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Event Notification Report for February 11, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           02/10/2000 - 02/11/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36676  36678  36679  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36676       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY            REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/09/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:50[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/08/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:09[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CHRISTOPHER HYNES            |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/10/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NINF                     INFORMATION ONLY       |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       93       Power Operation  |93       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INFORMATION CALL REGARDING RIVER WATER PUMP PROBLEMS                         |
|                                                                              |
| "This report is being made to provide preliminary notification of an event   |
| that is currently under investigation at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit    |
| No. 1 (BVPS-1).                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "River Water Pump WR-P-1B at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 tripped on   |
| overcurrent shortly after it was attempted to be started at 1209 on          |
| 02/08/2000. The Action Statement for Technical Specification 3/4.7.4.1 was   |
| entered for less than two River Water subsystems being operable. River Water |
| Pump WR-P-1C (swing pump) was then aligned to the 'B' train header and it    |
| also tripped on overcurrent shortly after it was started at 1716 on          |
| 02/08/2000.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Preliminary information identified that the 1B and 1C River Water Pumps     |
| would not operate due to the loss of gap between the pumps rotating assembly |
| and the pump bowl. Investigation into the cause of the loss of the pumps'    |
| gap is ongoing.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "BVPS-1 River Water Pump 1A on the 'A' train continues to operate            |
| satisfactorily and is operable. The 'A' train is being treated as protected  |
| equipment (i.e., no elective work is being done on or near 'A' train         |
| components). The BVPS-1 operating crews have reviewed the procedures         |
| associated with operating the BVPS-1 Auxiliary River Water System in the     |
| Alternate Intake Structure and the use of the cross tie connection with the  |
| diesel driven fire pump."                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the unit entered a 72 hour Technical Specification  |
| Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) at 1209 on 2/8/2000. The NRC resident |
| inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1827 ON 02/10/00 BY DAN MURRAY TO JOLLIFFE * * *             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has identified that the #1B and #1C River Water Pumps would not |
| operate due to the loss of gap between the pump's rotating assembly and the  |
| pump bowl.  This event is believed to have been initiated by a temporary     |
| operating procedure that started on 02/05/00 for maintenance on the          |
| non-safety related filtered water system.  This procedure altered the        |
| filtered water system configuration which was the normal supply to the River |
| Water Pumps' seal water system.  One effect of this change was an increase   |
| in the seal water temperature at times as much as 30 degrees above its       |
| previous temperature which had been near the current river water             |
| temperature.  This temperature increase adversely affects a pump in the      |
| standby configuration whereby thermal expansion of the pump's rotating       |
| assembly causes a loss of clearance.  River Water Pump #WR-P-1A has remained |
| operating satisfactorily throughout this event.  The identified increased    |
| seal water temperature condition would not adversely affect an operating     |
| pump.  Administrative controls have been implemented to require only the use |
| of seal water supply sources with temperatures at or near the current river  |
| water temperature for the River Water Pumps.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| This condition is being reported to the NRC pursuant to                      |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) as a condition that is outside the design basis of   |
| the plant because of the potential for one train of the two-train safety     |
| related River Water System (required to be operable per Technical            |
| Specification 3/4.7.4.1) to have been incapable of performing its design     |
| safety function for an extended period of time during operation.             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to revise the test procedure, perform the tech spec       |
| surveillance test using the safety related seal water supply source, and     |
| exit the tech spec action statement.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Harold Gray.                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36678       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WOLF CREEK               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/10/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  KS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:11[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        02/10/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:14[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TERRY DAMASHEK               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/10/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LINDA HOWELL         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF A 120-GALLON CONTAINMENT SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK LEVEL DEVIATION    |
|                                                                              |
| During review of calculations and calibration methods for the containment    |
| spray additive tank level indicator, it was determined that actual spray     |
| additive tank level was approximately 120 gallons below the technical        |
| specification required volume.  Technical Specification Limiting Condition   |
| for Operation (LCO) 3.6.7 had been entered earlier in the day due to planned |
| maintenance, and efforts to restore spray additive tank level minimum volume |
| are underway.  The impact of the 120-gallon level deviation is being further |
| evaluated at this time to determine the impact on the plant design basis.    |
| The licensee expects to be able to resolve this issue prior to expiration of |
| the 72-hour LCO.                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36679       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/11/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:59[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/10/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:50[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BROWN                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/11/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MARK LESSER          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE LICENSEE SUBMITTED A 24 HOUR OPERATING LICENSE DEVIATION REPORT.         |
|                                                                              |
| While performing the Penetration Seal Firestop Configuration verification    |
| project, engineering determined that 37 firestop penetrations are not        |
| configured in accordance with existing approved details.  Therefore, these   |
| 37 penetrations are not operable, putting the plant in a LCO action          |
| statement.  Remedial action has been taken per Selected License Commitment   |
| 16.9-5 Fire Barrier Penetrations, this action establishes hourly fire        |
| watches on each affected penetrations.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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