Event Notification Report for April 11, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/10/2000 - 04/11/2000
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36881
Rep Org: ILLINOIS DEPT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY
Licensee: ILLINOIS ROOF CONSULTING ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 3
City: McHENRY State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01713-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE KLINGER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: ILLINOIS ROOF CONSULTING ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 3
City: McHENRY State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01713-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE KLINGER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 04/12/2000
Notification Time: 11:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2000
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2000
Notification Time: 11:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2000
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER ROOF MOISTURE GAUGE
The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety reported the theft of a Troxler roof moisture gauge, model # 3216 (serial # 140) from a state licensee. It was stolen from a locked vehicle at 6929 S. Crandon in Chicago, Illinois. The gauge contains 40 mCi of Am-241/Be. The licensee is in contact the Chicago police department.
The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety reported the theft of a Troxler roof moisture gauge, model # 3216 (serial # 140) from a state licensee. It was stolen from a locked vehicle at 6929 S. Crandon in Chicago, Illinois. The gauge contains 40 mCi of Am-241/Be. The licensee is in contact the Chicago police department.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36890
Rep Org: DRESSER EQUIPMENT GROUP, INC.
Licensee: DRESSER VALVE DIVISION
Region: 4
City: Alexandria State: LA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. R. FENTERN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: DRESSER VALVE DIVISION
Region: 4
City: Alexandria State: LA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. R. FENTERN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 04/14/2000
Notification Time: 15:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2000
Notification Time: 15:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
CHARLES PAULK (R4)
CHRIS CHRISTENSEN (R2)
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
CHARLES PAULK (R4)
CHRIS CHRISTENSEN (R2)
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
VALVE BONNETS PRODUCED FROM IMPROPERLY UPGRADED CASTINGS.
The following noncompliance has been determined to be reportable within the requirements of 10 CFR Part
21. The noncompliance situation involves the delivery of two Safety Relief Valves to Nuclear Utilities for
Nuclear Safety Related service that had Valve Bonnets produced from improperly upgraded castings. The
valves affected by this situation are as follows:
1) Safety Relief Valve, SN TL-89763 - 1" 1970-2 (1-1-1-2)-XNC3116 (Code Stamped as Section VIII, Safety Related Service)
This valve was supplied to Commonwealth Edison Company per their Purchase Order 42I091(Dresser S0 18-56188-0) for their Quad Cities Station #4 in October 1999.
2) Safety Relief Valve, SN TL-66815-1" 1970-2(3-1-3-2)-XFL9-NC3090 (Code Stamped as Section III, Class 2)
This valve was supplied to Duke Energy Corporation per their Purchase Order MN39136 (Dresser SO 18-45913-0) for their McGuire Nuclear Station in April 1999.
Noncompliance Situation and Brief History
On Monday afternoon, April 10, 2000, during the review of documentation for a Nuclear Safety Related valve in process at our facility, we discovered that our casting supplier did not properly upgrade the bonnet staged for assembly of this valve. The mechanical properties of the steel were not verified after the heat treatment phase of the upgrading process.
We began our investigation and found the following circumstances that contributed to this situation:
1) The supplier of these castings approved for producing and upgrading castings for Nuclear Safety Related Service quit producing castings by the shell molding process and the casting patterns were transferred to a commercial foundry.
2) Commercial castings were then sent by the Dresser Valve Division, Alexandria facility to the supplier approved for producing and upgrading Nuclear Safety Related Castings with instructions for the castings to be upgraded.
3) The purchase orders for these castings did not reflect instructions for upgrade, but rather read as if we were buying the Nuclear Class castings from this supplier. The castings used for this effort were not certifiable as being free of weld repairs nor were they supported by test bars for use in verifying the mechanical properties after final heat treatment.
4) The Alexandria Inspection department received and inspected the castings but failed to detect the discrepancy during the production operations prior to Monday, April 10, 2000.
5) On Tuesday, April 11, 2000, we determined that two valves referenced earlier in this report had been processed using these castings and were delivered to customers for use in Nuclear Safety Related Service. At this point, we opened an investigation per the requirements of US Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10 CFR, Part 21.
We have conducted a full review of our records and have determined that this situation is isolated to the two valves referenced earlier in this report and have contacted the customers and are initiating recall actions as of this writing. Both valves in question were still in the customer's warehouses and had not been installed in the Safety Related Service applications.
Corrective actions are being initiated to address the internal and external issues and the details will be provided in our closure report due upon completion of our investigation into the causes of this situation.
The following noncompliance has been determined to be reportable within the requirements of 10 CFR Part
21. The noncompliance situation involves the delivery of two Safety Relief Valves to Nuclear Utilities for
Nuclear Safety Related service that had Valve Bonnets produced from improperly upgraded castings. The
valves affected by this situation are as follows:
1) Safety Relief Valve, SN TL-89763 - 1" 1970-2 (1-1-1-2)-XNC3116 (Code Stamped as Section VIII, Safety Related Service)
This valve was supplied to Commonwealth Edison Company per their Purchase Order 42I091(Dresser S0 18-56188-0) for their Quad Cities Station #4 in October 1999.
2) Safety Relief Valve, SN TL-66815-1" 1970-2(3-1-3-2)-XFL9-NC3090 (Code Stamped as Section III, Class 2)
This valve was supplied to Duke Energy Corporation per their Purchase Order MN39136 (Dresser SO 18-45913-0) for their McGuire Nuclear Station in April 1999.
Noncompliance Situation and Brief History
On Monday afternoon, April 10, 2000, during the review of documentation for a Nuclear Safety Related valve in process at our facility, we discovered that our casting supplier did not properly upgrade the bonnet staged for assembly of this valve. The mechanical properties of the steel were not verified after the heat treatment phase of the upgrading process.
We began our investigation and found the following circumstances that contributed to this situation:
1) The supplier of these castings approved for producing and upgrading castings for Nuclear Safety Related Service quit producing castings by the shell molding process and the casting patterns were transferred to a commercial foundry.
2) Commercial castings were then sent by the Dresser Valve Division, Alexandria facility to the supplier approved for producing and upgrading Nuclear Safety Related Castings with instructions for the castings to be upgraded.
3) The purchase orders for these castings did not reflect instructions for upgrade, but rather read as if we were buying the Nuclear Class castings from this supplier. The castings used for this effort were not certifiable as being free of weld repairs nor were they supported by test bars for use in verifying the mechanical properties after final heat treatment.
4) The Alexandria Inspection department received and inspected the castings but failed to detect the discrepancy during the production operations prior to Monday, April 10, 2000.
5) On Tuesday, April 11, 2000, we determined that two valves referenced earlier in this report had been processed using these castings and were delivered to customers for use in Nuclear Safety Related Service. At this point, we opened an investigation per the requirements of US Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10 CFR, Part 21.
We have conducted a full review of our records and have determined that this situation is isolated to the two valves referenced earlier in this report and have contacted the customers and are initiating recall actions as of this writing. Both valves in question were still in the customer's warehouses and had not been installed in the Safety Related Service applications.
Corrective actions are being initiated to address the internal and external issues and the details will be provided in our closure report due upon completion of our investigation into the causes of this situation.