Event Notification Report for March 23, 2000

- NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT -

During chemical cleaning of motor brake pads in the C-400 alkali tank, it was discovered that the brake pads were placed in the alkali tank before being verified to meet unconditional release limits, in violation of NCSA 400.011.

Compliance with unconditional release limits requires both a removable contamination smear and a fixed uranium contamination survey. The fixed contamination survey was omitted. Compliance with unconditional release limits and a visual inspection for uranium contamination are used to ensure that unknown quantities of fissile material do not enter the alkali tank. The visible inspection required was properly performed. A determination that assay was 5.5 wt% is also required and was performed and documented. However, the determination was documented on the C-400 Chemical Cleaning Log sheet, instead of the form required by CP2-EG-NS1O33.


SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:

The visual inspection of the brake pads showed no uranium contamination and this equipment is not directly in contact with process UF6. The potential for introduction of U-235 into the alkali tank from the brake pads is extremely low, a control relied upon for criticality safety was violated.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCEANARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]:

In order for a criticality to be possible, the accumulation of fissile material involving an unsafe mass and geometry would have to occur. However, since the visual inspection showed no contamination, an accumulation of U-235 above assumed limits did not occur. These limits are a small fraction of the unsafe mass value,

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):

Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two independent controls on mass.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITCAL MASS):

No visible contamination. Therefore, the mass is zero grams.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:

The first leg of double contingency relies on a visual inspection of all internal and external surfaces for uranium contamination to verify no visual contamination. Verification of no visual contamination ensures the mass limit is maintained for assays </= 5.5 wt%. This control was not violated. The second leg of double contingency is based on meeting health physics unconditional release criteria in order to meet the mass limit for assays </= 5.5 wt%. Compliance with the unconditional release criteria was not established. This control was violated when the brake pads were placed in the tank without verification that the unconditional release criteria were met.

One of the two controls on mass was violated, therefore double contingency was not maintained.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:

Sample the alkali tank and verify that the assay is less than 1 wt% U-235 and uranium concentration is less than 1.0 g U/I.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

PGDP Problem Report #ATRC-OO-1758; PGDP Event Report #PAD-2000-023.
Responsible Division: Chemical Operations.

FULL REACTOR SCRAM SIGNALS GENERATED DURING TESTING WHILE REACTOR IS SHUTDOWN

With Unit 2 in a refueling outage, control room operators were performing a Reactor Protection System scram discharge volume (SDV) high water level bypass switch (rod block) functional test. During performance of the test, control room operators placed the SDV high water level bypass switch #2C71-54 in the bypass position and the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. This action caused the generation of a full reactor scram signal. The Control Rod Drive System had already been deenergized and all control rods were already fully inserted into the reactor core.

Control room operators reset the reactor scram signal to normal and placed the bypass switch in the normal position in accordance with the test procedure. However, the bypass switch was placed in the normal position before the SDV had time to drain down. With the SDV water level above the high level alarm setpoint, a second full reactor scram signal was generated.

The licensee restored all systems to normal and is investigating this situation, including reviewing the test procedure.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

C-3 DEFECTS DETECTED DURING EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION OF STEAM GENERATORS

Indian Point 2 is conducting eddy current testing of 100% of the steam generator (SG) tubes. With about 90% of the inspection complete, SG-21 and SG-24 tubes have defects in greater than 1% of the tubes inspected. SG-22 and SG-23 have defects in much less than 1% of the tubes inspected. The majority of the defects are at the support plate intersections and in row 2 U-bends. There are 41 indications in SG-21, 40 at the support plate and 1 in the U-bend. There are 39 indications in SG-24, 36 at the support plate and 3 in the U-bend. In accordance with Technical Specification 4.13, these defects result in a C-3 classification. The testing will continue until 100% of the tubes are inspected.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


UPDATE ON 3/31/2000 BY LAMB, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *

This report is being made as a follow up to previously reported event number 36825. At approximately 1500 today, the tube at Row 2 Column 69 in steam generator 24 failed the three delta pressure requirement during in-situ pressure testing being performed in accordance with NEI 97-06 guidelines to meet Technical Specification requirements. The three delta pressure value was calculated to be 5118 psi, and with uncertainties applied, the test pressure was specified at 5173 psi. Shortly after achieving 5173 psi for the required two seconds specified in the test, pressure was noted to rapidly drop indicating leakage. No leakage was observed at a steam line test pressure of 2841 psi. Therefore, that performance criterion was met.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The operations center notified the R1DO (Evans).

THREE FUEL ASSEMBLIES DETERMINED TO BE IN WRONG POSITIONS IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL

Unit 1 personnel determined that three fuel assemblies, in the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP), were in positions inconsistent with the Technical Specifications (TS). Preliminary assessment indicates that the Keff limit of 0.95 (TS 3.7.15) for the SFP would have still been met. This condition existed for ten days, since the last Unit 1 core offload. The assemblies have been returned to the positions allowed by TS. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause of this event and to determine if the Keff limit was exceeded. There will be a 30 day written report submitted.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

MISSING AIR IONIZER

A generally licensed NRD model P-2021-3000 air ionizer (s/n 115737) was discovered missing from a clean room at the Honeywell SGP facility in Minneapolis. The device had an initial activity of 10 mCi of Po-210, but the caller did not know the current activity. The device was declared lost on 3/23/00 after repeated searches of the facility and interviews of employees did not lead to its recovery. Honeywell has contacted the vendor regarding this matter.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF ELECTRON CAPTURE DETECTOR

The State provided the following information via email:

"During a routine inspection of Chem-Bio Laboratories, Inc. on March 23, 2000, it was determined that a Perkin Elmer Model 330-0119 electron capture detector, previously possessed by the licensee could not be located. The management representative explained that the owner/authorized user had removed that particular source from the device and placed in storage. She stated that she would continue to look for the source. Shortly after the inspector departed the licensee's facility, a call was made to the MSDH-Division of Radiological Health stating that the missing source had been found. During another routine inspection conducted on March 18, 2004, it was discovered that the source was never located. The licensee stated that she called again to inform someone at DRH that she had mistakenly informed the Agency about the source location and the source had never been found. She stated that she has made every effort possible to locate the source, but has not been successful. The licensee also stated that she was aware that a letter should have been sent to our Agency describing the circumstances surrounding the missing source, but failed to do so.

"Isotope: Nickel - 63
"Activity: 15 mCi (millicuries)
"Date Closed: 4-12-04

"State Event Number: MS-04-002

"Enforcement action taken: Violations cited for failure to secure radioactive material from unauthorized removal or access and failure to properly report lost source and provide a written report to the Agency."