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Event Notification Report for March 22, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           03/21/2000 - 03/22/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36812  36815  36819  36820  36821  36822  36823  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36812       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK                REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/19/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:31[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        03/19/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARK SCHALL                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |AL BELISLE           R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE ON THE WITHDRAWAL LINE WELDS OF  |
| THREE CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISMS DURING HYDRO TESTING                      |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "EVENT:  During [the performance of procedure] OPT-80. 1, Reactor Pressure   |
| Vessel ASME Vessel ASME Section XI Pressure Test, reactor coolant system     |
| (RCS) pressure boundary leakage was observed on the withdrawal line welds of |
| three control rod drive mechanisms (CRDM).  The following CRDMS were noted   |
| with leakage:  CRDM 06-15 (10 drops/minute at 1030 psig), CRDM 30-15 (20     |
| drops/minute at 1030 psig) and CRDM 14-19 (20 drops/minute at 1030 psig).    |
| This leakage is outside the acceptance standard of zero leakage per ASME     |
| Section XI, Table IWB-3410-1."                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION:  Minimal; the leakage is well       |
| within the capacity of available injection systems."                         |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTION(S):  The CRDMs will be removed, and the affected areas    |
| repaired prior to reactor startup."                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION 1522 3/21/2000 FROM MARK TURKAL TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * *   |
| *                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Upon further inspection and evaluation, CP&L had determined that the        |
| previously reported leaks from control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) 06-15,   |
| 30-15, and 14-19 do not represent a serious degradation of a principal       |
| safety barrier.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Based on the location of the leaks, it was conservatively assumed to be     |
| pressure boundary leakage coming from the withdrawal line welds to the CRD   |
| housing flange; which was outside the acceptance criteria of zero leakage    |
| per ASME Section XI, Table IWB-3410-1. CP&L notified the NRC at 23:31 EST    |
| (i.e., Event Number 36812), in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), that a |
| condition on Unit 1 had been identified that had it been found while the     |
| reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant,    |
| including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.           |
|                                                                              |
| "Subsequently, repressuization of the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel was     |
| performed and the leaks were observed using advanced video inspection        |
| techniques. Based on this re-inspection, it was determined, on March 21,     |
| 2000, that the leakage was from the CRDM flange bolting and not the          |
| withdrawal line welds. As such, this is not pressure boundary leakage and    |
| the zero leakage acceptance criteria of ASME Section XI, Table IWB-3410-1 is |
| not applicable. This condition does not represent a serious degradation of a |
| principal safety barrier.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "CP&L has evaluated and dispositioned the observed leakage, in accordance    |
| with Code Case N-566-1, 'Corrective Action For Leakage Identified at Bolted  |
| Connections,' and determined it to be insignificant leakage, which is        |
| expected to seal during plant heatup."                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified    |
| R2DO (Decker).                                                               |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Hospital                                         |Event Number:   36815       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  CARDIOLOGY ASSOC OF FAIRFIELD CO.    |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/20/2000|
|LICENSEE:  CARDIOLOGY ASSOCIATES OF FAIRFIELD CO|NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:44[EST]|
|    CITY:  NORWALK                  REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        03/20/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  CT |EVENT TIME:             [EST]|
|LICENSE#:  06-077795-01          AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/21/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |LAURIE PELUSO        R1      |
|                                                |BRIAN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STUART KORCHIN               |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAAA 20.1906(d)           SURFACE CONT/ EXT RAD |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EXTERNAL RADIATION LEVELS EXCEEDING THE LIMITS OF 10 CFR 71.47               |
|                                                                              |
| CARDIOLOGY ASSOCIATES OF FAIRFIELD COUNTY LOCATED AT 40 CROSS STREET IN      |
| NORWLAK, CT, RECEIVED A PACKAGE FROM SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL IN STAMFORD, CT,   |
| LABELED WHITE I WHICH MEASURED 40 mR/HR (EXTERIOR SWIPE READ 38 DPM).   THIS |
| EXCEEDS THE EXTERNAL RADIATION LEVELS ALLOWED FOR WHITE I.  THE PACKAGE      |
| CONTAINED SEVERAL LEAD PIGS OF TECHNETIUM-99m , ONE OF WHICH WAS             |
| CONTAMINATED READING 5652 DPM USING A SWIPE.  THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE      |
| SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL AND THE NRC REGION I OFFICE (SHANBAKY).                 |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1116EST ON 3/21/00 BY S.SANDIN * * *                            |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS REPORT AFTER FURTHER REVIEW AND DISCUSSIONS  |
| WITH REGION I (DARDEN).  NOTIFIED R1DO (MANNING).                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36819       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEQUOYAH                 REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/21/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:15[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:40[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BILL HARRIS                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |AL BELISLE           R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       75       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TURBINE TRIP - REACTOR TRIP                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| An electrical fault on the main generator caused a turbine trip and an       |
| anticipatory reactor trip.  All rods fully inserted and the plant response   |
| to the trip was as expected.  Decay heat is being removed by dumping steam   |
| to the main condenser.   Auxiliary Feedwater started as expected.   Reactor  |
| coolant pumps are running.  Offsite power and the emergency diesel           |
| generators are operable.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is investigating the cause of the turbine trip.  The licensee   |
| notified the NRC resident inspector.                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36820       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HADDAM NECK              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/21/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:48[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        03/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:50[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JON BOWER                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LOUIS MANNING        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Decommissioned   |0        Decommissioned   |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MINOR OIL RELEASE TO DISCHARGE CANAL          |
|                                                                              |
| During demolition of a building, a hydraulic line was severed causing an     |
| approximate 1-2 gallon spill of oil.  A small portion of the spill reached   |
| the discharge canal creating a sheen on the water.  The licensee notified    |
| the State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the   |
| USCG and the National Response Center (NRC).                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36821       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/21/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:44[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        03/21/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        13:50[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/21/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |LARRY CAMPER         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PITTMAN                      |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "Valves being dispositioned as part of the transfer of material storage      |
| areas from DOE to USEC in C-331 were incorrectly handled as NCS exempt       |
| equipment in violation of NCSA GEN-20. NCSA GEN-20 requires that the         |
| equipment be characterized prior to movement/transportation. Valves located  |
| in former DMSAs were incorrectly labeled as exempt from NCS controls based   |
| on invalid assay smear results. The smears contained less than a measurable  |
| quantity of uranium and valid assay results could not be obtained. Assay     |
| smears with uranium below a measurable quantity cannot provide an accurate   |
| measurement of assay. The smear analysis results were incorrectly used to    |
| determine that the equipment assay was below 1%.                             |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Assay smears taken to determine the assay of the valves did not contain     |
| sufficient uranium for analysis. The smears included valve internal          |
| surfaces, but all internal surfaces were not visible. The items have been    |
| decontaminated and holdup of uranium in the internal surfaces is highly      |
| unlikely. In addition, many of the equipment items were not used in UF6      |
| service, however, the assay exemption process is not allowed unless valid    |
| sample analysis results can be obtained.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "In order for criticality to be possible, the accumulation of fissile        |
| material involving an unsafe mass and geometry would have to occur. A        |
| significant amount of uranium is not believed to be present but no valid     |
| quantification of mass has been made.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION ETC.):      |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two      |
| independent controls on assay.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITCAL MASS):                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Unknown due to DOE previously controlling areas.                            |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "No NCS controls (other than providing 10 foot buffer zone) were in place.   |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS              |
| IMPLEMENTED:                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "All equipment which has been improperly characterized will be identified    |
| and characterized with proper independent verification of assay and mass.    |
| The issue of inadequate procedures and/or training for the performance of    |
| independent assay verification will be corrected by retraining of personnel  |
| and/or revision of the applicable procedure prior to the performance of any  |
| further independent assay verifications."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36822       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/21/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:12[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3                    |EVENT DATE:        03/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:50[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GUNDERSON                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM INOPERABLE                     |
|                                                                              |
| "During performance of Unit One HPCI System Logic Functional Test, the HPCI  |
| Auxiliary oil pump would not stay running and the turbine stop valve did not |
| open on receipt of a simulated auto initiation signal. The Auxiliary oil     |
| pump was subsequently taken to manual, at which time the pump stayed running |
| and the turbine stop valve opened. HPCI is inoperable with Engineering and   |
| Maintenance troubleshooting possible pressure switch problems."              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36823       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/22/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:48[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        03/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:36[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE FREGEAU                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/22/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LOUIS MANNING        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - SERVICE WATER SYSTEM NONESSENTIAL VALVES ISOLATED DURING MAINTENANCE       |
| ACTIVITIES -                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| During performance of preplanned Division I Service Water System (SWS) logic |
| circuitry relay replacement activities, an installed electrical jumper       |
| failed to maintain contact within the circuit causing a fuse to blow and the |
| subsequent automatic isolation of the Division II SWS nonessential valves.   |
| This potential failure had been discussed in preevaluation briefings as a    |
| distinct possibility and a contingency was in place.                         |
|                                                                              |
| Maintenance technicians replaced the fuse and restored flow to the           |
| nonessential headers.                                                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+