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Event Notification Report for March 6, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           03/03/2000 - 03/06/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36660  36662  36707  36750  36751  36752  36753  36754  36755  36756  36757  36758 


!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36660       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:14[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:39[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  M VASELY                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/03/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |TONY DIMITRIADIS     R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       99       Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| VALIDITY OF ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE 30 MINUTE NITROGEN BACKUP SUPPLY IN QUESTION |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| During the review of Consolidated Edison calculation FIX-0030-02, Nitrogen   |
| Backup Supply for control of Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Control Valves,        |
| Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, and Atmospheric Steam Dump          |
| Controls, questions arose as to the validity of the assumption statements    |
| that resulted in the design basis for 30 minutes of nitrogen could not be    |
| sustained.  The assumptions are in the process of being validated.  A third  |
| nitrogen bottle has been placed in backup alignment to maintain the 30       |
| minute requirement.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| 3 of the 6 Nitrogen Backup Bottles are now valved in instead of 2.           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0936 ON 03/03/00 BY PHIL SANTINI TO JOLLIFFE * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| Additional licensee engineering review has determined that the Nitrogen      |
| Backup Supply for control of Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Control Valves,        |
| Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, and Atmospheric Steam Dump Controls |
| does meet the design basis as documented in licensee calculation             |
| FIX-0030-02.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Thus, the licensee desires to retract this event.                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Jim Trapp.                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36662       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/05/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:42[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/04/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        20:00[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/03/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |TONY VEGEL           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOE HOLONICH         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ERIC WALKER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii)    EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM HORN FAILED SURVEILLANCE                   |
|                                                                              |
| At 1600 on 02-04-2000 the PSS was informed of the failure of a criticality   |
| accident alarm system (CAAS) air horn to sound during the performance of     |
| surveillance testing.  The cause of the failure was determined to be debris  |
| in the air line fouling the flow path for the horn.   Subsequently, after    |
| this horn was repaired and the air horn line blown out, another air horn on  |
| the same branch line became clogged and would not sound sufficiently.  This  |
| horn was also repaired and its line blown out.  The system was retested      |
| satisfactorily and declared operable at 2245 on 02-04-00.  It is possible    |
| that the system would not have performed its intended safety function if it  |
| had been required to before it was declared inoperable.                      |
|                                                                              |
| This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as an event in which      |
| equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed.  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 3/3/00 @ 1732 BY WALKER TO GOULD * * *  RETRACTION           |
|                                                                              |
| THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. Subsequent testing of the C-337A CAAS horn    |
| system with the subject horn valved out, has shown that the CAAS meets the   |
| requirements for audibility in this area without this horn. Engineering      |
| Evaluation EV-C-812-00-003 Rev. 0 was completed to document the conclusions  |
| of this testing.                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident inspector was informed.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The Reg 3 RDO(Jordan) and NMSS EO(Sherr) were notified.                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36707       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/18/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:03[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/18/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:             [EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/03/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ERIC SPAETH                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NCFR                     NON CFR REPORT REQMNT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| At 1335 hours on 02/17/00 a see and flee emergency was initiated at the      |
| X-330 building Tails position #1. The see and flee was Initiated as a result |
| of a process gas release from the pigtail on Tails position #1. The release  |
| was large enough to exceed the capacity of portable mini-gulper staged In    |
| the area. The mini-gulper is used to divert and contain any small releases   |
| that may occur during pigtail connect/disconnect operations. The release of  |
| process gas caused a valid actuation of the pyrotronics smokehead safety     |
| system. The pyrotronics smokeheads and pigtail line isolation safety systems |
| operated as designed during this event.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| UPDATE AT 1445EST ON 3/300 FROM KURT SISLER TO S.SANDIN * * *                |
|                                                                              |
| The Regulatee is retracting this report based on the following:              |
|                                                                              |
| "Nuclear Regulatory Affairs has reviewed the basis for Portsmouth Event      |
| Report Notification PTS-2000-017, 'X-330 Tails Withdrawal, Pyrotronics       |
| Smokehead Actuation due to PG Release Exceeding the Capacity of the Gulper', |
| and determined that the event should be retracted. (Reference problem report |
| PR-PTS-00.-0096S).                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "On February 17, 2000 at 1335 hours, an outgassing occurred during the       |
| connection of an empty cylinder at Tails position 1. The outgassing was      |
| attributed to pressure inside the evacuation manifold due to a cylinder      |
| burping operation which had just been completed at Tails position 3. When    |
| position 3 was burped, the 1-inch diameter evacuation piping and the         |
| position 1 pigtail, which was valved into the evacuation header, would have  |
| been exposed to UF6 at above atmospheric pressure. When the burping          |
| operation was completed, the position 3 evacuation was valved off and UF6    |
| withdrawal was restarted.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "The operator proceeded to complete the connection of a new cylinder at      |
| position 1. The operator, who was wearing appropriate personal protective    |
| equipment, cracked open and closed the pigtail safety valve per procedure,   |
| to evacuate the small space between the cylinder safety valve and the        |
| pigtail safety switch, which plugs the safety valve when it is not connected |
| to a cylinder This exposed the space to UF6.  As the operator began to       |
| remove the pigtail safety switch, he observed smoke which was contained by   |
| the gulper. The operator closed the valve and attempted to tighten fittings. |
| When the pigtail safety valve was again cracked open and closed to evacuate  |
| the line, smoke exceeded the capacity of the gulper to contain the release   |
| and set off both Pyrotronics smokeheads above position 1. The pigtail safety |
| valve was already closed and the Pigtail Line Isolation System closed the    |
| manifold safety valve at position 1 automatically. The event was initially   |
| determined to be reportable as a Safety System actuation of the Pigtail Line |
| Isolation System in accordance with the Safety Analysis Report Section 6.9,  |
| Table 6.9-1, J.2.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "The TSR 2.5.3.4 Basis Statement indicates that the purpose of the Pigtail   |
| Line Isolation System is to minimize a release of liquid UF, due to pigtail  |
| failure during a withdrawal (Modes II and III). Since the pigtail was        |
| isolated from the liquid UF, system while the cylinder was being connected,  |
| Tails Withdrawal position 1 was in preparation mode (Mode I) and the Pigtail |
| Line Isolation System safety function was not required.                      |
|                                                                              |
| "The reporting criteria in Table 6.9-1, J.2 states that an actuation is      |
| reportable for events having the potential for significant impact on the     |
| health and safety of personnel. Events having the potential for significant  |
| impact are those events where actual plant conditions existed that the       |
| system was designed to protect against. Since position 1 was not in a Mode   |
| for which the safety system was required to be operable, this event has been |
| determined to not be reportable to NRC. Accordingly, this was not a valid    |
| actuation of a safety system. The event notification PTS-2000-017 may be     |
| retracted."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Operations informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE Site              |
| Representative.  Notified R3DO(Jordan) and NMSS(Cool).                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36750       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK                REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/03/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:38[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        03/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:50[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEVIN SMALL / KEN HILL       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/03/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          UNU                   |LEN WERT             R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |TAD MARSH            NRR     |
|AAEC 50.72 (a) (1) (I)   EMERGENCY DECLARED     |FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
|NOCM                     COMM ASST BRIEF        |KEN CIBOCH           FEMA    |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER TO 4 kV EMERGENCY      |
| BUSES (REFER TO EVENT #36751 AND EVENT #36752 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.) - |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| At 0950 on 03/03/00, with Unit 1 in a refueling outage, the licensee         |
| declared an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power to 4 kV emergency   |
| buses E-1 and E-2 due to a mispositioned switch during relay testing.  All   |
| four emergency diesel generators (two for each unit) started; both Unit 1    |
| EDGs are in operation powering buses E-1 and E-2.  Shutdown cooling was lost |
| but has been restored; spent fuel pool temperature is normal at 83F.  The   |
| licensee has suspended all fuel movement and is restoring power to systems   |
| that lost power.  Unit 1 is stable.  Unit 2, which is at 100% power, is      |
| unaffected by this event.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and state and local         |
| officials.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 3/3/00 @ 1226 BY HILL TO GOULD * * *                         |
|                                                                              |
| WHILE ATTEMPTING TO COME OUT OF THE LOSS OF OFF SITE POWER CONDITION, THE    |
| PLANT HAD AN OVERCURRENT ALARM ON THE D/G-2, AND THEY LOST POWER FROM THE    |
| NORMAL AND EMERGENCY POWER SOURCES TO THE E-2 BUS AT 1200.  THIS IN TURN     |
| RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF SHUT DOWN COOLING.   SHUTDOWN COOLING WAS RESTORED   |
| AT 1218 WITH MINIMAL TEMPERATURE INCREASE.  THEY ALSO HAD THE HALON SYSTEM   |
| ACTUATION IN THE D/G BASEMENT AREA.  THE CAUSE OF THIS MAY HAVE BEEN RELATED |
| TO THE GROUND ON THE E-2 BUS.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.   THE REG 2 RDO(WERT), NRR EO(HANNON),  |
| AND IRO(CONGEL) WERE NOTIFIED.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 3/3/00 @ 1615 * * *  COMMISSIONER'S ASSISTANTS BRIEF         |
|                                                                              |
| MALLETT(BRIEFER), MARSH(NRR EO), REYES(RA), EASLICK(RI), COLLINS(NRR),       |
| MILLER(IRO), WERT(RDO), WIENS(NRR), BEECHER(PA), LOHAS(SP), FAULKNER(IP),    |
| SATORIUS(EDO), BATES(SECY), CHAN(CHAIRMAN MESERVES' ASST), OLENCZ(COMM.      |
| DICUS' ASST), SHARFEY(COMM. MCGAFFIGAN'S ASST), CASTLEMAN(COMM. DIAZ'S       |
| ASST), AND McCABE(COMM. MERRIFIELD"S ASST).                                  |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 3/3/00 @ 1844 FROM JOLICOEUR TO GOULD * * *                  |
|                                                                              |
| NOUE TERMINATED AT 1840 DUE TO RESTORING POWER FROM NORMAL OFF-SITE SOURCES  |
| TO THE E-1 AND E-2 BUSSES.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| REG 2 RDO(WERT), NRR EO(HANNON), IRO(CONGEL), AND FEMA(STIENDRUF) WERE       |
| NOTIFIED.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36751       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK                REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/03/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:25[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        03/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:31[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JESTER                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/03/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LEN WERT             R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE PLANT HAD ESF ACTUATION DURING THE LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT.  (REFER  |
| TO EVENT #36750 AND EVENT #36752 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.)                |
|                                                                              |
| With Brunswick Unit 1 shutdown for refueling at approximately 09:31 on       |
| 3/3/00 while performing procedure TM-TTBUS1A (Trip Testing of 230KV Bus 1A)  |
| a loss of power to the Unit 1 BOP 4160 and emergency busses occurred.  This  |
| caused an automatic start of 4 diesel generators with diesels number 1 and 2 |
| loading and restoring power to their respective emergency busses.  Unit 1    |
| received a group 8 isolation signal that caused a loss of shutdown cooling.  |
| Core alterations were secured and shutdown cooling was reestablished at      |
| 09:52.  A small rise in reactor coolant temperature occurred (89F was the   |
| maximum) and the coolant system did not approach boiling temperatures.  Six  |
| group isolation signals occurred with various valves closing depending on    |
| initial (pre-event) position.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The following actuations occurred:  4 Diesel generators started, Reactor     |
| Building HVAC isolated, Standby                                              |
| Gas trains started, and an RPS trip occurred (no rod motion occurred due to  |
| all rods being inserted).                                                    |
| Systems and components performed as designed based on initial assessment of  |
| the event.  An Unusual Event                                                 |
| was declared at 09:50 (event #36750) due to a loss of offsite power to the   |
| emergency busses.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| At approximately 12:00 an actuation of the diesel building fire protection   |
| halon system occurred with an isolation of the control building ventilation  |
| system.  A subsequent loss of emergency bus E2 occurred due to a trip of     |
| DG#2, which resulted in a second loss of shutdown cooling on Unit 1.  Group  |
| isolations similar to those occurring initially also occurred.  Shutdown     |
| cooling was reestablished at 12:18.  The plant is stable and investigation   |
| into the cause of the DG trip is underway.  The plant fire brigade responded |
| and found no immediate evidence of a fire.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with state and local           |
| officials.                                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36752       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK                REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/03/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:29[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        03/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:57[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HILL                         |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/03/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LEN WERT             R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A)   PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR SHUT DOWN DUE TO ENTERING TS 3.0.3. LCO ACTION STATEMENT.  (REFER TO |
| EVENT #36750 AND EVENT #36751 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.)                   |
|                                                                              |
| At 1300 hours, Unit 2 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 due to the loss  |
| of diesel generator #2 while two off-site AC circuits were inoperable as     |
| required by Limiting Condition of Operation 3.8.1, Condition I.  The loss of |
| AC power and the diesel generator failure were previously reported in ENS    |
| #36751.  At 1357 hours, Unit 2 reactor shutdown commenced from 100% power.   |
|                                                                              |
| INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION:  The significance of this occurrence |
| is minimal.  Sufficient redundant equipment remains operable such that no    |
| safety functions have been lost.  Plant conditions are stable at this time.  |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTION(S):  Efforts to restore the inoperable equipment are in    |
| progress. Reference ENS # 36751                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 3/3/00 @ 2008 BY BELLER TO GOULD * * *                       |
|                                                                              |
| PLANT EXITED THE 3.0.3 LCO AT 1756 WHEN THE UNIT 1 STARTUP AUX TRANSFORMER   |
| WAS USED TO POWER THE EMERGENCY BUSSES.  THEY ARE STILL IN A 12-HOUR LCO     |
| ACTION STATEMENT TO RESTORE UNIT 1 UNIT AUXILLARY TRANSFORMER TO SERVICE OR  |
| BE IN HOT SHUTDOWN IN THE FOLLOWING 12 HOURS.  POWER HAD BEEN REDUCED TO     |
| APPROXIMATELY 60%.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE.  THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER   |
| NOTIFIED THE R2DO (WERT).                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36753       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/03/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:56[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        03/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:17[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROY GREEN                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/03/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |WAYNE LANNING        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JIM TRAPP            R1      |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |JOHN HANNON          NRR     |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     M/R        Y       28       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING A LOSS OF FEEDWATER SEAL INJECTION FLOW       |
| DURING PLANT SHUTDOWN                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "WHILE PERFORMING A NORMAL SHUTDOWN, THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY SCRAMMED AT    |
| 1417EST DUE TO A LOSS OF SEAL WATER TO THE OPERATING FEEDWATER PUMP AND ITS  |
| POTENTIAL FAILURE.  ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED.  SUBSEQUENT TO THE MANUAL       |
| SCRAM, AN AUTOMATIC SCRAM WAS RECEIVED ON REACTOR WATER LEVEL 3.  AN ATTEMPT |
| WAS MADE TO MANUALLY INITIATE REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING TO ASSIST WITH  |
| REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL.  THE RCIC SYSTEM FAILED TO INITIATE DUE TO A    |
| TRIPPED TRIP THROTTLE VALVE.  AT 1420EST THE RCIC SYSTEM WAS DECLARED        |
| INOPERABLE.  THE RCIC SYSTEM HAS BEEN RESTORED TO STANDBY.  THE OPERATING    |
| FEEDWATER PUMP CURRENTLY REMAINS IN SERVICE AND SCRAM RECOVERY PROCEDURE AND |
| REACTOR COOLDOWN ARE IN PROGRESS."                                           |
|                                                                              |
| FOLLOWING THE SCRAM MINIMAL SEAL INJECTION FLOW WAS AVAILABLE TO THE         |
| OPERATING FEEDWATER PUMP.  DECAY HEAT IS CURRENTLY BEING REJECTED TO THE     |
| MAIN CONDENSER.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED.                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36754       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MONTICELLO               REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/03/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:34[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        03/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:15[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PFEFFER                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/03/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MIKE JORDAN          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ISOLATION CONTROLS FOR THE TIP GUIDE TUBE ARE NOT DESIGNED/QUALIFIED FOR     |
| SAFETY RELATED SERVICE.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The Transverse Incore Probe (TIP) guide tube primary containment isolation   |
| controls are not designed or qualified for safety-related service.  This     |
| could result in a condition outside the Design Basis of the plant because    |
| multiple failures could cause the undesirable opening of the TIP ball valves |
| during a Design Basis Accident.  However, the TIP valve and TIP Shear Valve  |
| Actuation circuits remain operable and continue to be capable of operating   |
| as containment isolation valves. The TIP Ball Valve power source is through  |
| the TIP Drive Mechanism. The TIP Ball Valves will be disabled by removing    |
| the power source from the drive Mechanism when the TIP system is not in use. |
| The drive Mechanism power will be restored, under administrative controls,   |
| when the TIP system is required to be used.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36755       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK                     REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/03/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:42[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  NANCE                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/03/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MIKE JORDAN          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE LICENSEE DETERMINED A CONDITION FOUND WHICH COULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE   |
| PLANT BEING SERIOUSLY DEGRADED.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| As a result of an Engineering evaluation of all safety-related large bore    |
| piping, a number of as-built discrepancies were found with portions of the   |
| Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal, Safety Injection and Containment Spray piping  |
| systems. This analysis has concluded that these piping systems deviate from  |
| the design criteria USAS 831.1-1967, which is the code of record for the     |
| Cook Nuclear Plant.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| As the design and construction of the corresponding systems in Unit 1 are    |
| similar, this notification is being made for both units despite the fact     |
| that the Unit 1 review effort has not been completed.                        |
|                                                                              |
| Though informal evaluations have concluded that the piping is unlikely to    |
| fail in a postulated seismic event, no formal analysis exists to support     |
| this conclusion. The engineering efforts to evaluate and resolve these       |
| issues are ongoing.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Both units are currently in no Technical Specification Operating mode with   |
| both cores unloaded.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The Resident Inspector will be notified.                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36756       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FARLEY                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:37[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        00:18[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  WESS CUMBEE                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LEN WERT             R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       0        Startup          |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNEXPECTED AUTOMATIC AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP START                          |
|                                                                              |
| While passing through Mode 2 in the process of shutting down Unit 1 to enter |
| refueling outage #16, the last running feedwater pump was secured without    |
| defeating the automatic start defeat switch on the balance of plant.  This   |
| resulted in the automatic start of the 'B' motor-driven auxiliary feedwater  |
| pump.  The other auxiliary feedwater pump was already running.               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that a procedure step was missed and that an occurrence  |
| report has been initiated to determine why the procedure step was missed.    |
| The licensee also stated that all systems functioned as required and that    |
| there was noting unusual or not understood.  The unit is currently in Mode 3 |
| (Hot Standby).                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector who was at the site         |
| observing the unit shutdown.                                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36757       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:05[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        03/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:45[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TERRY BELTZ                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JIM TRAPP            R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF A REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) FLOW CONTROL            |
| IRREGULARITY DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF SURVEILLANCE TESTING                  |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "A RCIC flow control irregularity was identified during quarterly RCIC       |
| surveillance testing.  Upon reaching the required flow rate of 400 gpm, RCIC |
| flow dipped to approximately 360 gpm for 1 - 2 minutes before stabilizing at |
| 400 gpm.  Engineering is evaluating this condition.  In the interim, the     |
| RCIC system has been declared inoperable.  The plant is in a 7-day           |
| [technical specification limiting condition for operation (LCO)]."           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36758       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOPER                   REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/06/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:39[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        03/05/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:00[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVEN JOBE                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/06/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES CAIN         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Hot Shutdown     |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FAILURE TO MEET DRYWELL-TO-SUPPRESSION CHAMBER LEAKAGE TEST ACCEPTANCE       |
| CRITERIA                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "The acceptance criteria specified for the DRYWELL-TO-SUPPRESSION CHAMBER    |
| LEAKAGE TEST was not met.  The as-found value of 0.51 [inches] H2O/Min       |
| exceeded the operability value of <= 0.2 [inches] H2O/Min.  Based on this,   |
| the operability of the drywell-to-suppression chamber vent pipes, vent       |
| header down corners, and vacuum breakers cannot be assumed.  Primary         |
| containment was declared inoperable based on a failure to meet the           |
| requirements of [surveillance requirement (SR)] 3.6.1.1.2, Verify drywell to |
| suppression chamber bypass leakage is equivalent to a hole < 1.0 inch in     |
| diameter."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "[The unit] entered [limiting condition for operation (LCO)] 3.6.1.1,        |
| Condition A, requiring the restoration of primary containment to an operable |
| status within 1 hour.  If this required action is not met, Condition B.1     |
| requires having the reactor in Mode 3 within 12 hours and B.2 requires       |
| having the reactor in Mode 4 within 36 hours."                               |
|                                                                              |
| "Currently[, the unit is] in Mode 3 for commencing [a] planned refueling     |
| outage."                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "Engineering evaluation of test results is continuing, and the resident      |
| inspectors will be kept apprised."                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspectors.                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+