Event Notification Report for March 29, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
03/28/2000 - 03/29/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36834 36839 36840 36841 36842 36843
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36834 |
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| REP ORG: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/24/2000|
|LICENSEE: HTS, INC CONSULTANTS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:25[EST]|
| CITY: HOUSTON REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 02/08/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: TX |EVENT TIME: 12:00[CST]|
|LICENSE#: TX-L-02757 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/28/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LAWRENCE YANDELL R4 |
| |LARRY CAMPER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JAMES OGDEN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN / RECOVERED CPN NUCLEAR GAUGE IN HOUSTON, |
| TX |
| |
| The following text is from the facsimile received from the Texas Department |
| of Health: |
| |
| "Theft/Recovery of a nuclear gauge - licensee notified the agency [Texas |
| Department of Health] Feb 8, 2000. Reports lost in mail. Faxed information |
| today at request of Incident Investigation. Gauge recovered intact Feb 14, |
| 2000. Leak tested Feb 15, 2000 was fully satisfactory." |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1255 ON 03/28/00 BY JAMES OGDEN TO JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| The following is a more detailed version of the above Agreement State |
| Report: |
| |
| Texas Licensee #TX-L-02757, HTS, Inc. Consultants, Houston, Texas, reported |
| to Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, the theft of a |
| nuclear gauge in it's transport box from the bed of a company pickup truck |
| on February 8, 2000. Gauge Manufacturer: CPN, Model: MC-3. Serial Number: |
| M35116369. Two sealed sources: 1) Cs-137, maximum activity 10 millicuries |
| and 2) Am-241/Be, maximum activity 50 millicuries. The gauge was stolen |
| between 5:45 a.m. and 1:45 p.m. from a jobsite. Incident Report Number |
| 16656300-H was filed with the Houston Police Department on February 8, 2000. |
| Ten local pawn shops were notified by the licensee. The stolen gauge was |
| discovered in a lot adjacent to Hemmi Autoworks, Houston, TX by the |
| facility owner, Richard "Butch" Hemmi and reported to the City of Houston, |
| Bureau of Occupational Health and Radiation Control. This organization |
| recovered all components of the gauge intact on February 14, 2000 (Gauge, |
| Transport box, Calibration Block, Guide Pin, Guide Plate, and paperwork of |
| the last leak test.) The gauge was satisfactorily leak tested on February |
| 15, 2000. The gauge was returned to storage and to service with the Texas |
| licensee. |
| |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO Kriss Kennedy and NMSS EO Brian |
| Smith. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36839 |
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| REP ORG: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/28/2000|
|LICENSEE: FUGRO-McCLELLAND, INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:27[EST]|
| CITY: FORT WORTH REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 03/28/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: TX |EVENT TIME: [CST]|
|LICENSE#: TX-L-05082 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/28/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |KRISS KENNEDY R4 |
| |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JAMES OGDEN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN / RECOVERED TROXLER NUCLEAR GAUGE IN |
| ARLINGTON, TX |
| |
| Texas Licensee #TX-L-05082, Fugro-McClelland (Southwest), Inc., Fort Worth, |
| Texas, reported to Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, |
| the theft of a nuclear gauge from it's unsecured transport box sitting near |
| a work site at the General Motors Plant in Arlington, Texas. The gauge was |
| unsecured and the source rod was not locked, as the operator was going to |
| use the gauge after a short discussion approximately 100 feet from the |
| transport box. Gauge Manufacturer: Troxler, Model: 3411-B, Serial Number: |
| 10390. Two sealed sources: 1) Cs-137 with nominal activity of 10 |
| millicuries and 2) Am-241/Be, nominal activity 40 millicuries. The stolen |
| gauge was discovered along a local street several blocks from the GM Plant |
| and in a damaged condition - the source rod was extended and broken. The |
| gauge was recovered by a passerby who thought the damaged gauge may be of |
| value and took it to a local equipment rental facility to ascertain the |
| value. He was warned of the radiation hazard but reportedly departed the |
| facility with the broken gauge. He evidently changed his mind and notified |
| the City of Arlington, who arrived and recovered the gauge. The gauge was |
| turned over to the Troxler Service Facility in Arlington where a leak test |
| was performed and indicated that the sealed sources were still intact. |
| However, the gauge would require repair before being placed back into |
| service. The Texas Licensee was notified of the recovery. The gauge is |
| being maintained by the Troxler facility until release by this agency for |
| repairs. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36840 |
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| FACILITY: SEABROOK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/28/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:21[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:41[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MATTHEW ARSENAULT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/28/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MICHELE EVANS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO THE AREA |
| VENTILATION SYSTEM INCAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS SAFETY FUNCTION |
| |
| "On 03/26/00 Seabrook Station entered Tech Spec (TS) 3.0.3 due to both |
| trains of the Primary Component Cooling Water (PCCW) system being declared |
| inoperable. Both trains of PCCW were declared inoperable because the PCCW |
| Area Ventilation System was determined to be incapable of performing its |
| intended function. |
| |
| "The PCCW system is a two train closed loop cooling system used to remove |
| heat from plant components during plant operation, plant cooldown and during |
| various phases of an accident. The PCCW pumps are located within the Primary |
| Auxiliary Building (PAB). The operation of the PCCW pumps is supported by |
| the PCCW Area Ventilation system. This ventilation system has redundant, |
| automatically controlled auxiliary supply fans and associated dampers to |
| ensure that the temperature in this area does not exceed design limits |
| should the normal PAB ventilation system fail. |
| |
| "During surveillance testing of the PCCW Area Ventilation system, an exhaust |
| damper (PAH-DP-357) failed to open as required. During a subsequent local |
| investigation by the Shift Manager and Unit Supervisor it was determined |
| that recent painting activities may have affected both PAB Exhaust Dampers |
| (PAH-DP-357 and PAH-DP-358). A subsequent test of PAH-DP-358 indicated that |
| it also failed to open as required. TS 3.0.3 was entered on 03/26/00 at |
| 0346. TS 3.0.3 was subsequently exited at 0425 on 03/26/00 after plant |
| personnel reestablished operability for PAH-DP-358. The subject dampers |
| automatically open to provide an exhaust flow path for the PCCW Pump Area |
| ventilation system which supports operation of the PCCW pumps. An initial |
| review of this condition concluded that a report pursuant to the |
| requirements of 10CFR50.72 was not required. A subsequent review of this |
| event determined that it is reportable pursuant to the requirements of |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii) as a condition that alone could have prevented the |
| fulfillment of a safety function." |
| |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| HOO Note: The event time was the time the licensee determined this |
| condition to be reportable to the NRC. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36841 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/28/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:54[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/28/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 10:30[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/28/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |RONALD GARDNER R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN GREEVES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC SPAETH | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 4 HOUR REPORT - |
| |
| At 1030 on 03/28/00, a box containing uranium oxide standard vials was |
| discovered under a workbench in building X-710 room 117, The applicable |
| Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval/Evaluation (NCSA/E-0710-011) does not |
| analyze storing uranium oxide vials in this area of the X-710 building. The |
| uranium oxide vials were transported to an area designated for storage of |
| such materials under applicable approved NCSAs. The material was |
| non-destructive assay (NDA) tested. The combined mass of all of the uranium |
| oxides in all the standard vials was 18 +/- 9 grams U-235 with an average |
| enrichment of 18 wt% U-235, |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| The uranium oxide vials were stored at least two feet edge-to-edge from any |
| other fissile material. The combined mass of all of the uranium oxides in |
| all the standard vials was determined by NDA to be 18 +/- 9 grams U-235 with |
| an average enrichment of 18 wt% U-235. Due to the low mass and absence of |
| moderation, the safety significance is low. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]: |
| Additional mass and a spacing violation would have been required before a |
| criticality would be possible. Without moderation, much more than the safe |
| mass of 350 grams of U-235 would have to be present before a criticality |
| could be possible. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| This was an unanalyzed condition. Although not specifically controlled, the |
| combined mass of all the uranium oxides in all the standard vials was less |
| than a safe mass, moderation was not present, and the uranium oxide vials |
| were spaced at least two feet from any other fissile material. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDING PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| NDA shows the combined mass of all of the uranium oxides in all the standard |
| vials to be 18 +/- 9 grams of U-235 with an enrichment of 18 wt% U-235. The |
| material is in the form of dry oxides. For a spherical system at optimum |
| moderation, full water reflection, and 100 wt% enrichment, the safe mass is |
| 350 grams U-235. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFEEY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| The request failed to identify the presence of uranium oxide vials in the |
| room resulting in an unanalyzed condition. The uranium oxides are less than |
| a safe mass and other uranium bearing material was spaced at least two feet |
| edge-to-edge from the uranium oxides. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| The uranium oxide vials were removed from the X-710 room 117 under |
| applicable plant approved NCSAs. Total mass of material in X-710 room 117 is |
| currently less than 15 grams U-235. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the site DOE Representative were notified. |
| |
| PTS-2000-038; PR-PTS-00-01697. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36842 |
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| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/28/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:33[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/27/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GRANT FERNSLER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/28/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MICHELE EVANS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| - ESF ACTUATION OF REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM DURING DRAINING EVOLUTIONS |
| - |
| |
| During the Unit 1 Refueling and Inspection Outage, the licensee determined |
| that the Reactor Water Cleanup System received an ESF Actuation signal |
| during draining evolutions. The potential for an ESF Actuation is identified |
| in the draining procedure, however after review, the licensee determined |
| that the actuation signal was not part of the planned evolution due to the |
| system not being properly removed from service. An actual isolation did not |
| occur due to the isolation valves being bypassed per the draining procedure. |
| |
| |
| This event has no effect on Unit 2 which is at 100% power. |
| |
| The licensee is investigating this event and determining corrective |
| actions. |
| |
| At 2030 on 03/28/00, while reviewing this event, the licensee determined |
| that this event is reportable to the NRC. This failure requires a four hour |
| ENS notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii). |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36843 |
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| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/29/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:38[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/29/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GRANT FERNSLER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/29/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MICHELE EVANS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE THROUGH CONTROL ROD DRIVE CHECK VALVES |
| |
| "During the Unit 1 Refuel and Inspection Outage, it has been determined that |
| the CRD check valves (CRD Seismic Island) exceeded the as-found minimum path |
| leakage limit of 508 ml/hr. This failure is a degraded condition found while |
| the plant is shutdown, and requires a 4 hour ENS notification under |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021