Event Notification Report for April 21, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
04/20/2000 - 04/21/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36908 36909 36910 36911
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36908 |
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| FACILITY: SAN ONOFRE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/20/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [3] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:43[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 04/20/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:45[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CLAY WILLIAMS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/20/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DALE POWERS R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
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EVENT TEXT
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| - HPSI, LPSI & CS SYSTEMS OUTSIDE THEIR DESIGN BASIS DUE TO LACK OF |
| INSTALLED INSULATION - |
| |
| The following is the text of a fax received from San Onofre: |
| |
| This notification from San Onofre Units 2 and 3 is being made in accordance |
| with 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) for the condition of the High Pressure Safety |
| Injection (HPSI), Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) and Containment Spray |
| (CS) Systems being outside their design basis. This condition exists for |
| both Units 2 and 3. |
| |
| On 04/19/00, during an NRC inspection, it was discovered that portions of |
| the ECCS piping were not insulated as assumed in design calculations. |
| Affected lines are the suction and discharge piping for the HPSI Pumps |
| #P017, P018 & P019, LPSI Pumps #P015 & P016, and CS Pumps #P013 & P014. The |
| consequence of the missing insulation is that the heat loads in the ECCS |
| pump rooms will be higher than assumed in the plant accident analyses. |
| |
| At 0745 PDT on 04/20/00, SCE concluded that ECCS pump room temperatures |
| during certain accident scenarios may not remain below their design basis |
| room temperatures of 104�F. However, the equipment in the pump rooms |
| continues to be operable at the calculated higher post-accident |
| temperatures. That is, even with the higher than expected ECCS pump room |
| temperatures, the affected equipment would continue to be able to perform |
| its intended safety function. |
| |
| SCE has installed some temporary insulation and will take actions to install |
| permanent insulation on the affected piping. SCE's investigation of this |
| occurrence is ongoing; the cause of this condition will be reported in the |
| followup 30 day licensee event report. |
| |
| At the time of this discovery, both Units 2 and 3 were operating at about |
| 100% power: Unit 1 remains permanently defueled. SCE plans to notify the |
| NRC Resident Inspectors about this issue and will provide them with a copy |
| of this event report. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36909 |
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| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/20/2000|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:02[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/20/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN DONNELLY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/20/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN WHITE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |ED GOODWIN NRR |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| - UNIT 2 S/Gs PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY DESIGN DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE OUTSIDE |
| DESIGN BASIS - |
| |
| Indian Point Unit 2 received a letter from Westinghouse (the NSSS Supplier) |
| which stated that Westinghouse is in the process of completing a Nuclear |
| Safety Advisory Letter regarding the primary-to-secondary design pressure |
| differential in the steam generators. The current design pressure listed in |
| the equipment Specification is 1550 psid. With an anticipated steam |
| generator outlet pressure in the 650 to 660 psia range, this design pressure |
| will be exceeded. However, Indian Point Unit 2 has an analysis that |
| determined that the limiting structure within the steam generator, the tube |
| sheet, can withstand a pressure differential of 1750 psid. This issue may be |
| addressed by updating the design pressure and stress reports demonstrating |
| compliance with the ASME Code as governed by Section IWA-4312, Re-rating, of |
| Section Xl of the ASME Code. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36910 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/20/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:38[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 04/17/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:20[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE MERRILL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/20/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ANN BOLAND R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |DAVID MATTHEWS NRR |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY |CHUCK DePUY FEMA |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Hot Shutdown |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| - RCS LEAKAGE CRITERIA FOR DECLARING AN UNUSUAL EVENT EXISTED ON 04/17/00 - |
| |
| At 1020 on 04/17/00, St. Lucie Unit 2 was in Mode 4 in a refueling outage |
| preparing to go on shutdown cooling. |
| A pre-job brief was conducted and included a discussion of the potential for |
| pressurizer level change, relief valve lifting and the need to monitor the |
| telltale on containment spray isolation valve #MV-07-3 to determine valve |
| leakage. The expectation was established that the operating crew would |
| terminate the evolution if unexpected leakage was observed with the primary |
| focus on the telltale tubing monitoring containment spray isolation valve |
| #MV-07-3. |
| |
| The control room operator observed a sudden drop in pressurizer level once |
| the last shutdown cooling isolation valve was opened (6% drop on the hot |
| calibration indication). The valve was immediately closed and pressurizer |
| level stabilized; the evolution duration was approximately 3 minutes. As |
| the valve was closing, the field operator stated he was seeing leakage |
| through the tygon tubing, which he estimated to be about 1 to 2 gpm. There |
| was no increase in sump level and no abnormal interfacing system behavior. |
| Operations department personnel believed the behavior observed was |
| consistent with filling shutdown cooling lines. |
| |
| Subsequently, the on-shift engineer performed an inventory balance and, |
| without adjusting for changing temperatures and pressures, estimated a 100 |
| gpm leak had occurred. The Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS) did not feel the |
| inventory balance was valid in that he knew the accuracy of the calculation |
| was biased because of the effect of temperature and pressure and the short |
| duration of the event. Based on the discrepancy between the calculation and |
| field observation, the NPS had a condition report issued to determine the |
| RCS leak rate. |
| |
| The NPS rationale for not entering the Emergency Plan and that RCS leakage |
| was not greater than 10 gpm was based on the following: |
| |
| - his field operator's observations showed a 1-2 gpm leak, |
| - a lack of any increase in sump level, |
| - a lack of any abnormal plant interfacing systems behavior, and |
| - the evolution was consistent with his understanding of the pressurizer |
| level behavior when filling shutdown cooling piping based on his observation |
| in the past. |
| |
| A subsequent activity of placing shutdown cooling on line later that same |
| day resulted in a similar event, |
| with significantly less inventory loss. Shutdown cooling train A was placed |
| on line the afternoon of 04/17/00. |
| |
| However, based on the results of the engineering review, the pressurizer |
| level drop was not solely due to the fill and vent evolution of the shutdown |
| cooling system, as originally concluded. Two hundred (200) gallons of RCS |
| inventory was transferred inter-system during this event. FPL has concluded |
| that this short duration, operator-terminated event met the procedural |
| requirements for entering the emergency plan. However, it is clear upon |
| review of the context and intent of the emergency plan that at no time did |
| an actual emergency or threat thereof exist. |
| |
| As provided for in NUREG 1022, "a licensee may discover that an event or |
| condition had existed which met the emergency plan criteria, but that no |
| emergency had been declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer |
| exists at the time of discovery". Based on an engineering review, FPL |
| concludes that while initiating shutdown cooling on the A train on 04/17/00, |
| an RCS inventory transfer occurred to interfacing systems in the 2-3 minute |
| periods associated with starting shutdown cooling. The initial attempt to |
| place shutdown cooling on line, and possibly a second attempt later the same |
| day, resulted in leakage exceeding the Technical Specification threshold and |
| would constitute entry into a Notification of Unusual Event. Although the |
| criteria was met, FPL is not declaring an emergency for the following |
| reasons: |
| |
| 1. The event was the result of a planned activity and the greater than |
| expected pressurizer level drop was quickly compensated for by operator |
| actions. |
| |
| 2. The event was of very short duration and at no time challenged the |
| ability for decay heat removal or posed a threat to the health and safety of |
| the public or plant personnel. |
| |
| 3. The circumstances associated with determining the appropriate |
| classification of the event required three days of engineering evaluation. |
| |
| State and local county officials and the Senior NRC Resident Inspector are |
| being informed of the event. |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36911 |
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| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/20/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:29[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/20/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DOUG AMTHFIELD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/20/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN WHITE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| - LICENSEE NOTIFIED NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER AND STATE DEP OF A CHEMICAL |
| SPILL ONSITE - |
| |
| The licensee notified the National Response Center and the State Department |
| of Environmental Protection (DEP) that approximately 5 gallons of a mixture |
| of sulfuric acid and sodium hydroxide spilled from a tank truck onto the |
| ground after a chemical reaction took place. The spill was contained within |
| a portable dike area onsite and is being cleaned up. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021