Event Notification Report for May 1, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
04/28/2000 - 05/01/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36930 36938 36939 36940 36941 36942 36943 36944 36945 36946 36947
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36930 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BROWNS FERRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/26/2000|
| UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:23[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:42[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RODNEY NACOSTE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/28/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PAUL FREDRICKSON R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
| | |
|3 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| VARIOUS ESF ACTUATIONS DUE TO RPS BUS 3B DEENERGIZING AS A RESULT OF A |
| FAILED RELAY |
| |
| "At 2342 CDT on 04/25/00, the RPS bus 3B deenergized causing PCIS Group 2 |
| and Group 6 isolation valves to automatically close. A burnt relay was the |
| initiating condition. Group 2 outboard drywell equipment drain valve and |
| drywell floor drain valve closed. Group 6 drywell radiation monitor |
| isolation valves closed. All other expected group isolations occurred along |
| with the automatic starts of SBGT and CREV Systems. |
| |
| "Unit 3 is in Mode 5 with primary containment integrity not required. |
| |
| "This event is reportable under criteria 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) : Any event |
| or condition that results in manual or automatic actuation of any engineered |
| safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)." |
| |
| RPS bus 3B was reenergized from its alternate power supply. Electricians |
| are currently troubleshooting the cause of the failed relay. There was no |
| electrical maintenance or testing ongoing at the time of the relay failure. |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE AT 1424 ON 04/28/00 FROM RAYMOND SWAFFORD TO LEIGH TROCINE |
| ***** |
| |
| The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a |
| portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "TVA is retracting this event report. TVA has reviewed the plant conditions |
| and system alignments existing at the time of this event and has concluded |
| that the actuation signal was invalid. Primary Containment was not required |
| at the time of the event. The PCIS systems were either properly removed |
| from service, were already in their ESF positions at the time of the event, |
| or were a part of excepted systems from reporting according to NUREG-1022, |
| Revision 1. Likewise, the control room emergency ventilation system and |
| standby gas treatment system are excepted systems, and the actuations |
| observed during the event are not reportable since the actuation signal was |
| invalid. Therefore, this event is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR |
| 50.72(b)(2)(ii)." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R2DO (Fredrickson). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36938 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:10[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 04/27/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 10:30[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/28/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KURT SISLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING LOSS OF ONE OF TWO CONTINGENCY |
| CONTROLS |
| |
| "At 1030 hrs April 27, 2000, Chemical Operations personnel while performing |
| decontamination operations on three forklifts in the high bay discovered |
| slits in the seat cushion. Since these cushions are geometrically |
| unfavorable, this was a loss of one control (geometrically) of the double |
| contingency program for NCSA-0705__076.A00 'INADVERTENT CONTAINERS,' the |
| second control, physical integrity of overhead piping, was maintained |
| throughout. |
| |
| "At the direction of the PSS the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition |
| were initiated. At 1130 hrs compliance was regained by repairing the |
| seats. |
| |
| "1) Safety Significance of Events: |
| |
| "The safety significance of this event is very low. The seat cushions had |
| dimensions of approximately 18 x 19 x 5 [inches] which is over 7 gallons of |
| volume. The seats were damaged such that leakage of solution could readily |
| absorb into the padding in an unfavorable geometry and the forklifts were |
| parked directly under the overhead storage system. Although the overhead |
| storage system can contain high concentrations of uranium at high |
| enrichments, the current status is 69 ppm uranium. (Although enrichment is |
| not measured, it is likely <10 wt% U-235. |
| |
| "2) Potential Criticality Pathways Involved (Brief scenario(s) of how |
| criticality could occur): |
| |
| "If the overhead storage system contained sufficiently concentrated (>11,000 |
| ppm U-235) uranium and if the solution leaked out of the overhead storage |
| piping and landed on the forklift seat, the solution could achieve a |
| critical configuration due to the volume of the cushion (>7 gallons) and the |
| depth of the cushion (>1.5 inches). |
| |
| "3) Controlled Parameters (Mass, Moderation, Geometry, Concentration, |
| Etc.): |
| |
| "Controlled parameters include geometry and the design of the overhead |
| storage piping to protect against a large, uncontrolled leak. |
| |
| "4) Estimated Amount. Enrichment Form of Licensed Material (include process |
| limit and % worst case of critical mass): |
| |
| "No uranium was involved in this event. The overhead storage system, |
| however, can contain fully enriched uranium bearing solution at |
| concentrations above minimum critical at volumes up to 6000 gallons. Current |
| status of the overhead storage system is 69 ppm uranium and, although |
| enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt% U-235. |
| |
| "5) Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or control system(s) and |
| description of failures or deficiencies: |
| |
| "Nuclear criticality safety controls include geometry of the fissile |
| material processing equipment in X-705, the design of those systems to |
| contain the material and the prohibition against inadvertent containers in |
| the high bay. The forklift seats have holes which can allow for the |
| collection of solution in an unfavorable geometry." |
| |
| Operations staff informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the site DOE |
| Representative. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1423 ON 04/28/00 FROM KURT SISLER TO LEIGH TROCINE |
| ***** |
| |
| This update was given to provide a clarification to the initial event |
| report. There was only one fork lift involved that did not meet the NCSA |
| requirement. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from |
| the Portsmouth personnel: |
| |
| "On 04/27/00 at 1030 hours, X-705 Chemical Operation personnel discovered an |
| NCSA-705_076A00 noncompliance while decontaminating three forklifts in the |
| X-705 high bay area. One forklift seat cushion had a slit/crack failing to |
| meet NCSA-705 076.A00 requirement #4 which states, 'Absorbent materials |
| shall be covered so that they cannot absorb uranium-bearing liquids or |
| modified such that any uranium-bearing liquid could be collected is |
| geometrically favorable. Absorbent materials, which are controlled by |
| covering, shall be elevated at least one inch so that they cannot absorb |
| spilled uranium-bearing liquids. This requirement includes absorbent |
| materials within containers having openings within one inch of the bottom of |
| the container.' Since the forklift seat cushion is geometrically |
| unfavorable, a loss of one control (geometry) occurred with the double |
| contingency principle. The second control, physical integrity of the |
| overhead piping, was maintained throughout the event." |
| |
| "At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS), the requirements |
| for a NCS anomalous condition were initiated. At 1130 hours, compliance was |
| regained by repairing the seat." |
| |
| "The safety significance of this event is low. The seat cushion had |
| dimensions of approximately 18" x 19" x 5" which is over 7 gallons of |
| volume. The seat was damaged such that leakage of solution could readily |
| absorb into the padding in an unfavorable geometry, and the forklift was |
| parked directly under the overhead storage system. The overhead storage |
| system contained 69 ppm uranium during the event. Although the enrichment |
| was not measured, it is likely less than 10 wt% uranium-235." |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this report is |
| very low. Only one seat cushion had unfavorable dimensions of approximately |
| 18" x 19" x 5" which is over 7 gallons of volume. The seat was damaged such |
| that leakage of solution could readily absorb into the padding in an |
| unfavorable geometry, and the forklift was parked directly under the |
| overhead storage system. Although the overhead storage system can contain |
| high concentrations of uranium at high enrichments the current status is 69 |
| ppm uranium. (Although enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt% |
| 235U)." |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): If the overhead storage system contained |
| sufficiently concentrated (>11,000 ppm 235U) uranium and if the solution |
| leaked out of the overhead storage piping and landed on the forklift seat, |
| the solution could achieve a critical configuration due to the volume of the |
| cushion (>7 gallons) and the depth of the cushion (>1.5")." |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| Controlled parameters include geometry and the design of the overhead |
| storage piping to protect against a large uncontrolled leak." |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL. (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): No uranium was involved in this |
| event. The overhead storage system, however, can contain fully enriched |
| uranium-bearing solution at concentrations above minimum critical at volumes |
| up to 6,000 gallons. Current status of the overhead storage system is 69 |
| ppm uranium, and although enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt% |
| 235U." |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM (S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Nuclear criticality safety controls |
| include geometry of the fissile material processing equipment in the X-705, |
| the design of those systems to contain the material, and the prohibition |
| against inadvertent containers in the high bay. A forklift seat had holes |
| which can allow for the collection of solution in an unfavorable geometry." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| At 1030 hours, a NCS anomalous condition was initiated. At 1130 hours, |
| compliance was re-established by repairing the forklift seat." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Shear) and NMSS EO (Moore). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36939 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:19[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GORDON KNIGHT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/28/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES NOGGLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT A SHUTDOWN COOLING (SDC) ISOLATION VALVE WAS NOT DISABLED AS |
| REQUIRED BY APPENDIX R FOR MODES 1, 2, AND 3 |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "On [04/22/00], while shutting down in Mode 3 for a planned refueling |
| outage, it was discovered that a SDC isolation valve, 2-SI-651, was not |
| disabled as required by the facility [Appendix] R compliance report for |
| Modes 1, 2, and 3. Upon review and investigation of this deficiency, it was |
| determined on April 28, 2000, that this condition could have resulted in an |
| inability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown if a design basis |
| fire-induced hot short of this valve had occurred." |
| |
| "The [Appendix] R report credits disabling this valve to ensure that a |
| fire-induced hot short would not result in the valve damaging itself such |
| that it could not be opened, as needed to initiate shutdown cooling. |
| Additionally, there have been no Appendix R events during this timeframe." |
| |
| "A design modification was made in early 1999 (during the MP2 recovery |
| outage) which changed the location of the coils which are removed in Modes |
| 1, 2, and 3 to ensure the valve is disabled. When the modification was |
| implemented, adequate guidance was not given in applicable facility |
| procedures to ensure that the correct coils would be removed. This resulted |
| in the valve not being disabled during the previous operating cycle." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector as well as applicable state |
| and local agencies. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36940 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/2000|
|LICENSEE: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:44[EDT]|
| CITY: CRAWFORD REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 04/27/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: NE |EVENT TIME: 15:30[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: SUA-1534 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/28/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |PHIL HARRELL R4 |
| |TOM ESSIG NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+SCOTT MOORE NMSS |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE GRIFFIN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| URANIUM SOLUTION MINE SHALLOW MONITOR WELL PLACED INTO EXCURSION STATUS - |
| |
| Crow Butte Resources shallow monitor well #SM-723 in uranium solution mine |
| unit #7 in Crawford, NE, was placed into excursion status due to the |
| sulfates concentration of water sample measuring at 82 PPM (upper control |
| limit is 62 PPM). This was caused by nearby drilling activities. The well |
| is located within the licensee controlled area. The nearest active mining |
| well is 800 feet away. There are no public land use areas nearby. |
| |
| The licensee determined that there is no adverse impact or risk to people, |
| livestock, or wildlife. The NRC Uranium Mining Expert concurred with this |
| assessment. |
| |
| The licensee plans to sample the well more frequently than weekly and submit |
| a written report to the NRC within 7 days. |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36941 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:06[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KOHN REINSBURROW |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/28/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PAUL FREDRICKSON R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ISOLATION OF THE CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM TO THE RECIRCULATION |
| MODE (CHLORINE MODE) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "EVENT: On 04/28/00 at 1630, the control building ventilation system |
| isolated to the recirculation mode (chlorine mode). Maintenance [personnel] |
| had completed pressure testing the repairs that had been completed on the |
| number 3 chlorinator with nitrogen and were venting the chlorinator. |
| Residual chlorine with the nitrogen that was vented from the chlorinator |
| caused the isolation. The chlorination system was isolated and under |
| clearance in support of the scheduled maintenance activities during the |
| event." |
| |
| "INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: Minimal - The control building |
| ventilation system responded per design." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTION(S): The control room operators verified [that] all |
| automatic actions occurred. Local chlorine levels were verified to be less |
| than minimum detectable using portable chlorine monitors. Maintenance |
| completed venting the number 3 chlorinator with no subsequent detection of |
| chlorine. Control room ventilation was restored to the normal alignment." |
| |
| The licensee stated that this issue placed both units in a 12-hour to Hot |
| Shutdown limiting condition for operation (LCO) because the control room |
| emergency ventilation (CREV) system emergency ventilation fans are |
| inoperable (will not operate) during the chlorine mode. The LCO has since |
| been exited, and there was no reduction in power for either unit. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36942 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/29/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:47[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:40[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CARLSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/29/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GARY SHEAR R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A/R Y 21 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT HAD A REACTOR TRIP FROM 21.6% POWER DURING SHUTDOWN FOLLOWING A |
| TURBINE TRIP |
| |
| |
| THE UNIT 2 REACTOR TRIPPED DURING A POWER DECREASE FOR A REFUELING OUTAGE. |
| THE SUSPECTED CAUSE IS A SPIKE ON THE 23B FEEDWATER HEATER INSTRUMENTATION |
| GIVING A HI-HI LEVEL SIGNAL WHICH RESULTED IN A TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP. |
| PLANT HAD LETDOWN ISOLATION, BUT THE AUX. FEEDWATER PUMPS DID NOT AUTOSTART |
| AND WERE NOT REQUIRED TO START BASED ON THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVELS. ALL |
| CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED, NO ECCS ACTUATED AND NO SAFETY RELIEF VALVES |
| LIFTED. THEY ARE CONTINUING THE INVESTIGATION. |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36943 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/29/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:19[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 04/28/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:51[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/29/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOE HOLONICH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LARSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN - LOSS OF ONE CONTINGENCY |
| |
| On 4/28/00 at 0951 hours, X-705 Chemical Operation personnel discovered an |
| NCSA-705_076.A00 noncompliance when a 55-gallon burnable waste drum was left |
| unattended in the X-705 high-bay with it's lid ajar. This could have |
| resulted in the potential accumulation of an unsafe volume of solution in |
| the drum had a leak developed in the overhead storage system which contains |
| uranium-bearing solution. This was a loss of one control(volume) in the |
| double contingency control matrix for the aforementioned NCSA. The second |
| control (physical integrity of the storage system) was maintained throughout |
| this event. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| The safety significance or this event is low because the only credible |
| nearby source of uranium-bearing solution is that contained in the overhead |
| storage, which is inspected on a monthly basis for evidence of leaks. Also, |
| the solution contained in the overhead storage is typically low in uranium |
| concentration. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| If a leak had developed in the overhead storage system such that the |
| solution could have accumulated in the uncovered drum, an unsafe volume or |
| solution could have accumulated, if the leaking solution had contained a |
| sufficient amount of uranium, the resulting configuration could have been |
| sufficient for a criticality to occur. It should be noted that the allowed |
| safe geometry and volume limits established in NCSA-705_076 are based on |
| optimally moderated, UO2F2, and water solution which contains uranium |
| enriched to 100 wt% |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| The parameter which was violated during this upset was the volume of |
| potential accumulation present in the uncovered 55-gallon drum (i.e.. the |
| volume in which uranium-bearing solution could have accumulated in the event |
| of a leak). The physical integrity of the system containing the |
| uranium-bearing material was maintained. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT. FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| No uranium-bearing material was actually introduced into the uncovered drum. |
| However, the overhead storage system does routinely contain uranium-bearing |
| solutions of various enrichment and concentration (typically less than 500 |
| ppm uranium concentration and less than 10 wt% enrichment, although these |
| parameters are not controlled as NCS requirements). Data from the latest |
| sampling of solution at first stage microfiltration (which originates from |
| the overhead storage) indicates a maximum of 80 ppm uranium, although it |
| should be noted that this may not be indicative of the solution |
| concentration currently contained in the overhead storage. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| NCSA-0705_076.A00 takes credit for the physical integrity of systems which |
| contain uranium-bearing material and that unsafe volume/geometry containers |
| are either modified, covered, or oriented to prevent an unsafe configuration |
| from resulting in the event of a leak. The 55-gallon drum observed in the |
| X-705 high-bay was not protected from a potential accumulation since the |
| cover had been dislodged and left unattended. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| At 0951 hours, a NCS anomalous condition was initiated. |
| |
| At 1029 hours compliance was re-established. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE Representative were notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36944 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/29/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:48[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/29/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:45[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL MATHER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/29/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GARY SHEAR R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Hot Shutdown |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DETERMINATION THAT DUAL INDICATION ON FEEDWATER CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES |
| (WHILE IN THE CLOSED POSITION) MAY RESULT IN THEM BEING DEGRADED |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "While shutting down [the] Unit 2 reactor for a refueling shutdown, leakage |
| past the main feedwater control valves required shutting the feedwater |
| containment isolation (CI) valves to [the] 21 and 22 steam generators (S/G) |
| [in order] to maintain S/G level. With the CI valves in the closed |
| position, the limit switch that provides a white status light on the |
| containment isolation panel indicated the valves to be closed. The other |
| limit [switches] that [provide] a red (open) and green (closed) indication |
| for both valves were both on dual indication. S/G levels were controlled |
| with the CI valves close. The dual indication on the CI valves while in the |
| closed position may result in them being degraded. Containment integrity |
| isolations per operation procedures [were] implemented. Further engineering |
| evaluations and repairs will follow." |
| |
| The licensee stated that a unit cooldown was in progress as part of a |
| refueling outage which began shortly prior to midnight. (Refer to event |
| #36942 for additional information.) |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36945 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/29/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:38[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/29/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:34[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEPHEN BAKER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/29/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES NOGGLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNEXPECTED ISOLATION OF CONTAINMENT PURGE |
| |
| A containment purge valve closed due to a loss of power to a radiation |
| monitor. The licensee stated that the cause was deenergization of the power |
| panel per procedures for that radiation monitor. |
| |
| Apparently, this was the first time this procedure had been performed since |
| it had been revised, and there was no caution in the procedure indicating |
| that if a purge is in effect, it would be secured. The licensee plans to |
| change the procedures to reflect the possibility of isolation so that it can |
| be isolated before the radiation monitor is deenergized. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector as well as state and local |
| authorities. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36946 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OYSTER CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/30/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:58[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2 |EVENT DATE: 04/30/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JERE FREEMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/30/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES NOGGLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT INVOLVING FAILURE TO POST REQUIRED FIRE |
| WATCH DURING MAINTENANCE DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR. |
| |
| "ON 4/28/2000 AT APPROXIMATELY 1000EDT, A REACTOR BUILDING 23 FOOT ELEVATION |
| FLOOR PLUG WAS REMOVED. AN HOURLY FIRE WATCH WAS NOT ESTABLISHED AS |
| REQUIRED BY THE OYSTER CREEK FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM TECHNICAL |
| SPECIFICATIONS. THE HOURLY FIRE WATCH WAS ESTABLISHED ON 4/30/2000 AT |
| 0900EDT WHEN THE CONDITION WAS REALIZED." |
| |
| THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36947 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/01/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:55[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/01/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:07[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CARL RICH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/01/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES NOGGLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 92 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO A TURBINE |
| TRIP/GENERATOR LOCKOUT ON ELECTRICAL FAULT |
| |
| "At 0307, Unit 1 Reactor automatically shutdown from 92% power. The shutdown |
| was the result of a Turbine Trip/Generator Lockout caused by an electrical |
| fault on the '1C' Main Transformer. All Rods fully inserted (RPS), and the |
| plant is in Hot Shutdown (opcon 3). Level is currently at normal operating |
| level. The following isolations were received; Main Steam and Rx Sample |
| (1B), Reactor Water Clean-Up (3), Primary Containment Purge Supply and |
| Exhaust (6a), Primary Containment Exhaust to REECE (6b), Drywell Sump, |
| Suppression Pool Cleanup, and Tips (8b), and Reactor Enclosure HVAC. The |
| isolations were received due to a NSSSS 'Reactor Level 2 - Low Low' signal |
| during the event. All plant systems operated as designed. The cause of this |
| event is currently being investigated by plant staff." |
| |
| Unit 1 will remain in Opcon 3 pending the results of the investigation. No |
| SRVs cycled during the transient. Offsite power and EDGs are available. |
| The extent of repairs to the main transformer has not been determined. A |
| preliminary inspection shows a bus bar connection missing. |
| |
| The licensee informed state/local authorities and the NRC Resident |
| Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021