Event Notification Report for March 14, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
03/13/2000 - 03/14/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36709 36790 36791 36792
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36709 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/19/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:52[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/18/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:25[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/13/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BEASLEY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION - FAILURE OF THE UF6 RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM |
| |
| At 1325 CST, on 2/18/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified |
| of an air leak on the C-310 Cylinder Valve Closure System. The function of |
| this system is to close the cylinder valve in the case of an actuation of |
| the UF6 Release Detection and Isolation System Low Voltage ("New") System at |
| the UF6 Withdrawal Stations. TSR 2.3.4.1 requires this system to be |
| operable while operating in mod 2. At the time the leak was discovered, |
| the air pressure on the Cylinder Valve Closure System was being maintained |
| within allowed parameters. However due to the size of the leak, it was |
| questionable as to if the system could maintain enough air pressure to |
| perform its intended safety function, if it were called upon. After |
| discussing with the C-310 building System Engineer, the PSS could not be |
| provided with reasonable assurance of operability. The UF6 Release |
| detection System was declared inoperable by the PSS, and repair of the |
| system was initiated. TSR required LCO actions were implemented. Repair of |
| the air leak was completed, and the UF6 Release Detection System was |
| returned to Operable status at 1706 CST, on 2/18/00. |
| |
| This event is reportable under 10 CFR 7B.120(c)(2) as an event in which |
| equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed. |
| |
| The NRC Senior Resident inspector has been notified of this event and the |
| DOE on site representative was also informed. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 3/13/00 @ 1438 BY WALKER TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. Engineering Evaluation EN-C-826-00-018 |
| concluded that the capacity of the backup nitrogen supply regulator was |
| sufficient to provide for this backflow and loss of system air, and still |
| capable of providing flow to close two cylinder valves simultaneously. |
| Thus, the system was capable of performing its intended safety function |
| using nitrogen had it been called upon during the time of the subject event |
| and the 10CFR76.120 reporting criteria were not met. Given the results of |
| this Engineering Evaluation, this event is being retracted. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was informed and the Reg 3 RDO(Jacobson) and NMSS |
| EO(Smith) were notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36790 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:00[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/13/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 19:57[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/13/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN JACOBSON R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |THOMAS ESSIG NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MCCLEARY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE |
| |
| The Plant Shift Superintendent(PSS) was notified of two seal test buggies on |
| the cell floor of the X-333 facility containing a vacuum pump whose oil |
| reservoir volume was greater than the NCSA PLANT 069.A00 requirement of a 1 |
| quart reservoir. Boundaries were placed around the buggies and the buggies |
| were made inoperable to prevent use. The NCSE allows 3 quarts for normal |
| operations and an analyses for 5 quart reservoir for "abnormal operations." |
| Therefore, the safety significance is low since the pumps supplied by the |
| manufacturer have a reservoir volume of more than 3 quarts due to a design |
| modification. The site only had 4 pumps (two installed and two on the |
| shelf) with this design modification. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| The safety significance of this event is low. The NCSE evaluates a pump |
| filled to a capacity of 5 quarts and shows the system to remain subcritical. |
| NCSE- PLANT 031 .E03, for similar carts, modeled a cart with a 5 quart |
| vacuum pump adjacent to another cart and found that the system to be |
| subcritical with a Keff +2q (sigma) of 0.841. |
| |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| The Kinney model vacuum pump has a volume capacity of less than 4 quarts. |
| For a criticality to occur, a cart with a pump with a capacity of 5 quarts |
| would have to be used. The chemical traps in front of the pump would have |
| to be empty or saturated such that the pump oil becomes saturated with |
| uranium, and a spacing violation would have to occur. |
| |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| The controlled parameters in this NCSA are volume and interaction. |
| |
| |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| The carts are approved for use with 100% enriched material. The form of the |
| material is uranium in oil. This system has been modeled and the Keff |
| +2q(sigma) determined to be 0.841 for this upset. |
| |
| |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| The pump has been modified by the manufacturer to hold more than 3 quarts |
| |
| |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| Established conditions as required by the Anomalous Condition procedure. |
| |
| The double contingency cannot be established within 4 hours and is |
| reportable. |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and DOE Representative were notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36791 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/14/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: AR |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:11[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 03/14/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:05[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ALAN SMITH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/14/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAVID GRAVES R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |BRUCE BOGER NRR |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 82 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 MANUALLY TRIPPED FOLLOWING A FAILURE OF THE MAIN TURBINE GOVERNOR |
| VALVES CONTROL SYSTEM |
| |
| "The Unit 1 Reactor was manually tripped following a failure of the main |
| turbine governor valves control system. This failure resulted in the main |
| turbine governor valves inadvertently going closed. At the time of the |
| event, Unit 1 was at 82% power and proceeding to 100% power following the |
| completion of maintenance outage 1P-00-2. |
| |
| "Unit 1 has been stabilized in Hot Shutdown (550 degrees F, 2125 psig, and |
| the reactor is subcritical). No radioactive releases have occurred nor are |
| any planned." |
| |
| Prior to the transient the turbine governor valve position limit was acting |
| erratically. All control rods fully inserted. Following the trip, primary |
| pressure increased to 2300 psig. Three(3) of eight(8) mainsteam (MS) |
| safeties lifted and reseated on each MS header. Also, Bus "1H1" which |
| supplies power to two Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) was slow in transferring |
| to the startup transformer. This resulted in both "P32A" and P32C" RCPs |
| tripping. The 1H1 bus remained energized during the transient. |
| |
| Unit 1 is currently removing decay heat using RCPs "P32B" and P32D" (one |
| operating in each reactor coolant loop) with steam discharging to the Main |
| Condenser. All safety-related equipment including the Emergency Diesel |
| Generators (EDGs) is available, if needed. I&C is investigating the cause |
| of the governor valves' control system failure and the Relay Department is |
| evaluating the slow bus transfer. |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Arkansas. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36792 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEQUOYAH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/14/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:01[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/14/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:35[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL HARRIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/14/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |EDWARD MCALPINE R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |BRUCE BOGER NRR |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL PHASE "A" AND CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION INITIATED DUE TO SHUTDOWN |
| LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA). |
| |
| "Unit 1 was in Mode 5 with Cycle 10 refueling outage in progress. At 0017 |
| on 3/14/00 with RCS temperature at 145 F and RCS pressure at 330 psig. Unit |
| 1 entered Abnormal Operating Procedure R.02 (Shutdown LOCA) due to |
| decreasing pressurizer level. A manual Phase A and Containment Vent |
| Isolation were initiated at 0035 as required by procedure. The loss of RCS |
| coolant was initially contained in the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) until |
| the PRT rupture disc ruptured. At 0125, AOP R.02 was completed and plant |
| conditions were stabilized with RCS temperature at 156 F and RCS pressure at |
| 145 psig. At present there is no RCS leakage, plant conditions are stable, |
| and suspected cause is the RHR suction or discharge piping relief valve. |
| Investigation is in progress." |
| |
| The transient lasted approximately 30 minutes. The licensee suspects that |
| when RCS pressure was lowered per the AOP, the relief valve reseated. There |
| is no estimate of the lost RCS inventory at this time. |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021