Event Notification Report for January 31, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/28/2000 - 01/31/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36552 36625 36638 36639 36640 36641
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36552 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/30/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:45[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/30/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 11:30[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/28/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC WALKER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i) ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NOTE: THIS EVENT IS A CONTINUATION OF EVENT #35790. (Refer the event |
| #36018 and event #36605 for similar events at Portsmouth.) |
| |
| At 1130 CST on 12/30/99, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified |
| that during walkdowns of the high pressure fire water (HPFW) system in |
| C-337, a total of thirteen corroded sprinkler heads were discovered in |
| System B-2. The system was declared inoperable, and actions were taken as |
| required by the technical safety requirement (TSR). The PSS determined that |
| an update to this event report is required. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah |
| personnel. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2233 EST ON 1/12/00 FROM ERIC WALKER TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| At 0910 CST on 1/12/00 the PSS was notified that during walk downs of the |
| HPFW systems in C-337, two adjacent corroded heads were discovered on system |
| B-10. Per Engineering Notice C-822-99-047, Rev. 2, the criteria necessary |
| for system operability was not being met. The system was declared |
| inoperable, and actions were taken as required by the TSR. The PSS |
| determined that an update to this event report is required. |
| |
| It has been determined that this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) |
| as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as |
| designed. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Clayton) and NMSS |
| EO (Haughney). |
| |
| *** UPDATE ON 1/21/00 @ 2306 FROM UNDERWOOD TO GOULD *** |
| |
| At 1100 CST on 1/21/00, the PSS was notified that during walk downs of the |
| HPFW systems in C-337, thirteen corroded heads were discovered on system |
| D-3. This system was previously inspected on 6/24/99. In addition, at |
| 1640 CST on 1/21/00, the PSS was notified that during walk downs of the HPFW |
| systems in C-331, three adjacent corroded heads were discovered on system |
| 12. This system was previously inspected by Fire Services personnel on |
| 4/10/99. Per Engineering Notice C-822-99-047, Rev. 2, the criteria |
| necessary for system operability was not being met. The systems were |
| declared inoperable and actions were taken as required by the TSR. The PSS |
| determined that an update to this event report is required. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah |
| personnel. The R3DO (Hills) was notified by the NRC operations officer. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1549 ON 1/27/00 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| At 1500 [CST] on 1/26/00, the PSS was notified that during walk downs of the |
| HPFW systems in C-337, eight corroded heads were discovered on system D-12. |
| This system was previously inspected on 8/28/99. Per Engineering Notice |
| C-822-99-047, Rev. 2, the criteria necessary for system operability was not |
| being met. The systems were declared inoperable, and actions were taken as |
| required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this event report |
| is required. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Phillips). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1457 ON 1/28/00 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| At 1820 [CST] on 1/27/00, the PSS was notified that during walk downs of the |
| HPFW systems in C-333, twenty-nine corroded heads were discovered on system |
| B-1. This system was previously inspected on 8/22/99. Per Engineering Notice |
| C-822-99-047, Rev. 2, the criteria necessary for system operability was not |
| being met. The system was declared inoperable, and actions were taken as |
| required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this event report |
| is required. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Phillips). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36625 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/26/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:42[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 01/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 06:48[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: FRANK GORLEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/30/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CAUDLE JULIAN R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |WILLIAM BATEMAN NRR |
|ACCS 50.72(b)(1)(iv) ECCS INJECTION |FRANK CONGEL IRO |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON LOW REACTOR VESSEL WATER |
| LEVEL DUE TO A FEEDWATER (FW) CONTROL FAILURE. |
| |
| AT APPROXIMATELY 0648 EST ON 1/26/2000, CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS RESPONDED TO |
| A FEEDWATER CONTROL FAILURE ALARM. WHILE INVESTIGATING, FEEDWATER PUMP |
| SPEED DECREASED CAUSING REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL (RVWL) TO DROP FROM ITS |
| NORMAL OPERATING LEVEL OF 37.5" TO APPROXIMATELY -45". AT 0", AN AUTOMATIC |
| REACTOR SCRAM AND GROUP 2 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS FEATURES (ESF) ACTUATION |
| OCCURRED, AS EXPECTED. ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED. AT -38", BOTH THE |
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING |
| (RCIC) SYSTEM RECEIVED A START SIGNAL. HPCI INJECTED UNTIL THE HPCI PUMP |
| TRIPPED AT ITS RVWL SETPOINT OF 51.5". THE FW PUMPS TRIPPED AT 58" WITH |
| RVWL SWELL CAUSING LEVEL TO REACH 100". FOLLOWING THE LEVEL TRANSIENT, |
| OPERATORS HAD DIFFICULTY IN ESTABLISHING THE LOW-LOW SET RANGE FOR PRESSURE |
| CONTROL. NORMALLY, ONE OF THE FOUR SAFETY RELIEF VALVES (SRV) USED FOR |
| PRESSURE CONTROL (i.e., THE "H," "A," "G," OR "C" SRV) IS OPENED |
| ELECTRICALLY FROM THE CONTROL ROOM WHICH THEN ESTABLISHES THE LOWER PRESSURE |
| CONTROL. TEN OF THE ELEVEN SRVs FAILED TO OPEN IN RESPONSE TO CONTROL ROOM |
| SWITCH POSITIONING. THE LAST SRV ATTEMPTED (THE "B" SRV) OPENED. UNIT 1 IS |
| CURRENTLY STABLE IN HOT SHUTDOWN REJECTING DECAY HEAT TO THE TORUS WITH BOTH |
| TRAINS OF SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING IN SERVICE. EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY TO |
| RESTORE THE MAIN CONDENSER AS A HEAT SINK. THE LICENSEE INTENDS TO COOL |
| DOWN UNIT 1 TO INVESTIGATE AND RESOLVE THE PROBLEM WITH THE SRVs. THERE IS |
| NO INDICATION THAT THE SRV MECHANICAL SAFETY OR AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION |
| SYSTEM FUNCTION IS IMPAIRED AT THIS TIME. DURING THE TRANSIENT, REACTOR |
| COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE DECREASED FROM THEIR NORMAL AT |
| POWER VALUES OF 532�F AND 1035 PSIG TO AN OBSERVED MINIMUM OF 480�F AND 871 |
| PSIG. BOTH ARE CURRENTLY AT 510�F AND 977 PSIG. THERE IS NO INDICATION |
| THAT THE 100�F/HOUR COOLDOWN RATE WAS EXCEEDED. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
| |
| ******************* UPDATE AT 0138 ON 01/30/00 FROM BRUCE BUTLER TO LEIGH |
| TROCINE ******************* |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "Upon subsequent investigation, the event review team determined that the |
| cause of the low level condition that resulted in the Unit 1 reactor scram |
| was the inadvertent closure of feedwater valve 1N21-F005B. This valve is |
| the inlet valve to the 5th-stage feedwater heater. Closure of the valve |
| caused a feedwater flow reduction such that the low level scram setpoint was |
| reached. The valve closure was apparently caused by the spurious contact |
| closure within the control switch for the valve." |
| |
| "The plant systems initially appeared to respond automatically as expected |
| to this transient condition. Even though the [HPCI] system appeared |
| initially to trip at its high level setpoint, subsequent review of its |
| operation revealed that it operated longer than expected, and reactor water |
| reached a higher level than desired. Operators isolated the main steam |
| isolation valves [(MSIV)] in accordance with plant procedures. The HPCI |
| system eventually tripped, and reactor water level appeared to stop |
| increasing before reaching the main steam lines. A more detailed review of |
| the event using the plant's safety parameter display system (SPDS) revealed |
| that reactor water level increased to the point that water apparently |
| reached the bottom of the main steam lines with some water entering the |
| lines." |
| |
| "Operators proceeded to control reactor pressure using the main [SRV] system |
| manually and in the low-low set mode of operation. Normally one (1) of the |
| four (4) SRVs used for pressure control is opened manually from the main |
| control room, which then initiates automatic pressure control using the SRVs |
| in the low-low set mode. An operator attempted to manually open nine (9) of |
| the eleven (11) SRVs but did not receive direct indication that any of these |
| SRVs opened. When a tenth SRV was opened, the operator received direct |
| indication that the SRV opened." |
| |
| "During subsequent investigation, the event review team has preliminarily |
| determined that apparently enough water entered the main steam lines to |
| flood the SRVs. With the MSIVs closed, engineers calculated that a total of |
| approximately 4,100 gallons of water would be necessary to flood the SRVs. |
| The amount of water necessary to flood the SRVs differs with each steam |
| line, but it would only require an entry of approximately 860 to 1,060 |
| gallons to flood the affected SRVs. A review of the data indicated that the |
| flooded SRVs, although flooded, apparently opened upon demand by the |
| operator. This is based upon a significant and rapid increase in the |
| tailpipe temperature for the SRVs that were given an 'open' signal. Since |
| the medium passing through the SRV was two-phase, the tailpipe pressure |
| switches that provide positive direct indication that the SRV opened, and |
| initiate the low-low set logic, did not actuate on nine of the SRVs. This |
| led the operator to believe that those SRVs had not opened. When the |
| operator gave the 'B' SRV an 'open' signal, enough of the water had been |
| displaced to allow the tailpipe pressure switch to react normally. This |
| resulted in the operator seeing direct indication that the 'B' SRV opened |
| and actuation of low-low set logic. The operation of the SRVs with a |
| two-phase medium was confirmed by an engineer from General Electric with |
| extensive experience in SRV design and operation." |
| |
| "The plant is currently in Cold Shutdown. As a conservative measure all |
| eleven SRV topworks and solenoids were removed and replaced. Initially, |
| five (5) topworks and four (4) solenoids were sent to Wyle labs. |
| Preliminary results of testing performed at Wyle labs indicated [that] these |
| five topworks and four solenoids functioned normally. The remainder of the |
| solenoids is being checked by Target Rock technicians at the plant. |
| Appropriate walkdowns of plant systems are being conducted, and followup is |
| occurring for equipment items that require resolution prior to startup." |
| |
| "Plant management [plans to] review and evaluate the event in its entirety |
| and the response of plant systems before granting permission for restart of |
| the unit." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operation officer |
| notified the R2DO (Julian), NRR EO (Matthews), and IRO (Congel.) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36638 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/28/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:14[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 01/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:40[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DARYL CLARK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/28/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE DURING CORE ALTERATIONS. |
| |
| "On 1/28/00 at 0005 hrs, the U-2 Emergency Diesel Generator was found to be |
| inoperable due to the diesel generator room vent fan selector switch being |
| selected to the alternate feed. The 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator was |
| inoperable due to Division I electrical system refuel outage work. Core |
| alterations were in progress. |
| |
| "Per Tech Spec 3.9.B, one diesel generator must be operable in Mode 5 and |
| when handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment. |
| |
| "The switch was aligned to the normal position, and vent fan operation was |
| verified within approximately 15 minutes to restore the U-2 diesel generator |
| to an operable status. An internal investigation is commencing. Although |
| both the 1/2 and U-2 EDGs were inoperable, both diesels remained available |
| for operation. |
| |
| "This event is being reported as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D), an |
| event which alone could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function |
| needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36639 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/28/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:25[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 01/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:31[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: QUENTIN HICKS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/28/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN ROGGE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO WILDLIFE KILL |
| |
| The licensee notified the New York Department of Environmental Conservation |
| and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service regarding the death of 101 blue |
| billed ducks. The ducks were discovered after the circulating water system |
| was realigned from reverse flow to normal flow. The NRC resident inspector |
| will be informed of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36640 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/29/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:45[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 01/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GETZ |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/31/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN ROGGE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ECCS VENT SYSTEM FAILED SURVEILLANCE DUE TO PROBLEMS WITH THE CHARCOAL |
| FILTERS. |
| |
| UPON THE COMPLETION OF MAINTENANCE PERFORMED ON THE "11" AND "12" ECCS PUMP |
| ROOM VENT FANS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE CHARCOAL FILTERS DID NOT SEAT |
| PROPERLY DURING A CHARCOAL TEST (STPM-547-1) RESULTING IN THE TEST CRITERIA |
| NOT BEING MET. SEVERAL LOOSE NUTS WERE DISCOVERED ON THE CHARCOAL TRAY |
| HOLD-DOWN FASTENERS. THE NUTS WERE TIGHTENED, AND THE SURVEILLANCE WAS |
| PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY. THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING WHY THE NUTS WERE |
| LOOSE SINCE THE FILTERS WERE NOT INVOLVED IN MAINTENANCE PERFORMED. |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE. |
| |
| *************** UPDATE AT 0335 ON 01/31/00 FROM LEO GREGORY GETZ TO LEIGH |
| TROCINE *************** |
| |
| The licensee called to change its internal event report number and to |
| provide the following updated information. In an effort to check for a |
| common mode problem, the licensee checked the Unit 2 charcoal filters on |
| 01/29/00. They all tested satisfactorily. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R1DO (Rogge). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36641 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/29/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:20[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 01/29/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:40[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ANDY DISMUKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/29/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CAUDLE JULIAN R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| BLOWN FUSE CAUSES VALVES TO REPOSITION. |
| |
| A short circuit in a relay coil caused a blown fuse and resulted in the |
| following actuations: the main condenser mechanical vacuum pump tripped, |
| turbine steam packing exhausters received a trip signal (they were not |
| running at the time), partial primary containment isolation system (PCIS) |
| Group 2 isolation (outboard valves), and a partial PCIS Group 1 isolation |
| (outboard main steam line drain and reactor water sample valves). The |
| licensee reported that all actuations were expected for this condition. |
| |
| The faulty relay has been electrically isolated for repair, and the blown |
| fuse was replaced. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021