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Event Notification Report for January 31, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           01/28/2000 - 01/31/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36552  36625  36638  36639  36640  36641  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36552       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/30/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:45[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        12/30/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        11:30[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/28/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ERIC WALKER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i)     ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NOTE:  THIS EVENT IS A CONTINUATION OF EVENT #35790.  (Refer the event       |
| #36018 and event #36605 for similar events at Portsmouth.)                   |
|                                                                              |
| At 1130 CST on 12/30/99, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified   |
| that during walkdowns of the high pressure fire water (HPFW) system in       |
| C-337, a total of thirteen corroded sprinkler heads were discovered in       |
| System B-2.  The system was declared inoperable, and actions were taken as   |
| required by the technical safety requirement (TSR).  The PSS determined that |
| an update to this event report is required.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah        |
| personnel.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2233 EST ON 1/12/00 FROM ERIC WALKER TO S. SANDIN * * *      |
|                                                                              |
| At 0910 CST on 1/12/00 the PSS was notified that during walk downs of the    |
| HPFW systems in C-337, two adjacent corroded heads were discovered on system |
| B-10.  Per Engineering Notice C-822-99-047, Rev. 2, the criteria necessary   |
| for system operability was not being met.  The system was declared           |
| inoperable, and actions were taken as required by the TSR.  The PSS          |
| determined that an update to this event report is required.                  |
|                                                                              |
| It has been determined that this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) |
| as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as           |
| designed.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah        |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Clayton) and NMSS  |
| EO (Haughney).                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| ***  UPDATE ON 1/21/00 @ 2306 FROM UNDERWOOD TO GOULD  ***                   |
|                                                                              |
| At 1100 CST on 1/21/00, the PSS was notified that during walk downs of the   |
| HPFW systems in C-337, thirteen corroded heads were discovered on system     |
| D-3.  This system was previously inspected on 6/24/99.   In addition, at     |
| 1640 CST on 1/21/00, the PSS was notified that during walk downs of the HPFW |
| systems in C-331, three adjacent corroded heads were discovered on system    |
| 12.  This system was previously inspected by Fire Services personnel on      |
| 4/10/99.  Per Engineering Notice C-822-99-047, Rev. 2, the criteria          |
| necessary for system operability was not being met.  The systems were        |
| declared inoperable and actions were taken as required by the TSR.  The PSS  |
| determined that an update to this event report is required.                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah        |
| personnel.  The R3DO (Hills) was notified by the NRC operations officer.     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1549 ON 1/27/00 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| At 1500 [CST] on 1/26/00, the PSS was notified that during walk downs of the |
| HPFW systems in C-337, eight corroded heads were discovered on system D-12.  |
| This system was previously inspected on 8/28/99. Per Engineering Notice      |
| C-822-99-047, Rev. 2, the criteria necessary for system operability was not  |
| being met. The systems were declared inoperable, and actions were taken as   |
| required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this event report  |
| is required.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah        |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Phillips).         |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1457 ON 1/28/00 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| At 1820 [CST] on 1/27/00, the PSS was notified that during walk downs of the |
| HPFW systems in C-333, twenty-nine corroded heads were discovered on system  |
| B-1. This system was previously inspected on 8/22/99. Per Engineering Notice |
| C-822-99-047, Rev. 2, the criteria necessary for system operability was not  |
| being met. The system was declared inoperable, and actions were taken as     |
| required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this event report  |
| is required.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah        |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Phillips).         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36625       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/26/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:42[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        01/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:48[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  FRANK GORLEY                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/30/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CAUDLE JULIAN        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |WILLIAM BATEMAN      NRR     |
|ACCS 50.72(b)(1)(iv)     ECCS INJECTION         |FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON LOW REACTOR VESSEL WATER    |
| LEVEL DUE TO A FEEDWATER (FW) CONTROL FAILURE.                               |
|                                                                              |
| AT APPROXIMATELY 0648 EST ON 1/26/2000, CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS RESPONDED TO  |
| A FEEDWATER CONTROL FAILURE ALARM.  WHILE INVESTIGATING, FEEDWATER PUMP      |
| SPEED DECREASED CAUSING REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL (RVWL) TO DROP FROM ITS   |
| NORMAL OPERATING LEVEL OF 37.5" TO APPROXIMATELY -45".  AT 0", AN AUTOMATIC  |
| REACTOR SCRAM AND GROUP 2 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS FEATURES (ESF) ACTUATION     |
| OCCURRED, AS EXPECTED.  ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED.  AT -38", BOTH THE  |
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING    |
| (RCIC) SYSTEM RECEIVED A START SIGNAL.  HPCI INJECTED UNTIL THE HPCI PUMP    |
| TRIPPED AT ITS RVWL SETPOINT OF 51.5".  THE FW PUMPS TRIPPED AT 58" WITH     |
| RVWL SWELL CAUSING LEVEL TO REACH 100".  FOLLOWING THE LEVEL TRANSIENT,      |
| OPERATORS HAD DIFFICULTY IN ESTABLISHING THE LOW-LOW SET RANGE FOR PRESSURE  |
| CONTROL.  NORMALLY, ONE OF THE FOUR SAFETY RELIEF VALVES (SRV) USED FOR      |
| PRESSURE CONTROL (i.e.,  THE "H," "A," "G," OR "C" SRV) IS OPENED            |
| ELECTRICALLY FROM THE CONTROL ROOM WHICH THEN ESTABLISHES THE LOWER PRESSURE |
| CONTROL.  TEN OF THE ELEVEN SRVs FAILED TO OPEN IN RESPONSE TO CONTROL ROOM  |
| SWITCH POSITIONING.  THE LAST SRV ATTEMPTED (THE "B" SRV) OPENED.  UNIT 1 IS |
| CURRENTLY STABLE IN HOT SHUTDOWN REJECTING DECAY HEAT TO THE TORUS WITH BOTH |
| TRAINS OF SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING IN SERVICE.  EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY TO      |
| RESTORE THE MAIN CONDENSER AS A HEAT SINK.  THE LICENSEE INTENDS TO COOL     |
| DOWN UNIT 1 TO INVESTIGATE AND RESOLVE THE PROBLEM WITH THE SRVs.  THERE IS  |
| NO INDICATION THAT THE SRV MECHANICAL SAFETY OR  AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION  |
| SYSTEM FUNCTION IS IMPAIRED AT THIS TIME.  DURING THE TRANSIENT, REACTOR     |
| COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE DECREASED FROM THEIR NORMAL AT |
| POWER VALUES OF 532�F AND 1035 PSIG TO AN OBSERVED MINIMUM OF 480�F AND 871  |
| PSIG.  BOTH ARE CURRENTLY  AT 510�F AND 977 PSIG.  THERE IS NO INDICATION    |
| THAT THE 100�F/HOUR COOLDOWN RATE WAS EXCEEDED.                              |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
|                                                                              |
| ******************* UPDATE AT 0138 ON 01/30/00 FROM BRUCE BUTLER TO LEIGH    |
| TROCINE *******************                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "Upon subsequent investigation, the event review team determined that the    |
| cause of the low level condition that resulted in the Unit 1 reactor scram   |
| was the inadvertent closure of feedwater valve 1N21-F005B.  This valve is    |
| the inlet valve to the 5th-stage feedwater heater.  Closure of the valve     |
| caused a feedwater flow reduction such that the low level scram setpoint was |
| reached.  The valve closure was apparently caused by the spurious contact    |
| closure within the control switch for the valve."                            |
|                                                                              |
| "The plant systems initially appeared to respond automatically as expected   |
| to this transient condition.  Even though the [HPCI] system appeared         |
| initially to trip at its high level setpoint, subsequent review of its       |
| operation revealed that it operated longer than expected, and reactor water  |
| reached a higher level than desired.  Operators isolated the main steam      |
| isolation valves [(MSIV)] in accordance with plant procedures.  The HPCI     |
| system eventually tripped, and reactor water level appeared to stop          |
| increasing before reaching the main steam lines.  A more detailed review of  |
| the event using the plant's safety parameter display system (SPDS) revealed  |
| that reactor water level increased to the point that water apparently        |
| reached the bottom of the main steam lines with some water entering the      |
| lines."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Operators proceeded to control reactor pressure using the main [SRV] system |
| manually and in the low-low set mode of operation.  Normally one (1) of the  |
| four (4) SRVs used for pressure control is opened manually from the main     |
| control room, which then initiates automatic pressure control using the SRVs |
| in the low-low set mode.  An operator attempted to manually open nine (9) of |
| the eleven (11) SRVs but did not receive direct indication that any of these |
| SRVs opened.  When a tenth SRV was opened, the operator received direct      |
| indication that the SRV opened."                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "During subsequent investigation, the event review team has preliminarily    |
| determined that apparently enough water entered the main steam lines to      |
| flood the SRVs.  With the MSIVs closed, engineers calculated that a total of |
| approximately 4,100 gallons of water would be necessary to flood the SRVs.   |
| The amount of water necessary to flood the SRVs differs with each steam      |
| line, but it would only require an entry of approximately 860 to 1,060       |
| gallons to flood the affected SRVs.  A review of the data indicated that the |
| flooded SRVs, although flooded, apparently opened upon demand by the         |
| operator.  This is based upon a significant and rapid increase in the        |
| tailpipe temperature for the SRVs that were given an 'open' signal.  Since   |
| the medium passing through the SRV was two-phase, the tailpipe pressure      |
| switches that provide positive direct indication that the SRV opened, and    |
| initiate the low-low set logic, did not actuate on nine of the SRVs.  This   |
| led the operator to believe that those SRVs had not opened.  When the        |
| operator gave the 'B' SRV an 'open' signal, enough of the water had been     |
| displaced to allow the tailpipe pressure switch to react normally.  This     |
| resulted in the operator seeing direct indication that the 'B' SRV opened    |
| and actuation of low-low set logic.  The operation of the SRVs with a        |
| two-phase medium was confirmed by an engineer from General Electric with     |
| extensive experience in SRV design and operation."                           |
|                                                                              |
| "The plant is currently in Cold Shutdown.  As a conservative measure all     |
| eleven SRV topworks and solenoids were removed and replaced.  Initially,     |
| five (5) topworks and four (4) solenoids were sent to Wyle labs.             |
| Preliminary results of testing performed at Wyle labs indicated [that] these |
| five topworks and four solenoids functioned normally.  The remainder of the  |
| solenoids is being checked by Target Rock technicians at the plant.          |
| Appropriate walkdowns of plant systems are being conducted, and followup is  |
| occurring for equipment items that require resolution prior to startup."     |
|                                                                              |
| "Plant management [plans to] review and evaluate the event in its entirety   |
| and the response of plant systems before granting permission for restart of  |
| the unit."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operation officer |
| notified the R2DO (Julian), NRR EO (Matthews), and IRO (Congel.)             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36638       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/28/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:14[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3                    |EVENT DATE:        01/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        02:40[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DARYL CLARK                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/28/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MONTE PHILLIPS       R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE DURING CORE ALTERATIONS.         |
|                                                                              |
| "On 1/28/00 at 0005 hrs, the U-2 Emergency Diesel Generator was found to be  |
| inoperable due to the diesel generator room vent fan selector switch being   |
| selected to the alternate feed.  The 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator was      |
| inoperable due to Division I electrical system refuel outage work. Core      |
| alterations were in progress.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Per Tech Spec 3.9.B, one diesel generator must be operable in Mode 5 and    |
| when handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment.                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The switch was aligned to the normal position, and vent fan operation was   |
| verified within approximately 15 minutes to restore the U-2 diesel generator |
| to an operable status.  An internal investigation is commencing. Although    |
| both the 1/2 and U-2 EDGs were inoperable, both diesels remained available   |
| for operation.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "This event is being reported as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D), an    |
| event which alone could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function  |
| needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36639       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/28/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:25[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        01/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:31[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  QUENTIN HICKS                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/28/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN ROGGE           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO WILDLIFE KILL                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the New York Department of Environmental Conservation  |
| and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service regarding the death of 101 blue       |
| billed ducks. The ducks were discovered after the circulating water system   |
| was realigned from reverse flow to normal flow. The NRC resident inspector   |
| will be informed of this event by the licensee.                              |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36640       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS           REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/29/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:45[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        01/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GETZ                         |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/31/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN ROGGE           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ECCS VENT SYSTEM FAILED SURVEILLANCE DUE TO PROBLEMS WITH THE CHARCOAL       |
| FILTERS.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| UPON THE COMPLETION OF MAINTENANCE PERFORMED ON THE "11" AND "12" ECCS PUMP  |
| ROOM VENT FANS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE CHARCOAL FILTERS DID NOT SEAT     |
| PROPERLY DURING A CHARCOAL TEST (STPM-547-1) RESULTING IN THE TEST CRITERIA  |
| NOT BEING MET.  SEVERAL LOOSE NUTS WERE DISCOVERED ON THE CHARCOAL TRAY      |
| HOLD-DOWN FASTENERS.  THE NUTS WERE TIGHTENED, AND THE SURVEILLANCE WAS      |
| PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY.  THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING WHY THE NUTS WERE   |
| LOOSE SINCE THE FILTERS WERE NOT INVOLVED IN MAINTENANCE PERFORMED.          |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.                     |
|                                                                              |
| *************** UPDATE AT 0335 ON 01/31/00 FROM LEO GREGORY GETZ TO LEIGH    |
| TROCINE ***************                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee called to change its internal event report number and to        |
| provide the following updated information.  In an effort to check for a      |
| common mode problem, the licensee checked the Unit 2 charcoal filters on     |
| 01/29/00.  They all tested satisfactorily.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations        |
| officer notified the R1DO (Rogge).                                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36641       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/29/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:20[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        01/29/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:40[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ANDY DISMUKE                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/29/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CAUDLE JULIAN        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| BLOWN FUSE CAUSES VALVES TO REPOSITION.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| A short circuit in a relay coil caused a blown fuse and resulted in the      |
| following actuations: the main condenser mechanical vacuum pump tripped,     |
| turbine steam packing exhausters received a trip signal (they were not       |
| running at the time), partial primary containment isolation system (PCIS)    |
| Group 2 isolation (outboard valves), and a partial PCIS Group 1 isolation    |
| (outboard main steam line drain and reactor water sample valves). The        |
| licensee reported that all actuations were expected for this condition.      |
|                                                                              |
| The faulty relay has been electrically isolated for repair, and the blown    |
| fuse was replaced.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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