is reportable under criteria 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) :  Any event   |
| or condition that results in manual or automatic actuation of any engineered |
| safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)."        |
|                                                                              |
| RPS bus 3B was reenergized from its alternate power supply.  Electricians    |
| are currently troubleshooting the cause of the failed relay.  There was no   |
| electrical maintenance or testing ongoing at the time of the relay failure.  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE AT 1424 ON 04/28/00 FROM RAYMOND SWAFFORD TO LEIGH TROCINE      |
| *****                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is retracting this event notification.  The following text is a |
| portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:                           |
|                                                                              |
| "TVA is retracting this event report.  TVA has reviewed the plant conditions |
| and system alignments existing at the time of this event and has concluded   |
| that the actuation signal was invalid.  Primary Containment was not required |
| at the time of the event.  The PCIS systems were either properly removed     |
| from service, were already in their ESF positions at the time of the event,  |
| or were a part of excepted systems from reporting according to NUREG-1022,   |
| Revision 1.  Likewise, the control room emergency ventilation system and     |
| standby gas treatment system are excepted systems, and the actuations        |
| observed during the event are not reportable since the actuation signal was  |
| invalid.  Therefore, this event is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR         |
| 50.72(b)(2)(ii)."                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations        |
| officer notified the R2DO (Fredrickson).                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36938       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:10[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        04/27/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        10:30[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/28/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KURT SISLER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING LOSS OF ONE OF TWO CONTINGENCY   |
| CONTROLS                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1030 hrs April 27, 2000, Chemical Operations personnel while performing  |
| decontamination operations on three forklifts in the high bay discovered     |
| slits in the seat cushion.  Since these cushions are geometrically           |
| unfavorable, this was a loss of one control (geometrically) of the double    |
| contingency program for NCSA-0705__076.A00 'INADVERTENT CONTAINERS,' the     |
| second control, physical integrity of overhead piping, was maintained        |
| throughout.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "At the direction of the PSS the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition |
| were initiated.  At 1130 hrs compliance was regained by repairing the        |
| seats.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "1) Safety Significance of Events:                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "The safety significance of this event is very low. The seat cushions had    |
| dimensions of approximately 18 x 19 x 5 [inches] which is over 7 gallons of  |
| volume. The seats were damaged such that leakage of solution could readily   |
| absorb into the padding in an unfavorable geometry and the forklifts were    |
| parked directly under the overhead storage system.  Although the overhead    |
| storage system can contain high concentrations of uranium at high            |
| enrichments, the current status is 69 ppm uranium. (Although enrichment is   |
| not measured, it is likely <10 wt% U-235.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "2) Potential Criticality Pathways Involved (Brief scenario(s) of how        |
| criticality could occur):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "If the overhead storage system contained sufficiently concentrated (>11,000 |
| ppm U-235) uranium and if the solution leaked out of the overhead storage    |
| piping and landed on the forklift seat, the solution could achieve a         |
| critical configuration due to the volume of the cushion (>7 gallons) and the |
| depth of the cushion (>1.5 inches).                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "3) Controlled Parameters (Mass, Moderation, Geometry, Concentration,        |
| Etc.):                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Controlled parameters include geometry and the design of the overhead       |
| storage piping to protect against a large, uncontrolled leak.                |
|                                                                              |
| "4) Estimated Amount. Enrichment Form of Licensed Material (include process  |
| limit and % worst case of critical mass):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "No uranium was involved in this event. The overhead storage system,         |
| however, can contain fully enriched uranium bearing solution at              |
| concentrations above minimum critical at volumes up to 6000 gallons. Current |
| status of the overhead storage system is 69 ppm uranium and, although        |
| enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt% U-235.                      |
|                                                                              |
| "5) Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or control system(s) and           |
| description of failures or deficiencies:                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "Nuclear criticality safety controls include geometry of the fissile         |
| material processing equipment in X-705, the design of those systems to       |
| contain the material and the prohibition against inadvertent containers in   |
| the high bay. The forklift seats have holes which can allow for the          |
| collection of solution in an unfavorable geometry."                          |
|                                                                              |
| Operations staff informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the site DOE        |
| Representative.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1423 ON 04/28/00 FROM KURT SISLER TO LEIGH TROCINE  |
| *****                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| This update was given to provide a clarification to the initial event        |
| report.  There was only one fork lift involved that did not meet the NCSA    |
| requirement.  The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from   |
| the Portsmouth personnel:                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "On 04/27/00 at 1030 hours, X-705 Chemical Operation personnel discovered an |
| NCSA-705_076A00 noncompliance while decontaminating three forklifts in the   |
| X-705 high bay area.  One forklift seat cushion had a slit/crack failing to  |
| meet NCSA-705 076.A00 requirement #4 which states, 'Absorbent materials      |
| shall be covered so that they cannot absorb uranium-bearing liquids or       |
| modified such that any uranium-bearing liquid could be collected is          |
| geometrically favorable.  Absorbent materials, which are controlled by       |
| covering, shall be elevated at least one inch so that they cannot absorb     |
| spilled uranium-bearing liquids.  This requirement includes absorbent        |
| materials within containers having openings within one inch of the bottom of |
| the container.'  Since the forklift seat cushion is geometrically            |
| unfavorable, a loss of one control (geometry) occurred with the double       |
| contingency principle.  The second control, physical integrity of the        |
| overhead piping, was maintained throughout the event."                       |
|                                                                              |
| "At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS), the requirements  |
| for a NCS anomalous condition were initiated.  At 1130 hours, compliance was |
| regained by repairing the seat."                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The safety significance of this event is low.  The seat cushion had         |
| dimensions of approximately 18" x 19" x 5"  which is over 7 gallons of       |
| volume.  The seat was damaged such that leakage of solution could readily    |
| absorb into the padding in an unfavorable geometry, and the forklift was     |
| parked directly under the overhead storage system.  The overhead storage     |
| system contained 69 ppm uranium during the event.  Although the enrichment   |
| was not measured, it is likely less than 10 wt% uranium-235."                |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  The safety significance of this report is   |
| very low.  Only one seat cushion had unfavorable dimensions of approximately |
| 18" x 19" x 5" which is over 7 gallons of volume.  The seat was damaged such |
| that leakage of solution could readily absorb into the padding in an         |
| unfavorable geometry, and the forklift was parked directly under the         |
| overhead storage system.  Although the overhead storage system can contain   |
| high concentrations of uranium at high enrichments the current status is 69  |
| ppm uranium.  (Although enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt%     |
| 235U)."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):  If the overhead storage system contained          |
| sufficiently concentrated (>11,000 ppm 235U) uranium and if the solution     |
| leaked out of the overhead storage piping and landed on the forklift seat,   |
| the solution could achieve a critical configuration due to the volume of the |
| cushion (>7 gallons) and the depth of the cushion (>1.5")."                  |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
| Controlled parameters include geometry and the design of the overhead        |
| storage piping to protect against a large uncontrolled leak."                |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL. (INCLUDE PROCESS   |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):  No uranium was involved in this   |
| event.  The overhead storage system, however, can contain fully enriched     |
| uranium-bearing solution at concentrations above minimum critical at volumes |
| up to 6,000 gallons.   Current status of the overhead storage system is 69   |
| ppm uranium, and although enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt%   |
| 235U."                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM (S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  Nuclear criticality safety controls        |
| include geometry of the fissile material processing equipment in the X-705,  |
| the design of those systems to contain the material, and the prohibition     |
| against inadvertent containers in the high bay.  A forklift seat had holes   |
| which can allow for the collection of solution in an unfavorable geometry."  |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
| At 1030 hours, a NCS anomalous condition was initiated.  At 1130 hours,      |
| compliance was re-established by repairing the forklift seat."               |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC           |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Shear) and NMSS EO (Moore).            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36939       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE                REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:19[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP           |EVENT DATE:        04/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GORDON KNIGHT                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/28/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT A SHUTDOWN COOLING (SDC) ISOLATION VALVE WAS NOT DISABLED AS  |
| REQUIRED BY APPENDIX R FOR MODES 1, 2, AND 3                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "On [04/22/00], while shutting down in Mode 3 for a planned refueling        |
| outage, it was discovered that a SDC isolation valve, 2-SI-651, was not      |
| disabled as required by the facility [Appendix] R compliance report for      |
| Modes 1, 2, and 3.  Upon review and investigation of this deficiency, it was |
| determined on April 28, 2000, that this condition could have resulted in an  |
| inability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown if a design basis            |
| fire-induced hot short of this valve had occurred."                          |
|                                                                              |
| "The [Appendix] R report credits disabling this valve to ensure that a       |
| fire-induced hot short would not result in the valve damaging itself such    |
| that it could not be opened, as needed to initiate shutdown cooling.         |
| Additionally, there have been no Appendix R events during this timeframe."   |
|                                                                              |
| "A design modification was made in early 1999 (during the MP2 recovery       |
| outage) which changed the location of the coils which are removed in Modes   |
| 1, 2, and 3 to ensure the valve is disabled.  When the modification was      |
| implemented, adequate guidance was not given in applicable facility          |
| procedures to ensure that the correct coils would be removed.  This resulted |
| in the valve not being disabled during the previous operating cycle."        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector as well as applicable state |
| and local agencies.                                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36940       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  CROW BUTTE RESOURCES                 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/2000|
|LICENSEE:  CROW BUTTE RESOURCES                 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:44[EDT]|
|    CITY:  CRAWFORD                 REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        04/27/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NE |EVENT TIME:        15:30[CDT]|
|LICENSE#:  SUA-1534              AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/28/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |PHIL HARRELL         R4      |
|                                                |TOM ESSIG            NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+SCOTT MOORE          NMSS    |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE GRIFFIN                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| URANIUM SOLUTION MINE SHALLOW MONITOR WELL PLACED INTO EXCURSION STATUS -    |
|                                                                              |
| Crow Butte Resources shallow monitor well #SM-723 in uranium solution mine   |
| unit #7 in Crawford, NE, was placed into excursion status due to the         |
| sulfates concentration of water sample measuring at 82 PPM (upper control    |
| limit is 62 PPM).  This was caused by nearby drilling activities.  The well  |
| is located within the licensee controlled area.  The nearest active mining   |
| well is 800 feet away.  There are no public land use areas nearby.           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee determined that there is no adverse impact or risk to people,   |
| livestock, or wildlife.  The NRC Uranium Mining Expert concurred with this   |
| assessment.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to sample the well more frequently than weekly and submit |
| a written report to the NRC within 7 days.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36941       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK                REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:06[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        04/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KOHN REINSBURROW             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/28/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PAUL FREDRICKSON     R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ISOLATION OF THE CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM TO THE RECIRCULATION    |
| MODE (CHLORINE MODE)                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "EVENT:  On 04/28/00 at 1630, the control building ventilation system        |
| isolated to the recirculation mode (chlorine mode).  Maintenance [personnel] |
| had completed pressure testing the repairs that had been completed on the    |
| number 3 chlorinator with nitrogen and were venting the chlorinator.         |
| Residual chlorine with the nitrogen that was vented from the chlorinator     |
| caused the isolation.  The chlorination system was isolated and under        |
| clearance in support of the scheduled maintenance activities during the      |
| event."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION:  Minimal - The control building     |
| ventilation system responded per design."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTION(S):  The control room operators verified [that] all       |
| automatic actions occurred.  Local chlorine levels were verified to be less  |
| than minimum detectable using portable chlorine monitors.  Maintenance       |
| completed venting the number 3 chlorinator with no subsequent detection of   |
| chlorine.  Control room ventilation was restored to the normal alignment."   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that this issue placed both units in a 12-hour to Hot    |
| Shutdown limiting condition for operation (LCO) because the control room     |
| emergency ventilation (CREV) system emergency ventilation fans are           |
| inoperable (will not operate) during the chlorine mode.  The LCO has since   |
| been exited, and there was no reduction in power for either unit.            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36942       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND           REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/29/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:47[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        04/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:40[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CARLSON                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/29/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     A/R        Y       21       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT HAD A REACTOR TRIP FROM 21.6% POWER DURING SHUTDOWN FOLLOWING A        |
| TURBINE TRIP                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| THE UNIT 2 REACTOR TRIPPED DURING A POWER DECREASE FOR A REFUELING OUTAGE.   |
| THE SUSPECTED CAUSE IS A SPIKE ON THE 23B FEEDWATER HEATER  INSTRUMENTATION  |
| GIVING A HI-HI LEVEL SIGNAL WHICH RESULTED IN A TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP.   |
| PLANT HAD LETDOWN ISOLATION, BUT THE AUX. FEEDWATER PUMPS DID NOT AUTOSTART  |
| AND WERE NOT REQUIRED TO START BASED ON THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVELS.  ALL     |
| CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED, NO ECCS ACTUATED AND NO SAFETY RELIEF VALVES    |
| LIFTED.  THEY ARE CONTINUING THE INVESTIGATION.                              |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36943       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/29/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:19[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        04/28/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        09:51[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/29/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOE HOLONICH         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LARSON                       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN - LOSS OF ONE CONTINGENCY                             |
|                                                                              |
| On 4/28/00 at 0951 hours, X-705 Chemical Operation personnel discovered an   |
| NCSA-705_076.A00 noncompliance when a 55-gallon burnable waste drum was left |
| unattended in the X-705 high-bay with it's lid ajar. This could have         |
| resulted in the potential accumulation of an unsafe volume of solution in    |
| the drum had a leak developed in the overhead storage system which contains  |
| uranium-bearing solution. This was a loss of one control(volume) in the      |
| double contingency control matrix for the aforementioned NCSA. The second    |
| control (physical integrity of the storage system) was maintained throughout |
| this event.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The safety significance or this event is low because the only credible       |
| nearby source of uranium-bearing solution is that contained in the overhead  |
| storage, which is inspected on a monthly basis for evidence of leaks.  Also, |
| the solution contained in the overhead storage is typically low in uranium   |
| concentration.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| If a leak had developed in the overhead storage system such that the         |
| solution could have accumulated in the uncovered drum, an unsafe volume or   |
| solution could have accumulated, if the leaking solution had contained a     |
| sufficient amount of uranium, the resulting configuration could have been    |
| sufficient for a criticality to occur.  It should be noted that the allowed  |
| safe geometry and volume limits established in NCSA-705_076 are based on     |
| optimally moderated, UO2F2, and water solution which contains uranium        |
| enriched to 100 wt%                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| The parameter which was violated during this upset was the volume of         |
| potential accumulation present in the uncovered 55-gallon drum (i.e.. the    |
| volume in which uranium-bearing solution could have accumulated in the event |
| of a leak). The physical integrity of the system containing the              |
| uranium-bearing material was maintained.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT. FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| No uranium-bearing material was actually introduced into the uncovered drum. |
| However, the overhead storage system does routinely contain uranium-bearing  |
| solutions of various enrichment and concentration (typically less than 500   |
| ppm uranium concentration and less than 10 wt% enrichment, although these    |
| parameters are not controlled as NCS requirements).  Data from the latest    |
| sampling of solution at first stage microfiltration (which originates from   |
| the overhead storage) indicates a maximum of 80 ppm uranium, although it     |
| should be noted that this may not be indicative of the solution              |
| concentration currently contained in the overhead storage.                   |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| NCSA-0705_076.A00 takes credit for the physical integrity of systems which   |
| contain uranium-bearing material and that unsafe volume/geometry containers  |
| are either modified, covered, or oriented to prevent an unsafe configuration |
| from resulting in the event of a leak. The 55-gallon drum observed in the    |
| X-705 high-bay was not protected from a potential accumulation since the     |
| cover had been dislodged and left unattended.                                |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
|                                                                              |
| At 0951 hours, a NCS anomalous condition was initiated.                      |
|                                                                              |
| At 1029 hours compliance was re-established.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE Representative were notified.         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36944       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND           REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/29/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:48[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        04/29/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:45[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BILL MATHER                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/29/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Hot Shutdown     |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DETERMINATION THAT DUAL INDICATION ON FEEDWATER CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES |
| (WHILE IN THE CLOSED POSITION) MAY RESULT IN THEM BEING DEGRADED             |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "While shutting down [the] Unit 2 reactor for a refueling shutdown, leakage  |
| past the main feedwater control valves required shutting the feedwater       |
| containment isolation (CI) valves to [the] 21 and 22 steam generators (S/G)  |
| [in order] to maintain S/G level.  With the CI valves in the closed          |
| position, the limit switch that provides a white status light on the         |
| containment isolation panel indicated the valves to be closed.  The other    |
| limit [switches] that [provide] a red (open) and green (closed) indication   |
| for both valves were both on dual indication.  S/G levels were controlled    |
| with the CI valves close.  The dual indication on the CI valves while in the |
| closed position may result in them being degraded.  Containment integrity    |
| isolations per operation procedures [were] implemented.  Further engineering |
| evaluations and repairs will follow."                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that a unit cooldown was in progress as part of a        |
| refueling outage which began shortly prior to midnight.  (Refer to event     |
| #36942 for additional information.)                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36945       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE                REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/29/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:38[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP           |EVENT DATE:        04/29/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:34[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEPHEN BAKER                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/29/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNEXPECTED ISOLATION OF CONTAINMENT PURGE                                    |
|                                                                              |
| A containment purge valve closed due to a loss of power to a radiation       |
| monitor.  The licensee stated that the cause was deenergization of the power |
| panel per procedures for that radiation monitor.                             |
|                                                                              |
| Apparently, this was the first time this procedure had been performed since  |
| it had been revised, and there was no caution in the procedure indicating    |
| that if a purge is in effect, it would be secured.  The licensee plans to    |
| change the procedures to reflect the possibility of isolation so that it can |
| be isolated before the radiation monitor is deenergized.                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector as well as state and local  |
| authorities.                                                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36946       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OYSTER CREEK             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/30/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:58[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2                             |EVENT DATE:        04/30/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JERE FREEMAN                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/30/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT INVOLVING FAILURE TO POST REQUIRED FIRE  |
| WATCH DURING MAINTENANCE DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR.                             |
|                                                                              |
| "ON 4/28/2000 AT APPROXIMATELY 1000EDT, A REACTOR BUILDING 23 FOOT ELEVATION |
| FLOOR PLUG WAS REMOVED.  AN HOURLY FIRE WATCH WAS NOT ESTABLISHED AS         |
| REQUIRED BY THE OYSTER CREEK FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM TECHNICAL               |
| SPECIFICATIONS.  THE HOURLY FIRE WATCH WAS  ESTABLISHED ON 4/30/2000 AT      |
| 0900EDT WHEN THE CONDITION WAS REALIZED."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36947       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/01/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:55[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        05/01/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        03:07[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CARL RICH                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/01/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       92       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO A TURBINE               |
| TRIP/GENERATOR LOCKOUT ON ELECTRICAL FAULT                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0307, Unit 1 Reactor automatically shutdown from 92% power. The shutdown |
| was the result of a Turbine Trip/Generator Lockout caused by an electrical   |
| fault on the '1C' Main Transformer.  All Rods fully inserted (RPS), and the  |
| plant is in Hot Shutdown (opcon 3).  Level is currently at normal operating  |
| level. The following isolations were received; Main Steam and Rx Sample      |
| (1B), Reactor Water Clean-Up (3), Primary Containment Purge Supply and       |
| Exhaust (6a), Primary Containment Exhaust to REECE (6b), Drywell Sump,       |
| Suppression Pool Cleanup, and Tips (8b), and Reactor Enclosure HVAC.  The    |
| isolations were received due to a NSSSS 'Reactor Level 2 - Low Low' signal   |
| during the event.  All plant systems operated as designed. The cause of this |
| event is currently being investigated by plant staff."                       |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 1 will remain in Opcon 3 pending the results of the investigation. No   |
| SRVs cycled during the transient.  Offsite power and EDGs are available.     |
| The extent of repairs to the main transformer has not been determined.  A    |
| preliminary inspection shows a bus bar connection missing.                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed state/local authorities and the NRC Resident           |
| Inspector.                                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+