Event Notification Report for March 06, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/05/2000 - 03/06/2000
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36763
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JEFF CASTLE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JEFF CASTLE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/07/2000
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2000
Event Time: 21:42 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2000
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2000
Event Time: 21:42 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
- X-342 BUILDING EVACUATED DUE TO A VALID ACTUATION OF A "Q" SAFETY SYSTEM -
At 2142 on 03/06/00, X-342 building feed and sampling operations personnel viewed smoke escaping from the pigtail (female) to manifold (male) fitting for a cylinder in autoclave #2. The release started when the cylinder valve was opened. The building personnel evacuated the building and remotely placed the autoclave in containment shutdown. Placing the autoclave in containment shutdown by design resulted in closure of the pigtail line isolation/safety valve and a manual actuation of that particular safety system. The safety system was actuated while the autoclave was in an applicable TSR mode (TSR 2.1.3.13). The plant emergency response process and procedures were implemented. Results of all surveys performed during the emergency response were less than detectable. Plant personnel plan to inspect the subject area and repair/replace damaged parts.
This event is reportable to the NRC as a valid actuation of a "Q" Safety System in accordance with Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.9 (24-Hour Report).
There was no loss of hazardous or radioactive material nor radioactive or radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.
Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Site DOE Representative.
PTS-2000-026, PR-PTS-00-01308.
At 2142 on 03/06/00, X-342 building feed and sampling operations personnel viewed smoke escaping from the pigtail (female) to manifold (male) fitting for a cylinder in autoclave #2. The release started when the cylinder valve was opened. The building personnel evacuated the building and remotely placed the autoclave in containment shutdown. Placing the autoclave in containment shutdown by design resulted in closure of the pigtail line isolation/safety valve and a manual actuation of that particular safety system. The safety system was actuated while the autoclave was in an applicable TSR mode (TSR 2.1.3.13). The plant emergency response process and procedures were implemented. Results of all surveys performed during the emergency response were less than detectable. Plant personnel plan to inspect the subject area and repair/replace damaged parts.
This event is reportable to the NRC as a valid actuation of a "Q" Safety System in accordance with Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.9 (24-Hour Report).
There was no loss of hazardous or radioactive material nor radioactive or radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.
Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Site DOE Representative.
PTS-2000-026, PR-PTS-00-01308.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36762
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: ROCKY MOUNTAIN CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DON BUNN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: ROCKY MOUNTAIN CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DON BUNN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/07/2000
Notification Time: 12:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2000
Notification Time: 12:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
DAVID LOVELESS (R4)
DON COOL (NMSS)
DAVID LOVELESS (R4)
DON COOL (NMSS)
- CESIUM-137 SOURCE LOCATED IN A LOAD OF SCRAP STEEL IN A SCRAP YARD IN UTAH -
On 03/06/00, Ed Johnson of Rocky Mountain Consultants notified California Radiologic Health Branch (RHB) that he had discovered a 10 millicurie Cs-137 source in a load of scrap steel that originated from California. The
source was in a train car of scrap steel that set off the radiation monitor at Nucor Steel Company, Utah. Mr Johnson searched the load and discovered a Cs-137 source that had been removed from the body of a CPN portable gauge. The source appeared to have been through a shredder but the serial number was visible. The source manufacturer, Amersham, said it was delivered to CPN who said they installed it in a MC-1 gauge, serial number M-19089075. The gauge was sold to Petra Geotechnical Company, license #2933 in 1989. This gauge was reported stolen on 12/12/94 and an investigation was conducted at that time. Mr Johnson said the source will be shipped to CPN who will dispose of it.
The Am-241 neutron source was not located in the load of scrap steel. RHB-LA plans to go to Williams Recycling Company, Los Angeles, where the load originated, and survey their facility to try to locate it. The scrap yard operator had installed a $30,000 Bicron gate monitor system three years ago to keep unwanted radioactive material out of the scrap yard, but apparently this did not work. A 5010 has been opened and assigned to RHB-LA & Brea to investigate.
RBH plans to notify NRC of this incident after results of the survey at Williams Recycling Company are known.
On 03/06/00, Ed Johnson of Rocky Mountain Consultants notified California Radiologic Health Branch (RHB) that he had discovered a 10 millicurie Cs-137 source in a load of scrap steel that originated from California. The
source was in a train car of scrap steel that set off the radiation monitor at Nucor Steel Company, Utah. Mr Johnson searched the load and discovered a Cs-137 source that had been removed from the body of a CPN portable gauge. The source appeared to have been through a shredder but the serial number was visible. The source manufacturer, Amersham, said it was delivered to CPN who said they installed it in a MC-1 gauge, serial number M-19089075. The gauge was sold to Petra Geotechnical Company, license #2933 in 1989. This gauge was reported stolen on 12/12/94 and an investigation was conducted at that time. Mr Johnson said the source will be shipped to CPN who will dispose of it.
The Am-241 neutron source was not located in the load of scrap steel. RHB-LA plans to go to Williams Recycling Company, Los Angeles, where the load originated, and survey their facility to try to locate it. The scrap yard operator had installed a $30,000 Bicron gate monitor system three years ago to keep unwanted radioactive material out of the scrap yard, but apparently this did not work. A 5010 has been opened and assigned to RHB-LA & Brea to investigate.
RBH plans to notify NRC of this incident after results of the survey at Williams Recycling Company are known.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36760
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: JON GLUECK
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: JON GLUECK
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/06/2000
Notification Time: 13:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2000
Event Time: 11:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2000
Notification Time: 13:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2000
Event Time: 11:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
DAVID LOVELESS (R4)
DAVID LOVELESS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
- TECH SPEC REQUIRED PLANT SHUTDOWN DUE TO SMALL UNISOLABLE LEAK IN THE CVC SYSTEM -
At 1145 CST on 03/06/00, the licensee entered Tech Spec 3.0.3 due to visually observing a small crack (approximately 1/4 inch long) located at a welded joint in the suction line of the 'A' Charging and Volume Control (CVC) pump, leaking approximately 1 drop every 2 minutes. This rendered the entire CVC System inoperable. The leaking weld is unisolable from the entire charging header.
Tech Spec 3.1.2.4 requires at least two charging pumps to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. With only one charging pump operable, restoration of at least two charging pumps to operable status within 72 hours is required. Currently, the leakage is not preventing the system from performing its design function. The most closely affected charging pump has been secured to limit the line vibration, which is the apparent cause of the leak.
At 1222 CST on 03/06/00, the licensee commenced a plant shutdown from 100% power. Tech Spec 3.0.3 requires the plant to be in Hot Standby Mode within 6 hours. The licensee plans to cool the plant down to repair the leaking weld.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1145 CST on 03/06/00, the licensee entered Tech Spec 3.0.3 due to visually observing a small crack (approximately 1/4 inch long) located at a welded joint in the suction line of the 'A' Charging and Volume Control (CVC) pump, leaking approximately 1 drop every 2 minutes. This rendered the entire CVC System inoperable. The leaking weld is unisolable from the entire charging header.
Tech Spec 3.1.2.4 requires at least two charging pumps to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. With only one charging pump operable, restoration of at least two charging pumps to operable status within 72 hours is required. Currently, the leakage is not preventing the system from performing its design function. The most closely affected charging pump has been secured to limit the line vibration, which is the apparent cause of the leak.
At 1222 CST on 03/06/00, the licensee commenced a plant shutdown from 100% power. Tech Spec 3.0.3 requires the plant to be in Hot Standby Mode within 6 hours. The licensee plans to cool the plant down to repair the leaking weld.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.