Event Notification Report for March 22, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
03/21/2000 - 03/22/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36812 36815 36819 36820 36821 36822 36823
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36812 |
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| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/19/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:31[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/19/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK SCHALL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |AL BELISLE R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| DISCOVERY OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE ON THE WITHDRAWAL LINE WELDS OF |
| THREE CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISMS DURING HYDRO TESTING |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "EVENT: During [the performance of procedure] OPT-80. 1, Reactor Pressure |
| Vessel ASME Vessel ASME Section XI Pressure Test, reactor coolant system |
| (RCS) pressure boundary leakage was observed on the withdrawal line welds of |
| three control rod drive mechanisms (CRDM). The following CRDMS were noted |
| with leakage: CRDM 06-15 (10 drops/minute at 1030 psig), CRDM 30-15 (20 |
| drops/minute at 1030 psig) and CRDM 14-19 (20 drops/minute at 1030 psig). |
| This leakage is outside the acceptance standard of zero leakage per ASME |
| Section XI, Table IWB-3410-1." |
| |
| "INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: Minimal; the leakage is well |
| within the capacity of available injection systems." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTION(S): The CRDMs will be removed, and the affected areas |
| repaired prior to reactor startup." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION 1522 3/21/2000 FROM MARK TURKAL TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * |
| * |
| |
| "Upon further inspection and evaluation, CP&L had determined that the |
| previously reported leaks from control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) 06-15, |
| 30-15, and 14-19 do not represent a serious degradation of a principal |
| safety barrier. |
| |
| "Based on the location of the leaks, it was conservatively assumed to be |
| pressure boundary leakage coming from the withdrawal line welds to the CRD |
| housing flange; which was outside the acceptance criteria of zero leakage |
| per ASME Section XI, Table IWB-3410-1. CP&L notified the NRC at 23:31 EST |
| (i.e., Event Number 36812), in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), that a |
| condition on Unit 1 had been identified that had it been found while the |
| reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, |
| including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded. |
| |
| "Subsequently, repressuization of the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel was |
| performed and the leaks were observed using advanced video inspection |
| techniques. Based on this re-inspection, it was determined, on March 21, |
| 2000, that the leakage was from the CRDM flange bolting and not the |
| withdrawal line welds. As such, this is not pressure boundary leakage and |
| the zero leakage acceptance criteria of ASME Section XI, Table IWB-3410-1 is |
| not applicable. This condition does not represent a serious degradation of a |
| principal safety barrier. |
| |
| "CP&L has evaluated and dispositioned the observed leakage, in accordance |
| with Code Case N-566-1, 'Corrective Action For Leakage Identified at Bolted |
| Connections,' and determined it to be insignificant leakage, which is |
| expected to seal during plant heatup." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified |
| R2DO (Decker). |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Hospital |Event Number: 36815 |
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| REP ORG: CARDIOLOGY ASSOC OF FAIRFIELD CO. |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/20/2000|
|LICENSEE: CARDIOLOGY ASSOCIATES OF FAIRFIELD CO|NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:44[EST]|
| CITY: NORWALK REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 03/20/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: CT |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: 06-077795-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/21/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LAURIE PELUSO R1 |
| |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STUART KORCHIN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAAA 20.1906(d) SURFACE CONT/ EXT RAD | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| EXTERNAL RADIATION LEVELS EXCEEDING THE LIMITS OF 10 CFR 71.47 |
| |
| CARDIOLOGY ASSOCIATES OF FAIRFIELD COUNTY LOCATED AT 40 CROSS STREET IN |
| NORWLAK, CT, RECEIVED A PACKAGE FROM SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL IN STAMFORD, CT, |
| LABELED WHITE I WHICH MEASURED 40 mR/HR (EXTERIOR SWIPE READ 38 DPM). THIS |
| EXCEEDS THE EXTERNAL RADIATION LEVELS ALLOWED FOR WHITE I. THE PACKAGE |
| CONTAINED SEVERAL LEAD PIGS OF TECHNETIUM-99m , ONE OF WHICH WAS |
| CONTAMINATED READING 5652 DPM USING A SWIPE. THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE |
| SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL AND THE NRC REGION I OFFICE (SHANBAKY). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1116EST ON 3/21/00 BY S.SANDIN * * * |
| |
| THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS REPORT AFTER FURTHER REVIEW AND DISCUSSIONS |
| WITH REGION I (DARDEN). NOTIFIED R1DO (MANNING). |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36819 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: SEQUOYAH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/21/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:15[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:40[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL HARRIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |AL BELISLE R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 75 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TURBINE TRIP - REACTOR TRIP |
| |
| An electrical fault on the main generator caused a turbine trip and an |
| anticipatory reactor trip. All rods fully inserted and the plant response |
| to the trip was as expected. Decay heat is being removed by dumping steam |
| to the main condenser. Auxiliary Feedwater started as expected. Reactor |
| coolant pumps are running. Offsite power and the emergency diesel |
| generators are operable. |
| |
| The licensee is investigating the cause of the turbine trip. The licensee |
| notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36820 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HADDAM NECK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/21/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:48[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:50[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JON BOWER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LOUIS MANNING R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Decommissioned |0 Decommissioned |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MINOR OIL RELEASE TO DISCHARGE CANAL |
| |
| During demolition of a building, a hydraulic line was severed causing an |
| approximate 1-2 gallon spill of oil. A small portion of the spill reached |
| the discharge canal creating a sheen on the water. The licensee notified |
| the State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the |
| USCG and the National Response Center (NRC). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36821 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/21/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:44[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/21/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:50[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/21/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |LARRY CAMPER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PITTMAN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT |
| |
| "Valves being dispositioned as part of the transfer of material storage |
| areas from DOE to USEC in C-331 were incorrectly handled as NCS exempt |
| equipment in violation of NCSA GEN-20. NCSA GEN-20 requires that the |
| equipment be characterized prior to movement/transportation. Valves located |
| in former DMSAs were incorrectly labeled as exempt from NCS controls based |
| on invalid assay smear results. The smears contained less than a measurable |
| quantity of uranium and valid assay results could not be obtained. Assay |
| smears with uranium below a measurable quantity cannot provide an accurate |
| measurement of assay. The smear analysis results were incorrectly used to |
| determine that the equipment assay was below 1%. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "Assay smears taken to determine the assay of the valves did not contain |
| sufficient uranium for analysis. The smears included valve internal |
| surfaces, but all internal surfaces were not visible. The items have been |
| decontaminated and holdup of uranium in the internal surfaces is highly |
| unlikely. In addition, many of the equipment items were not used in UF6 |
| service, however, the assay exemption process is not allowed unless valid |
| sample analysis results can be obtained. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: |
| |
| "In order for criticality to be possible, the accumulation of fissile |
| material involving an unsafe mass and geometry would have to occur. A |
| significant amount of uranium is not believed to be present but no valid |
| quantification of mass has been made. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION ETC.): |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two |
| independent controls on assay. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITCAL MASS): |
| |
| "Unknown due to DOE previously controlling areas. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| "No NCS controls (other than providing 10 foot buffer zone) were in place. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS |
| IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| "All equipment which has been improperly characterized will be identified |
| and characterized with proper independent verification of assay and mass. |
| The issue of inadequate procedures and/or training for the performance of |
| independent assay verification will be corrected by retraining of personnel |
| and/or revision of the applicable procedure prior to the performance of any |
| further independent assay verifications." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36822 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/21/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:12[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 03/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:50[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GUNDERSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM INOPERABLE |
| |
| "During performance of Unit One HPCI System Logic Functional Test, the HPCI |
| Auxiliary oil pump would not stay running and the turbine stop valve did not |
| open on receipt of a simulated auto initiation signal. The Auxiliary oil |
| pump was subsequently taken to manual, at which time the pump stayed running |
| and the turbine stop valve opened. HPCI is inoperable with Engineering and |
| Maintenance troubleshooting possible pressure switch problems." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36823 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/22/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:48[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 03/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:36[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE FREGEAU |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/22/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LOUIS MANNING R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - SERVICE WATER SYSTEM NONESSENTIAL VALVES ISOLATED DURING MAINTENANCE |
| ACTIVITIES - |
| |
| During performance of preplanned Division I Service Water System (SWS) logic |
| circuitry relay replacement activities, an installed electrical jumper |
| failed to maintain contact within the circuit causing a fuse to blow and the |
| subsequent automatic isolation of the Division II SWS nonessential valves. |
| This potential failure had been discussed in preevaluation briefings as a |
| distinct possibility and a contingency was in place. |
| |
| Maintenance technicians replaced the fuse and restored flow to the |
| nonessential headers. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021